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PREFACE v
In writing this thesis, my purpose is to show how the Democratic 
Action Party (D.A.P.), a political party based on ideology and non-communal 
in approach, pursues its constitutional struggle in an environment of commu­
nal politics with all its inherent and contrived difficulties, the most se­
rious being racial polarization. Although what I have written may appear 
partisan to the "seasoned" and experienced observer of contemporary Malay­
sian politics, my intention nevertheless, is to assess and gauge the percep­
tion the average Malaysian Chinese, particularly the younger generation, has 
on the D.A.P. vis-a-vis the National Front (N.F.) government in post-1969 
Malaysian politics. My only disappointment is the inability to contact cer­
tain D.A.P. leaders, who, for reasons best known to themselves, have not 
even once replied to the repeated requests by my supervisor and I for pri­
mary material and other relevant information about the party which would im­
prove the quality of my thesis. Guarantees by us that whatever information 
received would be used strictly and solely for academic purposes were also 
unheeded.
I wish to express my gratitude and thanks to the following in making 
the writing of this thesis possible:
Dr. J.A.A. Stockwin of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Arts, 
School of General Studies, Australian National University, Canberra, for his 
encouraging reply to my enquiries regarding research opportunities on Malay­
sian politics in his department; my supervisor, Mr. I.F.H. Wilson, also of 
the same department, whose unstinting guidance and helpful criticisms have 
been most invaluable; Professor J.A.C. Mackie of the Department of Political 
and Social Change, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National 
University, for the many useful hints and suggestions in the course of my 
discussions with him; my wife, Chui Lian, for her patience and understanding;
and last, but by no means least, the Australian National University for 
granting me this M.A. Research Scholarship.
vi
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
The Democratic Action Party (D.A.P.) was registered as a politi­
cal party in March 1966, some 7 months after the expulsion of Singapore 
from the Malaysian Federation in August 1965^ It waS made UP from the 
remnants of the People's Action Party (P.A.P.) in Malaya with Devan Nair 
as Secretary-General and Dr. Chen Man Hin as Chairman. Its main purpose 
was to carry on the "Malaysian Malaysia" struggle which the P.A.P. had left 
off in 1965 in the belief that the aspirations of large numbers of Malaysians
of all races for political, social, cultural and economic equality did not
2disappear after the challenge from Singapore had ceased. The D.A.P.'s 
registration was grudgingly allowed by the Alliance government after a 
considerable period of delay, and only after certain Alliance-dictated 
conditions through an amendment in the Societies Registration Act (1966) 
were fulfilled. Among these were the insistence that its original name of 
P.A.P. (Malaya) be changed and its distinction between cadre and ordinary 
members in its ranks be dropped. These conditions reflected the attitude 
of the Alliance to prevent the repetition of the old quarrel between the 
P.A.P. and itself which led to the break with Singapore. They were premised 
on the fact that the Alliance regarded the D.A.P. as the P.A.P.'s extension 
in Malaysia, the manifestations of which were the similarity in objectives 
between the two parties and the leadership of Devan Nair, a prominent Sin­
gaporean with close links to the P.A.P. leadership although he was born in
1. For full details of the D.A.P.'s formation and registration, see Mi­
chael Ong, The D.A.P.: Case for a Malaysian Malaysia Re-stated, M.A. 
Thesis, La Trobe University, 1969* Ch. II.
2. See Central Executive Committee (C.E.C.) Report presented by Dr. Chen 
Man Hin, Chairman, to the First Conference of the D.A.P. held at Seta- 
pak, Kuala Lumpur, on 17th March 1968, Who Lives if Malaysia Dies? 
D.A.P.'s Case for a Multi-racial Society, D.A.P., Petaling Jaya,
1969, pp. 53-63.
2M alay sia . By in s i s t in g  on compliance to  th e se  c o n d itio n s , th e  A llian ce  
in te n d e d  to  ensure th a t  th e  D.A.P. would f in d  i t  extrem ely  d i f f i c u l t  to  
become th e  th r e a t  th e  P .A .P . had been in  M alaysia. The d e c is io n  of th e  
A llia n c e  to  allow  th e  D.A.P. to  fu n c tio n  as a p o l i t i c a l  p a r ty  was due to  th e  
f a c t  th a t  i t  had become s tro n g e r  a f t e r  th e  P .A .P . ch a llen g e . The A llian ce  
f e l t  th a t  w ith  th e  S o c ie tie s  R e g is tr a tio n  Act amended p r io r  to  th e  D .A .P .'s  
r e g i s t r a t i o n ,  i t  could  c o n tro l th e  a c t i v i t i e s  of th e  D.A.P. in  accordance 
to  th e  law w ithout appearing  to  be too d i c t a t o r i a l .  Moreover i t  was keen 
to  show th a t  i t  s tau n ch ly  upheld democracy in  th e  coun try . This was neces­
sa ry  in  view o f th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  D.A.P. had won a s t a t e  b y -e le c tio n  in  
Rahang, N egri Sem bilan, in  December 19&5 wi t h  Dr. Chen c o n te s tin g  as an 
independent w hile  th e  p a r ty  was s t i l l  aw aitin g  re g is tra tio n ." ^  B esides, th e  
D.A.P. had complied w ith  th e  S o c ie tie s  R e g is tr a t io n  A ct(l966) s t ip u la t io n s  
to  change i t s  name and drop i t s  cadre membership req u irem en t.
Once i t  was r e g is te r e d ,  th e  D.A.P. was determ ined to  show th e  
A llia n c e  th a t  even w ithout th e  P .A .P ., i t  could s t i l l  caxry on th e  f ig h t  
fo r  a  "M alaysian M alaysia". I t  contended th a t  even i f  th e  P .A .P . had no t 
e n te red  M alaysia, M alaysians s t i l l  would have fought fo r  th e  same o b je c t iv e s . 
The D .A .P .' s  co n ten tio n  was based on th e  conclusion  of w ell-in fo rm ed  o b ser­
v e rs  th a t  from th e  tim e an independent M alaysia ( th en  Malaya) was considered  
a r e a l i t y ,  th e  fu tu re  and success of such a n a tio n  mu3t be based on m u lti-  
r a c ia l i s m .^  P rev ious a ttem p ts to  b u ild  a u n ite d  M alaysian(M alayan) n a tio n
3» The r e s u l t  was as fo llo w s: Independent (D .A .P .) 3>576; A llian ce
2 ,038; S o c ia l i s t  F ront (S .F .)  1 ,231. Sunday Times, 12th  December 1965«
4* See F.H .H .King, The New Malayan N a tio n , I n s t i t u t e  of P a c if ic  A ffa ir s ,  
New York, 1957, T.H. S ilco ck , Towards a Malayan N atio n , E astern  U niver­
s i t y  P re s s , S ingapore, 1961 and W.L. H olland, Asian N ationalism  and 
th e  W est, MacMillan, New York, 1953»
3along multi-racial principles by the Independence of Malaya Party (i.M.P.) 
under Dato* Onn and the P.A.P. under Lee Kuan Yew had failed because the 
cleavages (e.g. economic, political, linguistic, cultural and religious) 
between the Malays and the non-Malays were both numerous and deep. These 
failures had led to Dato' Onn's political demise and Singapore's expulsion 
from the Malaysian Federation. However, they did not appear to discourage 
the D.A.P. It fervently believed that a multi-racial Malaysia with equality 
for all races was possible and indeed the only alternative to chaos in the 
final analysis, provided a non-communal approach to nation-building was 
taken. Although such an approach was acknowledged as difficult by the D.A.P., 
it nevertheless charged that the Alliance with its brand of communal politics 
- dividing the people into "bumiputras5 *11 (i.e.Malays) and "non-bumiputras"
(i.e.non-Malays) and openly discriminating in favour of the former - was 
deliberately preventing the development of a multi-racial nation. The D.A.P. 
held that the Alliance’3 approach to national unity based on Malay hegemony 
was impracticable in view of the nation's multi-racial demography in which 
no community by itself, formed an absolute majority. It also regarded the 
"quid pro quo" division of political and economic interests between the se­
nior partners of the Alliance, the United Malays National Organisation (U.M. 
N.O.) and the Malayan Chinese Association (M.C.A.) as not representative of
Malay and Chinese interests in general since only the Malay elite and the
5rich Chinese of both parties benefitted. As the eagerly anticipated date of
5. The "quid pro quo" arrangement was a legacy of the British "divide and
rule" colonial policy where the Malays under U.M.N.O. controlled poli­
tical power and the Chinese, led by the M.C.A., were given free play in
the economy. There wa3 a gentleman's agreement, with Tunku Abdul Rah­
man, the former Prime Minister as arbiter, that each was not to encroach 
upon the other's sphere of influence. See R.K.Vasil, The Malayan Gene­
ral Election of 1969« Oxford in Asia Current Affairs, Oxford University
Press, Singapore and Kuala Lumpur, 1972, p.2. Tunku Abdul Rahman has 
always maintained that this was his formula for a "happy Malaysia" and
warned of the dangers of a change in this arrangement. Alex Josey,
Lee Kuan Yew, Donald Moore, Singapore, 1968, p. 103.
4the 1969 general elections approached, the D.A.P. intensified its campaign 
for a "Malaysian Malaysia" in the belief that the Alliance,with its communal 
brand of politics, was actively working towards a Malay Malaysia. In this, 
it went beyond the P.A.P.'s position in defining its own interpretation ot 
"Malaysian Malaysia" in its Election Manifesto! To the Chinese, the D.A.P.’s 
campaign appeared a panacea for all their grievances against the Alliance.
But to the Malays, it was interpreted as a Chinese attempt, similar to Lee 
Kuan Yew's 1964-5 political challenge, to do away with their pre-eminent po­
litical position in the country. The D.A.P.'s campaign reflected the zeal 
of its leadership. Goh Hock Guan, who had taken over the position of Secre­
tary-General from Devan Nair, and Lim Kit Siang, the Organising Secretary, 
were the main strategists of the campaign. They were then comparatively new 
to politics, raw and inexperienced by the standards of veteran politicians 
like Dr. Lim Chong Eu and Devan Nair, and 4-engl to speak on fundamental issues 
like language, culture and education with a marked degree of frankness which 
was likely to provoke Malay anger? Under these circumstances, they were re­
garded as reckless proteges of Lee Kuan Yew by the Alliance. Their style 
reflected the D.A.P.'s purpose to build a strong urban base first and to win 
the support of the Malays later from a position of strength.^ However the May 
1969 racial riots with their aftermath of National Operations Council (N.O.C.) 
rule and the subsequent 1971 Constitutional Amendments banning the public
6. For full details of the D.A.P.'s campaign, see R.K.Vasil(l972), op. cit., 
Ch. Ill and Chin Fook Kiong, An Analysis of the Democratic Action Party 
in the 1969 General Election, Graduation Exercise, University of Malaya. 
1970.
7. For full details, see R.K.Vasil(l972), op. cit., pp. 30-3* Although the 
manifesto's objectives appeared multi-racial, they shrewdly articulated 
the aspirations of the non-Malays, especially in relation to language, 
culture, education and an end to Malay special privileges.
8. See Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy in Malaysia, 
Oxford in Asia Current Affairs, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur
and Singapore, 1971» P» 24*
9. R.K.Vasil(1972), op. cit., p. 22.
5discussion of "sensitive issues" made obsolete the D.A.P.'s pre-1969 
strategy. Its leaders then decided to map out another strategy in the 
light of the changing political situation.
The aim of this dissertation is to examine and evaluate the post- 
1969 strategy of the D.A.P. and its underlying assumptions, and to analyze 
the problems and difficulties that the party encountered. Lim Kit Siang's 
determination and philosophy were the driving force behind this strategy}^ 
He had assumed top position of the Secretary-General of the party following 
the resignation of Goh Hock Guan after the May riots. The D.A.P.'s post- 
1969 strategy involved selecting key issues which flowed from the govern­
ment's policies. The next step was to incessantly harp on these issues to 
highlight whatever adverse effects th§y might have, while carefully avoid 
mentioning their intended advantages. Finally the D.A.P. would offer its 
ovni solutions, which ignoring all the constraints of a multi-racial society 
faced by the government, appeared to be very attractive to those affected. 
The party did not have to worry about the implementation of what may have 
been perceived by the government impracticable solutions, as it was not the 
government. Since the government's post-1969 policies, e.g. the New Econo­
mic Policy (N.E.P.) and the New Education Policy, worked towards the inter­
ests of the Malays, it was inevitable that the overwhelming majority of the 
issues that the D.A.P. stressed concerned the grievances of the non-Malays, 
particularly the Chinese. As these issues, e.g. National Language, special 
privileges,etc., were considered "sensitive" and could not be publicly dis­
cussed as a result of the Constitutional Amendments of 1971, the D.A.P. 
resorted to insinuations in an attempt to air them publicly, though not
10. For full details of Lira Kit oiang's philosophy, see Personality
Profile on Lira Kit Siang, Malaysian Business. December 1Q7Q.pp. 26-31.
6directly. Thi3 was to circumvent prosecution under the Seditions Act. 
However when the issues did not appear to "be sensitive, e.g. the implemen­
tation of the N.E.P.'s objectives, the D.A.P. was more forthright in its 
criticisms, sometimes to the point of exaggeration. The D.A.P.’s post- 
1969 strategy did not significantly depart from its pre-1969 strategy.
The abrasive and combative 3tyle, typical of Lim Kit Siang, was still pre­
sent, the only difference being that sensitive issues were criticised indi­
rectly through nuance. The government, apparently exasperated at what it 
considered to be the D.A.P.’s persistence to stir up non-Malay dissatis­
faction in a subtle way and thus mar its new approach of accommodating and 
developmental politics, attempted to subvert the D.A.P. through prosecution 
of its leaders, undermining its morale and denying it access to the mass- 
media to defend itself. The government was concerned to prevent the Malays 
from joining the D.A.P. in significant numbers as it would compromise 
TJ.M.lI.O.’s cardinal approach to politics, that is, the unity of all Malays 
and the political supremacy of U.M.N.O. Despite these difficulties and 
harrassment, the D.A.P. was determined to carry on with its new strategy 
and appeared willing to pay the heavy price of prosecution. This reflected 
its conviction that ultimately its ideology based on class and economics 
would be accepted by the majority of Malaysians once they realise the folly 
of racial politics as advocated by the government.
The crucial question which concerns everyone, most of all the 
D.A.P. and the government, is,MWhat are the possible effects of the D.A.P.'s 
strategy on race relations and national unity in Malaysia?" This question 
is important in the sense that since 1957» the year Malaysia (then Malaya) 
became independent, both the P.A.P./D.A.P. and the Alliance/National Front 
(N.F.) government acknowledged that national unity in the country had yet
7to be achieved.^ An understanding of the D.A.P.'s post-1969 strategy 
and all its implications would not be complete without an analysis of the 
events immediately following the riots in May 1969 which had a direct or 
indirect impact on the D.A.P.'s strategy. Among these, the important ones 
were the secret merger talks with the M.C.A. and the D.A.P. leadership 
struggle.
11. See interview with Lee Lara Thye regarding the D.A.P.'s charge of the 
non-attainment of national unity by the government, Malaysian 
Business, September 1978» pp.5-15«
CHAPTER II
(a) The D.A.P./fa.C.A. Merger Talks
Between February and April 1971» the D.A.P. held talks on a possi­
ble merger with the M.C.A. The talks concerned a dissolution of the D.A.P. 
whereby its members would join the M.C.A. and other racial components of 
the Alliance as individual members. In return the D.A.P. was to participate 
in the government by having its leaders appointed to certain Ministerial 
and Deputy Ministerial post3 as M.C.A. representatives. The talks broke 
down because the M.C.A. could not accept the D.A.P.'s condition that compo­
nent parties of the Alliance dissolve themselves to form one multi-racial
party with it. The talks were conducted in secrecy, but they were __  -
ment was reconvened in February 1971* Its first task was to pass the Cons­
issues" like special privileges for Malays, the National Language, the 
status of the traditional rulers and citizenship. By an overwhelming majo-
democracy brought about a truncated debating chamber where Members of Par­
liament (M.P.) could not speak freely on sensitive issues. Since these 
issues appeared central to the nation’s problems, from either the Malay or 
non-Malay point of view, the ban imposed on their public discussion, in or 
out of Parliament, severely restricted the appeal of opposition parties
1. For details of this, see R.S.Milne and D.K.Mauzy,Politics and Govern­
ment in Malaysia, Federal Publications, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong 
Kong, 1978, pp. 94-99*
2. The debate on the Bill lasted a week with all the opposition parties, 
except the D.A.P. and the People’s Progressive Party (P.P.P.)} support­
ing the government. Straits Times, 4th March, I97I,
•fradiy leaked out to the press some 3 months later in July 1971*
After some 18 months of emergency rule under the N.O.C., Parlia-
titutional Amendment Bill.'*' It became an offence to question "sensitive
2rity of 126:17, the Bill was passed. Thus the restoration of Parliamentary
9which had made proposals to solve such problems their platform in the 
elections. The D.A.P., which had capitalised most on these sensitive issues 
in the 1969 elections, was severely affected. Contrary to its expectations 
of playing a meaningful role as an aggressive and abrasive opposition party, 
it found that its pre-1969 style was restricted and much of its appeal lost. 
There was ±0 be no return to the status quo ante where it could speak free­
ly on sensitive issues. Hence the D.A.P. found that it became increasingly 
isolated from the mainstream of politics where the trend was towards some 
form of co-operation with the government. The resignations and defections 
of D.A.P. members and elected representatives which had begun after the 
riots (and which the D.A.P. had grounds to believe were induced by the 
government) continued with the ex-members usually maintaining that the par­
ty had no future in the country.^ To further restrict the D.A.P., the 
government prosecuted some of its leaders. The M.P. for Kampar and Editor 
of the party’s journal, "The Rocket", Fan Yew Teng, was charged with sedi­
tion in printing the speech of a D.A.P. leader in Penang in the December 
1970 issue of the journal.^ The speech to commemorate the release of Lim 
Kit Siang from detention after 18 months under the Internal Security Act 
(i.S.A.)>allegedly criticised the government of favouritism towards the 
Malays. The D.A.P. regarded the sedition charge as an act of government
3. In December 1970» Lee Kuo Ming, a state committee member of the Johore 
D.A.P., maintained that the party had become racialistic and its poli­
cies were harmful to a multi-racial,democratic Malaysia. He defected 
to the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (G.R.M.). For details, see Mohamed 
Noordin Sopiee, "Decline of the D.A.P.: The reasons why....", Straits 
Times, 11th July, 1972.
4. Fan was charged and convicted in 1971* He however appealed success­
fully on the grounds that the trial was a nullity vrith no preliminary 
inquiry. Fan was charged a second time with a preliminary inquiry 
conducted and convicted on 13th January 1975 on the same earlier cha­
rges. Fan’s fine of $2,000 automatically disqualified him as a M.P. 
R.S.Milne and D.K.Mauzy, op. cit., p. 237»
10
p e rse c u tio n  to  undermine i t s  m orale; Fan had been one o f th e  p a r ty ’s most 
v o c ife ro u s  c r i t i c s  a g a in s t th e  government du rin g  th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s .
Meanwhile the M.C.A. was tak ing a se r io u s  look at re o rg a n iz in g
i t s e l f .  Follow ing i t s  d is a s tro u s  setback  in  th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  i t
5
had f i r s t  opted out o f th e  government, bu t l a t e r  re jo in e d  i t .  The M.C.A.’s
reorganization  was prompted by Tun Ism a il’s speech which stressed  stron g ly
th at U.M.N.O. would not work with the M.C.A. and the Malayan Indien Congg-
r e s s  (M .I.C .) i f  th ey  continued  to  be " n e i th e r  dead nor a l iv e " .  Although
Tun Tan Siew S in , th e  then  M.C.A. P re s id e n t, i n i t i a l l y  had. re a c te d  a n g r i ly ,
th e  M.C.A. took Tun I s m a il’s adv ice s e r io u s ly .  The Chinese U nity Movement
under the in i t ia t iv e  o f some young members headed by Alex Lee, son of fo r -
7
mer Finance M in is te r , Tun H .S.Lee, was in au g u ra ted  in  February 1971* A
5. For f u l l  d e t a i l s ,  3ee Goh Cheng T eik , The May T h ir te e n th  In c id e n t and 
Democracy in  M alaysia , Oxford in  A sia Current A ffa ir s ,  Oxford U niver­
s i t y  P re s s , Kuala Lumpur and S ingapore, 1971» p .2 8 . The M.C.A. had 
decided  to  s ta y  out of th e  government because i t  f e l t  th a t  i t  had lo s t  
th e  support o f th e  Chinese as in d ic a te d  by th e  r e s u l t s  of th e  1969 
g en era l e le c t io n s .  L a te r  when th e  h e a t of th e  May 1969 r a c ia l  r i o t  
subsided , i t  in d ic a te d  i t s  w illin g n e s s  to  re tu rn  to  th e  cab in e t a t  th e  
p e rsu as io n  of th e  Chinese Chambers o f Commerce. See a lso  R .S.M ilne 
and D.K. Mauzy, op, p i t . ,  p . I 75 .
6. S t r a i t s  Times, 18th  January , 1971« O p .c i t . Tun Ism a il, a form er 
M in is te r , had been r e - c a l le d  from re tire m e n t to  s tre n g th en  th e  c ab in e t 
a f t e r  th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s .  His speech seemed to  h in t to  th e  
M.C.A. and M .I.C . th a t  they  must d r a s t i c a l ly  overhaul t h e i r  e n t i r e  
o rg a n isa tio n s  i f  they  in ten d ed  to  con tinue  as U.M.N.O.'s  p a r tn e rs  in  
th e  government. Tun Tan Siew S in 's  angry re p ly  was to  show th a t  th e  
M .C.A.'s  dilemma arose  in  try in g  to  s a t i s f y  th e  le g it im a te  demands of 
th e  Chinese which c o n f l ic te d  w ith  th e  pro-M alay government p o l ic ie s  i t  
had to  uphold as a p a r tn e r  of U.M.N.O. He m ain tained  th a t  th e  M.C.A. 
would only be too  g lad  to  s ta y  out of th e  A llian ce  as i t  would face  
fewer c o n s tr a in ts .  S t r a i t s  Times, 19th  January , 1971»
7. S t r a i t s  Times, 8 th /9 th  F eb ru a ry ,1971» James Morgan, "M alaysia: Con­
fe s s io n a l  V ic to ry " , Far E astern  Economic Review, 20th  February , 1971 
and Alex Lee, "Trends in  P o l i t i c s :  A Mai ay s ian -C h inese  View", P a tr ic k  
Low e d . , Trends in  S ou theast Asia No.2 . , I n s t i t u t e  o f Southeast Asian 
S tu d ie s , S ingapore, Ju ly  1971» PP« 49” 53> "Roundtable D iscussion".op»  
c i t . , pp. 78- 80.
11
committee of 10 was formed to work towards unity within the Chinese commu-
0
nity as a pre-condition for national unity. It was believed that if the 
Chinese were united as a community, they would be in a better position to 
bargain effectively with U.M.N.O. in the Alliance to safeguard Chinese 
interests. The Chinese Unity Movement, though officially not a component 
of the M.C.A., was nevertheless given the party's blessing.
It was in this atmosphere of the D.A.P.'s increasing isolation 
from the mainstream of political developments and the formation of the Chi­
nese Unity Movement that the first moves to effect a possible merger between 
the two parties took place. Although reports conflict as to who actually 
initiated the talks, observers generally gave the benefit of the doubt to
9the D.A.P. This was based on the fact that the leader of the Chinese Un­
ity Movement, Alex Lee, was anxious to secure Chinese unity under whatever 
circumstances. Despite the D.A.P.'s multi-racial objectives, the Chinese 
Unity Movement nevertheless considered it as a Chinese party and its leaders, 
Chinese leaders. Believing that the D.A.P. which commanded substantial 
Chinese support (as indicated by the 1969 general elections results) would 
split the unity of the Chinese if it remained in the opposition, Alex Lee
8. The members of the committee were:
Alex Lee, lawyer.
Sim Mow Yu, President of the Chinese School Teachers Association. 
Dr. Too Chee Cheong.
Dr. Chong Yew Chong.
Lam Kuan Kit, lawyer.
Koo Eng Kuang, businessman.
Chow Seng Yau, prominent in the Merdeka University project. 
Choong Han Leong, businessman.
Teh Wai Boon, rubber dealer.
Wong Wei Keong.
Patrick Low ed., op, cit., p. 99.
9. See James Morgan, "A Case for Legal Dissent", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 31st July, 1971»
12
sent out feelers towards Lim Kit Siang in February 1971» requesting a 
meeting on 7th March, to discuss the possibility of a merger between the 
two parties in the interest of Chinese unity.^ Alex Lee made it very clear 
that he was representing the M.C.A. and the venue of the meeting was to be 
the Royal Commonwealth Society in Kuala Lumpur where Lim Kit Siang would 
meet Tun Tan Siew Sin.^ It was to be a secret meeting. Why the M.C.A. 
approached only Lim Kit Siang and not the other D.A.P. leaders was not clear. 
Perhaps the M.C.A. acknowledged Lim Kit Siang as the undisputed leader of 
the D.A.P. It could also be the M.C.A.’s intention to create dissension 
within the D.A.P. by singling out its leaders in an attempt to buy them over. 
What made Lim Kit Siang turn up at the appointed time without the knowledge 
of his colleagues also seemed unclear. But given his strong commitment to 
the party to the extent that he was prepared to go to jail for it, it may 
be surmised that he intended to find out more about the M.C.A.'s moves be­
fore acting accordingly. Already he was aware that the M.C.A. was inducing 
D.A.P. members and elected representatives to defect. Nothing concrete 
came out of the first merger talks. As they were held in secrecy, one can 
only speculate that Lim Kit Siang rejected the M.C.A.'s offer of a merger 
between the two parties. It was also unclear, what details, if any, of the 
possible merger, had been discussed at the secret meeting.
The next attempt at another secret meeting transpired in mid-April 
during the campaign for the Bekok state constituency by-election in Johore. 
Since Lim Kit Siang proved unamenable, the M.C.A. approached Goh Hock Guan,
10. Alex Lee however claimed that it was the D.A.P. who first sent out 
feelers for a meeting between the two parties. Straits Times, 12th 
July, 1971» Lim Kit Siang's version was that a Chinese newspaper 
reporter arranged for a meeting between him and Tun Tan Siew Sin.
Straits Times, 3rd August, 1971.
Straits Times, 12th July, 1971»
13
the former Secretary-General who resigned, after the riots in May 1969« 
Despite his relegation to one of the Vice-Chairmen of the party, the M.C.A. 
believed that Goh was still a prominent leader of the D.A.P., given his 
part as one of the party's successful strategists in the 1969 general elec­
tions. The M.C.A. hoped that Goh would prove to be more amenable than Lim 
Kit Siang to effect a possible merger between the two parties. Its second 
attempt at persuading the D.A.P. marked its desperation to secure Chinese 
unity at all costs. The Chinese Unity Movement which began with much pub­
licity in February had fizzled out some two months later in April 1971»
The "Old Guards" in the M.C.A. had become highly suspicious that the ini­
tiators of the movement were trying to undermine their power base and thus 
successfully thwarted their efforts at canvassing Chinese support in the
M.C.A. Also prominent leaders of the movement had been charged with sedi- 
12tion. In this context the D.A.P.'s role as an intended substitute for 
the defunct movement appeared important. The D.A.P. was persuaded to con- 
cede a walk-over to the M.C.A. in the Bekok by-election as a prelude to a 
possible merger between the two parties.^ The M.C.A. might have been 
encouraged by the fact that the D.A.P. had withdrawn from the earlier Kapar 
(Selangor) Parliamentary by-election held in April although it had finished 
a close second to the Alliance in the 1969 general elections.^ It had
12. James Morgan,"Without fear or favour", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
24th April, 1971* The leaders concerned were Sim Mow Yu and Koo 
Eng Kuang.
13. Bekok had an electorate of 13»755 voters made up of 2,825 Malays,
8,143 Chinese and 2,771 Indians. The by-election was caused by the 
death of the M.C.A. incumbent.
14» Kapar's electorate of some 25,000 voters comprised 12,000 Malays,
10,000 Chinese and 3»000 Indians. In the 1969 general elections, the 
Alliance (U.M.N.O.) candidate won by a majority of 1,047 over his 
D.A.P. and Parti Islam(P.A.S.) rivals. Straits Times, 12th May, 1969» 
In this by-election, caused by the death of the incumbent M.P., the 
U.M.N.O. candidate beat his P.A.S. rival by a majority of 8,762 in a 
straight fight. Patrick Low ed., bp. cit., p. 93.
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withdrawn from the by-election because it felt that its chances of success 
were virtually nil in an atmosphere of accommodation politics where the 
main issue appeared to be economic development. The 11.C.A. hoped that the 
D.A.P. would withdraw its candidate for the Bekok by-election for the same 
reasons as in the case of the Kapar by-election. Goh's initial reply to the 
M.C.A.'s request was a firm rejection, fully convinced that the D.A.P. would 
beat the M.C.A. in that predominantly Chinese constituency. He was then 
informed by Lee San Choon (the then M.C.A. Youth Deputy Chairman) that Lim 
Kit Siang had already met with Tun Tan Siew Sin earlier, possibly in con­
junction with the M.C.A.'s request for a walk-over and an intended merger
15between the two parties. Goh was brought to see Tun Tan Siew Sin where 
he was given the M.C.A. President's full reasons for wanting to meet him.
Tun Tan stated that if the M.C.A., after having been chided by Tun Ismail 
for being "neither dead nor alive" were to lose the Bekok by-election, its 
already unfavourable position in the Alliance would worsen.1^ He added that 
the position of the disunited Chinese community would be in danger if the 
D.A.P. won the by-election in that predominantly Chinese constituency, for 
U.M.N.O. would interpret this as the Chinese opting for chauvinism. Tun 
Tan rationalised that should this happen, it would trigger off Malay extre­
mism, making the Chinese position even more untenable. The message Tun Tan 
was driving to Goh was that at the prevailing stage of the country's poli­
tical development, the D.A.P. was regarded as an extreme Chinese party by 
U.M.N.O., having the same aims and objectives as the Singapore P.A.P. Tun 
Tan continued that the D.A.P. could not hope to contribute towards national 
unity under these circumstances. He maintained that only the M.C.A. which
15. See Goh's version of the D.A.P./M.C.A. secret merger talks } . Straits 
Times, 12th July, 1971»
16. Ibid.
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was acceptable to U.M.N.O. as a moderate Chinese party, would be able to 
lead the Chinese community out of its dilemma through co-operation with 
U.M.N.O. This could only be effected successfully if the M.C.A. were 
strong. Thu3 if the D.A.P. cared for the country in general and the Chi­
nese in particular, Tun Tan suggested that it should first of all concede 
a walk-over to the M.C.A. in the Bekok by-election and then dissolve itself 
to merge with the M.C.A. Goh appeared (as Lee San Choon was to put it)
convinced of Tun Tan’s sincerity in concerning himself greatly with the
17plight of the Chinese. He however expressed the D.A.P.'s fears that it
would lose its power base, if, after it dissolved itself, the M.C.A. deci-
18ded to play it out. In what way the M.C.A. would deceive the D.A.P. was 
not clearly spelt out by Goh, but it could be surmised that D.A.P. leaders 
were fearful over the prospect of being excluded from power and thus poli­
cy-making within the M.C.A. once they dissolved the party. Obviously the 
D.A.P. demanded as a price from the M.C.A., some share of power with some
of its leaders co-opted into the M.C.A. Central Working Committee (C.W.C.)
19as ä safeguard against any possible arbitrary action by the M.C.A. Hence 
the question of D.A.P. leaders holding Ministerial and Deputy Ministerial 
posts was brought up. The M.C.A. was to state later that the D.A.P. pro­
posed 3 Ministerial and 2 Deputy Ministerial positions in addition to the 
Deputy Presidency * of the M.C.A. for itself. However Tun Tan Siew Sin 
insisted that before the M.C.A. could consider these proposals, the D.A.P.
17. See Lee San Choon’s version of the talks, -Straits Times, 13th July, 1971. 
Goh was to clarify a year later (following the D.A.P. leadership 
struggle in his reply to Kit Siang's charges that he was keen on the 
D.A.P.'s merger with the M.C.A.) that if the country appeared to be
in danger(a3 a result of Chinese disunity), his first duty was to the 
country, and then only the party. Straits Echo, 22nd June, 1972.
18. Straits Times, 13th July, 1971
19. Ibid.
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must f i r s t  o f a l l  s a t i s f y  3 b a s ic  c o n d itio n s : ( l )  D isso lve  i t s e l f  w ith  i t s  
Chinese members jo in in g  th e  M.C.A. as in d iv id u a ls  w hile i t s  non-Chinese 
members would jo in  o th e r  r a c i a l  components o f th e  A llia n c e ; (2) D eclare 
p u b lic ly  th a t  i t  accep ted  th e  M.C.A. and A llian ce  p o l ic ie s ;  ( 3 ) The p ro - 
p o sa ls  would have to  be approved by Tun Razak and th e  M.C.A. C.Vf.C. $y 
s t a t i n g  th e se  cond itions,T un  Tan had ap p a ren tly  p laced  th e  M.C.A. in  a 
s tro n g  b a rg a in in g  p o s i t io n ,  co n tra ry  to  th e  D .A .P .'s  e x p ec ta tio n s  th a t  th e  
M.C.A. would seek i t s  co -o p e ra tio n  a t any p r ic e .  These 3 co n d itio n s  p laced  
th e  D.A.P. in  a v u ln e rab le  p o s i t io n . The f i r s t  would mean th a t  th e  D.A.P. 
v o lu n ta r i ly  s a c r i f i c e  i t s  power base , th e  second would in v o lv e  a b e tra y a l 
of th e  m u l t i - r a c ia l  p r in c ip le s  on which i t  was formed in  1966 and th e  th i r d  
was th a t  th e re  was no guaran tee  th e  D .A .P .'s  p rop o sa ls  could be approved. 
Even i f  a l l  th e  3 co n d itio n s  were met by th e  D .A .P., th e  M.C.A. had s ta te d  
th a t  i t  would only co n sid e r th e  p ro p o sa ls , and c o n s id e ra tio n  need no t neces­
s a r i l y  amount to  f u l l  accep tance . Under th e se  c ircu m stan ces , i t  could be 
surm ised th a t  th e  D.A.P. decided  not to  merge w ith  th e  M.C.A. A m eeting of 
th e  top  D.A.P. le a d e rs  -  Lim K it S iang, Goh Hock Guan, Dr. Chen Man Hin 
and Fan Yew Teng -  took p lace  and sought an honourable way o u t. The D.A.P. 
in  accep tin g  th e  M .C.A.'s  3 co n d itio n s , would suggest a  co u n te r-p ro p o sa l
th a t  a l l  p a r t ie s  concerned should  p u b lic ly  make a d e c la ra t io n  o f m u lti-
21r a c i a l  p r in c ip le s .  Not only  th e  D.A.P. but U.M.N.O. and M.C.A. should 
a lso  d is so lv e  them selves to  form one b ig  m u l t i - r a c ia l  p a r ty .  The D .A .P .'s  
co u n te r-p ro p o sa l must have stemmed from i t s  b e l i e f  th a t  given U.M.N.O.'s  
unchallenged  p o s it io n  in  th e  A llia n c e , i t  would be d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  no t impos­
s ib le ,  to  e x tra c t  fav o u rab le  concessions fo r  th e  C hinese. I t  might a lso
20. See Tun Tan Siew S in 's  p re ss  s ta te m e n t,. . Ma lay  M ail, 11th Ju ly ,
1971.
21. See Goh's account o f th e  t a lk s ,  S t r a i t s  Echo, 22nd June, 1972.
17
have grounds to  b e lie v e  th a t  d e sp ite  Tun T an 's  p ro fessed  s in c e r i ty ,  th e  
o th e r  M.C.A. le a d e rs ,  m ostly  th e  "Old Guards" who s t i l l  h e ld  much in f lu e n c e , 
appeared u n tru s tw o rth y . The fa c t  th a t  th e  M.C.A. a t f i r s t  gave th e  Chinese 
U nity Movement i t s  b le s s in g , and th en  l a t e r  th rough th e  Old Guards, worked 
a g a in s t i t  to  ren d e r i t  in e f f e c t iv e ,  was s u f f ic ie n t  testim ony o f t h i s .
There was a lso  a f e a r  th a t  in  th e  event of co-op ted  D.A.P. le ad e rs  prov ing  
them selves more popu lar th an  th e i r  M.C.A. c o u n te rp a r ts , e f f o r t s  would be 
made to  undermine them. Thus th e  D.A.P. f e l t  th a t  th e  co u n ter-p ro p o sa l 
(which would be anathema to  th e  communal se t-u p  of th e  A llia n c e ) would be 
a su re  and e f f e c t iv e  way o f te rm in a tin g  th e  t a lk s .  Goh was asked to  re la y  
th e  D .A .P .'s  l a t e s t  s tan d  and p re d ic ta b ly , th e  ta lk s  broke down. There 
was agreement on bo th  s id e s  th a t  th e  ta lk s  should be kep t s e c r e t .
I t  was only  some 3 months l a t e r  in  Ju ly  1971 th a t  news of th e  
s e c re t  m erger ta lk s  leaked  out to  th e  p re s s .  The reasons fo r  t h i s  appear 
c o n f l ic t in g ,  but th e  tre n d  of p o l i t i c a l  developm ents in d ic a te d  th a t  th e  
D.A.P. was lo s in g  support to  th e  M.C.A. I t  was presumably th i s  th a t  led  
to  th e  leakage o f th e  t a lk s .  The f i r s t  in d ic a t io n  of t h i s  was th e  Bekok 
b y -e le c tio n  h e ld  in  May 1971» D esp ite  th e  M .C.A.'s  fe a rs  th a t  i t  might 
lo se  in  t h i s  C hinese-predom inated co n stitu en cy  to  th e  D .A .P., th e  M.C.A. 
can d id a te  won. The s ig n if ic a n c e  o f th e  v ic to ry  was no t th e  v ic to ry  i t s e l f ,  
bu t i t s  m argin, in  which th e  M.C.A. can d id a te  alm ost doubled h is  p redeces- 
s o r 's  1969 s lim  m a jo rity  over an independen t. The M0C.A. was of course
e la te d , in te r p r e t in g  th i s  as th e  p a r ty  re g a in in g  th e  confidence of th e  Chi­
nese s in c e  th e  19&9 g en era l e le c t io n s .  I t  was th e re fo re  in c l in e d  to  make
22. The M .C.A.'s  fe a rs  were m an ifested  by Tun T an 's  s ta tem en ts  s h o r t ly  
b e fo re  th e  b y -e le c t io n . He sa id :"T h e  whole country  would in te r p r e t  
th e  r e s u l t  as e i th e r  a v o te  o f confidence fo r  th e  M.C.A. o r D .A.P." 
S t r a i t s  Times, 15th  May, 1971» op. c i t . In th e  even t, th e  M.C.A. 
can d id a te  won by 1,542  v o tes  compared to  780 in  1969.
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public Statements to this effect, adding that Tun Tan Siew Sin's undisputed 
leadership had been mainly responsible for this. This indirectly had an 
undermining effect on the D.A.P.'s sagging morale in what it perceived as 
an U.M.N.O. contrived political environment to place the Chinese at a severe 
disadvantage. A seemingly jubilant and united M.C.A. tend to reflect upon 
the D.A.P.'s own confused leadership and divisive ranks. It therefore in­
terpreted the M.C.A.'s statements as unwarranted boasts and taunts. The 
D.A.P. was also worried and resented the M.C.A. apparently cutting into its 
potential areas of Chinese support in the new villages, especially in Perak. 
Although the Chinese Unity Movement had become defunct, its leaders were 
not idle behind the soenes. The Task Force Movement, its subsidiary, had 
been active under the leadership of Dato' Tan Siew Eng, particularly in Pe­
rak. Tun Razak appeared to be satisfied with their efforts, and appointed 
Dr. Lim Keng Yaik through the Senate, a Minister with Special Functions to
take charge of new villages. In a fit of anger, the D.A.P. leaked the news
23of the secret merger talks to the press. The move appeared to spite the 
M.C.A. in an attempt to refute its claims to having regained the support of 
the Chinese. Never failing to remind the M.C.A. that Tun Ismail had once 
dubbed it "neither dead nor alive", the D.A.P. claimed that it was so des­
perate at one stage that it had to beg the party to merge with it, offering 
Ministerial posts as incentives. The D.A.P. implied that any apparently 
regained Chinese support was due to fear of a repetition of the May 1969 
racial riot than an acknowledgement of the M.C.A.'s capabilities. As for 
the M.C.A.'s cl&ims of Tun Tan being the acknowledged Chinese leader, the 
D.A.P. pointed out that he had always been returned in a Malay rather than 
a Chinese-predominated constituency.2 -^ Thus the D.A.P.'s intentions were tp 
show that despite the M.C.A.'s self-proclaimed credibility, it was still a
23. See Straits Times, 15th July, 1971 for further details.
24. Tun Tan has always contested in a Malay-majority constituency in 
Malacca.
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weak and u se le s s  p a r ty  as f a r  as th e  Chinese were concerned.
I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  surm ise w hether th e  D.A.P. r e a l i s e d  th e  harm­
f u l  e f f e c t s  th e  d is c lo su re  o f th e  s e c re t  ta lk s  w ith  th e  M.C.A. would have 
on i t s  c r e d ib i l i t y .  I f  i t  d id , i t  p robab ly  underestim ated  th e  damage th a t  
would b e f a l l  i t ,  g iven i t s  v in d ic tiv e n e s s  to  h i t  a t  th e  M.C.A. The f i r s t  
damaging blow to  th e  D.A.P. was th a t  th e  secrecy  in  which th e  ta lk s  were 
h e ld , m an ifested  th e  in t r ig u e  and su sp ic io n  w ith in  th e  p a r ty 's  C en tra l 
E xecu tive  Committee (C .E .C .) which was supposed to  work in  caucus. C ontra­
ry  to  t h i s ,  i t  appeared th a t  top  le a d e rs  were d e a lin g  in d iv id u a lly  and 
s e c r e t ly  w ith  th e  M.C.A. Goh and K it S iang only knew th a t  each had s e c r e t ­
ly  met w ith  the  M.C.A. a month a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  m eeting ( in v o lv in g  K it S iang) 
had t r a n s p ir e d .  The o th e r  le a d e rs  o f th e  C.E.C. -  Dr. Chen Man Hin and 
Fan Yew Teng - ap p aren tly  became invo lved  only a f t e r  th e  f i r s t  two ta lk s  
had tak en  p la c e . I f  th e  M.C.A. had in ten d ed  to  confuse and cause d is se n s io n  
w ith in  th e  D.A.P. le a d e rs h ip , Goh and K it S iang had played in to  i t s  hands. 
O ther members o f th e  C .E .C ., p a r t i c u la r ly  Dr. S oorian ,(M .P . fo r  P o rt Dick­
son and one of th e  Vice-Chairmen) complained th a t  they  were kep t in  th e  dark
on such an im portan t m a tte r  a lth o u ^ i they  had a r ig h t  to  be inform ed as 
25
C.E.C. members. y The f e e l in g  among th e  non-Chinese members,as ty p if ie d  by
Dr. S oo rian , was th a t  th e  D.A.P. had b e tray ed  i t s  m u l t i - r a c ia l  p r in c ip le s
and ac ted  as a Chinese p a r ty . Dr. Soorian  f e l t  th a t  i t  was even worse than
th e  M.C.A. While th e  M.C.A. had p u b lic ly  claim ed th a t  i t  was f ig h t in g
s o le ly  f o r  Chinese r i g h t s ,  th e  D.A.P. had s e c r e t ly  indu lged  in  doing so ,
26w hile  p u b lic ly  p ro fe s s in g  to  be a m u l t i - r a c ia l  p a r ty . To Dr. Soorian , i t
2 5 . Mohamed No or d in  Sopiee, op. c i t .
26. See Dr. Soorian*s p re ss  s ta tem en t, S t r a i t s  Echo, 19th  June, 1972 
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was im m ateria l as to  who (M.C.A. o r D .A .P.) had i n i t i a t e d  th e  s e c re t  t a lk s .  
What was more im portan t and which th e  D.A.P. could not deny was th e  f a c t  
th a t  i t  d id  p a r t i c ip a te  in  s e c re t  merger ta lk s  w ith  th e  M .C.A.; and th e  
p r in c ip le  th a t  th e  D.A.P. would d is so lv e  i t s e l f  a t th e  r ig h t  p r ic e ,  i . e .  i f  
th e  re le v a n t M in is te r ia l  and Deputy M in is te r ia l  p o s ts  were given to  i t s  
le a d e rs  was no t d isp u te d . I t  could be argued th a t  i f  th e  P .A .P ., th e  
D .A .P .'s  p red ecesso r, had been p r a c t is in g  double s tan d a rd s , th e  D.A.P. 
a p p a ren tly  appeared more d ish o n o u rab le . In  th i s  in s ta n c e , th e  P .A .P ., 
c la im ing  to  be a dem ocratic  s o c i a l i s t ,  m u l t i - r a c ia l  p a r ty , had a c tu a l ly  
e x h ib ite d  i t s  Chinese ex c lu siv en ess  by p u b lic ly  in d ic a t in g  i t s  d e s ire  to  
re p la c e  th e  M.C.A. in  th e  A llian ce  b e fo re  th e  1964 g en era l e le c t io n s .  Un­
l ik e  th e  P .A .P ., th e  D .A .P .'s  moves to  merge w ith  th e  M.C.A. and p a r t i c i ­
p a te  in  th e  government, were shrouded in  sec recy . Had i t  succeed in  mer­
g ing  w ith  th e  M.C.A., i t s  non-Chinese members r a t io n a l i s e d  th a t  th ey  would 
be in  a quandary, e i th e r  having  to  jo in  th e  o th e r  r a c i a l  components of th e  
A llian ce  or g ive up p o l i t i c s  e n t i r e ly .
In  r e t r o s p e c t ,  th e  s e c re t  merger ta lk s  w ith  th e  M.C.A. marked th e
D .A .P .'s  f i r s t  and only con certed  attem pt to  opt out of th e  o p p o sitio n  and
jo in  th e  government. I t  re v e a le d  th e  p a r ty 's  despondency in  th e  face  of
in c re a s in g  p o l i t i c a l  i s o la t io n  and p o s s ib le  d is in te g ra t io n  in  th e  changing
p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n .  Signs of th e  D .A .P .' s  in c re a s in g  p o l i t i c a l  i s o la t io n
were m an ife s ta ted  d u ring  th e  p e rio d  of N.O.C. ru le  when i t s  e f f o r t s  to
e f f e c t  some form o f co -o p e ra tio n  and decision-m aking  w ith  th e  government
28were repeated ly  spum ed. This despondency revealed an incohesive leader-
27* See Kam Woon Wah's p re s s  s ta tem en t, S t r a i t s  Times, 15th  J u ly , 1971*
28 . Jerome B ass,Malay s i an Po l i t i c s ,  1968-1970» C r is is  and Response, Ph.D. 
T h es is , U n iv e rs ity  o f C a l ifo rn ia , B erkeley , I 973 , pp. 459- 77 .
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ship v/ithin the C.E.C., marked by suspicion and intrigue, in which indivi­
dual leaders attempted to trade the party's principles for the spoils of 
power by merging the party with the M.C.A. The D.A.P. at first appeared 
keen, but apparently backed down when the stakes involved were considered, 
too high. It then leaked the talks to the press in an attempt to spite 
the M.C.A. in response to what it considered unwarranted taunts and boasts 
by its rival, following the latter's victory in the Bekok by-election. 
However the move backfired with all its damaging consequences to the party's 
credibility. The failure of the talks was a prelude to the leadership 
struggle a year later, which spelled more trouble for the party.
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(b)_______ The D.A.P. L eadersh ip  S tru g g le
A s tru g g le  fo r  th e  le a d e rsh ip  of th e  D.A.P. took p lace  alm ost a 
y e a r a f t e r  th e  d is c lo su re  o f th e  u n su ccessfu l m erger ta lk s  between th e  
p a rty  and th e  M.C.A. I t  invo lved  th e  two most prominent le a d e rs  of th e  
p a r ty , Lim K it S iang and Goh Hock Guan. Both had d i f f e r e n t  and c o n f l ic t in g  
id eas  as to  how th e  p a r ty , whose morale had been sagging  s in c e  P arliam en t 
wan reconvened in  February 1971» should  map out i t s  s t ra te g y  in  th e  coun­
t r y ' s  changing p o l i t i c a l  environm ent. W hile Lim K it S iang favoured a 
t ig h te n in g  o f d is c ip l in e  and weeding out members who could no t conform to  
th e  p a r ty 's  p re -1969 s t r a te g y ,  Goh Hock Guan advocated some form o f co­
o p e ra tio n  w ith  th e  government. Goh b e lie v e d  th a t  th e  D .A .P .'s  p re -1969 
a b ra s iv e  s t r a te g y  was s u ic id a l  in  th e  p re v a il in g  c ircum stances. The s t ru g ­
g le  which subsequen tly  degenera ted  in to  a p e rso n a l feud , ended w ith  th e  
expu lsion  o f Goh and confirm ed K it S ia n g 's  p o s i t io n  as und ispu ted  le a d e r  
o f th e  p a r ty .
Follow ing h is  r e le a s e  from d e te n tio n  in  l a t e  1970» Lim K it Siang 
assumed th e  to p  p o s i t io n  o f S ec re ta ry -G en era l of th e  p a r ty  which had been 
vaca ted  by Goh Hock Guan s h o r t ly  a f t e r  th e  May 1969 r a c i a l  r i o t .  The chan­
ging  p o l i t i c a l  environment in  th e  coun try  a f t e r  th e  reconvening  of P a r l i a ­
ment in  February 1971 r e f le c te d  a  mood o f c au tio n  m an ifested  by a marked 
re d u c tio n  in  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y .  P o l i t i c s  was a long th e  l in e s  o f accommo­
d a tin g  to  r a th e r  than  c o n fro n tin g  th e  government. The f e a r  o f a r e p e t i t io n  
of th e  May 1969 r a c i a l  r i o t  sowed th e  seeds o f such a developm ent. I t  was 
s tren g th en ed  by th e  C o n s ti tu tio n a l Amendments o f February 1971 banning th e  
p u b lic  d isc u ss io n  of " s e n s i t iv e  is su e s "  in  th e  b e l i e f  th a t  t h i s  would l e s s ­
en r a c i a l  te n s io n . The government.'s p o l i t i c a l  supremacy was th u s  beyond doubt 
and i t  was in  a p o s i t io n  to  i s o l a t e  r e c a lc i t r a n t  p o l i t i c a l  opponents l ik e
23
th e  D.A.P. Lim K it S la n g 's  response  was to  in te n s i f y  th e  D .A .P .'s  pre-1969 
s tru g g le  f o r  th e  fundam ental in t e r e s t s  of th e  non-Malays because he f e l t  th a t  
th e  p o s i t io n  of th e  non-M alays, v is -a v v is  th e  M alays, had d e te r io ra te d  a f t e r  
th e  1969 r a c i a l  r i o t  and th e  p e rio d  o f N.O.C. r u le .  Any delay  in  doing so 
would aggravate  th e  a lread y  bad s i tu a t io n  th e  non-Malays were in .  His r e s ­
ponse was prem ised on th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  D.A.P. and th e  non-Malays a t la rg e
r e je c te d  th e  governm ent's co n ten tio n  th a t  th e  r a c i a l  r i o t  o f 1969 waS caused
2Q
by th e  q u e s tio n in g  of s e n s i t iv e  is su e s  by th e  non-Malay o p p o s itio n . They 
had grounds to  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  r e a l  c u lp r i t s  were U.M.N.O. e x tre m is ts  f e a r ­
f u l  o f a lo s s  of p o l i t i c a l  p o w e r .^  The government had h e ld  th a t  th e  Con­
s t i t u t i o n a l  Amendments of 1971 banned th e  p u b lic  d isc u ss io n  o f s e n s i t iv e  
is su e s  so th a t  th e  r a c i a l  r i o t  o f 1969 would no t be re p e a te d . Lim K it Siang 
charged th a t  th e  government had d e l ib e r a te ly  prem ised th e  r i o t  o f 1969 on 
wrong causes so as to  p ro te c t  th e  r e a l  c u lp r i t s .  As such th e  ban imposed 
would n o t le a d  to  th e  d isappearance  o f th e  s o -c a l le d  s e n s i t iv e  i s s u e s . ^
Both Malays and non-Malays could s t i l l  d iscu ss  them p r iv a te ly ,  indeed  emo­
t io n a l ly  and i r r a t i o n a l l y .  R ac ia l te n s io n  and p o la r iz a t io n ,  a by-product 
o f th e  unreso lved  s e n s i t iv e  is s u e s ,  would th e re fo re  s t i l l  be v is ib le  a l th o ­
ugh muted. There was a danger th a t  they  would explode in  th e  fu tu re  to  
cause a r e p e t i t io n  o f th e  May 1969 r i o t  on a la r g e r  s c a le . Lim K it S iang
29. For th e  governm ent's view of th e  r i o t ,  see N a tio n al O perations Coun­
c i l ,  The May 13 Tragedy: A R eport, The N .O .C ., Kuala Lumpur, October 
1969, and Tunku Abdul Rahman, May 13 ; Before and A f te r , Utusan Melayu 
P ress  L td .,  Kuala Lumpur, 1969*
30 . This appeared to  be ev iden t from th e  experiences th e  non-Malays su f ­
fe re d  du rin g  th e  r i o t .  For a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  of t h i s  view, see John 
Slimming, M alaysia: Death o f a Democracy, John Murray, London, 1969-
See P arliam en ta ry  speech, "The Sword of Damocles", on th e  C o n stitu ­
t io n  Amendment B i l l  1971 on 23rd  February 1971 in  Lim K it S iang,
Time Bombs in  M alaysia, 2nd e d . , D .A .P ., Kuala Lumpur, 1978» PP» 207-  
24 fo r  f u l l  d e t a i l s .
31.
24
was concerned, that the ban was likely to work against the non-Malays in
practice rather than the Malays. He stated that an U.M.N.O. leader could
still call with immunity to deprive the citizenship of a trade union leader
criticizing the government, although citizenship was one of the sensitive 
32issues. He therefore advocated measures that would not jeopardize the po­
sition of the non-Malays further. Sensitive issues, he held, should be re­
solved at their root causes. Regarding the National Language, Kit Siang 
contended that the non-Malays had accepted the position of Malay unquestioni- 
ngly and this was not a cause of friction. What was at stake was the use 
and sustenance of the Chinese, Tamil and English languages. Owing to ambi­
guity, this Constitutional guarantee had been rendered formless and sterile 
by an educational policy emphasizing solely on Malay supremacy. He there­
fore called for a Parliamentary Commission to define in clear terms the 
clause ”to preserve and sustain the use of the other languages"^ Once this 
was done, Kit Siang held that language would cease to be an explosive and 
divisive issue.^ Concerning Malay special privileges, Kit Siang stated
that the government had made the justification of such privileges racial
35instead of economic to uphold its class interests. While stressing that 
the D.A.P. did not object to the principle of special privileges to allevi­
ate the incidence of Malay poverty, he argued that poor non-Malays also 
needed similar assistance. The sum of Kit Siang’s arguments was thus to 
call on the government to chart the course toward a genuine multi-racial 
Malaysia with equality for all instead of a Malay Malaysia.
The trend of political events in the country however rendered 
Kit Siang's strategy extremely difficult. The D.A.P. was finding that the
32. Ibid., p. 213.
33. Ibid.,
34» Ibid., p. 216.
p. 215-6, 35- Ibid., p. 217.
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ban on th e  p u b lic  d isc u ss io n  of s e n s i t iv e  is su e s  had deprived  i t  o f i t s  
most l e th a l  weapon a g a in s t th e  government, i . e .  ag g re ss iv e ly  ha rp in g  on 
s e n s i t iv e  is s u e s .  The p ro secu tio n  of some o f i t s  le a d e rs  l ik e  Fan Yew 
Teng fo r  s e d i t io n  was a co n stan t rem inder to  th i s  e f f e c t .  Moreover th e  
non-M alays, f e a r f u l  of a r e p e t i t io n  o f th e  May 1969 r a c i a l  f i o t ,  were i n ­
c lin e d  to  respond to  th e  M .C.A.’s o f f e r  of accommodation and developm ent.
As a r e s u l t ,  th e  D.A.P. found th a t  i t  was lo s in g  i t s  support among th e  non-
Malays to  th e  M.C.A. as in d ic a te d  by a s e r ie s  o f b y -e le c tio n  d e fe a ts  in
37
Bekok in  May 1971 and. Ulu Selangor in  June 1972. Although th e se  by- 
e le c t io n s  were caused by th e  deaths of M.C.A. incum bents, e ro sio n  o f D.A.P. 
support was m an ifested  by a decrease  in  th e  number o f D.A.P. vo tes p o lle d
■30
r e s u l t in g  in  a co rrespond ing  in c re a se  fo r  M.C.A. v o te s . At th e  same tim e 
th e re  was a sp a te  o f D.A.P. d e fe c tio n s  and re s ig n a tio n s  among i t s  members, 
e le c te d  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  and even C.E.C. members, many o f them induced by 
th e  government. The most damaging blow in  t h i s  aspec t were th e  d e fe c tio n s  
o f 2 im portan t C.E.C. members and M .P .'s ,  R ichard  Ho and W alter Loh; to  th e  
M.C.A. on th e  eve o f th e  nom ination fo r  th e  Ulu Selangor P arliam en ta ry
36. See Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, op. c i t .
37» For d e ta i l s  o f th e  D .A .P .'s  b y -e le c tio n  d e fe a t a t Bekok, see S ec tion  
(a ) of t h i s  c h ap te r . The Ulu Selangor P arliam en ta ry  b y -e le c tio n  was 
caused by th e  death  o f th e  incumbent M.C.A. M in is te r , Khaw Kai Boh. 
M ichael Chen, th e  d e fea ted  M.C.A. can d id a te  fo r  th e  P arliam en ta ry  
c o n stitu en cy  of Damansara (Kuala Lumpur) in  th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  
won t h i s  b y -e le c tio n  a g a in s t th e  D.A.P. As ian  Almanac, Yol. X, No.
32, 12 th  August, 1972.
38. In  th e  case o f Bekok, th e  M .C .A .'s w inning margin of 780 v o tes over 
an independent in  th e  I 969 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  was in c re ase d  to  1,542  
over h is  D.A.P. opponent in  May 1971* S t r a i t s  Times, 18th May, 1971»
As reg a rd s  Ulu S elangor, th e  l a t e  Khaw Kai Boh p o lle d  8,278 vo tes 
ag a in s t th e  D .A .P .'s  Liong Ah Nai who ob ta ined  6,755 vo tes in  1969*
In  th e  1972 b y -e le c t io n , th e  D .A .P .'s  t o t a l  vo te  was reduced to  5»439» 
a decrease  o f 1,316 w hile  th a t  of th e  M.C.A. ro se  by 2,774 to  11,052.
In term s of th e  v ic to ry  m argin, th e  M.C.A. had in c re a se d  i t s  re p re ­
s e n ta t io n  by over 4 »000 v o te s . Asian Almanac, 12th  August, 1972.
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39b y -e le c t io n . The fro n t-p a g ed  h e ad lin es  o f t h e i r  d e fe c tio n s  in  th e  
governm ent-biased lo c a l  p re ss  had a dem oraliz ing  e f fe c t  on an a lread y  psy­
c h o lo g ic a lly  d isadvan taged  D.A.P. a g a in s t th e  v a s t ly  su p e r io r  campaigning 
re so u rce s  o f th e  government.
C erta in  le a d e rs  of th e  D.A.P. became concerned over th e  p a r ty 's  
d e c lin e  and fe a red  th a t  i f  i t  f a i l e d  to  modify i t s  r e c a lc i t r a n t  a t t i tu d e  
in  l in e  w ith  p o l i t i c a l  r e a l i t i e s ,  i t  was su re  to  d is in te g r a te .  Hence th e  
le a d e rsh ip  o f Lim K it S iang came to  be q u estio n ed . Goh Hock Guan, th e  
p a r ty 's  form er S e c re ta ry -G en e ra l, was convinced th a t  K it S ia n g 's  in f l e x ib le  
p re -1969 s t r a te g y  was u n n e c e ssa r ily  re c k le s s  and th e re fo re  s u ic id a l  f o r  th e  
p a r ty . Goh r a t io n a l i s e d  th a t  th e  p o l i t i c a l  environment had undergone many 
changes which made th e  D .A .P .'s  ag g re ss iv e  s ty le  o b s o l e t e .^  I f  th e  D.A.P. 
p e r s i s te d  in  being  a b ra s iv e  as in  th e  p re -1969 s i tu a t io n ,  i t  would con tinue  
to  be reg arded  by th e  Malays and th e  government as an extreme Chinese chau­
v in i s t  p a r ty . Consequences o f t h i s  would be a Malay b ack lash , le a d in g  to  
an o th er May 1969 r a c ia l  r i o t  o r th e  in te n s i f i c a t i o n  of government measures 
to  punish  th e  D.A.P. as ev iden t in  the  p ro se cu tio n  o f  Fan Yew Teng fo r  s e d i-
39* See S t r a i t s  Times, 18th May, 1972, Asian Almanac, Vol. X, No. 29> 22nd 
J u ly , 1972 and James M organ,"Democratic D efec tio n s" , Far E astern  Eco­
nomic Review, 27th  May, 1972. T h e ir d e fe c tio n s  had been th e  su ccess­
f u l  e f f o r t s  o f Alex Lee and Dr. Tan Tiong Hong, form er members of th e  
defunct Chinese U nity Movement. R ichard  Ho, a law yer, and W alter Loh, 
an acco u n tan t, were e le c te d  as D .A .P .® .P .'s  in  S itiaw an(P erak) and 
Setapak (Kuala Lumpur) re s p e c tiv e ly  i n ’th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s .  
R ichard  Ho s ta te d  th a t  s in ce  May 1969» th e  D.A.P. had become unaccep­
ta b le  to  la rg e  s e c tio n s  of M alaysians. As a D.A.P. M .P., he found i t  
nex t to  im possib le  to  se rv e  h is  c o n s t i tu e n ts .  He f e l t  th a t  i t  was 
more in  th e  in t e r e s t s  o f h is  c o n s ti tu e n ts  to  work w ith in  th e  govern­
ment (M.C.A.) than  to  ra b b le -ro u se  o u ts id e  (D .A .P.) i t .  In te rv iew  
w ith  R ichard Ho, M alaysian B u sin ess , June 1979* W alter Loh d ec la red  
th a t  fo r  some tim e he had f e l t  th a t  D.A.P. le a d e rs  were too  l e f t i s t  
and communal and he d id  no t wish to  s u f f e r  ano ther May 13 r i o t .
40. See Goh's p re ss  s ta tem e n t, S t r a i t s  Echo, 19th  June, 1972.
27
tion. In either of these two eventualities, Goh maintained that the D.A.P.'s 
position would he even more precarious. He however appeared more concerned 
over the party’s attrition through the resignations and defections of mem­
bers, elected representatives and even important C.E.C. members.^ This 
would aggravate the already serious problem of the dearth of good D.A.P. 
leaders as evident in the case of the 1969 general elections when the same 
candidates contested for both Parliamentary and the State Assembly seats. 
Richard Ho and Walter Loh, according to one source, represented Mthe Fabian 
Wing of the D.A.P., i.e. well-heeled socialists of cosmopolitan outlook who 
provided the party with overlooked strength through its membership of So-
A  O
cialist International and ability to win friends overseas". As such their 
defections would be a big blow to the D.A.P., possibly triggering off fur­
ther defections and resignations. Thus Goh suggested that it would be 
better for the D.A.P. to adjust to political realities. For its own good, 
the D.A.P. should practise accommodation politics or at least appear not 
to deliberately confront the g o v e r n m e n t G o h ' s  questioning of the ability 
of Kit Siang’s leadership appeared to be premised on his belief that though 
in a relegated post of Vice-Chairman, he still had a prominent role to play 
in helping to chart the D.A.P.'s po3t-1969 strategy. After all he was one 
of the party's founder members, former Secretary-General, and continued to
41. Goh stated that at the time of his resignation from the D.A.P., 4 
li.P.'s and 8 State Assemblymen had resigned. Straits Echo, 21st 
June, 1972.
42. James, Morgan, ibid. Op. cit.
43» Goh's suggestions, initially by hints, became more evident after he 
had joined the G.R.M. prior to the 1974 general elections. Campai­
gning for the G.R.M. which had by then become a component of the N.
F., Goh talked about the built-in system of checks and balances in 
accommodation politics where unity could be achieved through a 
belief in dialogue and a spirit of give and take to effect equality 
for all. Straits Echo, 14th August, 1974»
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to enjoy the support and confidence of the moderate members of the party 
and the Chairman, Dr. Chen Man Hin, who he claimed, had authorised him to 
act on the party’s behalf in the unsuccessful merger talks with the M.C.A. 
Besides the harrowing experience of the May 1969 racial riot had convinced 
Goh that there was certainly a limit to the D.A.P.'s abrasive style of 
politics.
Predictably Lim Kit Siang resented the manner in which his leader­
ship of the party was being questioned and was inclined to interpret it as 
an unnecessary challenge to his authority, thereby constituting a breach of 
discipline. He believed that at the time the party was experiencing serious 
difficulties to the extent that its survival was being threatened, the duty 
of all members, irrespective of rank, was to rally behind the leader instead 
of unwisely questioning his authority. He repeated that the D.A.P. would 
never change the abrasive manner in which it had fought for the rights of 
the non-Malays under whatever circumstances. For in that eventuality, the 
party would have to operate more circumspectively and thereby less effectively. 
It would lose its distinctive identity as a fearless and agressive party, and 
with it, much of the support(which was necessary as a nucleus for the future 
long-term expansion plans of the party)it had won from the non-Malays in the 
1969 general elections. Kit Siang appeared convinced that the ban imposed 
on the public discussion of sensitive issues and the 1971 Constitutional 
Amendments, far from subduing the non-Malays, would only increase their 
resentment towards the government. As long as these so-called sensitive 
issues(which he equated with the legitimate grievances of the non-Malays) 
remained unresolved, the D.A.P. would always benefit from the increasing 
number of the already substantial non-Malay protest votes. As a solution,
Kit Siang therefore felt that to circumvent being penalised by the Seditions 
Act, the D.A.P. had to cloud the so-called sensitive issues by making insi-
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n u a tio n s  and innuendoes Y/hen c r i t i c i s i n g  th e  government. In  th i s  way, th e  
D.A.P. could s t i l l  a r t i c u l a t e  th e  g rievances of th e  non-Malays by a i r in g  
th e  s o -c a l le d  s e n s i t iv e  is su e s  p u b lic ly  bu t in d i r e c t ly .  The D.A.P. S ecre ­
ta ry -G e n e ra l was aware of th e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  he was fa c in g  and th e i r  p o s s i­
b le  harm ful e f f e c t s  on th e  p a rty  such as in c re ase d  Malay antagonism  and 
government su b v ersio n , but he seemed to  be guided by th e  philosophy th a t  
g re a t s a c r i f i c e s  preceded su ccess , and acco rd in g ly  ap p lied  i t  to  h is  s t r a ­
te g y . K it S iang  b e lie v ed  th a t  h is  approach would u l t im a te ly  be v ia b le  in  
th e  long  ru n , a lthough  th e  co n triv ed  p o l i t i c a l  s i tu a t io n  had rendered  i t  
p re c a rio u s  fo r  th e  tim e b e in g . To ensure th a t  h is  s t r a te g y  be fo llow ed a t 
a l l  tim es , K it S iang advocated th a t  s t r i c t  d is c ip l in e  should  be enforced  in  
th e  p a r ty  and a u th o r i ty  be obeyed u n q u estio n in g ly . Members found to  be 
w anting should  be e x p e lle d ,a s  t h i s  was l ik e ly  to  cause d iv is io n  and d is se n ­
s io n  in  th e  p a rty } which th e  government would e x p lo i t ; to  subvert i t . ^  In  
t h i s  a sp e c t, K it S iang h e ld  th a t  th e  d e fe c tio n s  o f R ichard  Ho and Y /alter
Loh were no lo s s  to  th e  p a r ty  as they  had be tray ed  th e  p a r ty 's  cause fo r
45p e rso n a l i n t e r e s t s .  This appeared to  be a d i r e c t  r e b u f f  to  Goh's advo­
cacy o f accommodation p o l i t i c s ,  thus in c re a s in g  th e  resentm ent of th e  l a t t e r .
44* In  an address to  th e  D.A.P. Serdang (S elangor) b ranch , K it Siang
warned th a t  th e  government was t r y in g  to  i n f i l t r a t e  th e  D.A.P. th ro ­
ugh th e  P ro je c ts  S ec tio n  o f th e  S p ec ia l Branch so as to  cause maxi­
mum damage and chaos to  th e  p a r ty . He reminded th e  members th a t  a 
s im ila r  t a c t i c  had been su c c e ss fu lly  used which caused th e  d e s tru c ­
t io n  of th e  Labour P a rty  o f Malaya (L .P.M .) in  th e  1960s. K it S ia n g 's  
w arnings were based on th e  p re d ic tio n s  of th e  Home A ffa irs  M in is te r , 
Tun Dr. Ism a il, to  an U.M.N.O. Youth conference th a t  th e re  would be 
r e b e l l io n  in  th e  D.A.P. le ad in g  to  mass re s ig n a tio n s  and th e  d is in ­
te g ra t io n  of th e  p a r ty . Asian Almanac, Vol. X, No. 41» 14th  O ctober, 
1972. He th e re fo re  urged D.A.P. members to  e x e rc ise  maximum v ig i la n ­
ce to  f o r e s t a l l  such an e v e n tu a li ty . Malay M ail, 1 s t J u ly , 1972.
45» S t r a i t s  Echo, 20th May, 1972. Dr. Chen Man Hin, th e  Chairman, how­
ev er, t r i e d  to  a l la y  th e  fe a rs  and doubts of members by s t a t in g  th a t  
t h e i r  d e fe c tio n s  (o r  ex p u lsions) were n ecessary  c o rre c t iv e  m easures, 
in  which th e  p a rty  would emerge s tro n g e r  in  th e  a fte rm a th .
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Apparently exasperated at failing to persuade Kit Siang to modify 
the D.A.P.’s strategy, Goh chose to resign, giving as his reason that he 
could no longer tolerate what he considered as the dictatorial attitude of 
Kit Siang, manifested by Spartan disciplinary measures which many members 
found unbearable. In retaliation, Kit Siang, with the backing of the
C. E.C., at first suspended but later expelled him from the party on the 
vague charge of "flouting party policy and (indulging in) activities detri­
mental to party discipline and morale"^ The leadership struggle between 
the two leaders subsequently degenerated into a personal feud. In an atte­
mpt to smear Goh's personal integrity, Kit Siang dwelt on Goh's part in the
D. A.P.'s unsuccessful merger talks with the M.C.A. and blamed the D.A.P.'s 
damaged credibility on Goh's mishandling of the whole affair where the 
D.A.P. was concerned. He held that Goh was responsible for making the 
D.A.P. vulnerable to M.C.A. charges that it was interested in Ministerial
A n
and Deputy Ministerial positions as a price to merge with the M.C.A. The 
implication was that Goh was prepared to sacrifice party principles for 
personal gain, since, as the D.A.P.'s main negotiator and a prominent lea­
der, he would presumably be given a Ministerial post should the D.A.P 
merge with the M.C.A. Goh retaliated by stating that he had the full
46. For full details, see Straits Times, 19th June, 1972, M.G.G. Pillai, 
"D.A.P. Dilemma", Far Eastern Economic Review, 1st July, 1972, Asian 
Almanac, Vol. X, No. 41> 14th October 1972 and Asia Research Bullet- 
in, Vol. II, No. 2, July 1972.
47» Straits Times, 19th June, 1972, op. cit. Kit Siang stated that Goh 
chose to defy the collective stand of the C.E.C. by making separate 
press statements on issues such as the government's claim that the 
Straits of Malacca was Malaysia's territorial waters and the govern­
ment's recognition of Bangladesh as an independent nation. In these 
statements, Kit Siang claimed that Goh's views were opposed to those 
of the C.E.C. This had caused confusion and disunity within the 
party. Straits Echo, 22nd June, 1972.
48. Straits Echo, 21st June, 1972 and Asian Almanac, 14th October, 1972.
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authority of Dr. Chen to negotiate with the M.C.A. on the D.A.P.'s behalf 
and that he had fully reported what had transpired to Dr. Chen and Kit 
Siang. This was an apparent move to clear himself of the charge by Kit 
Siang that he was acting individually for personal gain. He in turn char­
ged that Kit Siang had met secretly with Tun Tan Siew Sin first in an atte­
mpt to show that Kit Siang was unprincipled and dishonest. Goh held that
Kit Siang was also self-centred and selfish, and seemed to believe that
r 49just because he had spent l# years in prison, he could do no wrong. Kit
Siang, according to Goh, was indifferent to the loss of 12 M.P.'s and State
Assemblymen, even though the rank and file appeared concerned over the
50apparent loss of leaders of high calibre. It was also claimed by Goh
that Kit Siang had maintained an unnecessarily tight discipline over D.A.P.
M.P.'s in forbidding them to speak in Parliament before he diä} The M.P.'s
according to Goh, felt restricted and therefore resentful. The dispute took
a new turn when Dr. Soorian, a former Vice-Chairman who was expelled at the
52same time as Goh, joined in the attack against Kit Siang. Dr. Soorian 
appeared to hold Kit Siang responsible for his being kept out of the mer­
ger talks with the M.C.A. although he was a member of the C.E.C.
49« See Goh's press statement, Straits Echo, 19th June, 1972.
50. Straits Echo, 21st June, 1972.
51. Straits Echo, 19th June, 1972.
52. Dr. Soorian, M.P. for Port Dickson, had been expelled on the grounds 
that he withheld information about the defections of Richard Ho and 
Walter Loh. Soorian denied this, claiming that Kit Siang intended 
to silence him because he was critical over his (Kit Siang's) dicta­
torial attitude. Asian Almanac, 14th October, 1972. It appeared that 
Soorian's charge was trumped up by Kit Siang, as no evidence was 
produced. See letter to Far Eastern Economic Review, 12th August,
1972. For details of Soorian's attacks against Kit Siang, see his lett­
er to F.E.E.R._. 12th February, 1973, Straits Echo, 19th and 26th
June, 1972 and" Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. II, No. 2, July 1972.
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The outcome of the leadership struggle hinged on the C.E.C., the
supreme policy-making body of the party. It held the balance of power.
However some attempts -were made to reconcile the differences between the
two men earlier to prevent a split within the party as in the case of the 
53G.R.M. in 1971« Dr. Chen Man Hin, the Chairman, had at one stage, pro­
posed to step down in favour of Goh so that both he and Kit Siang could
54work together as a team on more or less equal status; This was apparent­
ly unsuccessful when Dr. Chen was urged to remain as Chairman in view of 
both his popularity and elderly stature in the party. The C.E.C. was left 
with the choice of either Kit Siang or Goh. In the event, Kit Siang was 
preferred. Personal abilities to respond fearlessly to crises seemed to be 
the determining criteria. This appeared to work against Goh. In the after- 
math of the May 1969 racial riot, his escape overseas to elude possible 
arrest and his subsequent resignation as Secretary-General were regarded as 
cowardly acts by the C.E.C. To cover up the D.A.P.'s embarrassment over 
Goh's actions, the C.E.C. claimed that it had to publicly state that Goh 
had gone to the Socialist International Conference in London to lobby for 
international support against the Malaysian government to release Kit Siang. 
To be fair to Goh, he had actually pleaded Kit Siang's case successfully in 
London so that Kit Siang was released earlier than anticipated. It was also 
a human instinct to flee if arrest appeared imminent. Goh was not the only
53» The G.R.M. split into 2 factions over Dr. Lim Chong Eu's increasingly 
pro-Alliance policies. This will be discussed fully in Chapter III.
54. Dr. Chen was reported to have said: "Perhaps I should withdraw as 
Chairman in favour of you (Goh) so that, with you as party Chairman 
and Kit Siang as Secretary-General, the D.A.P. will have 2 very 
strong leaders to lead the party". Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. II, 
No. 2, July 1972; op. cit. Goh claimed that this was Dr. Chen's 
way of persuading him to return as party leader following Kit Siang's 
release from detention. Dr. Chen's suggestion was premised on the 
fact that the Chairman and Secretary-General were the two most power­
ful positions in the C.E.C. As a semblance of their power, only they 
could authorise press statements on behalf of the parry and sanction the party's policies.
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D.A.P. le a d e r  to  do so as Fan Yew Teng, th e  e d ito r  of th e  p a r ty ’s jo u rn a l,
55"The R ocket", had a lso  gone underground. However th e  f a c t  th a t  Goh had 
d isp la y ed  a f e a r le s s  and ch a rism a tic  Lee Kuan Yew image in  th e  b u ild -u p  
tow ards th e  1969 g en e ra l e le c t io n s  which gave him the  h ig h e s t number o f vo tes
56p o lle d  in  th e  h is to ry  o f M alaysian g en era l e le c tio n s  u n t i l  1978, negated  t h i s .  
I f  th e  C.E.C. expected i t s  le a d e rs  to  s t i c k  by i t  in  tim es of c r i s e s ,  th e  
f e e l in g  was th a t  Goh should be in  th e  fo re f ro n t  in  view o f h is  top  p o s i t io n  
as S ec re t a ry -G en era l. Thus h is  apparen t d e s e r t io n  of the  p a rty  a t th e  tim e 
when i t  needed him most damaged h is  c r e d ib i l i t y  se v e re ly . This was to  prove 
f a t a l  to  him when he co n te s ted  th e  1974 g en era l e le c tio n s  on a N .F.(G .R .M .) 
t i c k e t  as an incumbent in  th e  same P a rliam en ta ry  co n stitu en cy  of Bungsar 
(renamed P e ta l in g ) .  In  th a t  g en era l e le c t io n ,  he lo s t  to  a r e l a t iv e ly  un­
known D.A.P. can d id a te  a lthough  th e  mood of e le c to r a l  c au tio n  appeared to  
57favour th e  N.F. ' In  c o n tra s t ,  K it S iang appeared determ ined to  s tan d  by 
th e  p a rty  under w hatever c ircu m stan ces . D esp ite  w arnings th a t  he would be 
a r re s te d  on h is  way home from Sabah where he had been ordered  to  leav e  by 
Tun Mustapha a f t e r  campaigning th e re , K it S iang n e v e r th e le s s  re tu rn e d , p re ­
sumably to  shore up th e  p a r ty ’s sagg ing  m orale in  th e  a fte rm ath  of th e  May 
1969 r i o t .  He was subsequen tly  d e ta in ed  fo r  18 months under th e  I .S .A .
55. See P e te r  Simms,"A Q uiet Coup in  K .L ." , L ife  (A sia E d itio n ) , Yol.
XXXXYII No. 2, 21st J u ly , 1969 .
56 . In  th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  Goh p o lle d  37>058 v o te s , having  a m a jo ri­
ty  of over 25,000 vo tes over th e  M .C.A.’s Lew Sip Hon who ob ta ined  
9,648  v o te s . S t r a i t s  Tim es, 12th May, 1969» This was only exceeded
by K it S ia n g 's  41»017 in  th e  same en larged  co n stitu en cy  and Chan Kok 
K i t 's  40,307 in  Sungei Besi in  th e  1978 g en era l e le c t io n s .  See 
Appendix C.
57» Follow ing h is  re s ig n a tio n  from th e  D .A .P ., Goh rem ained an independent 
M.P. u n t i l  he jo in e d  th e  G.R.M. in  1974* S t r a i t s  Times, 11th A p ril, 
1974« A fte r h is  d e fe a t in  th e  1974 genera l e le c t io n s ,  Goh has s in ce  
been p o l i t i c a l l y  in a c t iv e ,  though s t i l l  a member of th e  G.R.M.
58. For f u l l  d e t a i l s ,  see P e rs o n a lity  P r o f i le  on Lim K it S iang, M alaysian 
B usiness, December 1979» PP* 26-31.
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Following his release from detention in late 1970, and after assuming the 
position of Secretary-General, Kit Siang reiterated his intentions to pur­
sue the D.A.P.’s objectives in the same way that the party did in the 1969 
general elections. The C.E.C. thus decided that it could rely more on Kit 
Siang to lead the party out of the precarious position it was in, rather 
than Goh, despite Kit Siang's overt dictatorial attitude. It therefore 
threw its support to Kit Siang, and with that, Goh's fate was virtually 
sealed. However an extensive nation-wide tour of the party's branches to 
explain the C.E.C.'s decision followed by a Special Delegates Conference
at Seremban in August 1972 necessary to ratify Goh's (and Soorian's)
59expulsion.
Thus the leadership struggle between Lim Kit Siang and Goh Hock 
Guan began with a difference over the strategies to be used to arrest the 
D.A.P.'s decline which was manifested by a series of by-election defeats, 
resignations and defections of members, elected representatives and C.E.C. 
members. It degenerated into a personal feud with the washing of dirty 
linen in public as both Kit Siang and Goh tried to show that each was un­
principled and dishonest in mishandling the merger talks with the M.C.A.
The dispute widened with Dr. Soorian attacking Kit Siang's dictatorial 
attitude and Goh trying to implicate Dr. Chen in the merger talks. As a 
result the party's credibility was badly damaged. The crucial issue appea­
red to be Goh's challenge to Kit Siang's leadership. Had he unquestioningly 
serve in a subordinate role to Kit Siang as Vice-Chairman, the dispute,
which led to his expulsion, would not have started and the party would even 
do its best to cover up what it considered his past cowardly acts. The
59. For details, see M.G.G.Pillai's reply to Fan Yew Teng's letter to
the Far Eastern Economic Review, 29th July, 1972» Fan had protested 
over Pillai's report that there had been a split in the D.A.P.
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f a c t  th a t  Fan Yew Teng, who a lso  escaped a f t e r  th e  May 1969 r i o t ,  and was 
no t c a s t ig a te d ,  t e s t i f i e d  to  t h i s .  However Goh f e l t  th a t  h is  su g g es tio n s , 
in te r p r e te d  as a ch allen g e  to  K it S ia n g 's  le a d e rsh ip , were r a t io n a l  and aimed 
a t  sp a r in g  th e  D.A.P. f u r th e r  punishment by th e  government. U n fo rtunate ly  
fo r  him, they  were considered  by th e  p a r ty 's  h a rd - l in e r s ,  who dominated th e  
C .E .C ., as a s e l l - o u t  a ttem p t. Moreover Goh was a t  a d isadvan tage  owing to  
h is  d e s e r t io n  o f th e  p a r ty  in  th e  a fte rm ath  of th e  May 1969 r i o t  and h is  
p a r t  in  th e  s e c re t  merger ta lk s  w ith  th e  M.C.A. K it S iang su c c e ss fu lly  
c a p i ta l iz e d  on t h i s  to  sway th e  C.E.C. a g a in s t Goh. Although K it S iang 
was no t e n t i r e ly  p r in c ip le d  in  th e  sense th a t  he had f i r s t  indu lged  in  sec ­
r e t  t a lk s  w ith  th e  M.C.A., and h is  d i c t a t o r i a l  a t t i tu d e  was a lso  obvious, 
th e  C.E.C. appeared p repared  to  overlook t h i s  in  view o f h is  w illin g n e ss  
to  s t i c k  by th e  p a rty  in  tim es o f c r i s i s .  The le a d e rsh ip  s tru g g le  was a 
tu rn in g  p o in t fo r  th e  D.A.P. in  th e  sense th a t  i t  e i th e r  had to  r e t a in  i t s  
p re -1969 s t r a te g y  ( a lb e i t  w ith  minor changes) or opt fo r  accommodation p o l i ­
t i c s  a l to g e th e r .  With K it S ia n g 's  v ic to ry  over Goh, th e  D.A.P. engaged on 
th e  form er course to  r e b u ild  i t s e l f .  The manner in  which K it Siang d i s ­
posed of ch a llen g es  to  h is  a u th o r i ty  showed h is  apparent d is re g a rd  fo r  th e
60norms o f democracy, m an ifested  by h is  in to le ra n c e  of opposing view s.
60. This was confirm ed by h is  purge o f th e  Pensng D.A.P. Chairman, Yeap 
Ghim Guan, in  e a r ly  1978* The C.E.C. had been unhappy w ith  th e  Pe­
nang D.A.P. a f t e r  th e  1974 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  a f t e r  th e  
only  2 e le c te d  D.A.P. s t a t e  assemblymen d e fec ted  to  th e  M.C.A. This 
l e f t  th e  D.A.P. w ith  no re p re s e n ta t io n  in  th e  Penang s t a t e  assem bly.
As th e  1978 g en era l e le c t io n s  approached, th e  C.E.C. suspec ted  th a t  
th e  Penang D.A.P. w&g making s e c re t  d ea ls  w ith  the  M.C.A., a move i t  
s tro n g ly  den ied . Lim K it S iang th e re fo re  decided to  c o n tro l th e  
Penang D.A.P. by having K arpal S ingh, th e  p a r ty 's  le g a l  a d v ise r  and 
defence counsel in  numerous I .S .A . t r i a l s ,  co-opted in  th e  Penang 
D.A.P. s t a t e  committee. Yeap Ghim Guan p ro te s te d , fe a r in g  th a t  Kar­
p a l Singh would usurp  h is  p o s it io n  as Chairman in  Penang. Lim K it 
S iang  th e reb y  suspended Yeap and l a t e r  ex p e lled  him. For f u l l  d e ta i ­
l s ,  see a r t ic le s ," N o  W arlords", Asiaweek, 20th January , 1978 and 
"P a rty  Time Everyone", Asiaweek, 27t h  January , 1978. See a lso  a r t i c l e ,  
"Yeap ousted  as D.A.P. No. 2", M alaysia , February , 1978. Yeap 
e v en tu a lly  formed a s p l in te r  p a r ty , th e  S o c ia l i s t  Democratic P arty  
(S .D .P .J  which was e lim in a ted  in  th e  1978 g en era l e le c t io n s .
CHAPTER III
Democracy, Internal Security and Human Ri^its.
(a) The National Front Coalition
The extension of the Alliance coalition (U.M.N.O., M.C.A. & M.I.C.) 
into a broader-based. National Front (N.F.) to include its traditional oppo­
nents, the Sarawak United People's Party (S.U.P.P.), the Gerakan Rakyat Ma­
laysia (G.R.M.), the People's Progressive Party (P.P.P.) and Parti Islam 
(P.A.S.) was a new feature of post-1969 Malaysian politics. The 1971 Cons­
titutional Amendments and their implications had brought about this new 
development. To prevent a recurrence of the 1969 racial riot, the govern­
ment under Tun Razak had placed "sensitive issues" - Malay privileges, the 
National Language, citizenship and the status of the sultans - beyond the 
pale of public discussion.^ However the government felt that the ban by 
itself was not enough to ensure political stability, given the uneasiness 
of the non-Malays that the Constitutional Amendments worked towards their 
disadvantage. Thus to ensure that the non-Malays had some semblance of 
political power in what was a wholly Malay government, Tun Razak decided to
seek the co-operation of the non-Malay opposition parties which had substan-
2tial electoral support. This was necessary owing to the dismal performance 
of the M.C.A., the traditional Chinese partner in the government, at the 
1969 general elections.^ By bringing in these non-Malay opposition parties, 
Tun Razak hoped to restore the confidence of the non-Malays to effect better
1. For the government's reasons to ban the public discussion of sensitive 
issues, see the full text of Tun Razak's speech on The Constitutional 
Amendment Bill, Malaysian Digest, 28th February, 1971«
2. For full details, see Michael Chen,"Changing Political Structures and 
Alignments" in Yong Mun Cheong ed., Trends in Malaysia (2), Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1974» PP* 58-64.
3* The role of the M.I.C., owing to its size and representation, is in­
significant here.
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Sino-M alay c o -o p e ra tio n  in  what was p e rce iv ed  to  be a new e ra  o f accommoda­
t io n  and developm ent. S epara te  c o a l i t io n s  were meted out w ith  each o f th e  
non-Malay o p p o s itio n  p a r t i e s ,  beg inn ing  w ith  th e  S .U .P .P . in  l a t e  1970» f o l ­
lowed by th e  G.R.M. in  e a r ly  1972 and th e  P .P .P . in  mid-1972. To reduce 
p o l i t ic k in g  on i t s  Malay f la n k , a c o a l i t io n  was a lso  made w ith  P .A .S . in  
e a r ly  1973*^ In  seek ing  out th e  non-Malay o p p o sitio n  p a r t ie s  as c o a l i t io n  
p a r tn e r s ,  Tun Razak's  i n i t i a l  c r i t e r i a  appeared to  be th a t  th e  p a r t i e s  con­
cerned h e ld  some measures o f power, i . e .  th ey  must be in  c o n tro l o f a  S ta te  
government o r ho ld  th e  b a lance  o f power. What was even more im portan t to  
Tun Razak was th a t  th e  p a r t i e s  concerned must appear to  be m oderate to  th e  
M alays. This was because th e  government had a t t r ib u te d  th e  cause o f th e  19- 
69 r a c i a l  r i o t  as Malay re a c t io n  to  th e  p rovoca tions by e x trem is t C hinese- 
based p a r t ie s  who had challenged  th e  very  b a s is  o f Malay p o l i t i c a l  power by 
t h e i r  q u es tio n in g  o f s p e c ia l  r ig h t s ,  N a tio n a l Language, e tc .  In  exchange 
fo r  t h e i r  c o -o p e ra tio n , th e  C en tra l Government would prom ise a id  in  develop­
m ental p ro je c ts  in  th e  s t a t e s  where the  p a r t ie s  concerned c o n tro lle d  o r  h e ld  
th e  balance  o f power. The G.R.M. appeared to  s a t i s f y  th e se  two c o n d itio n s  
s t ip u la te d  by Tun Razak. I t  cap tu red  16 out o f th e  24 c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  in  
th e  Penang S ta te  Assembly in  th e  1969 e le c t io n s .  Dr. Lim Chong Eu as C hief 
M in is te r  o f Penang, had du rin g  th e  p e riod  o f N.O.C. r u le ,  shown th e  G.R.M.'s  
w illin g n e ss  to  co -o p e ra te  w ith  th e  C en tra l Government by co n ce n tra tin g  on 
prom oting goodw ill among th e  d i f f e r e n t  ra c e s  and im proving a d m in is tra tio n  
in  th e  s t a t e .  U.M.N.O. appeared s a t i s f i e d  th a t  th e  G.R.M. was a m oderate 
p a r ty  when th e  l a t t e r  vo ted  w ith  th e  government in  th e  C o n s ti tu tio n a l Amend­
ment B i l l  in  February 1971« In  th e  case of th e  P .P .P . , i t  had always been
4 . For d e ta i l s  of th e  s e p a ra te  c o a l i t io n s ,  see R .S,M ilne and D.K.Mauzy, 
P o l i t i c s  and Government in  M alaysia , F ed era l P u b lic a tio n s , S ingapore, 
Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, 1978» PP» 178-88.
5 . In  th i s  d isc u ss io n , th e  ro le s  o f th e  S .U .P .P . and P .A .S . a re  o m itted .
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the Alliance's traditional opponent since its leaders, the Seenivasagain
brothers, had been vociferous critics of the government's pro-Malay policies.
Sect«.r\<Kf)
Although U.M.N.O. regarded it as a «actgam» Chinese party, the fact that it
won 12 out of the total 40 seats in the Perak State Assembly in 1969 gave
£
it the balance of power. The dismal failure of the M.C.A. in Perak - it 
won only 1 state seat (Tapah) - made U.M.N.O. prepared to overlook the fact 
that the P.P.P. voted with the D.A.P. against the Constitutional Amendment 
Bill, as Perak was one of the important states to the government. Although 
the D.A.P. appeared to have significant Chinese support at both State and 
Federal levels (13 M.P.'s and 31 State Assemblymen) after the 1969 general 
elections, and theoretically it was possible for U.M.N.O. to effect a coali­
tion with it, especially in Selangor where it held 9 out of the total 28 
seats, U.M.N.O. nevertheless rejected the D.A.P. as a coalition partner.
It felt that the D.A.P.'s "Malaysian Malaysia" campaign in the 1969 general 
elections intended to do away with Malay political supremacy in the country. 
Given its primary task to re-assure the Malays that Malaysia was first and 
foremost their country, U.M.N.O. could not co-operate with the D.A.P under 
whatever circumstances. In the new era of accommodation and development, 
U.M.N.O. considered the D.A.P.'s abrasive role provocative, and therefore 
irrelevant.
The D.A.P.'s reaction to the coalitions effected by U.M.N.O. with 
its former allies, the G.R.M. and the P.P.P., was a combination of resent­
ment and defiance. Its reaction was consequent on the trend, of events 
following the 1969 racial riot. During N.O.C. rule, the government had 
repeatedly spumed its overtures to participate in measures to promote good-
6. The P.P.P.'s representation was however reduced to 10 when 2 assembly­
men defected to the Alliance. They were Samsuddin Harun (Sungei Raya) 
and Cheain Moi Tuck (Chemor). There were allegations that they were 
induced to defect.
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will among the various comnmnities and policy-making, on the grounds that
its abrasive Chinese image and style of campaigning in the 1969 general
7elections had been responsible for the riot. The government had resented 
what it considered the D.A.P.'s unsolicited advice and uncalled for critici­
sms in the manner its ad hoc bodies such as the National Goodwill Council 
(N.G.C.) and National Consultative Council (N.C.C.) were run. This would 
hamper what the government regarded as the smooth administration of these 
bodies. The government’s attitude was premised on the fact that the country 
was under emergency rule and the D.A.P.'s unnecessary criticisms would off­
end the Malays.. This would aggravate an already existing bad situation 
which it was trying very hard to improve. The government also resented the 
fact that the D.A.P., unlike the other parties, had insisted on conditions 
which appeared unacceptable before it agreed to participate in the ad hoc 
bodies. For instance, the D.A.P. insisted on having Lim Kit Siang (who was 
then in detention under the I.S.A.) as its representative in the N.C.C. as 
a condition for its participation, a move rejected by the government. The 
D.A.P. on its part felt that the ad hoc bodies in which the other political 
parties were represented would be meaningless if the government continued 
to disregard or did not take seriously any advice that they might offer on 
the grounds that the Malays felt offended by such advice. In the D.A.P.’s 
view, any non-acceptance of what it considered legitimate criticisms would 
turn these bodies into mere rubber stamps. If the government appeared to 
magnify the gravity of the situation, the D.A.P. was inclined to overlook 
the fact that the country was under emergency rule. When the country pre­
pared for the restoration of Parliamentary rule in February 1971» the D.A.P. 
regarded the threat by Tun Razak that the country would not revert to Par-
7. For full details, see Jerome Bass, Malaysian Politics, 1968-1970;
Crisis and Response, Ph.D. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 
1973, pp. 459-77.
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liamentaiy rule unless the Alliance obtained the required two-thirds majori­
ty (to amend the Constitution to ban the public discussion of sensitive is­
sues) as political blackmail. Thus when the Constitutional Amendments were 
tabled in Parliament in February 1971» the D.A.P.'s 13 M.P.’s (together with 
the 4 P.P.P. M.P.'s) predictably voted against them. The party believed that 
the amendments had restricted the traditional right of M.P.'s to speak free­
ly in Parliament. This was tantamount to the government making a mockeiy of 
democracy. Under these circumstances, the D.A.P. regarded the coalitions
Q
with the opposition parties as a drift towards a one-party state. The D.A. 
P. charged the government with intending to eliminate the opposition,first 
by suppression (as in the case of the L.P.M. and now increasingly itself), 
and then by absorption (as in the case of the G.R.M. and P.P.P.)? It warned 
U.M.N.O. that if the latter believed that by bringing the opposition parties 
into its fold, it could also secure their following, then it (U.M.N.O.) 
would be sadly mistaken. What would eventuate, according to the D.A.P., 
would be a withdrawal of support for the opposition parties concerned, un­
less U.M.N.O. resolved satisfactorily the political, social, economic and 
educational grievances of the non-Malays, the traditional supporters of the 
opposition parties which had joined the coalitions^ The D.A.P. stressed 
that the coalitions were attempts by U.M.N.O. to give legitimacy to its sup­
pression of the frustration of the non-Malays. The party's reactions were 
principally the views of Lim Kit Siang. Following his release from deten-
8. See Parliamentary speech, "Democratisation of Malaysian Life", on 11th 
May, 1972 in Lim Kit Siang,Time Bombs in Malaysia, 2nd Ed., D.A.P., 
Kuala Lumpur, 1978» P*‘ 17» See also his speech on coalition politics 
at the Fourth Great.Economics Debate at the University of Malaya,
Malay Mail, 26th August, 1972.
9« Ibid. See also D.A.P. charge by Lee Lam Thye that the N.F. was a stra­
tegy aimed to reduce genuine Parliamentary democracy. New Straits Ti­
mes, 5th March, 1973*
10. Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 17.
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tion, Lim Kit Siang had become something of a martyr to the party. As 
Secretary-General, he had consolidated his power in the C.E.C. after the 
challenge from Goh Hock Guan was stopped. Of the D.A.P. leaders, the govern­
ment regarded Lim Kit Siang as an extremist, pandering to Chinese chauvinism, 
the reason for which he was detained under the I.S.A. Kit Siang's views,
(see preceding Chapter) indicated that the party must not deviate from what 
it stood for by the 1967 Setapak Declaration and its abrasive style in the 
status quo ante. ^  This appeared to be doubtful following the D.A.P.'s 
unsuccessful secret merger talks with the M.C.A. (see preceding Chapter). 
Hence it could be surmised that the D.A.P.'s condemnation of the coalitions 
reflected its moves to wipe out the stigma of disgrace which was attached 
to it following the failure of the talks. Attempts to do this had already 
been underway earlier, during the party's leadership struggle when Kit Siang 
blamed the D.A.P.'s blunder in the talks on Goh Hock Guan to clear himself.
In condemning the coalitions, the D.A.P. hoped to draw attention to its pre- 
1969 fearless and combative role to win the support of what it perceived as 
a growing anti-establishment mood in the urban areas, especially in Penang 
and Perak, the strongholds of the G.R.M. and the P.P.P. Since the 1959 ge­
neral elections, these areas had never supported the M.C.A. because of what 
the predominantly Chinese electorate considered as excessively pro-Malay 
policies by the Alliance government. Their support had been given to the 
Socialist Front (S.F.) in Penang and the P.P.P. in the Kinta District of 
Perak. Even during the 1964 general elections, when the whole country 
appeared to support the Alliance owing to Indonesian Confrontation and the
M.C.A. did remarkably well, these areas continued to remain solidly pro- 
12opposition. In the 1969 general elections, with the mood of the urban
11. See Appendix A.
12. The most prominent were the Parliamentary constituencies of Tanjong 
and Dato Keramat in Georgetown (Penang) and Ipoh and Menglembu in
Perak. In the 1964 general elections, Tanjong went to Dr. Lim Chong 
Eu of the United Democratic Party(U.D.l») while Lim Kean Siew retai—
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e le c to r a te  s tro n g ly  a n t i-A ll ia n c e , th e  o p p o s itio n  cand ida tes  from th e  
G.R.M. and th e  P .P .P . won by unprecedented m a jo r i t ie s  in  th e se  areas '!^
This had le n t  credence to  th e  D .A .P .’s a l le g a t io n  th a t  th e  urban e le c to ra te  
in  th e se  a reas  vo ted  fo r  th e  G.R.M. and th e  P .P .P . more in  p ro te s t  a g a in s t 
th e  A llian ce  than  t h e i r  support fo r  th e se  p a r t i e s . ^  The D.A.P. r a t io n a ­
l i s e d  th a t  w ith  th e  1971 C o n s ti tu tio n a l Amendments, th e  t r a d i t io n a l  a n t i ­
e s tab lish m en t mood of th e se  a reas  would be re - in fo rc e d  as a s ig n  o f p r o te s t .  
I t  was w ith  t h i s  p r io r i t y  in  mind th a t  th e  D.A.P. d ire c te d  i t s  a tta c k s  
m ainly on th e  G.R.M. and th e  P .P .P . ,  but a lso  to  a l e s s e r  ex ten t on th e  
M.C.A.
The G.R.M.
The D.A.P. had no t been on f r ie n d ly  term s w ith  th e  G.R.M. s in ce  
th e  l a t t e r ' s  in c e p tio n  in  e a r ly  1968 from th e  moderate rem nants of th e  
L.P.M. (Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, V.Veerappan and V .David), th e  U.D.P. (Dr. Lim 
Chong Eu) and a group o f i n t e l l e c t u a l s ,  P ro fe sso rs  Syed H ussein A la ta s ,
Wang Gungwu and Dr. J .B .A .P e te r . The D .A .P .'s  i n i t i a l  d is l ik e  fo r  th e  
G.R.M. was i t s  f e a r  th a t  th e  l a t t e r  would be a se r io u s  r i v a l  to  i t  in  th e  
f ig h t  fo r  th e  growing a n ti-A ll ia n c e  mood as a p re lude  to  th e  1969 g en era l 
e le c t io n s .  I t  a lso  b e lie v ed  th a t  th e  G.R.M. was d iv id ed  on im portan t is su e s  
l ik e  language and c u ltu re . This b e l ie f  appeared v in d ic a te d  in  th e  Big Cul­
t u r a l  Debate in  l a t e  1968 between th e  2 p a r t ie s  when th e  D.A.P. a t t r ib u te d
ned Dato Keramat fo r  th e  S .F . In  Perak , th e  Seenivasagam b ro th e rs  
r e ta in e d  th e  s e a ts  o f Ipoh and Menglembu r e s p e c tiv e ly .
13. S t r a i t s  Times, 12th May, 19&9* P a r t  of th e  reason  fo r  th e  resounding  
v ic to r ie s  was th e  e le c to r a l  pact in  which th e  o p p o s itio n  p a r t ie s  en­
gaged in  s t r a ig h t  f ig h t s  w ith th e  A llia n c e .
14. See Lim K it S ia n g 's  speech on c o a l i t io n  p o l i t i c s ,  Malay M ail,
26th August, 1972.
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th e  G.R.M. *3 s tan d  on language and c u ltu re  to  be more extreme than  U .M .N .O .'s,
ba3ed on th e  views o f Dr. Syed Naguib A la ta s , b ro th e r  of P ro fe sso r Syed
15H ussein A la ta s , th e  G.R.Ll.’s Chairman. Dr. N aguib 's s tan d  appeared to  th e  
D.A.P. to  c o n f l ic t  w ith  th a t  of Dr. Tan Chee Khoon and Dr. Lim Chong Eu, 
who were re p o r te d ly  in  favour of m u lti- lin g u a lism . D esp ite  th i s  mutual 
h o s t i l i t y ,  th e  D.A.P. came to  an e le c to r a l  und ers tan d in g  w ith  th e  G.R.M. in  
which each pledged not to  c o n te s t a g a in s t th e  o th e r  in  th e  1969 g en era l 
e le c t io n s  so as to  e f fe c t  s t r a ig h t  f ig h ts  w ith  A llian ce  can d id a te s . This 
arrangem ent, which was acknowledged by bo th  p a r t ie s  as no more than  a mar­
r ia g e  o f convenience, a ro se  a f t e r  th e  A llian ce  (lI.C .A .) v ic to ry  in  th e  S er- 
dang (S elangor) s t a t e  b y -e le c tio n  in  e a r ly  1969« In  th a t  b y -e le c tio n , cau­
sed by th e  d e te n tio n  of th e  S .F . incum bent, Karam Singh, who had he ld  th e  
s e a t  s in ce  1959» th e  G.R.M. s p l i t  th e  o p p o s itio n  vo te  to  enable th e  M.C.A. 
to  b eat th e  D.A.P. in  a th re e -c ö m e re d  fi& ht}^ Both p a r t ie s  r e a l iz e d  from 
th e  experience  a t Serdang th a t  i f  they  c o n te s te d  a g a in s t each o th e r  in  t h ­
re e  or m u lti-co rn e red  f ig h t s ,  A llian ce  can d id a tes  would win as a r e s u l t  o f 
a s p l i t  in  th e  o p p o s itio n  v o te . A fte r th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  s igns o f 
an open r i f t  between th e  two p a r t ie s  developed. The D.A.P. was offended 
by th e  G.R.M.'s  r e je c t io n  of i t s  c a l l  ( to g e th e r  w ith  th e  P .P .P .)  to  form 
c o a l i t io n  governments in  th e  deadlocked r e s u l t s  o f bo th  th e  Selangor
15. Lim K it S iang, th e  D .A .P .'s  main sp eaker, accused Dr. Syed Naguib 
A la tas  o f p lann ing  to  In d o n es ian ise  m u l t i - r a c ia l  and m u lt i - c u l tu ra l  
M alaysia th rough  c u l tu ra l  and l i n g u i s t i c  u n ifo rm ity  based on Malay. 
For th e  f u l l  te x t  o f K it S ia n g 's  speech , see "The Big C u ltu ra l De­
b a te"  in  Y/ho Lives i f  M alaysia Dies? D.A.P. '3  Case fo r  a M u lt i - r a c ia l  
S o c ie ty , D .A .P ., P e ta l in g  Jaya , 1969, pp. 71-94« The d eb a te , which 
la s te d  some 5 hours, s e t t l e d  n o th in g  between th e  2 p a r t i e s .  On th e  
c o n tra ry , i t  c re a te d  even more b i t t e r n e s s .  Dr. Naguib re s ig n ed  from 
th e  G.R.M. s h o r t ly  a f t e r  th e  deb a te , to  th e  r e l i e f  o f Dr. Tan Chee 
Khoon and Dr. Lim Chong Eu. Nancy L. S n id e r, "Race, L eitm otiv  of th e  
Malayan E lec tio n  Drama", Asian Survey, Vol. X Ho.12, December 1970, 
pp. 1071-87.
16. The r e s u l t  of th e  b y -e le c tio n  was as fo llo w s: A llian ce  6,535
D.A.P. 5,928 G.R.M. 1 ,330. Sunday Times, 6 th  January , 1969.
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17and Perak s t a t e  assem b lie s . Although th e  r e s u l t s  in d ic a te d  o th e rw ise ,
th e  D.A.P. (and P .P .P .)  seemed to  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  G.R.M. had d e l ib e r a te ly
p reven ted  th e  fo rm ation  o f D .A .P ./ P .P .P . le d  c o a l i t io n  governments in  3 e l-  
18angor and Perak . The D.A.P. regarded  th e  G.R.M.'s  a t t i tu d e  as tre a c h e ro u s , 
s in c e  i t  b e lie v ed  tha.t by keeping  out of Penang, i t  had helped  th e  G.R.M. 
to  cap tu re  th a t  s t a t e  government in  s t r a ig h t  f ig h ts  w ith  th e  A llia n c e . The 
G.R.M.'s  r e je c t io n  o f th e  D .A .P .'s  c a l l  and i t s  in te n t io n  to  remain n e u tr a l  
in  th e  Selangor and Perak s t a t e  assem blies dem onstrated i t s  concern to  p a c i­
fy  th e  Malays who had become alarm ed a t th e  ex ten t o f th e  non-Malay opposi­
t io n  success in  th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s .  Besides i t  could a ffo rd  to  i g ­
nore  th e  D.A.P. s in c e  i t  had an ab so lu te  m a jo rity  in  Penang to  form th e  
s t a t e  government by i t s e l f .  As f a r  as th e  G.R.M. was concerned, th e  m a rr i­
age o f convenience between th e  two p a r t ie s  was over. Follow ing th e  p e rio d  
o f 11.0.C. ru le  in  th e  co un try , th e  G.R.M. appeared to  move c lo se r  to  th e  
A llia n c e . The C en tra l Government c o n tro lle d  th e  funds necessary  fo r  P enang 's  
development ( in c lu d in g  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  o f a b rid g e  l in k in g  th e  is la n d  and 
th e  m ainland) which th e  G.R.M. had prom ised th e  Penang e le c to ra te  in  th e  
1969 g en e ra l e le c t io n s .  I t  would th e re fo re  be in  th e  in te r e s t s  o f th e  i s ­
land  to  c u l t iv a te  and m ain ta in  good r e la t io n s  w ith  Kuala Lumpur to  e f fe c t  
development ail a id  fo r  Penang. I f  th e  G.R.M. moved c lo se r  to  th e  A llia n c e , 
i t  was moving f u r th e r  away from th e  D.A.P. Dr. Lim Chong Eu re p e a te d ly  
spum ed what he considered  to  be u n s o l ic i te d  advice from th e  D .A .P., p a r t i ­
c u la r ly  from i t3  Penang Chairman and 3 ta te  assemblyman, Yeap Ghim Guan, as
17. The deadlocked r e s u l t s  were as fo llo w s:
S elangor: A llian ce  14 D.A.P. 9 G.R.M. 4 Ind . 1 (T o ta l 28) 
P erak : A llian ce  19 P .P .P . 12 D.A.P. 6 G.R.M. 2 P .A .S . 1 
(T o ta l 4S) S t r a i t s  Times, 12th May, 1969.
18. Even i f  th e  G.R.M. agreed to  jo in  th e  D .A .P ./ P .P .P . c o a l i t io n  in  bo th  
s t a t e s ,  a l l  3 p a r t ie s  combined could no t e f fe c t  a sim ple m a jo rity  in  
th e  deadlocked r e s u l t s  as in d ic a te d  in  Footnote 17«
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re g a rd s  how th e  3 ta te  government should be ru n . A pparently  angry a t b e in g  
re p e a te d ly  spum ed, th e  D.A.P. r e t a l i a t e d  by accusing  th e  G.R.M. o f b e tra y ­
in g  th e  t r u s t  o f th e  Penang e le c to ra te  in  p o in tin g  to  th e  in c re a s in g  ra p p o rt 
between th e  G.R.M. and th e  A llia n c e . The D .A .P .’s in te n t io n  was to  3how th a t  
th e  G.R.M. was no d i f f e r e n t  from th e  M .C.A., which th e  Penang v o te rs  had com­
p le te ly  r e je c te d  a t th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s .  S evera l developments w itjiin  
th e  G.R.M. appeared to  v in d ic a te  th e  D.A.P . 13 charge. The G.R.M. had voted  
w ith  th e  A llian ce  in  th e  1971 C o n s ti tu tio n a l Amendment B i l l ,  a move p o rtray e d  
by th e  D.A.P. as pro-M alay, and by im p lic a tio n , an ti-C h in e se . In  mid-1971» 
th e  G.R.M. i t s e l f  s p l i t  in to  2 fa c tio n s  over Dr. Lim Chong Eu 's o v e r tly  i n ­
c re a s in g  p ro -A llian c e  a t t i t u d e  reg a rd in g  Penang 's r e la t io n s h ip  w ith  th e
19
C en tra l Government. The r i v a l  fa c t io n  headed by Dr. Tan Chee Khoon became 
P a r t i  K eadilan  M asyarakat (PEKEI.IAS) w ith  b a s ic a l ly  th e  same aims as th e  
G.R.M. a t i t s  in c e p tio n  in  1968. With th e  d ep artu re  of i t s  prom inent l e a ­
d ers  a t  bo th  P a rliam en ta ry  and S ta te  l e v e l s ,  Dr. Lim Chong Bu was v i r t u a l ly
a lo n e , th e reb y  be in g  fo rced  to  move even c lo se r  to  th e  A llian ce  to  m ain ta in
20h is  shaky p o s i t io n .  The fa c t  th a t  Dr. Lim Chong Eu was once a P re s id e n t
o f th e  M.C.A. was no t lo 3 t on th e  D.A.P. as reg ard s  h is  in c re a s in g ly  c lo se
21a s s o c ia t io n  w ith  th e  A llia n c e . The D.A.P. suggested  th a t  he had re tu rn e d
19. For f u l l  d e t a i l s ,  see S t r a i t s  Times, v a rio u s  is s u e s ,  from 18th  June 
to  12 th  J u ly , 1971.
20. The prom inent le a d e rs  who re s ig n ed  were P ro fe sso r  Syed H ussein A la tä s , 
Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, V.Veerappan, ,V.David, Yeoh Teck Chye and Mustapha 
H ussein. In  P a rliam en t, Dr. Lim was th e  only G.R.M. M.P. l e f t  of th e  
8 who were e le c te d  in  1969» At s t a t e  le v e l ,  th e  G.R.M.'s  16 assem bly- 
men were reduced to  13» having  a b a re  m a jo rity  o f 1. Dr. Lim was thus 
fo rced  to  tu rn  to  th e  4 U.M.N.O. a33emblymen fo r  su p p o rt.
21. Dr. Lim, then  a le ad in g  "Young Turk", had d e fea ted  Tan Cheng Lock, th e  
incumbent P re s id e n t, f o r  th e  M.C.A. P residency  in  1958 by 89 v o tes  to  
67 . R .K .V asil, P o l i t i c s  in  a P lu ra l  S o c ie ty : A Study o f Non-communal 
P o l i t i c a l  P a r t i e s  in  West M alaysia , East Asian H is to r ic a l  Monographs, 
Oxford U n iv e rs ity  P re s s , Kuala Lumpur, 1971» Ch. I .  He gave up th e  
M.C.A. P residency  a f t e r  th e  U.M.N.O./ M.C.A. c r i s i s  over th e  a l lo c a ­
t io n  of s e a ts  fo r  th e  1959 g en era l e le c t io n s .  A fte r a sh o rt in te r v a l ,  
he formed th e  U nited Democratic P a rty  (U .D .P.) in  1962.
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to  th e  fo ld  o f th e  A llian ce  a f t e r  com pleting a c i r c le  from th e  M.C.A., th e
22U .D .P ., th e  G.R.M. and f i n a l l y ,  hack to  th e  IvI.C.A. Thus th e  D.A.P. j u s t i f i e d  
i t s  c o n ten tio n  th a t  th e  G.R.M. jo in e d  th e  N.F. c o a l i t io n  to  p reven t th e  
dw ind ling  of i t s  p o l i t i c a l  fo r tu n e s  r a th e r  th an  to  e f fe c t  th e  in t e r e s t s  o f 
th e  Penang e le c to ra te  which had voted  i t  to  power.
The P .P .P .
Compared to  the  G.R.M., th e  P .P .P . appeared c lo se r  to  th e  D.A.P.
in  th e  sense th a t  bo th  p a r t ie s  shared  common o b je c tiv e s  o f m u lti- lin g u a lism ,
c u l tu r a l  democracy and antagonism  towards Malay s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s .  The
P .P .P . had t r i e d  to  merge w ith  th e  D .A .P .’s fo re -ru n n e r , th e  P .A .P ., bu t
i t s  o v e rtu re s  were tu rn ed  down fo llo w in g  th e  S ingapore r a c i a l  r i o t s  of 1964»
Lee Kuan Yew had in ten d ed  a p o l i t i c a l  tru c e  w ith  th e  A llian ce  and th e re fo re
f e l t  th a t  form al l in k s  w ith  an o v e r tly  an ti-M alay  p a rty  l ik e  th e  P .P .P .
would be an o b s ta c le . In  tu rn  th e  D.A.P. had always admired th e  v o c ife ro u s
23
a n ti-A ll ia n c e  s tan d  taken  by th e  l a t e  P .P .P . le a d e r , D.R.Seenivasagam. 
Although p ro sp ec ts  of a m erger between th e  2 p a r t ie s  appeared good in  view 
of s im ila r  o b je c t iv e s , th e  P .P .P . fe a red  th a t  in  such an even t, i t  would be 
submerged by th e  la rg e r  and b ro ader-based  D.A.P. The P .P .P . 's  fe a rs  were 
no t e n t i r e ly  g ro u n d less . In  th e  m iddle 1960s, th e  D.A.P. had e s ta b lis h e d  
s e v e ra l  branches in  th e  P .P .P . 's  s tro n g h o ld  in  th e  K in ta  V alley  o f Perak as 
p a r t  o f i t s  n a tio n -w id e  expansion p la n s . The P .P .P . regarded  t h i s  as e f f o r t s
22. For a j u s t i f i c a t i o n  o f t h i s  view, see James M organ,"Full C irc le  fo r  
Dr. Lim?", Far E astern  Economic Review, 25th  December, 1971*
23« D.R.Seenivasagam became th e  f i r s t  non-Malay o p p o sitio n  M.P. when he 
s u c c e s s fu lly  co n tes ted  th e  Ipoh-Menglembu P arliam en ta ry  b y -e le c tio n  
in  l a t e  1957 a g a in s t th e  M.C.A. on a P .P .P . t i c k e t .  R .K .V asil, o p . c i t . ,  
p .232 . He re ta in e d  th e  se a t in  bo th  th e  1959 and 1964 g en era l e le c ­
t io n s .  He had on many occasions spoken out s tro n g ly  a g a in s t th e  
N a tio n a l Language, s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s  fo r  Malays and p u b lic ly  advo­
ca ted  e q u a li ty  fo r  non-M alays. He d ied  in  March 1969.
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by the D.A.P. to undercut its support, but this was denied by the D.A.P.^
It was also alleged that the D.A.P. had induced the en-masse defections of
P.P.P. local councillors and office bearers so that the D.A.P. actually came
25to control a former P.P.P. local council. Despite these differences, their 
common antagonism towards the Alliance brought about an electoral pact which 
appeared to be more than a marriage of convenience for the 1969 general ele­
ctions. Following the elections, the D.A.P. was prepared to help the P.P.P. 
come to power in Perak by forming a coalition government to include the
26G.R.M. and even P.A.S. However this was not successful owing to the G.R.M. 
rejecting the proposal and the subsequent racial riot in Kuala Lumpur. The 
last semblance of a D.A.P. / P.P.P. unity was their common stand against 
the Constitutional Amendment Bill in February 1971» After it came into effe­
ct, the P.P.P., like the D.A.P., found its pre-1969 appeal became severely 
restricted. It realized that it would also face political isolation in the 
new era of accommodation politics. Added to this disadvantage was the in­
tention of the Alliance to take control of the P.P.P.-administered Ipoh
2 4. In opening a D.A.P. branch in Ipoh in 19^7» the then Secretary-General, 
Devan Hair, stated that "the object of the D.A.P. in setting up a 
branch wa3 not to fight v/ith the other opposition parties like the 
P.P.P. but rather to find a united front against the Alliance".
Straits Times, 26th June, 1967» op«cit.
25« For details of the D.A.P.-induced P.P.P. en-masse defections, see
The Guardian, Vol.I Ho.11, August 1967« These allegations were ex­
ploited by the 1.1.C.A. to cause a rift between the P.P.P. and the D.A.P.
26. Since its inception, the P.P.P. had never really come so close to con­
trolling a state government than after the 1969 general elections.
Its leader, S.P.Seenivasagam, had even sought an audience with the 
Sultan of Perak to discuss the possibility of a P.P.P.-led coalition 
government. The P.P.P. intended to muster all 21 opposition state 
assemblymen (P.P.P. 12, D.A.P. 6, G.R.M. 2 and P.A.S. l) so as to 
effect a simple majority of 2 against the Alliance's 19 members in the 
assembly. S.P.Seenivasagam wanted to make the sole P.A.S. representa­
tive the Speaker so as to neutralise his vote. This would appear ra­
ther far-fetched, since the P.A.S. assemblyman had publicly indicated 
his desire to back U.M.IT.O. in the event of a non-Malay political 
threat. See Goh Cheng Teik, The May Thirteenth Incident and Democracy 
in Malaysia, Oxford in Asia Current Affairs, Oxford University Press, 
Kuala Lumpur and Singapore, 1971» p.25*
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Municipal Council a3 part of the Central Government’s exercise of abolishing 
local councils initiated since 1971* As the P.P.P. was unwilling to lose 
its only semblance of political power, it rationalised that the only alter­
native was to come to terms with the Alliance, so that incumbent P.P.P. mu­
nicipal councillors could still continue in office under the Alliance.
Thus the P.P.P. regarded Tun Razak’s offer of a coalition government in 
Perak as the only way out of its quandary in the prevailing circumstances. 
Besides Tun Razak's terms also appeared generous; state/federal funds could 
be procured to effect the Ipoh Municipal Council's development projects and
the P.P.P. could also participate in the Perak state government, something
27it had always desired. The D.A.P. wa3 angry that its only ally after the 
1969 racial riot had to chosen to desert it at the time it was facing incre­
asing isolation. The D.A.P.'s anger at the P.P.P. appeared to be greater 
(compared to its dislike for the G.R.M.) since the former had shown itself 
not only to be opportunistic but cowardly a3 well. It therefore sought to 
discredit the P.P.P. by contrasting the conciliatory approach of S.P.Seeni- 
vasagam in coming to terms with the Alliance with the earlier strong anti- 
Alliance stand taken by the late D.R.Seenivasagam. It even went a step fur-
27. P.P.P leaders tried very hard to explain the justification of the
coalition with the Alliance to their constituents. S.P.Seenivasagam 
and Khong Kok Yat stated that the P.P.P. wanted to do something con­
structive owing to a change in political realities in the country. 
Seenivasagam added that the P.P.P. faced these realities and accepted 
the fact it could only fulfil the expectations of its supporters by 
working closely with the Alliance. Straits Echo, 22nd May, 1972» 
Speaking at the Fourth Great Economics Debate at the University of 
Malaya, Seenivasagam said,"We cannot change the basic policies of the 
government, but we most certainly can ensure a more just implementa­
tion of those policies. If we stay out and maintain a confrontation 
with the Malays, the result will be chaos. Once we get a mandate from 
the people we represent, a coalition government cannot ignore their 
voice..." Malay Mail, 26th August, 1972, op. cit. He pledged that 
if there was bad faith, then the P.P.P. would pull out of the coali­
tion government. Ibid. The P.P.P.'s lengthy explanations were 
designed to counter the D.A.P.'s charges that it had sold out the 
rights of the non-Malays it represented by coming to terms with the 
Alliance.
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ther to allege that P.F.P. state assemblymen received bribes and favours
when the P.P.P. joined the coalition, never failing to imply that the late
D.R.Seenivasagam had once exposed a corruption scandal involving a govern-
28ment minister in the early 1960s.
The M.C.A.
The D.A.P. also turned its attack on the M.C.A. This seemed to 
indicate that as far as it was concerned, the row with the M.C.A. over the 
leakage of the secret merger talks in mid-1971 far from over. The 
D.A.P. felt that the M.C.A.'s raising of the principle of joining it (i.e. 
the M.C.A.) if the price was right, which it could not deny, had been parti­
cularly damaging to its credibility. Moreover the M.C.A. had been inducing 
its elected representatives and members to defect prior to its leadership 
struggle in mid-1972. Being aware that the M.C.A. appeared unhappy over 
the decision of U.M.N.O. to bring the G.R.I.I. and the P.P.P. into an extended 
1J.F. because this would hamper its (i.e. the M.C.A.'s) efforts to regain
Chinese supx)ort, the D.A.P. derided the M.C.A.'s inability to rebuild it-
29self after its shattering defeat in the 1969 general elections. The D.A.P. 
regarded the M.C.A.'s efforts to reorganize itself through the "new blood"
23. Lim Kit Siang alleged that a P.P.P. State Assemblyman was alienated 
1,000 acres of oil palm land worth $100,000 in the district of Hut an 
Melintang in Lower Perak when the P.P.P. joined the Alliance coalition. 
See Parliamentary speech,"Corruption in High Political Places", in 
Lim Kit Siang, Time Bombs in Malaysia, 2nd ed, D.A.P.,Kuala Lumpur, 
1978» p.46. For details of how the late D.R.Seenivasagam exposed 
the corruption scandal involving the former Hducation Minister, Rah­
man Talib, see Karl Von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus, Communa- 
lism and Political Stability in Malaysia, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1975» pp» 183-3.
29. See Lim Kit Siang's speech on coalition politics, Malay Mail, 26th 
August, 1972.
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as mere propaganda which impressed no one, least of all U.M.N.O. That 
was why the latter had lost faith in the M.C.A.'s capability to canvass for 
Chinese votes and sought new non-Malay partners. It pointed out that even 
the M.C.A. victory at the Ulu Selangor by-election in June 1972 was due 
more to U.M.N.O.'s efforts, since the M.C.A. could not muster more than 
30yo of the total votes?*“1 The D.A.P.'s tirades against the M.C.A. appeared 
to be a reaction to the latter's remarks that rabble-rousing and unwarranted 
criticisms on its (i.e. the D.A.P.'s) part were no solutions to the problems 
of the non-Malays in the new era of accommodation and development?^-
In retrospect, the D.A.P.'s attacks against the non-Malay part­
ners in the N.F. coalition appeared to be a show of resentment and defiance. 
It resented the fact that the government decided to isolate it by creating 
conditions not conducive to its survival unless it changed its basic poli­
cies. Lim Xit Siang decided to intensify the D.A.P.'s pre-1969 strategy 
in the feeling that if the government decided to isolate the D.A.P. politi­
cally, the D.A.P. would fight back with whatever means it had. The party 
rationalised that whatever the merits of the N.F. coalition as claimed by 
its former allies, the legitimate grievances of the non-Malays relating to 
their fundamental rights would not be resolved unless the basic pro-Malay 
policies of the government were reviewed. As in the old Alliance, where 
the roles of the M.C.A. and the M.I.C. appeared insignificant, the D.A.P.
30. Ibid.
31« For the M.C.A.'s views on coalition politics, see Michael Chen,
"Changing Political Structures and Alignments" in Yong Mun Cheong ed., 
op.cit. See also Lew Sip Hon's speech delivered at the Fourth Great 
Economics Debate at the University of Malaya, Malay Mail, 26th Au­
gust, 1972,and Tun Tan Slew Sin's speech delivered to the Historical 
Society of the University of Malaya on the dangers of venting racial 
issues in public, Suara Malaysia. 15th September, 1965*
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believed that the G.R.M. and the P.P.P. would not be able to contain the 
dictatorial attitude of U.M.N.O. As such, contrary to their claims, they 
would be unable to effect meaningful changes to the advantage of the non- 
Malays whom they purportedly represented. The D.A.P. concluded that both 
the G.R.M. and the P.P.P. Y/ere only interested to preserve their identity 
and survival by coming to terms with U.M.N.O. By criticising its former 
allies, the D.A.P. hoped to supplant them in their traditional strongholds 
in the urban areas of Penang and Perak. The D.A.P.'s opportunity to do this 
came in the 1974 general elections. Charging that the G.R.M. and the P.P.P. 
had sold out non-Malay rights, the D.A.P. concentrated all its efforts in 
its bid to capture the state governments of Penang and Perak. Greatly han­
dicapped by the cautious mood of the electorate, a3 the general elections 
were the first after the 1969 racial riot, the D.A.P. v/as unsuccessful in 
Penang. Dr.Lim Chong Eu's response of partially delivering the goods and 
the multi-cornered fights involving PEKI3.1AS, the P.S.R.M. and independents, 
were the contributing factors. However the D.A.P. succeeded in dislodging 
the P.P.P. from its stronghold in the Kinta Valley of Perak as the predomi­
nantly Chinese electorate could not reconcile itself v/ith the P.P.P.'s about-
turn stance which v/as not balanced by any significant manifestation3 of
32development as the P.P.P. had pledged. In the 1978 general elections,
the D.A.P. succeeded in making some headway in Penang, partly due to the
33rivalry between the M.C.A. and the G.R.M. In Perak, it consolidated its 
1974 victories in the Kinta Valley.
32. For full details, see Chandrasekaran Pillay, The 1974 General Electi­
ons in Malaysia: A Post-Mortem, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Singapore, 1974* In Penang, only 2 D.A.P 3tate assemblymen were ele­
cted, but they subsequently defected to the M.C.A. In Perak, the 
D.A.P. v/on 11 state seats, defeating P.P.P. incumbents,including its 
strongman, S.F.Seenivasagam. The traditional P.P.P. Parliamentary 
strongholds of Ipoh and Menglembu Y/ere also wrested by the D.A.P.
The rivalry between the M.C.A. and the G.R.M. in Penang involved33.
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(b ) Local Government E lec tio n s
Local government in  P en in su la r M alaysia ha3 always been a sso c ia te d  
w ith  th e  towns and sem i-urban a re a s . In  th e  l a t e  1960s, th e  s t ru c tu re  of 
lo c a l  government was as fo llo w s: Kuala Lumpur (F edera l C a p i ta l) ,  th e  3 muni­
c i p a l i t i e s  o f Georgetown(Penang), Ipoh and M alacca, 37 town co u n c ils , 37 
town b o ards, 7 d i s t r i c t  cou n cils  and 289 lo c a l  co u n cils  which comprised some 
60/S of th e  new v il la g e s ? ^  E le c tio n s  to  lo c a l  bodies such as th e  above, had 
always been regarded  as g ra s s - ro o ts  democracy, where the  people e le c te d  lo ­
c a l  re p re s e n ta t iv e s  to  run t h e i r  own a f f a i r s .  Local government e le c tio n s  
were h e ld  from 1957 to  1963» I t  had been th e  p ra c t ic e  of p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  
to  in v o lv e  them selves in  lo c a l  government e le c t io n s  in  a d d itio n  to  g en era l 
e le c t io n s .  Thus what had been reg arded  as n a t io n a l  is su e s  such as language, 
c u l tu re  and ed u ca tio n , were brought w ith in  th e  realm  of lo c a l  p o l i t i c s  in  
a d d itio n  to  what p ro sp e c tiv e  cand ida tes  could o f f e r  p e rso n a lly  to  serve  as 
lo c a l  c o u n c il lo rs .  Local government e le c t io n s  were suspended in  1964» th e  
y e a r  Indonesian  C on fro n ta tio n  began. In  19^5» t h e i r  suspension  was l e g i s ­
la te d ,  C on fro n ta tio n  being  c i te d  as th e  main reaso n . The A thi Nahappan 
Commission o f Enquiry to  study a l l  a sp ec ts  o f lo c a l  government in  l a t e  1971
th e  a l lo c a t io n  o f s t a t e  oeat3 fo r  th e  1970 g en era l e le c tio n s  in  Pe­
nang among the  II.F . components. Owing to  i t s  dism al perform ance in  
th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  th e  1.1.C.A. was given only 3 s e a ts  to  con­
t e s t  a t  s t a t e  le v e l  in  1974* I t  won only 1, but managed to  secure  
3 more by in d uc ing  d e fe c tio n s  from PEKB.IAS ( l )  and the  D.A.P. ( 2 ) .
By 1978> th e  M.C.A. f e l t  th a t  i t  had s u f f ic ie n t ly  recovered  from i t s  
1969 debacle  and th a t  th e  Penang v o te rs  were g e t t in g  d i s s a t i s f i e d  
w ith  th e  G.R.M. A ttem pting to  make a come-back, th e  M.C.A. demanded 
a t l e a s t  0 s e a ts  a t s t a t e  le v e l .  The f in a l  N.F. d e c is io n  however 
a llo c a te d  th e  M.C.A. only 5 compared to  th e  G.R.M.’s 11, U.M .N.O.'s 
10 and M .I .C . 's  1. Obviously unhappy, th e  M.C.A. f ie ld e d  "indepen­
den ts"  a g a in s t th e  G.R.M. to  wliich th e  l a t t e r  r e t a l i a t e d  lik e w ise .
The r e s u l t  was th a t  th e  D.A.P. b e n e f i t te d  from th e  s p l i t  in  th e  N.F. 
v o te  to  w rest 5 s t a t e  and 4 P a rliam en ta ry  s e a ts  from th e  N.F. in  Pe­
nang.
34* R .S .M ilne and D.K.Mauzy, op. c i t . .  p . 284.
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suggested, th e  resum ption of th e  suspended lo c a l  government e le c t io n s .
However th e  recommendation was no t fo llow ed and th e  government continued
i t s  a b o l i t io n  o f e le c te d  lo c a l  bod ies by re p la c in g  e le c te d  lo c a l c o u n c il lo rs
w ith  s ta te -a p p o in te d  members and r e s t r u e tu r in g  th e  lo c a l  bodies them selves 
35in  1972. J S ince 1976, th e  Local Government Act had re s tru c tu re d  th e  then  
374 lo c a l  a u th o r i t ie s  (from m u n ic ip a li t ie s  to  lo c a l  new v i l la g e  c o u n c ils )  
in to  12 m u n ic ip a li t ie s  and about 90 d i s t r i c t  c o u n c ils , w ith  s ta te -a p p o in te d  
c o u n c i l lo r s ^
The D .A .P .'s  r e a c t io n  to  th e  con tinued  suspension  of lo c a l  govern­
ment e le c t io n s  was, p re d ic ta b ly , un fav o u rab le . As a p a r ty  th a t  was r e g i s ­
te r e d  in  1966, a y e a r  a f t e r  th e  suspension  o f lo c a l  government e le c tio n s  
was le g i s l a t e d ,  i t  never had th e  o p p o rtu n ity  to  p a r t i c ip a te  in  them, th e re ­
by t e s t i n g  i t s  appeal a t g ra s s - ro o ts  le v e l .  Local government e le c tio n s  
appeared im portan t to  th e  D.A.P. in  term s o f w inning th e  Chinese v o te . In  
th e  10 most populous urban a reas  o f  P e n in su la r  M alaysia, th e  r a c i a l  compo- 
s i t i o n  was 29/J Malay, 57>^  Chinese, 13fo In d ian  and Z/o O thers. In  th e  muni­
c i p a l i t i e s  o f Georgetown, Ipoh and M alacca, th e  p ro p o rtio n  o f th e  Chinese 
was even h ig h e r in  r e la t io n  to  th e  o th e r r a c e s . As a C hinese-based p a rty  
w ith  i t s  p o l ic ie s  having  a s tro n g  appeal fo r  th e  Chinese, th e  D.A.P. r a t i o ­
n a lis e d  th a t  i f  such e le c t io n s  were h e ld , i t  would be ab le  to  tak e  con­
t r o l  of s e v e ra l lo c a l  b o d ie s . I t s  r a t io n a l iz a t io n s  were prem ised on th e  
v ic to r ie s  o f C hinese-based p a r t ie s  l ik e  th e  S .F . and P .P .P . in  th e  e a r l i e r
35. For f u l l  d e ta i l s  o f th e  governm ent's a b o l i t io n  of lo c a l  government 
e le c t io n s ,  see  Paul Tennant,"The D ecline of E le c tiv e  Local Govern­
ment in  M alay sia" , Asian Su rv ey , Vol. X III Ho. 4» A p ril 1973, pp* 
347-65.
36. R .S .M ilne and D.K.Mauzy, op. c i t . ,  p . 289.
37« Paul Tennant, op, c i t . ,  p . 347*
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local government elections. These parties had been able to defeat the 
Alliance to take control of the municipalities of Georgetown (3.F.) and 
Ipoh (P.P.P.) exclusively, or by coalitions with other parties such as the
 ^n
U.D.P. in the case of the town councils like Taiping and Seremban. The 
D.A.P. believed that control of local bodies would enable it to build up a
39strong power base to prepare itself for the Stateand Parliamentary elections. 
If the D.A.P. had any hopes of controlling a state government, it believed 
that the necessary pre-requisite to this was to control the important local 
bodies in the state concerned, not withstanding the fact that state ( and 
Parliamentary) constituency delimitations were gerrymandered in such a way 
as to favour the Malay vote. (Thi3 is to be discussed later). Under these 
circumstances, the D.A.P. was inclined to attribute the continued suspension 
of local government elections to U.M.N.O.'s alleged political motive of 
wanting to deprive the non-I.Ialay majorities at the local level of position 
and influenced In thi3 Lim Kit 3iang accused the government of not follow­
ing the recommendation of the Athi Nahappan Report to resume the suspended 
local government elections, alleging that the ruling party» despite its sup­
port for democracy, did not openly accept the cardinal principle in democra­
cy, that it should bow bo the wishes of the electorate if the latter wanted 
a change of governmentd The D.A.P.’s allegations seemed to suggest the 
intention of the Malay-led state governments to control local bodies either 
directly or indirectly. The latter case seemed more likely in view of the 
predominant Chinese population in the composition of the local bodies if
38. Ibid, pp. 347-65.
39» See Parliamentary speech,”«7hy Local Governments should be elected", 
on 11th February, 1972, in Lim Kit oiang, op. cit., pp. 29-35»
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid, p.31.
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e le c t io n s  were h e ld , a t l e a s t  th e o r e t ic a l ly .  In  such a s i tu a t io n ,  th e  Malay- 
le d  governments a t s t a t e  le v e l  would e x e rc ise  c o n tro l through M.C.A. e le c te d  
lo c a l  c o u n c il lo rs ,  who would be re sp o n s ib le  to  th e  h ig h e r Malay a u th o r i t ie s  
in  th e  s t a t e  governm ents. In  p r a c t ic e ,  however, th e  lik e lih o o d  o f M.C.A. 
c o u n c il lo rs  be ing  e le c te d  in  predom inantly  Chinese lo c a l  bodies to  form 
ex c lu s iv e  A ll ia n c e -c o n tro l le d  lo c a l  governments seemed rem ote, given what 
th e  average Chinese lo c a l  government v o te r  perce iv ed  a3 th e  M .C.A.’s weak 
and su b se rv ie n t r o le  to  U.M.N.O. in  s t a t e  and n a tio n a l p o l i t i c s .  R .K .V asil’s 
a n a ly s is  o f th e  v o tin g  behaviour o f th e  M alaysian e le c to ra te  a t s t a t e  and 
n a t io n a l  le v e ls  appears to  v a l id a te  th i s  a rgum en t^  He concludes th a t  v o t­
in g  fo llow ed r a c i a l  l in e s  and M.C.A. can d id a tes  could only hope to  win in  
c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  where th e  Malay m in o rity  was a t le a s t  30)3*7 ^  Although V a s i l ’s 
a n a ly s is  r e f e r s  only to  S ta te  and P a rliam en ta ry  e le c t io n s ,  i t  a lso  a p p lie s  
to  lo c a l  government e le c t io n s ,  s in ce  th e  average Chinese v o te r  fo r  th e  S ta te  
and P a rliam en ta ry  e le c tio n s  was l ik e ly  to  v o te  in  lo c a l  co u n cil e le c tio n s  
as w e ll, i f  he happened to  be in  a lo c a l  co u n cil a re a . Under th e se  circum­
s ta n c e s , M.C.A. lo c a l  government can d id a te s  could only hope to  win in  lo c a l 
bod ies w ith  a t l e a s t  a 3O/o Malay m in o rity . A lte rn a tiv e ly , th e  A llian ce  
could e x e rc ise  power through c o a l i t io n s  w ith  o th e r p a r t ie s  o r independen ts.
I t  was thus very r a r e  fo r  th e  A llian ce  to  have ex c lu s iv e  co n tro l in  Chinese 
predom inated lo c a l  bodies th rough  e le c t io n s .  On th e se  grounds, th e  D.A.P. 
accused th e  government o f w anting to  k i l l  democracy a t g ra s s - ro o ts  le v e l  by
42. R .K .V asil, The Malayan G eneral E lec tio n  of 19&9? Oxford in  A sia
C urrent A f fa ir s ,  Oxford U n iv e rs ity  P re s s , S ingapore and Kuala Lumpur, 
1972, pp. 38-40.
43* I b id . This assumes th a t  th e  M.C.A. can d id a te  i s  invo lved  in  a s t r a i ­
ght f ig h t  w ith  a non-Malay o p p o sitio n  cand ida te  and th e  Malay m inori­
ty  tu rn s  out in  f u l l  fo r c e (a t  th e  p e rsu as io n  o f U.M.N.O.) to  vo te  fo r  
th e  M.C.A. Any s l ig h t  edge th a t  th e  non-Malay o p p o s itio n  has over th e  
M.C.A. would be o f f s e t  by th e  s o l id  Malay vo te  in  th e  l a t t e r ' s  favour. 
A way of en su ring  th e  M .C.A.'s  d e fe a t in  th i s  s i tu a t io n  i s  to  s p l i t  
th e  Malay vo te  by th e  en try  of a Malay p a r ty , e .g . P .A .S .
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denying the non-Malays their right to choose their own representatives 
through local council elections to run their own affairs.
If the D.A.P. resented what it regarded as U.M.N.O.'s dictatorial 
attitude in continuing the suspension of local government elections, it was 
inclined to belittle the M.C.A. in the eyes of the Chinese. In this it re­
ferred to the state-appointed members to replace elected local councillors 
in the government’s process of abolishing elected local bodies. As many of 
the appointed members were Chinese, it wa3 obvious to the D.A.P. that they 
would be M.C.A. members. The D.A.P. alleged that the M.C.A. appointees were 
in the majority of cases, candidates defeated in the 1969 general elections 
who were trying to make a come-back to political power through U.M.N.O.’s 
authority via appointments?^ It held that the LI.C.A. was not in favour of 
local government elections because it (the M.C.A.) feared an even bigger 
defeat than the 1969 general elections. Lim Kit Siang added that the
M.C.A. appointees, including those holding responsible positions a3 in the 
case of Datuk Tan Cheng Swee(the Malacca Municipal Commissioner) would ne­
ver be in their positions if elections were conducted?6 The D.A.P.'s deri­
sion of the M.C.A. led it to suggest further that appointed councillors were 
inclined to be dishonest and corrupt. As they were not elected and there­
fore not answerable to their constituents, the D.A.P. alleged that appointed 
councillors could afford to be inefficient and neglect their responsibilities?^ 
In making this allegation, the D.A.P. seemed to imply that elected local
44» Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 32.
45- Ibid.
46. Ibid..
47- Ibid, p. 33.
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councillors appeared dedicated to their work as they had a responsibility 
to those who elected them. Thus the D.A.P. accused the M.C.A. of plotting 
with U.M.N.O. to kill grass-roots democracy by supporting the government 
legislation in 1972 to abolish elected local bodies. The D.A.P.'s scathing 
attacks on the M.C.A. over the issue of elected local government reflected 
its continuing struggle with its rival for the support of the Chinese in 
the urban areas and the new villages. The new era of accommodation and 
development ushered in by Tun Razak placed the M.C.A. at an advantage to 
undercut the D.A.P.'s support among the Chinese. Thus the D.A.P.'s outbursts 
against the M.C.A. along the lines of the latter's subservient role to U.M. 
N.O. were intended to blunt this challenge.
The government's decision to continue suspending local government 
elections, to abolish elected local bodies and restructure them eventually, 
were premised on both political and administrative reasons. In the govern­
ment's view, they were inter-related. As regards political reasons, the 
government's rationale was that ultimate Malay control over local government 
was imperative if there was to be stability in post-1969 Malaysian politics. 
From previous experience, the M.C.A.'3 record at local government elections 
was always poor. U.M.N.O. rationalised that if such elections were held 
in the prevailing period, there was no guarantee that the M.C.A would per­
form well, given its recent dismal performance at the 1969 general elections. 
As such U.M.N.O. would not be able to exercise indirect control over the lo­
cal bodies through the M.C.A. Therefore it felt that the only way it could 
control local bodies was to have state-appointed members replacing elected 
local councillors. Besides, the non-co-operation between elected local bo­
dies dominated by opposition parties and Alliance-led state governments in 
the past seemed to justify U.M.N.O.'s contention that local bodies should
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ARhave appointed members rather than elected ones. Under these circumstances, 
whatever developmental plans local bodies(under the control of opposition 
parties) envisaged could be sabotaged. Thus to effect unhindered develop­
ment, divergent political views had to be eliminated. As the state govern­
ment was apparently in control of finance, it would appear that it had an 
advantage to insist that uniformity of political views be advocated. U.M.N.O. 
felt that this could be best achieved by having state-appointed councillors.
As regards administrative reasons, it had been the tendency of previous
elected councillors to engage in malpractices such as corruption and nepoti- 
49sm. Although not all elected councillors were guilty, this stigma could
not be erased. These malpractices were often at the expense of developmental
funds. The government held that divergent political views and malpractices
brought about stagnation in local bodies instead of progress. Thus it felt
that by abolishing local bodies and restructuring them, divergent political
views would be eliminated and development to include the provision of loans
for minor projects and infrastructure facilities such as new roads, drains,
50public lavatories and street lighting, be effected'.
Thus it may be held that the D.A.P.'s criticisms of the abolition 
of local government elections touched on only one aspect of the problem, i.e. 
the political aspect dealing with the government's intention to do away with 
different political views. Although the D.A.P.'s criticisms derided the
48. Opposition-controlled local councils had in the past clashed with the 
Alliance-administered state governments. In this instance, the S.F.- 
controlled Georgetown municipal Council had been reluctant to provide 
flags and illuminations to celebrate the end of emergency or the 
founding of Malaysia as requested by the Alliance-controlled Penang 
state government. R.S.Milne and D.K.Mauzy, op. cit., p. 286.
49. Paul Tennant, op. cit., pp. 361-3.
50. For details of development in restructured local bodies, see New 
Straits Times, 2nd October, 1979 ami 20th February, 1980.
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lii.C.A., they reflected its ora frustration at not being given the opportuni­
ty to test its appeal at grass-roots level in the same way that the P.A.P. 
was being thwarted in 1965 when local council elections were suspended. 
Granted that they were resumed in accordance with the recommendation of the 
Athi Nahappan Report, there was no certainty that the D.A.P. would sweep 
Chinese predominated local bodies as it had given the impression that it was 
capable of doing so. There appears to be some justification for this con­
tention when the D.A.P.’s popularity was tested against that of the IvI.C.A. 
in the Bekok state constituency by-election in 1971» In that predominantly
Chinese constituency in Johore, the D.A.P. was convincingly trounced by the 
51I.i.C.A. Assuming that this defeat may not be indicative of the non-accep­
tance of the D.A.P.’s abrasive style of politics in an era of accommodation 
and development, the fact that the government controlled the resources of 
development always placed the D.A.P. at a disadvantage. The D.A.P. was 
careful to avoid mentioning the administrative aspect of the problem which 
the government justified for abolishing elected local bodies. Beyond touch­
ing briefly on corruption which it attributed more to state-appointed coun­
cillors than elected ones, the D.A.P. avoided mentioning the inability of 
elected local councils to obtain funds for development. This difficulty 
was a major concern in that it Y/as one of the problems of the P.P.P.-contro­
lled Ipoh I.iunicipal Council v/hich led the P.P.P. leadership to accept the 
Alliance’s offer of a coalition government in mid-1972. The absence of a 
long and deep-rooted tradition of local government among the Chinese in
Peninsular Malaysia also made the D.A.P.’s call for the resumption of local
52government elections difficulty
51. See Section (a) in Ch. II.
52. Paul Tennant, op. cit., p. 348
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(c )  C onstituency  D e lim ita t ions
In  M alaysia, where p o l i t i c s  i s  based on ra c e , c o n stitu en cy  d e lim i­
t a t io n s  have played an im portan t r o le  in  de term in ing  th e  v e s tig e s  o f p o l i t i ­
c a l  power a long  th e  l in e s  o f ra c e . S ince th e  Malays c o n tro l p o l i t i c a l  power 
in  th e  co u n try , i t  has been th e  p r iv i le g e  o f U.M.N.O., th e  dominant Malay 
p a r ty ,  to  gerrym ander P arliam en ta ry  and S ta te  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  in  3uch a way 
a3 to  g uaran tee  and p e rp e tu a te  Malay p o l i t i c a l  supremacy. C onstituency  
boundaries were drawn in  such a way a3 to  ensure to  th e  M alays, p o l i t i c a l  
power d isp ro p o r tio n a te  to  t h e i r  numbers in  th e  coun try . Thus i f  th e  Malays 
com prised ju s t  over 50$ of th e  c o u n try 's  p o p u la tio n , th e  co n stitu en cy  d e l i ­
m ita tio n s  guaran teed  them a t l e a s t  6T/° of th e  t o t a l  s e a ts  in  P arliam en t and 
th e  o ta te  Assem blies where they  formed th e  m a jo rity  of th e  v o te rs . To th e  
M alays, th i s  was im p era tiv e  to  p reven t th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  of what they  reg a rd  
as a Chinese th r e a t  to  tak e  over th e  country  v ia  th e  b a l lo t  box. The 1957 
b a rg a in  between U.M.N.O. and th e  M.C.A. had c rea ted  l i b e r a l  co n d itio n s  in  
which th e  non-Malays could become c i t iz e n s  o f the  coun try . From 1955 to  
1959» th e  p ro p o rtio n  of non-Malay c i t iz e n s  in  th e  country  ro se  from I 5 . I /0 
(C hinese 11.2;£ and Ind ian s  3• 9/^) to  43,5 (C hinese 35*6/0 and Ind ians 7*47°)
as a r e s u l t  of th e se  l i b e r a l  c i t iz e n s h ip  laws and th e  a c tiv e  c i t iz e n s h ip
53re c ru itm e n t d r iv e  by th e  M.C.A; The Malays f e l t  th a t  as more and more
53* In 1955 when th e  f i r s t  g en era l e le c t io n s  were h e ld , th e  Malays com­
p ris e d  some 84. 2/0 o f th e  e le c to ra te  and formed th e  m a jo rity  in  50 
out o f 52 F ed era l c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  as a g a in s t th e  Chinese form ing only 
11.2,5 of th e  e le c to ra te  and predom inating  in  only 2 c o n s ti tu e n c ie s , 
i . e .  Georgetown (Penang) and Ipoh-M englembu(Perak). The A llian ce  
under Tunku Abdul Rahman however f ie ld e d  35 Malay, 15 C hinese, 1 
In d ian  and 1 Ceylonese can d id a tes  re s p e c tiv e ly  fo r  th e  1955 g en era l 
e le c t io n s .  In  1959» th e  Malays comprised 56. 8)o of th e  e le c to ra te  
and predom inated in  66 out o f a t o t a l  of 104 c o n s t i tu e n c ie s . K .J. 
Ratnam, Communalism and th e  P o l i t i c a l  P rocess in  M alaya, U n iv e rs ity  
o f Malaya P re s s , Kuala Lumpur, 1965» p .2 0 1 .
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non-Malays became citizens, their voting strength (and thereby political 
power) was also liable to be increased to the point that ultimately they 
would challenge the very basis (i.e. Malay political supremacy) of how the 
nation was built. This fear of the Malays was manifested in the under­
representation of Singapore in the Federal Parliament when Singapore was in 
Malaysia from 1963-5* Therefore the constituencies had to be gerrymandered 
in such a way that this possibility would not arise. The gerrymandering of 
the constituencies was also a means by the Malays to have at least two- 
thirds of all Parliamentary seats to amend the Constitution to forestall any 
possible change in the political situation that might disadvantage them.
From the I).A.P.'s point of view, the gerrymandering of Parliamen­
tary and State constituencies to favour the Malays appeared to be the most 
glaring manifestation of political imbalance against the non-Malays and the 
urban areas. Disregarding the arguments of history that Malaysia was first 
and foremost a Malay country, it attributed this to the government's non­
adherence to the principle of one-man-one-vote, considered to be the cardi­
nal principle in Parliamentary democracy, which the government professed to 
uphold. The D.A.P.'s strategy in stressing this principle was to dwell on 
the increasing disparity between the rural and the urban areas, highlighting 
the incidental disadvantage of the latter. As rural and urban areas coinci­
de with Malay and Chinese constituencies, the D.A.P. Y/as in fact harping on 
the political imbalance against the Chinese. Lim Kit Siang argued that the 
rural/urban disparity,which he associated with the strengthening of the Ma­
lay vote and the corresponding dilution of the Chinese vote, was increasing
54* Singapore which accounted for about 16/ of the total population of 
Malaysia was given only 15 seats(9*3/) out of a total of 159* 3n 
exchange, it was given autonomy in labour and education. R.K.Vasil, 
The Malayan General Election of 1969 > p* 6.
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r a t h e r  th a n  d e c re a s in g . T h is  n eg a ted  th e  p r in c ip le  o f  p o l i t i c a l  e q u a l i ty  
f o r  a l l  M a lay s ian s , w hich was g u a ra n te e d  by P a r lia m e n ta ry  dem ocracy. He 
s t a t e d  t h a t  r u r a l  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  had an advan tage o f  15$  in  th e  number o f 
v o te r s  v i s - a - v i s  u rban  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  a3 recommended by th e  E le c tio n s  Commi- 
s s io n  in  i 960 . However, U.M.N.O. was n o t s a t i s f i e d  w ith  t h i s  and su c c e s s ­
f u l l y  sough t an amendment to  th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  in  1962 to  p ro v id e  f o r  a 100$ 
ad v an tag e  f o r  r u r a l  a r e a s .  U .M .N.O.’s amendment meant th a t  th e  number o f 
r u r a l  v o tb rs  need be as few as  h a l f  t h a t  o f u rban  v o te r s ,  i t s  r a t i o n a l e  b e­
in g  th a t  t h i s  was n e c e s sa ry  to  overcome d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f a re a  and communica-
5 6
t i o n  to  e f f e c t  b e t t e r  r u r a l  r e p r e s e n ta t io n ;  In  1973» th e  D .A .P. p o in te d
ou t t h a t  U.M.N.O. sough t a n o th e r  amendment to  th e  e f f e c t  th a t  th e  advan tage
en joyed  by r u r a l  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  was n o t to  be bound by l i m i t s  in  p e rc e n ta g e
57te rm s so lo n g  as d i f f i c u l t i e s  o f  a re a  and com m unication w ere p r e s e n t .  The 
D .A .P . h e ld  th a t  under th e s e  c irc u m s ta n c e s , th e r e  was g o ing  to  be no l im i t  
in  th e  s t r e n g th  o f th e  r u r a l  v o te  in  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  u rban  v o te  and c o n c lu ­
ded t h a t  th e  u rban  v o te  m ight as w e ll lo s e  a l l  i t s  e f f e c t iv e n e s s  and th e re b y , 
i t s  v a lu e  a l to g e th e r .  I t  c i t e d  th e  re d ra w in g  o f th e  e x i s t in g  P a r lia m e n ta ry
55. See P a r lia m e n ta ry  sp eech ,"T h e  D isen fran ch isem en t o f  K uala Lumpur" on 
9t h  J u ly ,  1973 in  Lim K it S ian g , op . c i t . ,  p . 243.
56 . The 1962 C o n s t i tu t io n  Amendment B i l l  to  approve a  new b a s i s  o f  c o n s t i ­
tu en cy  d e l im i ta t i o n ,  was moved by Tun Razak. I t  was as fo llo w s :
"These a re  known and a cc ep ted  p r in c ip le s  and w ere ta k e n  
in to  accoun t when d e l im i t in g  th e  p re s e n t  c o n s t i tu e n c i e s .
T here i s  th e r e f o r e  no new p r in c i p l e  w hich has been b ro u ­
g h t i n .  One o f  th e s e  p r in c ip le s  i s  th e  w eigh tage  o f  r u ­
r a l  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  f o r  a r e a .  B a s ic a l ly  th e  number o f 
c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  in  each a r e a  ought to  be ap p ro x im ate ly  
equ a l excep t th a t  h a v in g  r e g a rd  to  th e  g r e a te r  d i f f i ­
c u l ty  o f r e a c h in g  e le c to r s  in  co u n try  d i s t r i c t s  and o th e r  
d isa d v a n ta g e s  a f f e c t in g  r u r a l  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s ,  w eigh tage 
f o r  a re a  may be g iv en  to  r u r a l  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  to  th e  
e x te n t th a t  in  c e r t a in  in s ta n c e s ,  r u r a l  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  
may c o n ta in  a3 l i t t l e  as h a l f  th e  number o f E le c to rs  in  
an u rban  c o n s t i tu e n c y ."  I b i d , op. c i t .
57. I b id .
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constituency boundaries to provide for an increase of 10 constituencies in 
Peninsular Malaysia from 104 to 114 in view of Kuala Lumpur becoming a Fede­
ral Territory in the early 1970s^ The greater portion of the increase,
according to the D.A.P., occurred in the east coast states of Kelantan and 
Pahang with 2 constituencies each. This reflected U.M.N.O.'s intention as 
part of the coalition deal to appease P.A.S. by providing 2 extra constitu­
encies in Kelantan, the latter’s stronghold, and then balancing this by an 
equal number of constituencies in Pahang, its own stronghold. In both cases, 
the D.A.P. contended that the disadvantage worked towards the non-Malays.
Even in Penang and Perak, the non-Malay predominated states, where an in­
crease of one Parliamentary constituency each occurred, the D.A.P. was in­
clined to argue that the extra seat went to the rural (Malay) rather than 
the urban (Chinese) areas^ At the same time, the D.A.P. expressed its con­
cern that the government was determined to dilute further the already wea­
kened Chinese vote. Selangor, a Chinese-majority state, lost 3 Parliamen­
tary constituencies from 14 to 11 when Kuala Lumpur became a Federal Terri-
50. The new Parliamentary constituency delimitations for the 1974 and. 
subsequent general elections were as follows:
State Present Previous
Federal Territory 5 -
Johore 16 16
Kedah 13 12
Kelantan 12 10
Malacca 4 4
Negri Gembilan 6 6
Pahang 8 6
Perak 21 20
Penang 9 8
Perlis 2 2
Selangor 11 14
Trengganu 7 6
Total 114 104
Source: Yong Mun Cheong ed., Trends in Malaysia (2), Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1974» PP* 11-2.
59« In Penang, the increase in one Parliamentary constituency was effected 
by the redrawing of the former Malay-predominated constituency of Se- 
berang Utara (Province L'ellesley North) into 2 new constituencies, 
Permatang Pauh and Kepala Bata3. In Perak, similarly, the Malay-
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to r y .  These c o n s t i tu e n c ie s , th e  D.A.P. h e ld , were predom inantly  C hinese.
At th e  s t a t e  le v e l ,  th e  D.A.P. charged th a t  9 predom inantly  Chinese c o n s t i ­
tu e n c ie s  h e ld  by th e  o p p o sitio n  in  th e  v ic in i ty  of Kuala Lumpur du rin g  th e  
1969 g en e ra l e le c t io n s  were ab o lish ed . As reg a rd s  both  th e  redraw ing o f new 
c o n s titu en c y  boundaries and th e  tra n s fo rm a tio n  of Kuala Lumpur in to  a Fede­
r a l  T e r r i to ry ,  th e  D.A.P. p o in ted  out th a t  th e  measures e ffe c te d  an accommo­
d a tio n  o f th e  m ig ra tio n  of la rg e  numbers of Malays to  the  urban a re a s , a 
s p l i t  in  th e  c o n ce n tra tio n  of an ti-IT .F . v o te rs  in  m arginal c o n s t i tu e n c ie s , 
and th e  lumping o f th e  growing numbers o f p ro -o p p o sitio n  v o te rs  in to  th e  
a lre ad y  over-crowded urban c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  he ld  by th e  o p p o s itio n . The mi­
g ra t io n  o f la rg e  numbers o f Malays in to  th e  urban a r e a s , encouraged by th e  
government to  f u l f i l  th e  aims o f th e  New Economic P o licy  (N .E .P .) a f t e r  th e  
1969 r a c i a l  r i o t  to  c re a te  a v i s ib le  Malay in d u s tr ia l ,  and commercial commu­
n i t y ,  had transfo rm ed  t r a d i t io n a l  non-M aiay-m ajority  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  in  th e  
urban  a reas  l ik e  Setapak in  Kuala Lumpur,to M alay-m ajority  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s , 
th e reb y  ju s t i f y in g  Malay (U.M.N.O.) P a rliam en ta ry  can d id a te s . The s p l i t  in  
th e  c o n ce n tra tio n  of anti-governm ent v o te rs  in  m arginal c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  had 
d isp e rse d  them to  o th e r pro-governm ent a re a s , th u s  making th e  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  
concerned "u n safe1* fo r  th e  o p p o s itio n . This was ev iden t in  th e  case of Da- 
m ansara in  Kuala Lumpur. F in a lly  th e  lumping of th e  in c re a se  o f growing 
numbers of an ti-governm ent v o te rs  in to  a few co n cen tra ted  a reas  as in  th e  
case  o f Ipoh in  Perak and Bungsar (renamed P e ta lin g )  in  Selangor made th e  
D.A.P. suggest th a t  th e  non-Malay in c re a se  in  v o tin g  s tre n g th  was meaning­
le s s  w ithou t a correspond ing  in c re a se  in  th e  number of t h e i r  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s .
predom inated co n stitu en cy  of K rian D arat was redrawn in to  2 new c o n s ti  
tu e n c ie s , P a r i t  B untar and Bagan S e ra i . Before they  were redraw n, th e  
2 o r ig in a l  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  in  Penang and Perak had roughly  h a l f  th e  num 
b e r o f v o te rs  of t h e i r  urban co u n te rp a rts  in  both s t a t e s .  I t  would 
appear th a t  w ith  th e  redrawn b o u ndaries, th e  r a t i o  had f a l l e n  from 
i  : 1 to  4 : 1 in  favou r of th e  r u r a l  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s .
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The D.A.P.'s criticisms over the gerrymandering of both Parlia­
mentary and State constituencies reflected its frustration and concern that 
no matter how hard it tried, it could never hope to win more than a third 
of the total number of seats in Parliament. As a Chinese-based party ope­
rating from the urban areas, the D.A.P. found that its Parliamentary repre­
sentation could at the most be limited to the 22 Chinese-predominated and 
some of the 13 "mixed" constituencies in which the non-Malays formed a sli­
ght majority?0 This assumed that voting would be along racial lines and 
that polarization was highest. Under these circumstances, the D.A.P. rea­
lized that it would always be a minority in Parliament, even if it were to 
succeed in wresting all the non-Malay constituencies held by the M.C.A. and 
the G.R.M., a remote possibility to say the least. If the situation was 
bad for the D.A.P. at Parliamentary level,it was even worse at state level 
where the gerrymandering was even more lop-sided in favour of the Malays.
Gut of the 312 state constituencies in all state assemblies in Peninsular 
Malaysia for the 1974 and subsequent general elections, only 51 and 25 were 
Chinese-dominated and mixed respectively, leaving 236 dominated by the Malays*? 
The D.A.P. felt that the gerrymandering of electoral constituencies was 
specifically aimed to curb its power and ex£>ctnsion plans. This was evident 
in Selangor where its strength was the gree.test compared to the other states. 
At Parliamentary level, although there was a marked increase in the number 
of non-Malay voters, the D.A.P. claimed that the number of non-Malay cons­
tituencies did not increase. It was in Bungsar, the D.A.P.'s Parliamentary
60. For a breakdown of Parliamentary and State constituencies in Peninsu­
lar Malaysia for the 1974 and subsequent general elections, see 
Appendix in Ismail Kassim,Race, Politics end Moderation: A Study of 
the Malaysian Electoral Process, Times Books International, Singa­
pore, 1979. The number of Maiay-majority constituencies for Parlia­
ment has increased from 66 in 1959 to 79 in 1974* At the same time, 
the non-Malay-majority constituencies decreased from 38 to 35»
61. Ibid.
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c o n s titu e n c y  f i r s t  won by th e  P .A .P . in  1964) th a t  th e  p a rty  accused th e
government o f d i lu t in g  th e  non-Malay v o te . As e a r ly  as 1967) th e  then
S e c re ta ry -G en e ra l, Devan H air, had s ta te d  th a t  B ungsar's  then  e le c to ra te  o f
69,021 was only a th i r d  as e f f e c t iv e  as th e  Kuala Kedah co n stitu en cy  of
6 2Tunku Abdul Rahman, th e  form er Prime M in is te r , w ith  33)775 v o te s . Devan 
H a i r 's  co n ten tio n  was th a t  one r u r a l  vo te  from Kuala Kedah was eq u iv a len t 
to  3 urban vo tes from Bungsar. Lim K it S iang c i te d  f ig u re s  to  show th a t  
over th e  y e a rs , th e  d isadvan taged  p o s i t io n  o f th e  urban vo te  had agg ravated . 
In  1969) he s ta te d  th a t  th e  d is p a r i ty  between urban and r u r a l  v o tes  had in ­
creased  to  th e  fo rm er 's  d isadvan tage  where 6 urban vo tes from Bungsar 
(31,086 in  1969) were necessa ry  to  match 1 r u r a l  vo te  from Johor Tenggara 
(13,821 in  1969)«^ The tra n sfo rm a tio n  of Kuala Lumpur in to  a F edera l T e r r i ­
to ry  was regarded  by th e  D.A.P. as the governm ent's in te n t io n  to  f o r e s t a l l  
any p lans i t  might have o f talcing over th e  Selangor s t a t e  government. In  
th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  th e  D.A.P. had won 9 s t a t e  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  out 
o f a t o t a l  of 28, th e  m a jo rity  o f them w ith in  th e  v ic in i ty  of Kuala Lumpur 
where th e  non-Malays predom inated. Although th e  m otive of th e  government 
appeared to  be to  f o r e s t a l l  fu tu re  deadlocked e le c t io n  r e s u l t s  as in  1969 
when th e  A llian ce  and th e  combined o p p o s itio n  t i e d  14 : 14) th e  D.A.P. nev er­
th e le s s  b e liev ed  th a t  th e  government in ten d ed  to  reduce i t s  re p re se n ta tio n
6ato  minimal by a b o lish in g  th e  9 p rev ious s t a t e  c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  i t  h e ld .
The D.A.P . '3 o th e r  and more u rg en t concern was th e  p o s s ib i l i ty
62. The Guardian, O ctober 1967«
Lim K it S iang , op. c i t . ,  p . 242.
I b i d, p . 239•
63.
64*
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that it might lose some of the Parliamentary and State constituencies that 
it currently held. The redrawing of certain boundaries had either made the 
marginal constituencies more favourable to the government(as in the case of 
Damansara in Kuala Lumpur) or amalgamated D.A.P. strongholds with those of 
other non-Malay opposition parties(as in the case of Kuala Lumpur Bandar)^ 
This meant that not only would the D.A.P. have to field strong candidates 
to take on the government challenge, but also that of a third non-Malay 
opposition party. The D.A.P. felt that the government’s intention behind 
such a move was to split the opposition vote so that it would win. Under 
the circumstances of increasing support for the accommodation and development 
features of Tun Razak'3 administration and the ban on the public discussion 
of sensitive issues prior to the 1974 genera.1 elections, the D.A.P.’s fears 
were more real than apparent.
The D.A.P.'s actions to get the partial constitutional delimita­
tions redrawn more impartially to the non-Malays were restricted to merely 
expressing protests that the government was not following the one-man-one- 
vote principle wliich would in fact have led to some form of proportional 
representation, and calling for increases in the number of non-Malay consti­
tuencies. Lim Kit Siang called for an increase of 3 (instead of l) consti­
tuencies for Penang and Perak so that their new representation would be 11 
(instead of 9) in Penang and 23(instead of 2l) in Perak. He also wanted 
the number of seats in the Federal Territory to be increased to 10 (instead 
of 5) in view of the large population. This was to effect a fairer re­
adjustment of the glaring disparity between the average numbers of voters
6tin rural areas (20,000) and urban areas (45>000) per constituency.
65. The D.A.P. lost Damansara to the M.I.C. in the 1974 general elections 
by a split vote in a 3-cornered fight.
66. Lim Kit Siangf op. cit., p. 245« 67. Ibid.
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The g e rry m an d erin g  o f b o th  P a r lia m e n ta ry  and S ta te  c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  
r e f l e c t e d  th e  f e a r  o f th e  M alays, e s p e c ia l ly  U.M.N.O., th a t  th e  non-M alays 
had in t e n t io n s  o f  ta k in g  over th e  co u n try  th ro u g h  e l e c t i o n s ,  as th e y  had 
a tte m p te d  in  1969« Under such c irc u m s ta n c e s , th e  p r in c ip le  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
e q u a l i ty  w hich would weaken th e  e x i s t in g  p o l i t i c a l  suprem acy o f th e  M alays 
v i s - a - v i s  th e  C h inese , cou ld  n o t be a llo w ed . The D .A .P . 's  c a l l  f o r  th e  i n ­
c r e a s e  o f  non-M alay c o n s t i tu e n c ie s  ex p re ssed  i t s  concern  t h a t  th e  non-M alay 
v o te  was d i lu te d  and th e y  cou ld  n o t have t h e i r  f a i r  sh a re  o f  p o l i t i c a l  power 
in  th e  c o u n try . U n d erly in g  th e  D .A .P . 's  c a l l  f o r  th e  adherence o f th e  one- 
m an-one-vo te  p r in c ip le  was i t s  f e a r  t h a t  th e  M alays w ith  t h e i r  overw helm ing 
v o t in g  s t r e n g th  in d is c r im in a te ly  amended th e  C o n s t i tu t io n  each tim e th e y  
f e l t  t h a t  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  suprem acy was th r e a te n e d .  The D .A .P . 's  r a t i o n a l e  
was t h a t  p ro p o r t io n a l  r e p r e s e n ta t io n  would m i t ig a te  t h i s  m easure to  s a f e ­
g uard  th e  fundam en ta l i n t e r e s t s  o f th e  non-M alays.
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(d ) The E s s e n t ia l  S e c u r i ty  R e g u la tio n s  and th e  I n te r n a l  S e c u r i ty  A c t.
In  O ctober 1975j th e  governm ent decreed  2 s e t s  o f  com plem entary 
emergency r e g u la t io n s ,  th e  E ssen tia l(C om m unity  S e lf - R e l ia n c e R e g u la t io n s  
and th e  E s s e n t i a l ( S e c u r i ty  C a s e s R e g u la t io n s . These w ere d es ig n ed  to  coun­
t e r  th e  r e c e n t  re su rg e n c e  o f  te r r o r i s m  by th e  M alayan Communist P a r ty  (M.C.P.) ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  1974 and 1979* The new emergency r e g u la t io n s  g ra n te d  a lm ost 
a b s o lu te  and a r b i t r a r y  powers to  th e  Home A f fa ir s  M in is try  where i n t e r n a l  
s e c u r i t y  was concerned . T h is  meant t h a t  on th e  s l i g h t e s t  grounds o f  s u s p i ­
c io n  th a t  a p e rso n  c o n s t i tu te d  a s e c u r i ty  r i s k ,  he could  be charged  u n d er 
th e  new emergency r e g u la t io n s .  F u r th e r ,  th e  r i g h t  o f  s u sp e c ts  to  be b rou g h t 
b e fo re  a  m a g is t r a te  fo r  t r i a l  w ith in  24 hours o f t h e i r  a r r e s t  was r e p la c e d  
by i n d e f i n i t e  p e r io d s  o f d e te n t io n .  P r e d ic ta b ly  th e r e  w ere s tro n g  p r o t e s t s  
from  th e  Bar C ouncil o f  M alay s ia  and th e  D .A .P. They argued  th a t  th e  new 
emergency r e g u la t io n s  w ere an o v e r - r e a c t io n  to  th e  i n t e r n a l  s e c u r i ty  problem  
and a g ro s s  v io l a t i o n  o f human r i g h t s  and c o n s t i tu t i o n a l  g u a ra n te e s  in  th e  
c o u n try .
The e a r ly  1970s saw a marked r e v iv a l  o f  communist t e r r o r i s t  a c t i ­
v i t i e s  w hich p a r a l l e l e d  th o s e  o f th e  Emergency o f 1948-60. A cts o f  te r r o r i s m  
w ere v a r ie d ,  and f o r  th e  f i r s t  tim e , ex tended  to  th e  u rban  a re a s  o f  P e n in su ­
l a r  M a la y s ia . They w ere desig n ed  to  i n s t i l  f e a r  and despondency, and to  
show th e  governm ent t h a t  d e s p i te  Tun R aza k 's  v i s i t  to  C hina in  1974 to  pave 
th e  way fo r  th e  e s ta b lish m e n t o f  d ip lo m a tic  r e l a t i o n s  betw een M alay s ia  and
C hina, th e  M .C .P .'s  t r a d i t i o n a l  s u p p o r te r ,  th e  M .C.P. would s t i l l  c o n tin u e
68th e  s t r u g g le  a g a in s t  th e  governm ent, w ith  o r  w ith o u t C h in a 's  s u p p o r t.
6 8 . For d e t a i l s  o f Tun R aza k 's  v i s i t  to  China, s e e  M .G .G .P illa r ,"T h e  Road 
to  P ek in g " , F ar Eas te r n  Economic Rev ie w, 13 th  May, 1974» "O pening th e
door to  C o -o p e ra t io n " ,F.E.E.R. , 27t h  May 1974and "B laz in g  th e  P ek in g  
T r a i l " ,  F.E.E.R. , l J t h  June> 1974.
70
The first major assault against the government was on the East-West Highway
project near Grik in north Perak on 23rd May 1974 when about 100 terrorists
69blew up earth-moving equipment valued at nearly $15 million. This was an
attempt to disrupt transportation in the country’s economic development
programmes. Hardly a month later on 7th June 1974> the Inspector-General
of Police (i.G.P.) and a former head of the Special Branch, the intelligence
wing of the police, Tan Sri Abdul Rahman Ha3him, was assassinated in broad
70daylight in Kuala Lumpur during the lunch hour traffic jami This was a 
follow-up to the attacks against the Special Branch when 5 Chinese officers 
of the Branch were killed between 1973 and 1974* The communist victories 
in Cambodia and Vietnam in April 1975 seemed to encourage the M.C.P. to in­
tensify its "war of liberation". Casualties were inflicted on the security
71forces in Per ale and Kedah. Shortly in the early hours of the morning on
26th August 1975» the National Monument, which was built to commemorate the
nation’s declaration of the end of the Unergency in I960, was partly blown 
72up. The government had hardly recovered from this shock when hand-grenades
were thrown into the headquarters of the para-military police force in Kuala
73Lumpur, killing 2 constables and wounding 41 others; Attacks against the 
Special Branch continued with the assassination of the Chief Police Officer 
of Perak, Koo Chong Kongl^ As in the past, the M.C.P.’s terrorism was
69. See R.3.Milne and D.K.Mauzy,op.cit.,p.317 and Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 10th June, 1974» p. 15*
70. For full details, see Harvey 3tockwin,"A Deadly Pattern from the Past", 
F.E.E.R* ,17th June, 1974,pp.14-6. The assassins were officially iden-
tiTiecT~as a Chinese and a Malay from the M.C.P. and the reasons given 
for the assassination were personal. This was to prevent an exacerba­
tion of racial tension leading to possible racial riots.
71. See K.Das,"The Terrorists go to Town" , F.E.E.R., 12th September, 1975>PP* 
10-1. Based on official count, 24 soldiers were killed and 49 wounded 
between 7th and 11th April, 1975*
72. Oee K.Da3, "Striking at the Heart of a Nation", F.E.E.R., 5th September,
1975> PP- 28-9.
73» See K.Das,"The Terrorists go to Town", F.E.E.R., 12th September, 1975»
pp. 10-1.
74* See K.Das,"Malaysia prepares for total war", F.E.E.R., 26th December, 
1975, PP- 23-5.
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portrayed as a struggle for a "cause". Whereas the cause in the 1948
Emergency was for the country’s independence (via a Communist Republic)
against British colonialism, the cause in the I97O3 appeared to be for the
overthrow of class oppression and racial discrimination by the government.
Basically, as in the past, the LI.C.P.'s appeal was directed towards the
Chinese masses who had been the victims of race and class discrimination as
75a result of the government's post-1969 policies.J
The government considered the communist challenge as a grave threat 
to the nation's security in view of it3 motives and dimensions. It classi­
fied the threat into 2 aspects - military and subversive - for the purpose 
of meting out counter-insurgency measures. Militarily, the government appe­
ared confident of defeating the M.C.P.(as it had done so in the 1940 Emergen­
cy with British military aid) with the expansion of the police force, the
reorganization of the Special Branch and military collusion with Thailand
vand Indonesia. However subversion could pose serious problems as it was 
usually by subtle means. Previous experience had shown that the M.C.P. had 
infiltrated schools, trade unions, old boys associations and left-wing poli­
tical parties to subvert the government as in the case of Singapore in the
75. F.E.E.R., 12th September, 1975» pp. 10-1. A leaflet published by the
"People's Army for the liberation of Malaysia" was found in Ipoh, Pe­
rak, on 3rd July 1975 during the height of urban guerilla terrorism.
It accused the government of reneging on the 1957 Merdeka contract to 
practise racial and class discrimination against the Chinese. The 
leaflet urged the Chinese to stand up and fight for their just righto.
76. The government announced that from 1973 to 1975» 150 terrorists were 
killed and 709 surrendered. New Straits Times, 5th February, 1976.
The strength of the police force depleted after the Emergency ended 
in i960, was increased by 20,000 members. Both the Police Field 
Force, concerned with anti-terrorist operations mostly in the jungle, 
and the Special Branch, were reorganised by providing incentives such 
as pay increases and decorations in recognition of public services on 
police officers by the King. R.3.Milne and D.K.LIauzy, p-p. cit.. p. 319. 
Joint military exercises with Thailand against the terrorists in the 
Malayan-Thai border were stepped up and more officers of the Malaysian 
army were sent to Indonesia for military training.
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1950s and 1960s .  As th e  M .C.P. was p red o m in an tly  C h inese , i t  was obv ious 
to  th e  governm ent th a t  i t s  su b v e rs io n  would be d i r e c te d  a t  th e  la rg e  C h inese  
community, p a r t i c u l a r l y  in  view o f  C hinese g r ie v a n c e s .  T h is  d id  n o t mean 
t h a t  th e  governm ent co n s id e re d  th e  M alays im perv ious to  communist s u b v e rs io n . 
Ind eed  th e  d e te n t io n  o f 2 prom inent M alays, Samad I s m a i l ,  th e  m anaging e d i ­
t o r  o f th e  Hew S t r a i t s  T im es, and Mohamed Sam ani, a s s i s t a n t  e d i to r  o f  th e  
B e r i ta  H arian  , re v e a le d  th a t  th e  M alays we r e  a ls o  v u ln e ra b le  to  communist 
su b v e rs io n . T h e ir  p u b lic  c o n fe s s io n  le a d in g  to  th e  a r r e s t  o f 2 Malay depu- 
ty  m in is te r s  in  l a t e  1976, a ff irm e d  t h i s ;  The govern m en t's  mo3t  e f f e c t iv e  
weapon to  d e a l w ith  su b v e rs io n  was th e  I n t e r n a l  S e c u r i ty  Act ( i . S . A . ) .  The 
I .S .A . ,  a le g a c y  o f th e  1943 Emergency Powers and R e g u la tio n s  o f  th e  execu­
t i v e  to  e f f e c t  i n d e f i n i t e  p re v e n tiv e  d e te n t io n  w ith o u t t r i a l  to  uphold  n a -  
t i o n a l  s e c u r i t y ,  was l e g i s l a t e d  in  i 960 ; I t  has s in c e  form ed th e  c o rn e r ­
s to n e  o f b o th  th e  N .F . and P .A .P . r u le  in  M a lay s ia  and S in g ap o re , and i s  th e  
most f e a re d  l e g i s l a t i o n  by th e  g o v ern m en t's  o p p o n en ts . In  view o f th e  dim en­
s io n  and s o p h is t r y  o f  th e  l a t e s t  communist su b v e rs io n , th e  government f e l t  
t h a t  th e  I .S .A . sho u ld  be s tre n g th e n e d  and supplem ented  by new emergency 
r e g u la t io n s .  S e v e ra l f a c to r s  w ere c o n s id e re d  b e fo re  th e  governm ent d ec re ed  
th e  new r e g u la t io n s .  T here was no need to  d e c la r e  a n o th e r  s t a t e  o f  em ergen-
77* Samad Is m a il  was d e ta in e d  in  June 1976 f o r  su sp e c te d  communist a c t i v i ­
t i e s  s h o r t ly  a f t e r  he had re c e iv e d  a  to p  l i t e r a r y  aw ard. H is a r r e s t  
was a fo llo w -u p  to  th e  d e te n tio n -c u m -p u b lic  c o n fe s s io n  o f 2 M alay 
j o u r n a l i s t s  in  S in g ap o re  by Lee Kuan Yew f o r  communist a c t i v i t i e s .
On 1 s t  Septem ber 1976, Samad c o n fe sse d  on t e l e v i s i o n  th a t  as a  commu­
n i s t  a g e n t, he had moved c lo se  to  th e  co re  o f  th e  U.M.N.O. le a d e r s h ip  
and had been s u c c e s s fu l  w ith  th e  younger g e n e ra tio n  o f U.M.N.O. l e a ­
d e r s .  His c o n fe s s io n  s t a r t e d  a communist "w itch  h u n t"  in  U.M.N.O. 
le d  by J a a f a r  A lb a r (P re s id e n t of U.M.N.O. Youth) and Senu Abdul Rah- 
m a n (S e c re ta ry -G e n e ra l o f U.M.N.O.) and i n s t i g a t e d  by U.M.N.O. Y outh. 
S u b seq u en tly  on 3rd November 1976, A bdu llah  Ahmad, form er p o l i t i c a l  
s e c r e ta r y  to  Tun Razak, and A bdullah  M ajid , fo rm er p re s s  s e c r e ta r y  to  
Tun Razak, became v ic tim s  o f t h i s  w itc h  hun t and w ere d e ta in e d  under 
th e  I .S .A . K .D as,"The Enemies w ith in "  and "S w itch in g  on th e  C onfess­
io n s " ,  Far E a s te rn  Economic Review, 2nd J u ly ,  1976 and 1 8 th  F eb ru a ry ,
1977*
78. For d e t a i l s  o f  th e  I .S .A . ,  see  J o u rn a l o f  Contem porary A sia , V ol. IV,
1974, pp. 375-81.
73
cy l i k e  In d o n es ian  C o n fro n ta tio n  in  1964 and th e  r a c i a l  r i o t  in  1969. A
d e c l a r a t i o n  o f emergency would 3 c a re  away b ad ly -n eed ed  fo r e ig n  in v estm en t
f o r  th e  su c c e ss  o f th e  New Economic P o lic y  (N .E .P .)  to  b e n e f i t  th e  M alays.
A3 th e  emergency r e g u la t io n s  o f 1964 and 1969 had n o t "been r e p e a le d ,  th e y
w ere s t i l l  b in d in g , and in  f a c t  th e  co u n try  wa3 o f f i c i a l l y  s t i l l  under
emergency w ith o u t th e  need to  p u b l i c i s e  i t .  The new E s s e n t i a l  S e c u r i t i e s
R e g u la t io n s (E .S .R .) would form  an in te g ra l ,  p a r t  o f th e  fo rth co m in g  T h ird
M a la y s ia  P lan (T .M .P .)  in  r e l a t i o n  to  i n t e r n a l  s e c u r i t y .  Thus th e  f i r s t  s e t
o f  r e g u la t io n s ,  th e  E s s e n t i a l  (Community S e lf  R e l ia n c e )R e g u la t io n s (o r  Rukun
T etangga) was d ec reed  in  l a t e  1975 under th e  u n re p e a le d  p ro v is io n s  o f  th e
em ergency r e g u la t io n s  w hich w ere in tro d u c e d  by th e  N.O .C. s in c e  th e  1969 
79r a c i a l  r i o t .  P a r t i c ip a t io n  in  th e  scheme would be com pulsory f o r  a b le -
b o d ied  men betw een th e  ages o f 18-25 ; th e y  would be r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  p a t r o l
and guard  d u t ie s  and ch eck in g  on th e  movement o fp e rso n s  from  one s e c to r  to
80a n o th e r  in  c e r t a in  a re a s  d e s ig n a te d  by th e  governm ent. The second , th e  
E s s e n t i a l ( S e c u r i ty  C a se s )R e g u la tio n s , to  be ta b le d  in  P a r lia m e n t s h o r t ly ,  
was com plem entary to  th e  f i r s t .  I t  concerned  th e  a r r e s t  and p r e - t r i a l  
p ro c e d u re s  o f  p e rso n s  c o n s id e re d  a  s e c u r i t y  r i s k  who w ere d e ta in e d  as a 
r e s u l t  o f th e  f i r s t  s e t  o f  r e g u la t io n s .  I t s  main f e a tu r e  was t h a t  th e  
accused  had to  d e te rm in e  h i s  innocence  r a t h e r  th a n  f o r  th e  p ro s e c u to r  to  
p rove h is  g u i l t .  A n t ic ip a t in g  o b je c t io n  and p r o te s t s  from  c r i t i c s ,  th e  
governm ent moved c irc u m s p e c tiv e ly  to  d e fu se  any p o te n t i a l  v o l a t i l e  s i t u a t i o n  
t h a t  m ight a r i s e .  V/hile e x p la in in g  th a t  th e  new emergency r e g u la t io n s  would 
make th e  la w -a b id in g  more co n sc io u s  o f t h e i r  r o le  in  show ing t h e i r  lo y a l ty  
to  th e  n a t io n ,  th e  governm ent g ra d u a l ly  p la y ed  down th e  pro-M alay  em phasis
79* For f u l l  d e t a i l s  see  K .D as, " In su rg e n cy  and th e  R ule o f  Law", Far 
E a s te rn  Economic R eview , 10 th  O cto b er, 1975*
80. R .3 .M ilne and D.K.Mauzy, op. c i t . ,  p . 320.
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of its policies. For instance, a gentle campaign to improve the system of
teaching English was carried out to effect the pronouncement that while
Malay was the National Language, other languages, particularly English, had
81a major role to play in the country. To stem the widespread belief among
the Malays that the Chinese were communists and therefore their loyalty to
the country in doubt, it was stated publicly that the vast majority of the
8 2Chinese in the country were loyal and valuable citizens. These measures 
were calculated to win Chinese support for the new emergency regulations.
The government then tried to rationalize and justify the promulgation of the 
E.S.R. to word off protests from critics and also to accommodate the increa­
singly restless Malay mood. Tan Sri Abas Saleh, the Solicitor-General, 
stated that the government was considering the overall issue of internal 
security posed by the communist threat. He stressed that it was necessary 
to protect the country as a whole by the E.S.R. even to the extent that the
O  ^
rights of some were curtailed. He maintained that the sacrifice of some 
personal liberties was not a great price to pay to ensure overall internal 
security. Once the security situation in the country returned to normal, 
the E.S.R. would be revoked?^
Unlike the Bar Council, which viewed the new emergency regulations 
as "panic measures" to curtail the fundamental liberties of Malaysians, the 
D.A.P. considered them as part of an overall government plan to do away with 
human rights and constitutional guarantees with a view to stifling Parlia-
81. See K.Das,"Malaysia prepares for total war", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 26th December, 1975> pp. 23-5«
82. Ibid.
83. For full details, see K.Das,"Panic Measures under fire", F.E.E.R.,
31st October, 1975» PP* 11-3*
84. Ibid. Tun Kazak gave this assurance over radio and television in his 
Hari Raya message to the nation.
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mentary democracy and turning the country into a police state. The govern­
ment, according to the D.A.P., had exploited the security threat to vest 
absolute and arbitrary powers on itself as manifested first by the I.S.A. 
and now the E.S.R. The D.A.P.'s fears were that the government was likely 
to use its powers to silence even legitimate and constructive criticism on 
the grounds that the vague and much-abused tern, "national interest" was 
threatened?0 Under the circumstances, the D.A.P. held that it was very easy 
for the government to detain dissidents indefinitely by branding them commu­
nists or subversive elements even though they were not. Previous experience 
had shown the D.A.P. that the I.8.A. was a favourite instrument to stifle 
all forms of dissent, not all of them necessarily due to communist activities. 
Lim Kit Siang himself was detained for 10 months after the 1969 racial riot 
even though he had been very outspoken against the communists. The former 
Sarawak deputy Chief Minister and Sarawak National Party (S.N.A.P.) stalwart,
James Wong, was also detained on flimsy and vague charges not related to 
07communism. As the E.S.R. appeared to strengthen the I.S.A. considerably 
in this case, the D.A.P. felt that its duty was to do all it could to high­
light the unsavoury aspects of both the E.S.R. and the I.S.A. to bring about 
public revulsion. However the party's initial reaction to condemn the E.S.R.
85
05. For a detailed account of the D.A.P.'s views on this, see Fan Yew Teng's 
two articles,"Malaysia:Growing Insurgency and Increasing Repression", 
Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. VI, 1976» pp» 3 7 5  and "Repression 
in Malaysia: Tightening the screws on lawyers and university teachers", 
AMPO Japan Asia Quarterly Review, Vol, X No. 4» 1973, pp. 23-6, The 
D.A.P. through Fan, who had lost his sedition conviction appeal after 
a re-trial in 1975» was highlighting the Malaysian government's dicta­
torial attitude on human rights and constitutional guarantees overseas 
to embarrass it in the hope that the draconian lav/s would be modified.
86. See D.A.P.'s letter,"Abuse of Detention Powers", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 24th February, 1970» PP* 6-7*
87. For the D.A.P.'s views on James Jong's detention, see Parliamentary 
speech, "Detention of Datuk James Jong", on 9ih December, 1975 i-n Fim 
Kit Siang, op. cit. ,pp.313~7« As a condition for Janes .<ong's subse­
quent release, S.N.A.P. was persuaded to join the N.F.coalition just 
before the 1973 general elections.
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v/as thwarted by Tun Kazak's challenge to the opposition to declare their
* 88stand on the mounting urban guerilla activity in the country. His call
came after U.M.N.O., P.A.S., and the G.R.K. had expressed their full support 
for the first set of the E.S.R., the Essential(Community Self Reliance) Re­
gulations, v/hile the second set, the Essential (Security Cases Regulations
was awaiting ratification in Parliament. All 3 parties concerned had urged
8Qfor its immediate implementation. To stave off possible charges of dislo­
yalty wliich v/ould give the government every pretext to use the E.S.R. to 
harrass it, Lim Kit Siang was forced to declare that D.A.P. members were
9prepared to give their lives in defence of the country if and when necessary. 
He later explained that the D.A.P.'s stand did not mean that it supported 
the first set of the E.S.R., but merely an expression of the party's loyalty 
to the King. He stressed that support for the government's policies and 
loyalty to the King v/ere entirely different things. The D.A.P. then called 
for a Parliamentary debate to express its opposition and concern to the 
E.S.R. At the same time it instructed its lawyers to ötudy the legal and 
constitutional implications of the E.S.R. with a view to challenging the 
government to court.
In opposing the first set of the E.S.R., the D.A.P. pointed out 
tha.t they sought to turn the country into a police state with the tendency 
for people to turn informers either out of fear or for personal gain. The 
party held that the government's motive was to start a communist witch hunt 
by making it compulsory that all residents in designated areas, including
88. See Lim Kit Siang's letter to the Ear Eastern Economic Review, 7th 
November, 1975*
09. See K.Das,"Panic Measures under fire", E.E.E.R., 31st October, 1975» 
pp. 11-3.
90. See Lim Kit Siang's letter;F.E.E.R., 21st November, 1975«
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children above 14 years, inform the authorities of persons inside or outside 
the areas having committed, attempting to commit or having been suspected 
of committing offences in relation to security. The nature of the offences 
was so vaguely defined that they covered not only offences under the law but 
also almost anything deemed by the authorities to be prejudicial to the 
economic, morale or social well-being of the area. The D.A.P. continued 
that if residents failed to report any offences or suspected offences com­
mitted, they themselves would be deemed to committing an offence. Thus the 
residents affected would be in a dilemma as they could either be incrimina­
ted for offences they did not commit or charged with failing to report of­
fences that they were unsure of. Since the truthfulness of the evidence of 
informers need not be ascertained, the D.A.P. argued that this would encou­
rage people to become informers, either to settle old scores, to receive 
bribes or for a variety of other reasons. The D.A.P. also highlighted the 
questionable principle of group liability in which all members of a house­
hold were collectively responsible for crimes committed by any member, even 
though they may be innocent. It regarded this as a way to intimidate chil­
dren to spy on their parents and vice-versa. The constant surveillance of
the movements of all residents in designated areas, according to the D.A.P.,
91thus violated the principles of justice.
The major part of the D,A.P.'s criticisms was directed towards 
the second set of the E.3.R., the Essential(Security Cases Regulations.
91. See Fan Yew Teng(l978)> op. cit., p. 24* To substantiate his charges. 
Fan quoted an excerpt from the June I976 issue of the Review, the of­
ficial organ of the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists: 
"Equally disturbing are the provisions of the Community 
(oelf-Reliance)Regulations, 1975» which make every member 
of a household above the age of 14 years responsible for 
the family's activities. This is either to be regarded 
as a form of guilt by association, or as a form of repri­
sal. In either case, it is a serious violation of the 
basic principles of justice."
78
It felt that the gross abuse of absolute and arbitrary powers by the govern­
ment to intimidate its opponents was most likely to take place in conjunc­
tion with security cases. The D.A.P. held that the Essential(Security Cases) 
Regulations strengthened the I.S.A. in detaining suspects indefinitely with­
out trial. They were so obnoxious to the rule of law that the usually do­
cile Bar Council of Malaysia had even called for their repeal at an extra­
ordinary meeting in Kuala Lumpur in early 1976» The Bar Council's grounds 
for objecting were numerous and varied, but the conclusion derived was that 
the accused did not have the slightest chance of proving his innocence due 
to the draconian measures introduced to negate a fair trial. It accused the 
government of a gross abuse and misuse of power. In fact the Secretary of 
the Penang State Bar Committee alleged that the 2 sets of the E.S.R. reflec­
ted the government's inability to secure convictions under existing laws 
(i.e. the I.S.A.)". The Bar Council's reaction was a manifestation of its 
disappointment that the government never consulted it before the E.S.R, were 
decreed in 1975 and amendments to the Constitution were made in 1976» to 
make them more effective. As a result, on 18th October 1977» it instructed 
its members not to appear in trials under the Essential(Security Cases) Re­
gulations?"^
92. See K.Las,"Panic Measures under fire", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
31st October, 1975» p* 12.
93» Fan Yew Teng,(l978)> op. cit., p. 25. The following
resolution was passed by the Bar Council at the meeting:
"To resolve that all members of the Bar of the States 
of Malaya be advised not to appear in trials under the 
Essential(Security Cases) Amendment Regulations 1975 
whether retained or assigned from henceforth as these 
regulations are oppressive and against the rule of lav/.
Provided that those who have been retained prior to
18th October 1977 may either discharge themselves or
refund any fees collected or complete their brief", Op. cit.
Fan claimed that by 24th October 1977» 4 lawyers had abided by the 
above resolution and decided to withdraw their services to clients 
who were appealing against sentences passed under the E.S.R.
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In tabling his motion on 19th December 1975 in Parliament to get 
the Essential (Security Cases)Regulations repealed, Lim Kit Siang cited seve­
ral grounds of objection, especially the violation of the principle of the 
94rule of law. This was to give the impression that the D.A.P. was not al­
one in it3 opposition to the government and that the Bar Council was behind 
it. The D.A.P. accused the government of deliberately seeking to give a 
different interpretation to the principle of the rule of law to strengthen 
its powers. The party contended that the government had actually advocated 
and practised "legality" while misleading the people to believe that it up­
held the rule of law. These two concepts, according to the D.A.P., were 
entirely different. Lim Kit Siang held that legality, which corresponded 
rather to the rule of men, need not necessarily follow the rule of law; that 
was why there were so many amendments to the Constitution to make the law 
follow the whims and fancies of those in power, i.e. the N.F. The essence 
of legality was to make the actions of those in power legitimate and justi­
fiable. The predictable consequences of legality, he added, was the drift 
towards a dictatorial state along the lines of Hitler's Germany. Manifes­
tations of this were the gross abuse and misuse of power and the arbitrary 
interference with the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals.
The D.A.Po claimed that the wide and arbitrary powers of the Attorney-
General as provided by the Essential(Security Cases)Regulations were likely
95to be abused and misused". It was alleged that he could use his discretion
94» Lim Kit Siang listed 6 objections. They Y/ere (i) A blow to the rule 
of law; (ii) A blow to human rights; (iii) Constitutional violations; 
(iv) Gross abuse and misuse of power; (v) Parliamentary democracy 
would be undermined and (vi) A set-back in the battle for the hearts 
and minds of the people. For further details, see Parliamentary 
speech,"The Security Cases Regulations", in Lim Kit.Siang, op. cit.,
pp. 184-98.
95. Ibid, p. 192. See also K.Das,"Law Critics cut deep", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 11th November, 1977*
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to certify whether cases brought before him were security cases, premising
his criteria solely on opposition to the government, irrespective of whether
it was inspired by the communists or not. Once a case was certified to be
a security case, it was up to the accused to prove his innocence rather than
for the prosecutor to find him guilty. The D.A.P. contended that this re-
96moved one of the most fundamental safeguards for a fair trial. It also
97violated Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
The retroactive effect of the Essential(Security Cases)Regulations to 1957
as a result of an amendment to the Constitution also violated Article 3 of
the 1948 Declaration that guaranteed the individual’s right to life, liberty 
98and security. The D.A.P. then highlighted the violations to the Constitu­
tion in the government's alleged perversion of pre-trial procedures in se­
curity cases trials. It claimed that no warrant of arrest was needed to
detain a suspect and suspects were detained for a week and a further 60 days
99for questioning before they were put on trial". Lim Kit Siang pointed out 
that this allegedly violated Article 5(4) of the Malaysian Constitution by 
removing the constitutional right of suspects to be brought before a magis­
trate within 24 hours of their arrest}^ He argued that the acquittal
96. This was the presumption that a person is assumed innocent until 
proven guilty.
97. Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I94Q,states:
" i. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right
to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to 
law in a . public trial at which he has had all guaran­
tees necessary for his defence, 
ii. No one 3hall be held guilty of any penal offence on 
account of any act of omission which did not consti­
tute a penal offence,under national or international 
law, at the time it was committed. Nor shall a hea­
vier penalty be imposed than the one that was appli­
cable at the time the penal offence was committed. "
Lim Kit Siang, op, cit., p. 190.
98. Ibid. Article 3 reads:"Everyone has the right to life, liberty and 
security of person". Op. cit.
99. Fan Yew Teng(l978), op. cit., p. 24.
100. Lim Kit Siang,pp.cjt.,p,191» Article 5(4) of the Malaysian Consti-
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of a suspect through insufficient evidence to commit him was not guaranteed* 
The prosecutor could invoke Clause 21 of the Essential(Security Cases) Re­
gulations to recommit the suspect for trial. This clause allowed the evi­
dence of prosecution witnesses to he heard in camera in the absence of the 
accused and even his counsel"}”^  Prosecution witnesses could be protected 
from being identified either by wearing hoods(appearance) or elect to have 
their evidence relayed by an interpreter(voice). The government justified 
evidence in camera so as to encourage as many witnesses as possible to tes­
tify without the fear of reprisal. The D.A.P. charged that this would in 
fact encourage informers and accent provocateurs to incriminate innocent
persons by resorting to perjury and even blackmail, since their credibility
102could not be effectively challenged. It further claimed that the jury 
and even assessors(as in the case of trials under the 1949 Emergency) were 
abolished, leaving the judge to be the sole arbiter of the outcome of the 
trial. If and when the accused failed to prove his innocence(and the D.A.P. 
submitted that this was more than likely under the prevailing circumstances), 
the judge was pressured to impose the maximum mandatory sentence, i.e. the 
death penalty. If for some reason the maximum sentence was not imposed, 
the prosecutor was thus likely to appeal}*^ The chances of a successful 
appeal in favour of the prosecutor were very much higher than the accused 
appealing against the maximum sentence. This was because the traditional 
appeal to the court of last resort, the Privy Council, had been abolished.
tution reads:"where a person is arrested and not released, he
shall without unreasonable delay, and in any case 
within 24 hours(excluding the time of any necessa­
ry journey) be produced before a magistrate and shall 
not be further detained in custody without the 
magistrate's authority". Op. cit.
101. Ibid, p. 187-
102. Ibid, p. 188
103. Ibid, p. 189.
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By t h i s  th e  D.A.P. im plied  th a t  th e  M alaysian J u d ic ia ry  was B iased tow ards 
th e  government}0^
In  v o ic in g  i t s  o b je c tio n s  to  th e  E .3 .R ., th e  D.A.P. was a lso  show­
in g  i t s  concern over th e  a r b i t r a r y  d e te n tio n  powers o f the  I .S .A . Two o f 
i t s  members, N a tio n a l T rea su re r , Chan Kok K it and th e  M.P. fo r  Batu Gajah, 
Chian Heng K ai, were d e ta in ed  to g e th e r  w ith  Abdullah Ahmad, Abdullah M ajid, 
Tan.Kwee Shen and Kassim Ahmad under th e  I .S .A . on 3rd November 1976* f o r  
a l le g e d ly  be in g  d e l ib e ra te ly  or unknowingly, d i r e c t ly  or in d i r e c t ly ,  in v o l­
ved in  a c t i v i t i e s  w hich(in  th e  governm ent's op in ion) could be regarded  as 
a s s i s t i n g  th e  advancement o f  th e  Communist U nited Front (C .U .F .)}°^  The 
governm ent's m otive in  d e ta in in g  th e  above-m entioned in d iv id u a ls  was to  
h ig h lig h t  th e  gra.v ity  o f communist subversion  through i n f i l t r a t i o n .  This 
a f fe c te d  even th e  p a r t ie s  and in d iv id u a ls  who were u n lik e ly  to  be in flu en c ed  
by communist propaganda. Except f o r  Kassim Ahmad, th e  Chairman of P .S .R .M ., 
whom th e  government regarded  as having s tro n g  M a rx is t-L e n in is t te n d e n c ie s , 
th e  o th e rs  were in  th e  government o r component p a r t ie s  o f th e  N.F. Abdul­
la h  Ahmad and Abdullah M ajid were both  deputy M in is te rs  and Tan Kwee Shen 
was th e  Executive S ec re ta ry  o f th e  M.C.a}0^ In  d e ta in in g  th e  above-m entioned 
in d iv id u a ls ,  th e  government gave th e  im pression  th a t  i t  d id  no t d is c r im in a te  
a g a in s t anyone th en  d e a lin g  w ith  communist su b v ersio n , even government
104. Fan Yew Teng(l97§), op. c i t . ,  p . 25. Fan s ta te d
th a t  th i s  was l ik e ly  to  occur because th e  J u d ic ia ry  was under p re s ­
su re  from th e  government to  to e  i t s  l in e .  I t  was a lle g e d  th a t  Dr. 
M ahath ir, th e  Deputy Prime M in is te r , gave a th in ly  v e i le d  th r e a t  a t 
th e  end of 1977 th a t  th e  J u d ic ia ry  should no t a ttem pt to  fo rc e  i t s  
viev/s on th e  l e g i s la tu r e  o therw ise  i t  could face  adverse  consequen­
ces . This was in  response  to  some judges opposing th e  E.S.R .
105. New S t r a i t s  Times, 5 th  February , 1977« See speech by th e  I .G .P . ,  
Tan S r i H an iff Omar on communist subversion  and th e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  
o f th e  a r r e s t  o f th e  above-m entioned in d iv id u a ls .
106. For d e ta i l s  o f th e  a r r e s t ,  see K .D as,"Purge from W ith in" , F ar E a s t­
ern Economic Review, 12th November, 1976. For d e ta i l s  o f th e  con-
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ministers. The D.A.P. however attributed the detention of its 2 members
to a consequence of intra-party fighting in U.H.N.O. Lim Kit Siang stated
that both Chan and Chian were sacrificial victims of this, in the same way
that he had been detained for 18 months under the I.S.A. shortly after the
1969 radial riot. He denied that both had been involved in the activities
of the C.U.F., either directly or indirectly and held that the real reaaon
for their detention was their consistent advocacy of Chinese educational
issues(which,according to the D.A.P., were lawful and constitutional) from 
1071971 to 1976. This was in response to the I.G.P.’s address on television 
on 4th February 1977 dealing with communist subversion and the confessions 
of all the detainees except Kassim Ahmad. Lim Kit Siang claimed that the 
I.G.P.'s address had inferred that both Chan and Chian had confessed their 
involvement with the C.U.F. privately because they wished to continue with 
their political activities on their release. According to him, this was 
an attempt to smear the integrity of both men. He therefore challenged 
the government to either prove that both men had in fact been involved in 
C.U.F. activities or release them unconditionally. His challenge was pre­
dictably ignored.
The D.A.P.'s inconsistent stand over the I.S.A. made it very vul­
nerable to charges that it practised double standards. Before the 1969
fessions of Abdullah Ahmad and Abdullah Llaiid, see K.Das, "Switching 
on the Confessions", F.E.E.R., 18th February, 1977* For Tan's 
confession, see K.Das,"The Subtle Art of Subversion", F.S.E.R., 26th 
February, 1977* For Kassim Ahmad's detention and earlier harrass- 
ment, see Fan Yew Teng,"Torture and Ill-treatment of political pri­
soners in Malaysia", AI.IPO Japan Asia Quarterly Review, Yol. XI No.
4, 1979, PP- 12-7.
107. See Parliamentary speech,"Chian Heng Kai and Chan Kok Kit: Detention 
under I.S.A." in Lim Kit Siangan.cit.,op. 202-6 for full details.
To persistent D.A.P. calls forlineir release, the Home Affairs Mi­
nister, Ghazali Shafie explained that both men had, in accordance 
to the laws of the country, been given several opportunities to de­
fend themselves. They had been brought before a Review Board _■
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g en e ra l e le c t io n s ,  th e  D.A.P. had in  f a c t  supported  th e  I .S .A . as shown in
108th e  1967 Setapak D e c la ra tio n . Acceptance of th e  I .S .A . was d ic ta te d  by
h i s t o r i c a l  t i e s  w ith  th e  P .A .P . which had no t only supported  th e  p ro v is io n s ,
109but had s im ila r  ones in  S ingapore. The D .A .P .'s  p o s it io n  subsequen tly  
changed w ith  th e  d e te n tio n  o f Lim K it S iang  fo r  18 months a f t e r  th e  1969 
r a c i a l  r i o t .  At th e  1971 D.A.P. Conggress, Lim K it S iang condemned th e  
I .S .A . in  M alaysia. Though he d id  no t d i r e c t ly  condemn th e  I .S .A . in  S in ­
gapore, he c a l le d  fo r  th e  r e le a s e  of th e  "O peration Cold S to re"  d e ta in ee s  
( s in c e  1963) Said  Z ahari, Dr. Lim Hock Siew, Dr. Poh Soo Kai and Ho P i a o l ^  
K it S ia n g 's  c r i t i c s  in te rp re te d  th i s  as th e  D .A .P .(o r a t  l e a s t  K it S iang) 
s t i l l  su p p o rtin g  th e  I .S .A . in  S ingapore. They appeared v in d ic a te d  when 
th e  D.A.P. S ecre ta ry -G en era l c a lle d  fo r  th e  P .A .P . 's  re -ad m issio n  to  th e  
S o c ia l i s t  I n te rn a t io n a l  ( S . I . )  a t a m eeting in  Tokyo in  January  1978» a f te r  
th e  P .A .P . had been ex p e lled  fo r  a lle g e d ly  v iö la t in g  human r ig h t s  under 
th e  I .S .A . K it S iang s ta te d  th a t  S ingapore’s d e ten tio n -v /ith o u ^ b -tria l laws
were n ecessa ry  owing to  th e  th r e a t  of m i l i t a n t  communism on th e  is la n d .
Pie added th a t  curbs on S in g ap o re 's  abuse of i t s  d e te n t io n - w ith o u t- t r ia l
powers could be more e f f e c t iv e ly  meted out w ith  S ingapore in s id e  th e  S . I .
112r a th e r  than  o u ts id e  i t .  This s ta tem en t p r e c ip i ta te d  some confusion  in  
th e  D .A .P .'s  ran k s , le a d in g  to  th e  re s ig n a tio n  o f Fan Yew Teng who had been 
a c t iv e ly  campaigning overseas a g a in s t re p re s s io n  in  bo th  M alaysia and S inga-
on 6th  and 12th O ctober, 1978» So f a r  th e  l a t t e r  was s t i l l  no t s a ­
t i s f i e d  th a t  they  were no longer s e c u r i ty  r i s k s  and th e re fo re  could 
no t r e le a s e  them. New S t r a i t s Times, 6th  December, 1978.
108. See Item  8 in  Appendix A.
109. See l e t t e r  to  th e  Far E astern  Economic Review, 31st March, 1978 by 
an ex-D.A.P. member in  Penang.
110. Lira K it S iang, op. c i t . ,  p. xxx.
111. See D .A .P .'s  le t te r ," A b u se  of d e te n tio n  pow ers", to  th e  Far E astern  
Economic  Review, 24th  February , 1978, pp. 6- 7 .-
112 . Ib id .
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pore, as manifested, by the excessive detention powers of the I.S.a } ^  In 
his letter of resignation, Fan had. accused Lim Kit Siang of condemning re­
pression in Malaysia while condoning it in Singapore by his support of Sin­
gapore's re-admission to the S. Lim Kit Siang tried to clarify the 
D.A.P.'s position to refute Fan's charges. He held that the D.A.P.'s call 
to the S.I. to re-admit the P.A.P. did not depart from its official stand 
in opposing the I.S.A. in both countries. The D.A.P. had proposed an Asso­
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) commission on human rights to 
end detention-without-trial laws in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indone­
sia and the Philippines in the Parliamentary debate on 24th March, 1978*1** 
However this appeared unconvincing to many of its critics, who, in the ab­
sence of a direct D.A.P. condemnation of the I.S.A. in Singapore,publicly, 
considered this a generalisation on Kit Siang's part and in no way reflected 
the D.A.P.'s clear stand on the I.S.A.
\
In retrospect, the D.A.P. opposed the E.S.H. and the I.S.A. in 
particular and the government's overall handling of the security situation 
in general. Its opposition was premised on the strong belief that the 
government intended to use the E.S.H. on its political opponents, rather 
than on the communists. The D.A.P.'s strategy was to condemn the govern­
ment for abusing and misusing the arbitrary powers vested in itself and to 
show that while the government abused the law, it staunchly upheld it.
This was manifested by its association with the Bar Council's criticisms 
of the E.5.R. The government was thus portrayed as undermining democracy
113. For Fan's condemnation of repression in Singapore, see Harvey Stock- 
win, "Exit S'pore", Far Eastern Economic Review, 11th June, 1976.
For his resignation from the D.A.P., see New Straits Times, 29th 
May, 1978.
114. Ibid.
115. See Lim Kit Siang's letter to the Far Eastern Economic Review, 
28th April, 1978. ~ ~  •
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in the country. The D.A.P. highlighted the adverse effects of the E.S.Ri 
on the average citizen rather than the communists by the government’s de­
tention of suspects and then its meting out the mandatory death sentence
ll6in one-sided trials. It decided to make political capital out of the
death sentence meted out to a 14 year-old boy for possession of firearms
by publicly associating itself with the international and domestic outcry 
117over the sentence. By this it was also drawing attention to itself as 
a victim of government persecution and harrassment in the hope that public 
outcry would help to secure the release of its 2 detained leaders, Chan Kok 
Kit and Chian Heng Kai. The D.A.P.’s usual theme was to suggest that the 
correct way for the government to check the communist threat was to ensure 
that political, social, cultural, educational and economic equality be gi­
ven to all. It held that these existing inequalities provided the commu­
nists with issues to exploit and thus exacerbate the communist threat. It
116. Fan Yew Teng (197.8 ) > op. cit., p. 25. Fan stated
that more than 40 people were awaiting the death sentence since the 
S.S.R. cane into effect in late 1975« He added that up to October 
1977» not more than 7 of the persons tried under the E.3.R. had been 
acquitted. These were all on technical grounds. The first execu­
tion by hanging under the E.S.R. involved a Malaysian house painter 
on 6th January, 1976. In March 1900, there were 3 more hangings
of I.S.A. cases. New Straits Times, 15th March, 1980. Lim Kit Si- 
ang urged the government to order a stay of execution of persons 
sentenced to death for I.S.A. offences if no violence had been com­
mitted although the accused were in possession of firearms. This 
was to enable them to seek pardons from the King by having their 
death sentences commuted to life imprisonment. Kit Siang's pleas 
were based on humanitarian grounds.
117. See K.Das,"Executing the letter of the law”,"A Boy’s Life in the 
Balance”, and "Security Act row spreads", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Jth September, 1977» 10th & 14th October, 1977« The boy,
Lim Hiang Seoh, was charged under the I.S.A. with possession of a 
Browning pistol and 20 rounds of ammunition in a coffee shop in 
Penang at 9 p»m. on 14th February, 1977* Both offences, possession 
of guns and ammunition, carried a mandatory death sentence under 
Section 57(l)(A) & (b ) of the I.S.A. A 15 year-old boy who acted 
as informer for the police could not be produced to the defence, 
neither was his identity revealed. The judge, F. Arulanandom, in 
adhering closely to Section 3(3) °T the Essential(Security Cases)
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reminded the government that the proclamation of emergency regulations and 
increased military expenditure would not defeat the communists as in the 
case of South Vietnam. By this it implied that there was corruption in hi­
gh government political circles and taunted the government that the E.S.R. 
would be better used against its own corrupted officials instead of the 
average citizen.
The D.A.P.'s criticisms overlooked the gravity of the communist 
threat and the difficulties arising from it that the government had faced. 
They were calculated more to discredit the government by stressing on the 
unsavoury rather than remedial effects of the E.S.R. and the I.S.A. The 
government regarded the widespread and unprecedented activities of the M.C.P. 
as a threat to its efforts to achieve national unity through the N.E.P., 
then entering its second phase in the form of the T.M.P. The government's 
fears were premised more on the implications of the M.C.P.'s terrorism 
causing racial strife between the Malays and the Chinese, given the back­
ground of the 1969 racial riot. Already there were signs of restlessness 
among the Malays, particularly U.M.N.O. Youth, over the spate of terrorism 
by the M.C.P. That was why the government had to play down the racial fac­
tor in the assassination of the I.G.P. in 1974 By publicly stating that one 
of the 2 assassins was a Malay and that the cause of the assassination was 
personal, although it was widely believed that both assassins were Chinese.
Amendment Regulations 1975 “ where a person is accused or charged 
with a security offence, he shall regardless of his age, be dealt 
with in accordance with the provisions of these regulations and the 
Juvenile Courts Act(1947) shall not apply to such a person - imposed 
the maximum mandatory death sentence. Lim Kit Siang said that the 
boy's death sentence had made the law even more meaningless. He 
held that unfair and unjust lav/s offended the conscience of ordinary 
men who could not be expected to stand up and defend them, and thus - 
submitted that the offensive law3 could not win the confidence of 
the people. See also Parliamentary speech,"The 14 Year-old Condemned
Boy - Aftermath", in Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., pp. 199-201.
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The government follow-ed t h i s  up by p u b lic ly  s ta t i r ig  th a t  th e  m a jo rity  of th e  
C hinese in  th e  country  were law -ab id in g  c i t iz e n s  and n o t communists. These 
m easures were c a lc u la te d  to  p reven t a re c u rre n ce  6'f  an o th er 1969 r a c i a l  r i o t .  
The government th e re fo re  j u s t i f i e d  th e  p roclam ation  of th e  E .S .R . in  i t s  be­
l i e f  th a t  th ey  would only apply to  th e  communists o r t h e i r  ag en ts . I t  f e l t  
th a t  law -ab id in g  c i t iz e n s  could h e lp  i t  to  check communist te r ro r is m  by p a r ­
t i c i p a t i n g  in  th e  Rukun Tetangga scheme provided  by th e  f i r s t  s e t  o f th e  
E .S .R . I t  th u s  had a duty to  p ro te c t w itn esses  from r e p r i s a l  by p e rm ittin g  
evidence in  camera. A3 fo r  th e  laws being  ex cessiv e ly  h a r3h in  th e  case o f 
th e  m andatory dea th  sen tence  imposed on th e  14 y e a r -o ld  boy fo r  p o sse ss in g  
f ire a rm s , th e  government in ten d ed  i t  to  be a w arning to  th e  M.C.P. not to
use  c h ild re n  as c o u rie rs  and lo g i s t i c s  su p p o rte rs . I t  was to  show th e  M.C.P.
118th a t  i t  would hang even c h ild re n , i f  and when n e ce ssa ry . W hatever th e  
dem erits  o f th e  E .S .R ., th e  government reg arded  them as a n ecessa ry  p r ic e  
to  pay f o r  th e  m aintenance o f s e c u r i ty  in  th e  c o u n try . T here fo re  i t  was
o b liv io u s to the D.A.P. charge that i t  was abusing and m isusing the emer­
gency powers, and thereby dism issed D.A.P. c a l ls  fo r  the annulment o f the 
E.S.R . 119
118. On th e  A tto rn ey -G en era l's  adv ice , th e  boy had h is  d eath  sen tence  
commuted to  a p e rio d  o f d e te n tio n  in  th e  Henry Gurney Reform School 
u n t i l  he reached th e  age o f 21 y e a r s .
119 . The D.A.P. was n e v e r th e le s s  undaunted in  i t s  c a l l  upon th e  government 
to  re p e a l th e  E.S.R. and amend th e  I .S .A . from tim e to  tim e . In  1979 
i t  c a lle d  upon th e  government to  annul th e  4 p roclam ations o f emer­
gency in  th e  country  which i t  considered  were no lo n g e r n ecessa ry . 
These were ( i )  The 1964 C o n fron ta tion  by In d o n esia  ( i i )  The 1966 
re su rg en ce  of communist underground a c t i v i ty  in  Sarawak ( i i i )  The 
a fte rm a th  o f th e  1969 r a c ia l  r i o t  and ( iv )  The 1977 C iv il  D isorders 
in  K elantan . See A siaweek, 13th  J u ly , 1979 and New S t r a i t s  Times, 
29th  June, 1979.
CHAPTER IV
Education, Language and Culture.
(a) The Future of Chinese and Tamil Primary Schools
Education in the vernacular languages, either Malay, Chinese or 
Tamil, had been first and foremost, associated with cultural objectives} 
Under these circumstances, Chinese and Tamil vernacular schools had always 
been resented by the Malays as cultural strivings of the immigrant communi­
ties. Among the extremist Malays, the feeling was that Chinese schools were
nothing more than "little Chinas" transplanted into the country, thereby
2constituting an affront to its Malay cultural heritage. First indications 
of Malay resentment towards Chinese vernacular schools was their support 
for the recommendations of the Barnes Report in 1951» The recommendations 
generally advocated Malay as the main medium of instruction in all schools,
and by implication, would assert the predominance of the Malay culture in
\the country. As the British were still in charge, the views of the Chinese 
community were entertained through the Fenn-Y/u Report, also in the same 
year} That report called for caution and accommodation and suggested the > 
importance of the non-Malay languages and cultures as ingredients of nation 
building through integration, in contrast to the assimilative intention of 
the Barnes Report}- Understandably both the recommendations of the Bame3 
and Fenn-Yiu Reports were not considered on the grounds that they were likely
1. For full details, see Tham Seong Chee,"Issues in Malaysian Education: 
Past, Present and Future", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. X 
No. 2, September 1979» PP* 321-50«
2. See Mahathir b. Mohamad,The Malay Dilemma, Asia Pacific Press, Singapore 
1970, op» cit., p. 144« Prior to becoming Deputy Prime Minister in 1976» 
Dr. Mahathir was very outspoken in his anti-Chinese views.
3. It is not proposed to discuss the views of the Indians in response to 
the Barnes Report in relation to Tamil education in this chapter.
4. Tham Seong Chee, op. cit., p. 325«
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to provoke bad feelings between the Malays and the Chinese. Besides the
Colonial Administration felt that the then English-medium predominated
educational system in the country was sound and fair to all communities.
It was the policy of the British to stress the importance of English as the
main medium of instruction in schools for two important reasons. Firstly,
because of its established status, English was practical in administration,
commerce and industry, and provided access to higher education either in
Malaysia(then Malaya) or overseas. Secondly, English, as evident by the
partial integration of students of all races in Ehglish-medium schools,
could serve as an effective neutral vehicle to bring about ultimate national
5unity among the races when the country became independent. However the 
teaching of the vernacular languages in Malay, Chinese and Tamil schools 
was not discouraged for cultural purposes.
The Malays however began once again to assert their predominance
\
in language and education in 1955 when the U.M.N.O.-dominated Alliance 
won 51 out of the 52 seats in the first general elections for the Federal 
Legislative Council. Since the Malays formed some 85$ of the then electo­
rate, U.M.N.O. felt that it had a duty to bring about an education system 
that would reflect Malay aspirations in relation to language and culture. 
There was a need to bring about a unified education system incorporating 
the various media schools, based on the dominance of Malay as the National 
Language although Chinese and Tamil could still continue as media of inst­
ruction in the schools concerned. Malay was thus elevated to the same 
status as English for official purposes and made compulsory, together with 
English, in all schools. The government's position was summed up in the 
recommendations of the Razak Report in 1956, a year before the country
5. See T.H.Silcock, Towards a Malayan Nation, Eastern Universities Press 
Singapore, 1961.
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became independent. Chinese educationists in the country however regarded 
the Razak Report as a subtle expression of the earlier Barnes Report. They 
were unhappy that the preservation of Chinese primary schools was condition­
al on their acceptance of the compulsory teaching of Malay and English!
To them, especially the United Chinese School Teachers’ Association, 
(U.C.S.T.A.) who appeared dedicated to Chinese exclusiveness regarding 
education, the guarantee that other languages - in this case Chinese and 
Tamil - would be preserved and sustained was formless since the Razak Re­
port, by stressing the compulsory teaching of Malay and English, had indir­
ectly curbed the orientation of instruction in Chinese. This curb, in its 
extreme form, was interpreted as an affront to Chinese culture. Thus there 
were demonstrations by Chinese schools against the Razak Report in the big 
towns, especially Georgetown(Penang) and Ipoh(Perak) and the Alliance 
(M.C.A.) lost its first Parliamentary by-election in Ipoh in late 1957 to 
the P.P.P. over the issue of Chinese education. If the government had been 
facing pressures from the Chinese over the Razak Report, it also faced coun-
6. Tun Razak was the then Education Minister. The Razak Report stated
"that the ultimate objective of the educational policy in this country 
(Malaya) must be to bring together the children of all races under a 
national education system in which the National Language(i.e.Malay) is 
the main medium of instruction ...." Karl Von Vorys, Democracy without 
Consensus, Communalism and Political Stability in Malaysia, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1975, op.cit., p. 212. The 
main recommendations of the report were the following:
Malay and Hhglish would be compulsory subjects in all 
primary and secondary schools;
Instruction in Chinese and Tamil would be made available 
in all primary schools maintained in whole or in part from 
public funds when the parents of 15 children from any school 
required it;
The other language media schools would remain in existence;
All schools conforming to the government education policy 
would be eligible for grants-in-aid;
A common syllabus and time-table for all schools was to be 
enforced.
R.K.Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-communal Poli­
tical. Parties in West Malaysia, East Asian Historical Monographs, Ox­
ford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971» op. cit., p. 231.
7* Ibid.
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ter pressures from the Malays, especially the powerful Malay School Tea­
chers' Association,(M.S.T.A.) with many of its members U.M.N.O. supporters. 
They thus felt that the Razak Report was not forceful enough to pander to 
Malay aspirations because it indirectly supported the continued existence 
of Chinese and Tamil schools although it had asserted Malay as the main me­
dium of instruction. Their feeling was that the supremacy of Malay culture 
was being threatened so long as the existence of Chinese and Tamil schools 
was guaranteed. Following the electoral success of the extremist P.A.S, 
in the 1959 state elections in the predominantly Malay east coast states of 
Kelantan and Trengganu, U.M.N.O, interpreted this as the materialisation of 
the earlier threat by the M.S.T,A. and its many supporters to withdraw their 
support from it over the Razak Report. Thus in an attempt to win back Malay 
support, an even more pro-Malay education system had to be advocated. This
was the Rahman Talib Report in i960. As far as the Chinese were concerned,
9it was even worse than the Razak Report. Chinese secondary schools in their 
existing state of Chinese exclusiveness, were gradually phased out by the 
withdrawal of grants while Chinese and Tamil primary schools were tolerated 
"for the time being" until some propitious time when the government would 
accordingly deal with thenw^ Thus their fate depended upon the Educational 
Act of 196l(Clause 21(2)) which stipulated that the Minister of Education 
could convert Chinese and Tamil primary schools into National(i.e.Malay)
8. D.R.Seeniv as again was the successful P.P.P. candidate and it marked the 
beginning of his rise as a strong advocate of non-Malay rights. The 
by-election was caused by the resignation of the incumbent, Leong Yew 
Koh, to become the Governor of Penang. R.K.Vasil, op^cit., p. 232.
9. The Rahman Talib Report implied that "Chinese education would not be 
permitted to prosper:instruction in Chinese culture would be discoura­
ged, instruction in Chinese language would be limited to promote an 
educational policy designed to create national consciousness and having 
the intention of making the Malay language the national language of the 
country". Karl Von Voiy3, op. cit., p. 215.
10. Ibid, p. 216.
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schools if he considered it necessary. As a reaction, Chinese parents 
began to send their children to the English-medium schools. This was also 
due to the "publicly acknowledged superior academic and pedagogical standa­
rds, and more significantly, its direct linkage with the institutions of
higher leaming(particularly the University of Malaya) and to future econo- 
12mic prospects". The Malay extremist outcry against the promulgation of the 
1967 National Language Act on the grounds that it indirectly gave a semi­
official status to English as an official language and permitted the liberal 
usage of Chinese and Tamil, re-affirmed the fears and apprehensions of the 
Chinese regarding their education and language^ These fears and apprehen­
sions were revived by the announcement of the then Education Minister, Rah­
man Yaakub, on the New Education Policy in July 1969» shortly after the 
racial riot. The Minister stated that all English-medium primary schools 
would convert to the Malay-medium, beginning with Standard One from 1970 
onwards. The conversion process would be carried out on a yearly basis so 
that eventually all levels of education, from primary, secondary and tertia­
ry would be in the Mai ay-medium by 1983» Although Chinese and Tamil prima­
ry schools were not directly affected by this conversion process, the Chi­
nese did not feel re-assured, granted their perception that the New Educa­
tion policy was inspired by pressure from extremist Malays for one race,
11. See R.3.Milne and D.K.Mauzy, Politics and Government in Malaysia, 
Federal Publications, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, 1978, 
p. 372.
12. Tham Seong Chee, op. cit., p. 328.
13. For further details of the 1967 National Language Act, see Karl Von 
Vorys,op.cit. ,PP. 200-10 and Margaret Roff,"The Politics of Language 
in Malaya", Asian Survey, Vol. VTI No. 5» May 19^7> PP* 316-28. The 
extremist Malays in U.M.N.O. were angry at the National Language Bill 
introduced by the moderate U.M.N.O. leadership because the bill per­
mitted the official usage of English at the King’s discretion and al­
so the liberal usage of Chinese and Tamil. They interpreted this as 
unofficial government support for multi-lingualism. The extremists 
wanted a firm and immediate shift from the use of English to the use 
of Malay in every facet of life, but in particular in the educational 
system. See also Patrick Low ed., Trends in Southeast Asia No.2..
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one language and one culture.14
Under these circumstances, the D.A.P. found itself forced to arti­
culate the fears and apprehensions of the Chinese. Being a traditional 
opponent of the government, it was expedient for the D.A.P. to highlight the 
issue of the future of Chinese and Tamil primary schools mainly to consoli- 
date its base in the urban areas. This, however, is not to suggest that 
the party was not concerned over the future of the vernacular schools in 
question. Indeed the New Education. Policy with its objective of assimila­
tion towards Malay language and culture, was diametrically opposed to the 
D.A.P.’s advocacy of the free use of all 4 languages - Malay, Chinese, Ta­
mil and English - as media of instruction in schools to eventually bring 
about a united Malaysian nation by integration. As such it may be argued 
that the D.A.P.’s concern for the future of Chinese and Tamil priraaiy schools
was within the context of its fight for a multi-racial nation with equality
\
for all races against U.M.N.O.'s measures to promote Malay hegemony through 
assimilation by the New Education Policy. The D.A.P. identified the fears 
and apprehensions of the Chinese regarding the future of their primary sch­
ools as firstly, the possible conversion to the Malay-medium(in the same 
way that English-medium primary schools were converted)by legislation and 
secondly, the possible alteration of their Chinese character by subtle and
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1971» P* 114*
14. Rahman Yaakub stressed that the educational policy was to achieve the 
target of "one country, one people and one language". Ibid, op.cit. 
This would imply assimilation of the non-Malays to Malay culture 
through education and language, a prospect which they resented and 
feared. For details of the conversion process in stages, see John 
Pillai,"The English-Bohasa Story", New Straits Times, 19th March, I960.
15. After the restoration of Parliamentary democracy in February 1971» the 
D.A.P.'s influence in the urban areas became shaky due to the Consti­
tutional Amendment Bill and the era of accommodation politics ushered 
in by Tun Razak. See Chapter II and Section (a) of Chapter III.
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in s id io u s  means.
In  th e  f i r s t  in s ta n c e , th e  p a r ty  h e ld  th a t  d e sp ite  government 
assu ran ces  th a t  Chinese and Tamil prim ary schoo ls  would not be a f fe c te d  by 
th e  conversion  to  Malay-medium of English-medium prim ary schoo ls from 1970» 
th e re  was no guaran tee  to  t h i s  e f f e c t .  The p a rty  j u s t i f i e d  i t s  c o n ten tio n  
on th e  grounds th a t  government p o l ic ie s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  th o se  7/here th e  non- 
Malays were concerned, were always ambiguous. I t  f e l t  th a t  although th e  
Rahman T a lib  Report allow ed th e  continued  e x is ten c e  o f Chinese and Tamil 
prim ary sch o o ls , C lause 21(2) o f th e  I 96I  E ducational Act which p e rm itte d  
th e  Education M in is te r  to  convert them a t h is  d is c r e t io n ,  caused w idespread  
apprehension  among th e  Chinese and a lso  In d ia n s . Thus, acco rd ing  to  Lim 
K it S iang , th e  government had been too  "equ ivocal on th e  fu tu re  o f Chinese 
and Tamil schoo ls fo r  too  lo n g " ^  This had been m an ifested  by th e  govern­
m ent’s vague re p ly  th a t  i t  would d ea l w ith  th e  problem in  2 o r 3 y e a rs  tim e 
(from  1972) when p ressed  by th e  D.A.P. fo r  a c a te g o r ic a l  assu rance  th a t  
Chinese and Tamil prim ary schoo ls would n o t be converted  in to  N a t io n a l ( i .e .  
Malay) prim ary sch o o ls" . The D.A.P. b e liev ed  th a t  th e  government in ten d ed  
to  do away w ith  Chinese and Tamil prim ary schools from th i s  vague and im p li­
c i t  re p ly . I t  h e ld  th a t  Malay e x tre m is ts  who were th e  de fa c to  r u le r s  o f
th e  coun try  had in  f a c t  e a r l i e r  c a lle d  f o r  th e  a b o li t io n  o f Chinese and Ta-
18m il prim ary schoo ls th rough  th e  Utusan M elayu» th e  Malay v e rn acu la r p re s s .
l 6 . See P arliam en ta ry  sp eech ,"F u tu re  o f Chinese and Tamil Prim ary S chools", 
in  Lim K it S iang, Time Bombs in  M alay sia» 2nd E d., D .A .P., Kuala Lum­
p u r, 1978, op. c i t . ,  p . 272.
^7« lt> id, op. c i t .« p . 274*
18. The E d ito r  of Utusan Melayu, Melan A bdullah, p u b lished  th e  a lle g e d ly  
s e d it io u s  speech of Musa Hitam, then  an a s s is ta n t  m in is te r ,  c a l l in g  
fo r  th e  a b o l i t io n  o f Chinese and Tamil sch o o ls . He was fin e d  $500 
fo r  s e d i t io n .  See a r t ic le ," A  C lear Case", Far E aste rn  Economic
Review, 20th  November, 1971*
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Although the Editor of the paper was charged with sedition, the D.A.P. felt 
that Malay feelings over this issue were generally in support of the paper's 
views. Sensing that the government continued to be indecisive which it in­
terpreted as insincerity over what was a matter of vital concern to the non- 
Malays, the D.A.P. began to agitate for a categorical government assurance 
that Chinese and Tamil primary schools would not be converted. It argued 
along the lines of the right of non-Malays to be educated in their mother 
tongue as provided for by Article 152(l) of the Constitution^ The D.A.P. 
held that if the government decided to convert Chinese and Tamil primary 
schools to Malay, it would be deviating from Article 152(l) of the Consti­
tution, and thereby the Rukunegara, which respected and upheld the Consti­
tution. The D.A.P.'s consistent agitation reflected its belief that the
M.C.A. and the G.R.M. could not effectively protect non-Malay interests
20such as education and language in the N.F. coalition. Although the D.A.P.'s
call to repeal Clause 2l(2) of the I96I Educational Act was not successful,
19» Article 152(l) of the Constitution states:
(l) The National Language shall be the Malay Language and shall be in
such script as Parliament may by law provide;
Provided that:
(a) no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using(Other­
wise than for official purposes), or from teaching or learn­
ing any other language;
and
(b) nothing in this clause shall prejudice the right of the 
Federal Government or of any State Government to preserve 
and sustain the use and study of the language of any other 
community in the Federation.
Lim Kit Si an,r .op. cit., PP213-4* He claimed that thi3 clause
was vague and caused great anxiety among the non-Malays, and called 
for a Parliamentary Commission to define clearly the phrase'to pre­
serve and sustain the use and study of the language of any other com­
munity in the Federation'. In the absence of this, Kit Siang held that 
the non-Malays were entitled to interpret thi3 as not merely the study 
of their languages as a subject(as the government had probably intended) 
such as French, German, etc., but also their use as effective media 
of instruction in Chinese and Tamil schools. Ibid, p. 273.
20. Despite earlier pledges by M.C.A. Ministers that the teaching of Chi­
nese would not be curtailed after Malay became the sole official lan­
guage of the country in 1967» the D.A.P. remained skeptical. Khaw
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the government nevertheless had been forced to categorically state that it
21had no intention to convert Chinese and Tamil primary schools. Whatever 
the government's reasons, the D.A.P. felt it was due to the government's
22fear of losing non-Malay votes in the forthcoming 1974 general elections.
The D.A.P. did not believe that the categorical assurance by the
government not to convert Chinese and Tamil pritaary schools reflected its
sincerity that the schools should develop in such a way as to fulfil the
cultural and linguistic aspirations of the non-Malays. It held that the
government could always resort to subtle and insidious ways to alter their
character so as to stifle their development. To prove this point, Lim Kit
Siang cited several ways as to how the government intended to alter the
23character of Chinese primary schools. He alleged that there had been no 
corresponding increase in the number of Chinese primary schools in relation 
to their increased enrolment. On the contrary he stated that there wa3 a 
net reduction of 6 primary schools in Peninsular Malaysia from 1970 to 1973 
when 4 new Chinese primary schools were built in exchange for 10 being clo­
sed down. He further alleged that the government had been indifferent in 
providing subsidies for the development and maintenance needs of Chinese
Kai Boh pledged that the M.C.A. would "ensure that the teaching and 
learning of the Chinese language is not prohibited and that the pre­
servation and sustenance of the use and study of the Chinese language 
is not prejudiced". Suara Malaysia, 24th September, 1965» °P« cit. 
Lee Siok Yew stated:"The position of the Chinese language has been 
clearly written in the Constitution which states that the teaching of 
the language will not be curtailed even after 1967 when the national 
language has become the only official language of the country". Ibid, 
27th August, 1 9 6 5» on. cit.
21. Parliamentary speech,"Future of Chinese and Tamil Primary Schools", 
in Lim Kit Siang, op. cit.. p. 274.
22. Ibid.
23» For full details, see ibid, especially pp. 275“8» The intended possi­
ble alteration of Tamil primary schools by the government, according 
to the D.A.P., would also be along similar lines.
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primary schools and neglected the teacher training programme for Chinese- 
medium teachers. A3 a result, Kit Siang claimed that there was a shortage 
of such teachers. In addition, he held that the teachers trained were not 
competent to teach in the Chinese medium, as they merely had 6 years of 
Chinese primary education, necessitating a switch to national-type(öiglish- 
medium) secondary schools, taking Chinese as a subject only. Further it was 
alleged that their training in Malay(except for Chinese language and litera­
ture) blunted their effectiveness to teach in Chinese. Lim Kit Siang also 
maintained that the priority given to Malay as a mandatory pass in examina­
tions caused the standard of education in Chinese primary schools to deterio­
rate owing to a lack of attention to the Chinese language. Finally the pos­
ting of clerks inclined towards the use of Malay in circulars and notices 
(previously in Chinese) and the government's refusal to conduct educational 
programmes in Chinese were cited by Kit Siang as further measures to alter 
the character of Chinese primary schools.
In retrospect, not all the allegations regarding the alteration 
of the character of Chinese and Tamil primary schools by the D.A.P. against 
the government were justifiable, considering the constraints of a multi­
racial society. For instance, the training of Chinese school teachers in 
Malay did not blunt their effectiveness to teach in Chinese in the majority 
of cases. Lim Kit Siang was trying to link the priority given to Malay in 
Chinese primary schools, resulting in a corresponding neglect of mother- 
tongue instruction to the manner in which Chinese-medium teachers were 
trained, and then to suggest that the former adversely affected the latter. 
He contended that the spirit of Article 152(l) of the Constitution was vio­
lated because Chinese was not effectively used as a medium of instruction 
in Chinese primary schools. The government however regarded the D.A.P.'s 
allegations as reflecting the aspirations of Chinese extremist educationists
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which were likely to work up Chinese passions. In particular, the government 
resented the D.A.P.’s subtle objection to the priority given to Malay in 
Chinese primary schools. In putting foreward its allegations, the D.A.P. 
was in fact comparing the unfavourable treatment given to Chinese and Tamil 
primary schools to the privileged treatment Malay (or National) schools re- 
ceived in the form of generous grants, modem facilities, etc. The D.A.P. 
wa3 perhaps more concerned in highlighting the fact that the government, 
forced to grant the continued existence of Chinese and Tamil primary schools, 
wa3 nevertheless determined to stifle their development as manifestations 
of non-Malay cultural aspirations. Lim Kit Siang's allegations attempted 
to show that this was done in a subtle and insidious manner. Whatever the 
irregularities of the D.A.P.'s allegations, they as a whole, were neverthe­
less vindicated by 2 glaring manifestations of the New Education Policy:
The first was the ineffective procedure adopted to teach Chinese and Tamil 
an a language in schools, owing to their absence in government or public
examinations. This would cause Chinese and Tamil to lose their significance
25as media of instruction which may lead to their demise at some future date.
The second appeared to be the perceived absence of reward, particularly in
26access to higher education, in the study of Chinese and Tamil.
24« The D.A.P. doubted the M.C.A.'s claim(tlirough its Deputy Education Mi­
nister, Chan Siang Sun) that the government had done much for Chinese 
schools. For details of government grants to Chinese primary schools 
and the training of Chinese-medium teachers, see New Strait3 Times,
25th September, 1978, 20th October, 1978 and 11th July, 1979* The 
D.A.P. considered this claim as 1.1.C.A. propaganda to win Chinese votes. 
It challenged the Deputy Education Minister to give a comparative break­
down of funds and allocations to the different media schools. Lim Kit 
5iang,op.cit.,pp?75» By this the D.A.P. hoped to show that grants and 
allocations to Chinese schools were a mere pittance compared to what 
Malay-medium schools were given. The D.A.P.'s contention could be jus­
tified by Tun Tan Siew Gin's figures on grants to Chinese schools for 
1954 and 1983» compared to grants for education as a whole. In 1954» 
the figures were $11-7 million and 399-9 million. In 1963, they were 
;44.6 million and 3283 million. Suara Malaysia, 17th September, 19^5- 
The D.A.P.'s contention assumed that the bulk of educational grants 
were for Malay-medium schools.
25. Tham Seong Chee, op. cit., p. 344« 26. Ibid.
1
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(b) The 1972 Mass M.C.E. Bahasa Malay s ia  F ailures
On 19th  March 1973» th e  r e s u l t s  o f th e  M alaysian C e r t i f i c a te  of 
Education (M .C.E.) exam ination conducted the  p rev ious y e a r were re le a s e d .
The M.C.E. c e r t i f i c a t e  was norm ally awarded to  can d id a tes  who passed th e  
exam ination a f t e r  5 y ears  o f secondary school ed u ca tio n . A pass in  Bahasa 
M a la y s ia ( i .e .  Malay) which rep laced  E n g lish , i s  mandatory fo r  th e  award of 
th e  c e r t i f i c a t e .  The r e s u l t s  d isc lo se d  an unprecedented h igh  r a te  of f a i lu r e s  
and c lo s e r  a n a ly s is  rev ea led  th a t  th e  m a jo rity  of th e  can d id a tes  f a i l e d  be­
cause o f Bahasa M alaysia. As Malay was no t th e  m other-tongue o f th e  non- 
M alays, i t  was p re d ic ta b le  th a t  th e  m a jo rity  o f th e  f a i lu r e s  were Chinese 
and In d ia n s . F igures re le a se d  by th e  M in is try  of Education on 4th  A p ril 
1973 d isc lo se d  th a t  of 27»704 non-Malay cand ida tes  who s a t  fo r  th e  1972 
M.C.E. exam ination , 14 ,116(51/^) f a i le d  because of Bahasa M alaysia as a g a in s t 
4 ,354 g en e ra l f a i l u r e s . '  I t  was a lso  d isc lo se d  th a t  among th e  Bahasa Malay­
s i a  f a i l u r e s ,  many of th e  cand ida tes  were from some o f th e  töp  urban schools
28in  P e n in su la r  M alaysia. These had t r a d i t io n a l ly  d is tin g u ish e d  them selves 
in  th e  p rev ious English-medium School C e r t i f i c a te  (S .C .) exam ination conduc­
te d  by Cambridge U n iv e rs ity . The S.C. had been d isco n tin u ed  a f t e r  197*3 and 
re p la c e d  by th e  M.C.E. AI30 many o f th e  can d id a tes  who f a i le d  Bahasa Malay-
27 . See P arliam en ta ry  speech,"The 1972 Mass M.C.E. Bahasa M alaysia F a ilu re s "  
on 10 th  A p ril , 1973 in  Lim K it S iang , op. c i t . ,  p . 324«
28. The percentages of the 1972 M.C.E. passes of some o f the lead in g  urban 
sch ools were as fo llow s:
Penang. S t .  X a v ie r 's  I n s t i t u t i o n  26/0
Chung L ing High School 2G°/o
Han Chiang High School 27
M ethodist Boys School 27. 1$
Penang Free School 57i°
Ipoh. S t. M ichael's In s t itu t io n  17»4/*
Kuala Lumpur. Jalan Cochrane English School 28. 3/0 
Bukit Bintang Boys School 30/o
Assunta Convent, P eta lin g  Jaya 58c/ °
Methodist Boys School, Sentul 62-/0
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s i a  had b r i l l i a n t  g rades, s c o r in g  some J or 8 d i s t in c t io n s  in  d i f f i c u l t  
s u b je c ts ,  e sp e c ia l ly  M athematics and S c ience . From th i s  i t  was ev iden t th a t  
had i t  n o t been fo r  Bahasa M alaysia, many of th e se  can d id a tes  would have 
d is tin g u is h e d  them selves as in  th e  case o f th e  S .C ., and th e  non-Malay pass 
r a t e  fo r  th e  1972 M.C.E. exam ination would have been 84»5^(aS a g a in s t th e  
e x is t in g  33« jfo) compared to  the  Malay pass r a t e  o f ']2.25c/o. y
The immediate r e a c t io n  o f th e  non-Malays -  s tu d e n ts , te a c h e rs  
and p a re n ts  - was one o f shock, dismay, g r i e f  and sm ouldering anger. The 
p r e v a i l in g  mood was t h a t ,  w hatever p lans th e  can d id a te s  had o r t h e i r  p a ren ts  
envisaged  fo r  them, th e se  had been th w arted . The a l l  im portan t M.C.E. c e r ­
t i f i c a t e  was th e  p a ssp o rt to  p re -u n iv e r s i ty  c la s s e s  and th e  minimum "meal 
t i c k e t "  to  th e  job  m arket. W ithout i t ,  s tu d e n ts ,  i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f th e  s t r in g  
of d i s t in c t io n s  in  th e  re le v a n t s u b je c ts ,  could n o t e n te r  p re -u n iv e r s i ty
c la s s e s ,  and e v en tu a lly  th e  u n iv e r s ity .  Those who had q u a lif ie d  fo r  p la ces
>
in  6 th  Form C lasses by p a ss in g  th e  r e q u i s i t e  6 th  Form Entrance Examination 
b e fo re  th e  re le a s e  o f th e  M.C.E. r e s u l t s ,  were l i a b l e  to  have t h e i r  p lace s  
w ithdrawn i f  they  f a i le d  th e  M.C.E. P ro sp e c tiv e  jo b -se ek e rs  e i th e r  in  th e  
government or p r iv a te  s e c to r ,  would f in d  th e  doors o f employment shjit to  them 
w ithou t th e  M.C.E. Perhaps what was even more im portan t to  them was th e  
em otional and p sy ch o lo g ica l sense o f f a i l u r e ,  a f e e l in g  th a t  th ey  had l e t  
down t h e i r  p a re n ts  and te a c h e rs . Under th e se  c ircum stances, th e  a f fe c te d  
can d id a te s  tended to  v is u a l iz e  a b leak  fu tu re  w ithou t h ig h e r ed u ca tio n a l
M alacca. M alacca H i$i School 57/^
Source: Lim K it S iang , i b i d , p . 323* I t  should be noted  th a t  th e
above-m entioned schoo ls used to  have a t  l e a s t  85c/o pass r a t e  in  th e  
p rev ious English-medium S.C. exam ination.
29. Of th e  t o t a l  number o f 9*342 Malay M.C.E. can d id a tes  fo r  th e  1972
Exam ination, 6,751(72*25/^) passed , 1 4 6 ( 1 . 5 5 ) f a i l e d  because o f Bahasa 
M alaysia  and 2 ,4 4 5 (2 6 .255^9 were g en e ra l f a i l u r e s .  Lim K it S iang , 
op. c i t . ,  p . 324*
102
opportunities or jobs commensurate with their years of education in school. 
After the initial feelings of disappointment over failure had subsided, the 
tendency of the affected candidates was to re-examine the circumstances under 
which they had sat for the examination to find out what had gone wrong. The 
conclusions they derived as regards this were directly or indirectly conse­
quential on the recent events in the educational field following the announ­
cement of the New Education Policy by the former Education Minister, Rahman 
Yaakub, in July I969. Within a period of 4 years from his announcement, ma­
ny undesirable consequences in relation to making Malay the sole medium of 
instruction in all schools had been brought about, so far as the non-Malay3 
were concerned. Their indications, according to the non-Malays, pointed to 
a new wave of Malay extremism.
Firstly, on 6th October 1970» some 500 Malay students belonging 
to the extremist Malay Language Society(M.L.S.) of the University of Malaya, 
tore down campus notices printed in English and painted over English words 
on sign-boards?0 They regarded this as a legitimate move to protest against 
the 3low pace in implementing Malay as the university's medium of instruction. 
The executive committee of the University of Malaya Students' Union(U.M.S.U.), 
a multi-racial body, criticised this action a3 vandalism. The M.L.S. and 
U.M.S.U. had been at odds previously because the former, unlike the Chinese 
and Tamil Language Societies, had refused affiliation with U.M.S.U., alleging 
it to be a non-Malay body, articulating non-Malay views only. The M.L.S., 
maintaining that its action was in line with the new Razak government, gave 
U.M.S.U. 24 hours to withdraw it3 vandalism charge. After some heated de­
bate, U.M.S.U. reluctantly capitulated on the advice of its Malay members 
that there would be racial trouble if the vandalism charge was not withdrawn
30. For full details, see Jerome Bass,"New Malaysian Government", Asian 
Survey, Vol. XI IIo. 10, October 1971» pp* 970-83»
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com ple te ly . Second ly , th e  government had r e je c te d  th e  r e v iv a l  o f th e  de­
mands o f th e  Chinese fo r  th e  re c o g n itio n  o f Nanyang and Taiwan u n iv e r s i ty  
d eg rees . I t  however agreed to  g ive value  to  them in  th e  sense  th a t  th e  g ra ­
d u a tes from th e se  u n iv e r s i t i e s  were paid  le s s  than  t h e i r  c o u n te rp a r ts  from 
recogn ized  u n iv e r s i t ie s  f o r  doing th e  same work?"*" Under th e  p re v a i l in g  c i r ­
cum stances, th e  governm ent's d e c is io n  was probably  due to  i t s  f e a r  o f demon­
s t r a t io n s  by Malay e x tre m is ts , th e reb y  ex ace rb a tin g  r a c i a l  tension*
T h ird ly , th e re  were demands by Malay e x tre m is ts  th a t  th e  e x is t in g  c h a ra c te r  
o f th e  M .C.A .-sponsored Tunku Abdul Rahman College (T.A.R.C*) w ith  i t s  p re ­
dom inantly  Chinese enrolm ent and use o f E n g lish  as a medium o f in s t r u c t io n ,  
be changed to  b r in g  i t  in  l in e  w ith  th e  New Education P o licy  which m eant, to
th e  e x tre m is ts , hav ing  a predom inantly  Malay enrolment and u s in g  Malay as
32th e  medium of in s t r u c t io n .  F in a l ly , th e  e x tre m is ts  had demanded th a t  as a 
p re -c o n d itio n  fo r  th e  renew al o f t r a n s p o r t  l ic e n c e s , vans, tru c k s  and lo r r i e s  
be long ing  to  the  C hinese, should p rom inently  d isp la y  bo ld  Malay l e t t e r i n g .
Under th e se  c ircu m stan ces , th e  non-Malays were in c lin e d  to ,  f i r s t l y ,  
a l le g e  th a t  th e  s tan d a rd  o f th e  Bahasa M alaysia  paper was d e l ib e r a te ly  h ig h . 
C and idates, accord ing  to  a M.C.A. a l le g a t io n ,  were re q u ire d  to  have a " fe e l"
31. The is su e  o f th e  re c o g n itio n  of Taiwan and Hanyang U n iv e rs ity  degrees 
had always been a c o n stan t source o f f r i c t i o n  between th e  Chinese and 
th e  M alays. Although th e  g radua tes from th e se  2 u n iv e r s i t i e s  g e n e ra lly  
d id  th e  same work as th o se  from o th e r recognized  u n iv e r s i t i e s ,  th e  
government had re p e a te d ly  re je c te d  c a l l s  to  reco g n ize  Taiwan and Nan- 
yang d eg rees . The grounds fo r  r e je c t io n  appeared to  be em otional, 
c u l tu r a l  and r a c i a l ,  s in c e  t h e i r  re c o g n itio n  would b e n e f i t  s o le ly  th e  
Chines e-educat ed.
32. 'The Tunku Abdul Rahman C ollege (T .A .R .C .) was i n i t i a t e d  by th e  M.C.A. 
to  b lu n t Chinese a g i ta t io n  fo r  th e  s e t t in g  up o f th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs i­
ty  p r io r  to  th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s .  I t s  dual purpose was to  ac t 
as a feed e r c o lle g e  to  th e  u n iv e r s i t ie s  and to  p rov ide  p ro fe s s io n a l 
t r a in in g  in  commerce, sc ien ce  and technology fo r  C hinese-stream  s tu ­
d e n ts , but i t s  p u b lic  image was m u l t i - r a c ia l .  I t  was to  be a p r iv a te ly  
run i n s t i t u t i o n ,  bu t th e  government p a id  h a l f  i t s  b i l l s .  For f u l l  
d e t a i l s  o f th e  T .A .R .C ., see  th e  Guardian, Vol. I I  No. 9> August- 
September 1968 and e d i to r i a l  o f th e  A llia n c e , Vol. I l l  No. 2, August 
1968.
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for the language in answering the paperP If this allegation was true, it 
gave an unfair advantage to the Malays since Bahasa Malaysia their mother 
tongue, and they were able to use better expressions to convey meanings than 
the non-Malays. The next allegation was that there had been partiality in 
the marking of the scripts. This had been done by Malay lecturers in the 
University of Malaya, and many of them had been sympathetic to the aspira­
tions of the extremist M.L.S. Given the hostility shown by the M.L.S. to­
wards the non-Malays, the tendency of the examiners, as alleged, was to fail 
as many non-Malays as possible on grounds that were not made public. Alle­
gations of partiality in marking had been brought about by other allegations 
that Malay-stream candidates had been issued with answer scripts of a diffe­
rent colour to distinguish them from English-stream candidates^ As the 
non-Malays were constrained by the Seditions Act, they therefore confined 
all their frustrations to criticisms along the above allegations.
However the feeling that many non-Malays, either because of in­
herent prejudices or for a variety of other personal reasons, had shown a
dislike towards Bahasa Malaysia, was not lost on the government and the
Malays. The government's first reaction to the non-Malay allegations was
35that they were untrue. It then accused the non-Malays of not being serious
33» bee M.G.G.Pillai,"The M.C.E. Drama", Far Eastern Economic Review,
30th April, 1973-
34» Or. Tan Chee Khoon, PEKri.lAS M.P. for Batu(Kuala Lumpur) alleged that 
Malay-stream candidates for the Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia(S.P.M.), the 
M.C.E.’s Malay equivalent, were given pink answer scripts instead of 
white ones issued to English-stream candidates. This was allegedly 
to facilitate partiality in marking. Ibid.
35* In n letter to the Far Eastern Economic Review, 20th May, 1973» the 
Public Relations Officer of the Ministry of Education, Mohd. Kaus b. 
Haji Salleh, denied Dr. Tan’s allegation. He stated that all candi­
dates, either for the M.C.E. or 3.P.M., had the similar usual white 
answer sheets for the Balias a Malaysia paper and any other paper. Even 
names were not written on the answer sheets, but candidates' numbers 
and their identity card numbers were.
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about the importance of Bahasa Malaysia and advised them to take the failure 
as a serious warning, that unless they had an adequate command of the lang­
uage, their future was liable to be bleak in Malaysia. On the outcry by 
non-Malays that it was unfair to fail candidates because of Bahasa Malaysia 
despite good results, the government's reaction Y/as to ask v/hy there had been 
no similar outcry against the mandatory Ihglish pass as in the case of the 
S.C. previously when brilliant students failed also because of English.
The government's reaction reflected the anger of the Malays and their be­
lief that the non-Malays were opposed to the status of Bahasa Malaysia as a 
mandatory pass for the M.C.E.
As a political opponent of the government, the D.A.P.'s inclina­
tion was to associate itself with the grievances of the non-Malays and at 
the same time attempt to refute the government's arguments. Lim Kit Siang's 
first move v/as to accuse the government of adopting an indifferent attitude 
towards the mass M.C.E. Bahasa Malaysia failures problem despite the fact 
that the future of some 14,000 students v/as at stake. He held that the 
Koyal Address in Parliament did not make any reference to the problem altho­
ugh it v/as urgent. The D.A.P. re-affirmed the non-Malay allegations that 
there had been partiality in the marking procedures against them. It attemp­
ted to substantiate this by contrasting the dismal performances of the tra­
ditional top urban schools v/ith the creditable performances of virtually 
unknovm Malay-medium schools v/hich scored almost 100c/o successes; Lim Kit 
Siang even v/ent further to insinuate racial discrimination by alleging that 
in a particular school in Jerantut, Pahang, although the M.C.E. pass rate
36. Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 323.
37- Ibid, p. 324-
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was 450/° i th e re  were lOQf/o non-Malay f a i lu r e s  in  Bahasa M alaysia. ^  The 
D.A.P. b e liev ed  th a t  Malay e x tre m is ts  in  U.M.N.O. were re sp o n s ib le  f o r  th e  
m easures th a t  had caused th e  mass M.C.E. Bahasa M alaysia f a i lu r e s  among th e  
non-M alays. I t  in s in u a te d  th a t  by p a r t i a l  marking p ro cedu res, th e  government 
v/as t r y in g  to  re v e rse  th e  p rev ious p a t te rn  o f exam ination r e s u l t s  which in ­
d ic a te d  th a t  th e  non-Malays had t r a d i t i o n a l ly  perform ed b e t t e r  than  th e  Ma­
la y s .  This r e f le c te d  th e  resen tm ent o f th e  e x tre m is ts  tow ards the  dominant 
s ta tu s  o f th e  E ng lish  language which could  be a t t r ib u ta b le  to  i t s  more ex­
te n s iv e  use in  commerce, in d u s try  and h ig h e r  edu ca tio n , and th e reb y  commanded 
g re a te r  economic value  and u se fu ln e ss  when compared to  Malay. By in s i s t i n g  
on a mandatory pass fo r  Bahasa M alaysia, th e  D.A.P. h e ld  th a t  th e  e x tre m is ts  
were determ ined to  do away w ith  th e  pre-em inent s ta tu s  o f E ng lish  in  th e se  
f i e l d s ,  and re p la c e  i t  w ith  Malay by l e g i s l a t i o n ,  and i f  n ecessa ry , by fo rce  
as in  th e  case o f th e  a c ts  o f vandalism  by th e  M.L.S. In  t h i s  way, i t  was 
h e ld  th a t  th e  ex tre m is ts  wanted to  secu re  fo r  Malay th e  same economic va lue  
and u se fu ln e ss  as E ng lish , so th a t  th ey , as u ltra-cham pions o f Malay, would 
b e n e f i t  p e rso n a lly . Under th e se  c ircu m stan ces , th e  D.A.P. suspec ted  th a t  
th e  government in ten d ed  as many Malays as p o ss ib le  to  pass th e  M .C .E ./ S.P.M. 
aa a f i r s t  s te p  towards en su rin g  th e  dominant s ta tu s  of Malay in  commerce, 
in d u s try  and h ig h e r ed u ca tio n . By im p lic a tio n , t h i s  had to  mean f a i l i n g  
th e  non-Malays in  s ig n i f ic a n t  numbers, and s in ce  th e  only obvious d isadvan­
ta g e  th e  non-Malays had in  r e l a t io n  to  th e  Malays was Bahasa M alaysia, th e  
mass f a i lu r e s  among th e  non-Malays in  1972 in  th i s  aspec t was p re d ic ta b le . 
The D.A.P. agreed w ith  non-Malay com plain ts th a t  th e  s tan d a rd  o f th e  Bahasa 
M alaysia paper expected from s tu d en ts  was too  h ig h . As p ro o f, Lim K it S iang 
s ta te d  th a t  among th e  f a i lu r e s  were th o se  who had done very  w ell in  t h e i r
38. Ib id
107
school trial examinations along the lines of the M.C.E., including a student
from Chung Ling High School in Penang, who had won the Bahasa Malaysia com-
39petition for the whole school in that year. Lim Kit Siang also refuted the 
government's retort that non-Malay students had not taken the Bahasa Malay­
sia paper seriously. He held that they had conscientiously studied the lan­
guage as they and their parents were aware that it was a mandatory pass in 
the M.C.E., without which their chances of entering pre-university classes 
or seeking employment would be bleak. Besides the failures in Bahasa Malay­
sia in the previous years 197*3 and 1971 with their adverse implications and 
consequences, had heightened the awareness of the students of the importance 
of passing the mandatory Bahasa Malaysia paper. As for the government's 
charge that there had been no similar outcry against previous S.C. failures 
because of English, Lim Kit Siang held that it was irrelevant since no paral­
lel situation in the past involving 14,000 failures had existed!^
Having criticised the government strongly, the D.A.P. made its
own suggestions regarding the solution of the problem. Lim Kit Siang urged
the government to institute a Royal Commission of Inquiry into the causes
and reasons for the high rate of Bahasa Malaysia failures, thus implying
that the government had made a big mess out of the whole M.C.E. examination^
He called for conditional passes for those who would otherwise have passed
42had it not been for a failure in Bahasa Malaysia. As for those who had
39« Ibid, p. 325. 40. Ibid, p. 326.
41. Ibid, p. 327.
42. Ibid. In the previous S.C. examination, students who had obtained 
the requisite number of passes for the award of a certificate but 
failed in English, were given a conditional General Certificate of 
Education pass. This would enable them to either seek employment or 
join pre-university classes if their grades were good. The majority 
of these cases, however, usually repeated the S.C. It could be held 
that the award of a conditional pass, as advocated by Kit Siang, was
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qualified for admission into 6th Form classes before the M.C.E. results 
were released, Kit Siang argued that their places should not be withdrawn 
but that they should be made to repeat the Bahasa Malaysia’ pap er ' He ’*
held that it was wasteful of effort for students with good results to re­
peat the whole M.C.E. examination as the government had suggested^ Besides 
it would be a great strain on the already insufficient numbers of qualified
Bahasa Malaysia teachers to handle enlarged classes caused by repeating 
45students: The D.A.P. expressed the fears and apprehensions of the non-
Malays over what it felt to be Malay extremist motivated measures in the 
mass M.C.E. Bahasa Malaysia failures. It called upon the moderate U.M.N.O. 
leadership to adopt a humanitarian approach to the affected 14,000 non- 
Malay students and treat the mass failures as a national rather than a com­
munal problem!^ In this way, the party argued that goodwill and unity could 
be created by gratitude rather than resentment shown by the non-Malays5^
\
In retrospect, the 1972 M.C.E..mass Bahasa Malaysia failures was 
an act deliberately and insidiously contrived by Malay extremists in the 
government as a reaction to the seemingly lack of regard and interest shown 
by the non-Malays towards the importance of Bahasa Malaysia in the New Edu­
cation Policy. The mass failures aggravated the bad feelings between the 
Malays and the non-Malays. This muted ill-will had been intensified by the 
increasingly pro-Malay policies of the government after the 1969 racial 
riot. If the non-Malays felt grievous over what they perceived as the
more in the purpose of removing the psychological sense of failure 
among the affected non-Malay candidates.
43« Ibid. 44. Ibid.
45. Ibid. 
47. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
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injustice perpetrated by the government, the Malays were quick to feel 
offended that the non-Malays had either deliberately chosen to ignore or 
had not fully understood the implications of the New Education Policy.
The government thus faced pressures from the non-Malays to review the M.C.E. 
Bahasa Malaysia results and counter-pressures from the Malays not to do so. 
Given the weaker political position of the non-Malays, it appeared that they 
could not do much(except to protest) in seeking redress. In the case of 
those with prejudices against Bahasa Malaysia for whatever reasons, they 
would have to change their attitude to master the language adequately to 
avoid, as the government warned, a bleak future in the country. Time has 
proved that, with determination and a change in attitude, non-Malays could 
overcome the problem of not being proficient in Bahasa Malaysia, as indica­
ted by the M.C.E. Bahasa Malaysia results of subsequent y e a r s T h u s  the 
problem of Bahasa Malaysia failures would tend to be gradually phased out 
in the future with the implementation of the New Education Policy as more 
and more non-Malays received their education in the Malay-medium^
As a Chinese-based party, the D.A.F. held the government solely 
responsible for the dilemma of the 14,000 affected non-Malay students. It 
successfully articulated the fear3 and apprehensions of the non-Malays and 
proposed solutions which appeared attractive to them. To them, it appeared 
as a concerned party that was not afraid to 3peak on their behalf. The
48. For the 1978 M.C.E. results, Musa Hitarn, the Education Minister, 
announced that the Bahasa Malaysia pass rate among the non-Malays 
was 83.3/0« This was 31° higher than the previous year. Malaysia,
May 1979«
49« Tiie M.C.E. was discontinued after 1979 to be rejjlaced by the wholly 
Malay-medium S.P.M. from 1980 onwards, thus completing the imple­
mentation of the New Education Policy at both primary and secondary 
levels.
D.A.P.’s critici3rn3 however did not lead to a resolution of the problem in 
the v^ ay the non-Malays v/ould have preferred in viev>r of the huge N.F. majori 
ty in Parliament. They nevertheless drew the attention of the government 
of urgent problems confronting the non-Malays.
Ill
(c) Dimunition of Higher Education Opportunities; Falling Standards of 
English; the Brain Drain.
The above issues were some of the direct or indirect consequences 
of the New Economic Policy (iT.E.P.) promulgated after the 1969 racial riot. 
The II.E.P.'s broad scope had advocated the expansion and training facilities 
for Malays as a means to increase productivity, enlarge opportunities and
"reduce existing inequalities in the distribution of income between income
50and racial groups". This sought to achieve its ultimate objective of mak­
ing the Malays own at least 30$ of the total commercial and industrial acti­
vities of the country in all categories and scales of operation within 20
51years from 1970-90. The marked increase in Malay enrolment at the local 
universities after 1970 predictably led to a corresponding marked decline 
in non-Malay enrolment, which was comparatively higher in the past. The
increasing use of Bahasa Malaysia as a medium of instruction in schools
\
brought about a decline in the standard of English. This further complica­
ted the student enrolment issue in the sense that it reduced the chances 
of non-Malays going overseas for tertiary education. The ultimate conse­
quences of the enrolment issue and the deteriorating standards of English 
caused many non-Malays to become frustrated and lose confidence in the edu­
cation system of the country. A brain drain of non-Malay professionals to 
the white Commonwealth countries therefore took place. It was inevitable 
that the above issues became politicized. They assumed racial overtones 
with U.M.N.O. re-inforcing the demands of the Malays, forcing the D.A.P. 
to articulate the grievances of the non-Malays, particularly the Chinese.
50. See Outline Perspective Plan, 1971-90 in Chapter IV of The Third 
Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980» Government Pres3, Kuala Lumpur, 1976»
°P-v -fit* The New Education Policy also came within the N.E.P.'s
scope.
51. Ibid.
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The D.A.P.'s initial reaction to the considerable reduction of 
university places locally for eligible non-Malays was to criticise the govern­
ment for not honouring its pledge that in the implementation of the Third 
Malaysia Plan*s('T.M.P.1 s) objectives, including education, no one should 
feel a sense of deprivation. The logical move of the party was to point out 
that many eligible and qualified non-Malays had been deprived of their right 
to enter the local universities because of the unusually large Malay enrol­
ment. Lim Kit Siang stated that for the 1977/78 session, the enrolment of 
the 5 universities in the country had been 75$ Malay to 25$ non-Malay, and 
claimed that some 20,000 non-Malay students with the requisite Higher School 
Certificate (lI.S.C.) entry qualifications were refused admission? This 
disparity in favour of the Malays appeared to be an over-reaction to the 
government's rationale of increasing the Malay intake by the Central Pro­
cessing Unit which was responsible for selecting students to the 5 local
universities. The government stated that its rationale was to correct the
53under-representation of the Malays at university level prior to 1970»
52. See Parliamentary speech, "IT.E.P.'s New Injustices and Inequalities", 
in Lim Kit Siana:. op.cit. ,p.9. In 1977» be stated that a total of 
251998 students of all races applied for degree and diploma courses 
in the 5 Malaysian universities, the University of Malaya, the Science 
University, the National University, the Agricultural University and 
the University of Technology. Only 5»953 students were accepted.
The racial breakdown of the successful applicants was as follows:
Malays 4?457 Chinese 1,187 Indians 226 Others 43*
53» In an interview with Asiaweek, the Education Minister, Musa Hitam, gave 
reasons for the greater weightage in respect of Malay enrolment in the 
local universities. Prior to 1978» the enrolment at the University 
of Malaya, then the only university in Malaysia, was heavily in favour 
of the non-Malays because the best schools in the country were located 
in the towns in which the non-Malays predominated. The schools had 
acted as a feeder to the university. After 1978» with the expansion 
of educational facilities to the rural areas where the Malays predomi­
nated, the composition of the feeder base was drastically altered to 
favour the Malays. This was facilitated by the change in the dduca- 
tional policy with the switch from English to Malay as the medium of 
instruction. Musa stressed that the government's rationale wa3 based 
on unusual circumstances in the sense that the number of Malay gradu­
ates be increased as much as possible within the shortest time avail-
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I t  was based on th e  recommendations of a committee appoin ted  by th e  N.O.C.
in  August 1969 under the  Chairmanship o f Dr. M ajid Ism a il to  study th e  cam-
54pus l i f e  o f s tu d en ts  in  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f Malaya; Having as background 
th a t  th e  May 1969 r a c i a l  r i o t  was caused by Malay d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  over econo­
mic and ed u ca tio n a l u n d e r-re p re se n ta tio n , th e  M ajid Ism a il Committee was 
m ainly concerned w ith  th e  com paratively  sm all t o t a l  number o f Malay s tu d e n ts
in  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f Malaya as a whole, and a läo  on a f a c u lty -b y - f a c u lty  
55b a s is .  The low Malay enrolm ent had. been due to  the  pre-1970 adm ission c r i ­
t e r i a ,  based on m e rit , w ith  th e  minimal en try  q u a l i f ic a t io n s  be ing  th e  H .S.C. 
Owing to  a com bination o f s e v e ra l f a c to r s ,  th e  most im portan t be ing  t h e i r  
r u r a l  background, r e l a t i v e  poverty  and co n se rv a tiv e  Is lam ic-b ased  va lue  sy s ­
tem s, many Malays f a i le d  to  a t t a in  t h i s .  The committee th e re fo re  recommended 
th a t  fu tu re  adm issions to  th e  u n iv e r s i ty  should n o t be based on academic 
c r i t e r i a  a lo n e , e x p la in in g  th a t  s tu d e n ts  in  r u r a l  a reas  were u n d e r-p r iv ile g e d
a b le . He p re fe r re d  to  use th e  term  " r u r a l” to  denote th e  governm ent’s 
fa v o u ritism  towards th e  Malays a g a in s t th e  "urban" C hinese. Asiaweek, 
23rd June, 1978.
54* For f u l l  d e t a i l s ,  see Thain Seong Chee, op, c i t . ,  pp. 321-50*
55. I b i d, The s tu d en t enrolm ent by race  w ith in  each fa c u lty  between 1969 
and 1971 o f th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f Malaya was as fo llo w s:
Acade
-m ic
. f a c u l t y  
Race ~
A rts S c ie ­nce Engin­e e r in g ies§u- Educa­t io n Medi­cine Econo­mics
1969/
70
Malay 1,489 150 11 70 102 109 442
Chinese 930 965 328 187 • 171 388 563
O thers 404 74 20 17 47 71 ___134.
T o ta l 2,823 1,189 359 274 320 568 1,139
1970/
Malay 1,996 157 5 91 436 128 510
Chinese 867 1,118 365 208 147 417 663
71 O thers 402 88 22 25 59 86 187
T o tal 3.26S 1,363 392 324 442 631 1,360
Source: M ajid Ism ail R eport, 1971, p . 3b, c i te d  in  i b i d . From th e  above
ta b le ,  i t  was ev iden t th a t  except fo r  A rts , th e  Malays appeared under­
re p re se n te d  in  th e  o th e r f a c u l t i e s ,  e sp e c ia l ly  E ngineering  and M edicine. 
Even in  A rts , th e  m a jo rity  of Malay s tu d e n ts  m ajored in  Malay and I s l a ­
mic s tu d ie s .
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and th a t  t h e i r  f u l l  p o te n t ia l  could n o t be known on th e  b a s is  of th e  H .S.C .
56r e s u l t s  a lo n e . The committee pub lished  i t s  re p o r t  in  1971 w ith  th e  main 
recommendation th a t  th e  u n iv e rs i ty  should ensure as f a r  as p o ss ib le  th a t  th e  
r a c i a l  com position o f i t s  s tu d en t p o p u la tio n  as a whole and a lso  on' a f a c u l ­
t y - ^ - f a c u l ty  b a s is ,  should r e f l e c t  th e  r a c i a l  com position of th e  p o p u la tio n  
in  th e  co u n try . This would r a i s e  th e  Malay enrolm ent to  a t l e a s t  in  
bo th  in ten d ed  a sp e c ts . A loophole  in  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f Malaya C o n s ti tu tio n  
p e r ta in in g  to  adm ission of s tu d en ts  enabled p o l i t i c a l  in f lu e n c e  to  determ ine
numbers adm itted  and th e  1971 C o n s ti tu tio n a l Amendment B i l l  e n tru s t  th e  King
57to  g u aran tee  a c e r ta in  quo ta  o f Malay adm issions. In  in c re a s in g  th e  Malay
in ta k e , th e  government a lso  considered  th e  h igh  p ro p o rtio n  o f non-Malay s tu -
58d en ts  e n ro lle d  a t overseas u n iv e r s i t i e s .  I t  j u s t i f i e d  i t s  co n ten tio n  th a t  
th e  h igh  percen tag e  o f Malay s tu d en ts  in  lo c a l  u n iv e r s i t ie s  was to  ba lan ce  
t h i s  up, so th a t  when bo th  lo c a l  and overseas u n iv e r s i ty  enrolm ents were 
added to g e th e r , th e  com position would roughly  r e f l e c t  th e  r a c i a l  com position 
o f th e  co u n try . The D . A . P .  held  th a t  th e  c r i t e r i a  used by th e  government 
in  s e le c t in g  s tu d en ts  to  th e  lo c a l u n iv e r s i t ie s  was u n fa ir  to  non-Malay s tu -
56. I b id , p . 335*
57*  I b id , p . 338. In  re sp e c t o f th e  adm ission p o lic y  p e r ta in in g  to  u n iv e r­
s i t y  adm ission, S ec tion  47 o f the  U n iv e rs ity  o f Malaya C o n s ti tu tio n  
s t a t e s  th a t  "A s tu d en t s h a l l  no t be adm itted  to  th e  U n iv e rs ity  to  a 
course  of study f o r  a degree u n le ss  he s h a l l  have s a t i s f i e d  such r e ­
quirem ents as may be p re sc rib ed  by th e  Act: Provided  t h a t , except w ith  
th e  agreement o f th e  M in is te r , s tu d en ts  who have been awarded F edera l 
o r S ta te  sch o la rsh ip s  o r o th e r s im ila r  f in a n c ia l  a s s is ta n c e  from pub­
l i c  funds fo r  u n iv e rs i ty  degree co u rses , s h a l l  no t be re fu sed  adm ission 
i f  th ey  s a t i s f y  such req u irem en ts" . Than s t a t e s  th a t  t h i s  th e re fo re  
allow s th e  M in is te r  o f Education and s ta t e  M en tri-m en tri Besar to  have 
a d i r e c t  in f lu e n c e  in  determ in ing  th e  com position of s tu d en ts  in  th e  
u n iv e r s i ty  as w ell as w ith in  each f a c u lty , sim ply by in c re a s in g  or de­
c re a s in g  th e  number o f s c h o la rsh ip  awards. Op. c i t . In  a d d itio n , th e  
C o n s ti tu tio n a l Amendment B i l l  o f 197^- s t ip u la te s  th a t  " i f  th e  number 
o f p laces  o ffe re d  by the  a u th o r ity  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  management o f 
th e  u n iv e r s i ty ,  c o lle g e , o r such e d u c a tio n a l: i n s t i t u t i o n  to  can d id a te s  
fo r  any course  o f study i s  le s3  than  th e  number of can d id a tes  q u a l i f ­
ie d  fo r  such p la c e s , i t  s h a l l  be law fu l fo r  th e  Yang d i-P e r tu a n  Agong 
(King) to  ensure th e  re s e rv a tio n  of such p lace s  fo r  M a la y s . . . .a s  th e  
Yang d i-P e r tu a n  Agong may deem reaso n ab le ; and th e  a u th o r ity  s h a l l  du­
ly  comply w ith  th e  d i r e c t io n s " .  Op. c i t .
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dents, especially taking into consideration the non-Malay enrolment at 
overseas universities. It pointed out that the restriction on non-Malay 
enrolment at local universities had forced parents to send their children 
overseas in the first place, and held that if they did not go overseas, pros­
pective students would miss a chance of university education at home altoge­
ther. In any case the numbers who went overseas were small and restricted 
to the rich, compared to the many who were qualified but could not enter 
local universities. Lim Kit Siang claimed that non-Malay students in schools 
faced a dilemma, because they were worried about getting a place to study 
in the university after completing their H.S.C. He was careful to stress 
that the D.A.P. did not object to more university places for Malays, but 
this should not be at the expense of deserving non-Malay students. Kit Si­
ang suggested that the government should regard the problem of the diminution 
of university places for non-Malays locally as a national and not a communal 
problem, and should seriously resolve it to the satisfaction of all tö ensure 
national unity in the country. He stated that the Malays, being more back­
ward than the other races, deserved full governmental assistance in higher 
education, but at the same time there should be an appropriate and fair ex­
pansion of higher education opportunities for non-Malays. In this aspect, 
the non-Malay total intake of l,456(Chinese 1,187 Indians 226 Others 43) 
for the 1977/78 session for the 5 local universities should be tripled for 
the forthcoming 197,8/79 session without reducing the existing Malay intake^
58. In 1975» there were about 31,500 Malaysian students enrolled in over­
seas institutions of higher learning. The racial breakdown was as 
follows: Malays 20.6/ Chinese 69/ Indians 9*2/ Others 1.2/.
Ibid, P.340.
59* Lim Kit Siang,op.cit. ,p,12. He further urged the government to set 
up at least 3 or 4 more local universities in view of the large num­
ber of qualified students who could not find places. Hew Straits 
Times, 27th December, 1979« This was apparently in response to spe­
culation that a 6th university may be set up. New Straits Times,
15th December, 1979»
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This would have, in  th e  D .A .P .'s  view, f a i r l y  r e f le c te d  th e  r a c i a l  composi­
t io n  o f th e  country  in  th e  sense th a t  th e  t o t a l  enrolment fo r  th e  5 lo c a l  
u n iv e r s i t i e s  fo r  th e  1978/79 se ss io n  would be roughly  5 Malay and ^Ofo non- 
Malay. The D.A.P. suggested  th a t  an o th er avenue fo r  th e  expansion of lo c a l  
educa tion  o p p o rtu n itie s  would be th e  e stab lish m en t o f p r iv a te  u n iv e r s i t i e s ,  
such as th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity .(T h is  i s  to  be d iscu ssed  f u l ly  in  th e  next 
s e c tio n  o f th i s  c h a p te r) . I t  claim ed th a t  Chinese Guilds and A sso c ia tio n s  
would only  be too w il l in g  to  s e t  up a p r iv a te  u n iv e r s i ty  once th e  government 
gave them th e  perm ission  to  do so . At th e  p re -u n iv e r s i ty  l e v e l ,  th e  D.A.P. 
wanted th e  government to  extend T aylor C o lle g e '3 perm it fo r  as lo n g  as Ma­
la y s ia n s  re q u ire d  i t  to  p rep a re  them f o r  th e  M a tr ic u la tio n  Exam ination f o r
60e n try  in to  A u s tra lia n  and New Zealand u n iv e r s i t i e s .  The D.A.P. m ain ta ined  
th a t  T ay lo r C ollege had been perform ing a u se fu l fu n c tio n  in  a l l e v ia t in g  
th e  sh o rtag e  of ed u ca tio n a l o p p o r tu n itie s  a t  p re -u n iv e rs i ty  l e v e l .  I t  s u s ­
pected  th a t  tiie  in te n t io n  of th e  M alay-dominated P o lic e  C o -opera tives to  buy
\
over th e  C o lle g e 's  re n te d  prem ises in  Kuala Lumpur, causing  i t  to  cease ope­
ra t io n s  by th e  end of 1978, was a move to  deny non-Malays o f h ig h e r educa­
t io n  o p p o r tu n i t ie s ,  s in ce  th e  overwhelming m a jo rity  o f th e  C o lle g e 's  s tu d e n ts  
were non-M alays.
The D.A.P. nex t concerned i t s e l f  w ith  th e  d e te r io r a t in g  s tan d a rd s  
o f th e  E n g lish  language as a r e s u l t  of th e  sw itch  in  th e  medium of in s t r u c -
60. T ay lo r C ollege was s e t  up in  1969 in  Kuala Lumpur. The number of s tu ­
d en ts  i t  had s u c c e s s fu lly  p repared  fo r  th e  A u s tra lian  M a tr ic u la tio n  
Exam ination on a y e a r ly  b a s is  was as fo llo w s:
1969 26 1974 360
1970 48 1975 383
1971 63 1976 324
1972 78 1977 350
1973 217
The C ollege opera ted  s o le ly  as a p r iv a te  i n s t i t u t i o n .  
Source: Lim K it S iang , op, c i t . ,  p . 11.
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tion in schools from English to Malay. The party had always emphasised the 
importance of English in view of its practicality in administration, commer­
ce and industry, and also an access to higher education overseas, especially 
in Science and Technology. Since the 1967 National Language Act which made 
Malay the sole official language in the country and downgraded the status 
of English, the D.A.P. had always called for its restoration as an official 
language. The party even went to the extent of suggesting that English 
could also be considered a Malaysian language in the same way that Chinese 
and Tamil could. Its contention was justified by the fact that the educated 
of all races tend to communicate with one another in English rather than Ma­
lay, and the English-medium schools had always been a meeting place of all 
races where some form of integration(i.e.Malayanization) had taken place.
In concerning itself with the falling standards of English, the D.A.P. cri­
ticized the government for failing to preserve and sustain the use of Eng­
lish to the extent that the Ministry of Education had to recruit about 200 
British teachers to arrest the decline of English in schools^ The D.A.P.'s 
criticisms revealed the dilemma of the moderate U.M.N.O. leadership in stri­
ving for an educational system based solely on Malay to reflect the suprema­
cy of Malay culture in the country while at the same time retaining the use 
of English for practical purposes. The necessity of placing a premium on 
Malay predictably brought about a psychological and emotional rejection by 
the Malays of English, dubbed as a "colonial" language by Malay extremists.
61. The Education Minister, Musa Hitam, said that there would be a sharp 
decline in the standard of English once it was no longer the language 
of instruction. However the decline was worse than what the govern­
ment had expected. The Ministry of Education planned to have more 
English classes in schools with emphasis on both spoken and written 
English, with the intention of bringing English back into prominence 
as a second language in schools. Interview with Musa Hitam, Asiaweek, 
23rd June, 1978»
62. See Musa Hitam's contention with regard to this in Rodney Tasker,
The Politics of Education", Far Eastern Economic Review, 23rd June 
1978, pp. I4-6.
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In resuscitating the importance of English, the U.M.N.O. leadership had to 
repeatedly stress that this was not intended to bring the language to the 
same status as Malay. Conscious of the fact that the government appeared 
concerned at the falling standards of English, the D.A.P. repeatedly urged 
it to make a concerted effort to encourage its effective use in schools.
The D.A.P. then tried to link the falling standards of English with 
the governments motive of reducing the numbers of intending non-Malay stu­
dents at overseas institutions of higher learning. Lim Kit Siang stated : 
that with the conversion of English-medium schools to Malay, students having 
to sit for the Malay-medium S.P.M.(in place of the English-medium S.C. or 
M.C.E.) at the 5th. form,would find that their qualifications did not entitle 
them to automatic entry into pre-university classes in the white Commonwealth 
countries as the S.C. or M.C.E. had been entitled to in the past. This was 
because these countries had regarded the standard of English of the S.P.M. 
as below the minimal qualifying standard required for matriculation and 
eventually the university. Intending students, then, would have to sit for 
a proficiency test in the English language. Kit Siang held that with the 
declining standards of English in schools consequent on the switch to Malay, 
the chances were that many students would not be able to pass this test. 
Therefore they v/ould not be able to pursue higher education overseas. The 
D.A.P.’s implication was that the government was trying to reduce the num­
bers of non-Malay students intending to enrol at overseas institutions of 
higher learning in this subtle manner. As English was the pre-condition for
63. In commenting on the government’s decision to recruit 200 British tea­
chers, Karpal Singh, the Penang D.A.P. Chairman, stated that the need 
to engage the British teachers, which stemmed from a shortage of lan­
guage teachers, was the result of relegating English to a position of 
non-significance. He added that the standard of English had deterio­
rated to such an extent that it may well be impossible to acquire the 
levels of proficiency the country enjoyed before Merdeka(l957) unless 
the government made a sincere effort to encourage its use. See Karpal 
Singh’s letter to Asiaweek, 17th August, 1979.
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entry into overseas universities and colleges, the D.A.P. held that the 
government was indirectly encouraging(or doing nothing to discourage) its 
decline to shocking levels by the switch to Malay. This automatically dis­
qualified many prospective students through failure in the language test.
As most of the intending overseas students were non-Malays, the D.A.P. con­
cluded that the net effect would be an edge to the numbers of Malay students 
when combining the overall university and college enrolments in both local 
and foreign institutions of higher learning. As a possible solution to this 
particular problem that prospective overseas students were facing, the D.A.P. 
called for the introduction of a specially up-graded English syllabus to en­
sure that students who passed the S.P.M. in 1980 and after would continue 
to command an adequate proficiency in English so that they would be able to 
pass the requisite language proficiency test^
The D.A.P. next pointed out what it considered as the predictable 
consequences of the government's measures to switch the medium of instruction 
from English to Malay and the large-scale Malay enrolment in the local uni­
versities. In the former, it contended that educational standards were bound 
to fall. The party justified its contention on 2 basic grounds. Firstly, 
there were not enough qualified teachers to teach in Malay; during the ini­
tial stages of the implementation of the New Education Policy, several Indo­
nesian teachers were recruited. Secondly, most of the textbooks and access 
to new knowledge were in English. The translation of material in English to 
Malay by the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka(D.B.P.) - Language and Literature 
Agency - was also liable to be fraught with difficulties considering the 
enormity of the task and the difficulty of translating technical and legal 
terms. In the latter case, the D.A.P. pointed out that the majority of these 
were admitted on minimal qualifications, while in the case of some, this had 
64. Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 11.
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65even "been waived. This was especially prevalent in the Science, Medical, 
Engineering and other faculties where the Malays had been heavily under­
represented prior to 1970 when admission was based on merit. The D.A.P. went
to the extent of alleging that standards had been deliberately lowered in a
66vain attempt to get as many Malaya qualified in these fields as possible.
The logical conclusion to this was the different sets of criteria used for 
passing both Malay and non-Malay students, instead of a uniform set for all 
students as in the past. This had led to many resignations of academics from 
the University of Malaya. These, long accustomed to the high standards main­
tained by the university prior to 1970» had felt that cardinal principles 
were being breached by sacrificing standards in allowing the admission of 
students who v/ere not qualified in the first place. Lira Kit Siang alleged 
that the decline in standards at the university was so serious as to warrant, 
for instance, a detailed report on curriculum, student performance, staff 
qualifications, etc., from the Medical Faculty before international recogni- 
tion could be granted to the university's medical degrees. He maintained 
that this v/as tantamount to non-recognition unless certain conditions, such 
as those mentioned above, were fulfilled. Kit Siang reminded the govem-
65» For details, see the recommendations of the Majid Ismail Committee in 
the earlier part of this section. As a result of this liberal admis­
sion policy, there were far too many Malay applicants and the admission 
procedure had to be revised slightly. Musa Hitam, the Education Minis­
ter, explained that selection was based on merit, but there were sepa­
rate merit lists for Malays and non-Malays. "Cut-off points" made up 
the selection criteria. For the 1977/78 session, the cut-off points 
were as follows: Arts: Malays - 36 points Non-Malays - 44 points
Science: Malays - Minimal academic qualifications Non-Malays 54 
points. It would appear that for the other faculties such a3 Medicine 
and Engineering, the admission criteria was even more relaxed for Malays. 
Determination of cut-off points was flexible, and was subjected to 
annual changes based on the number of places available. See Malaysia, 
December 1978.
66. This view was justified by Musa's contention that most of the archit­
ects, doctors and lawyers in Malaysia v/ere non-Malays, and the only 
v;ay to push up the Malay percentage(in these professions) was to"toke 
them like a horse and pull them by the nose". See Hugh Lunn,"Malay­
sia, Racism and the Boat People", The V/eekend Australian Magazine, 
28th-29th July, 1979» op. cit.
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ment that before it implemented the New Education Policy and the Majid Ismail
Committee’s recommendations, medical and other degrees from the University
67of Malaya encountered no problems in gaining international recognition.
Under these circumstances, the D.A.P. alleged that it was not surprising for 
the public to lose confidence in the educational system of the country as a 
whole. Lim Kit Siang pointed out that even Ministers and Sultans had lost 
confidence, preferring to send their children abroad for higher studies. 
Therefore professionals, academics and other skilled personnel could hardly 
be blamed for leaving the country in droves for the white Commonwealth coun­
tries. Their numbers, according to Kit Siang, exceeded the brain drain imme­
diately following the May 1969 racial riot. He maintained that those who 
emigrated were not only young men in search of greener pastures, but also 
elderly people with established standing who had to uproot family and social 
ties. A good example of this was the doctor-brother of the deputy Education 
Minister, Chan Siang Sun. Malaysian students who graduated from overseas 
universities, preferred to remain in their host countries rather than return 
home. The D.A.P. concluded that the reasons for the severe brain drain appe­
ared to be more for the sake of the children of those who emigrated; in Ma­
laysia existing trends pointed to a bleak future for non-Malay children.
The fact that many emigrants were prepared to take up jobs which were compa-
68ratively inferior to their previous jobs testified to this. Thus to check
67. See Parliamentary speech,’’Call for a Tunku Abdul Rahman Commission of 
Inquiry on Education" on 7th December, 1977 in Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., 
p. 261. This report was requested by the United Kingdom General Medi­
cal Council v/hich concluded that it doubted the ability of the Medical 
Faculty of the University of Malaya to continue to maintain interna­
tional academic standards.
68. For details of the brain drain, see Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., pp. 13-4» 
Fan Yev/ Teng,"Growing Insurgency and Increasing Repression", Joumal 
of Contemporary Asia, Vol. VI, 197&> PP* 374~5 and- Susan Lim,"The 
Malaysian Brain Drain", Insight,October 1978» pp* 17-20. Government 
reaction to the brain drain varied. Y«hile the Prime Minister, Datuk 
Hussein Onn, according to Lim Kit Siang, showed concern by asking Aus­
tralian Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, not to allow Malaysian students
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the deterioration in standards in the education system to regain the confi­
dence of Malaysians and thus arrest the brain drain, the D.A.P. suggested 
that the whole education system be entirely reviewed. It called on the gov­
ernment to set up a public inquiry on education to comprise of a cross-section 
of Malaysian citizens, including top educationists, academics and administra­
tors under the chairmanship of the former Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. 
The party felt that the appointment of the Tunku, given his great reputation 
for impartiality, as chairman, would restore the confidence of the non-Malays 
and also arrest the divisive tendencies along racial lines that the present 
education system had brought about. The D.A.P.’s suggestion of a public in­
quiry was also in response to the government’s failure to produce a report 
on education under the chairmanship of the then Education Minister, Dr. Maha­
thir, within 6 months of the 1974 general elections at the suggestion of the
69late Prime Minister, Tun Razak. The D.A.P. had hoped that its pressure
would speed up the government's intention to review the entire education
\
system by the Mahathir Report.
To conclude in this section, the D.A.P.'s arguments on the issues 
pust discussed, suggested that it was opposed in principle to the New Educa-
to remain behind after completing their studies,(Lim Kit Siang, op. cit. 
p. 13) Dr. Mahathir and Musa Hitam expressed contradictory opinions.
Dr. Mahathir said that he was convinced that if Malaysia was to open 
its doors to professionals like doctors, the country would be flooded 
with these people from the Indian sub-continent, who would only be too 
willing to come and practise in Malaysia and who would not question 
the country's education system. Susan Lim, op. cit., p. 18. Dr. 
Mahathir's attitude to the emigrants thus appeared to be 'good riddance' 
Musa Hitam stated that a brain drain of intellectuals was a very com­
mon phenomenon all over the world, even from developed countries like 
the United States, Britain and New Zealand. Malaysia was thus no ex­
ception, according to Musa. New Straits Times, 17th December, 1979*
It would appear that Hussein Onn, unlike Mahathir and Musa, understood 
and was more concerned about the psychological and emotional factors 
behind non-Malay frustration which led to the brain drain.
69. The Mahathir Educational Report was only released in November 1979» 
some 5 years later. New Straits Times, 27th November, 1979.
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t io n  P o lic y  and th e  recommendations o f th e  M ajid Ism a il Committee to  admit 
more Malays in to  th e  lo c a l  u n iv e r s i t i e s .  In  p u t t in g  forew ard i t s  su g g es tio n s , 
th e  D.A.P. t r i e d  to  s im p lify  a couple:* s i tu a t io n  by p ro je c t in g  an image o f 
p r a c t i c a l i t y  of i t s e l f .  To th e  e x te rn a l ob serv er and th o se  a f fe c te d , th e  
D .A .P .'s  su g g estio n s  seemed r a t io n a l  s o lu t io n s ;  f o r  in s t a n c e , i f  th e  non- 
Malays were u n d e r-rep re sen ted  and th e  Malays o v e r-re p re sen te d  in  lo c a l  u n i­
v e r s i t i e s ,  th e  sim ple so lu tio n  would be to  in c re a se  non-Malay and decrease  
Malay subsequent u n iv e r s i ty  enrolm ent a cco rd in g ly . However what was a t  
s ta k e  and more im portan t were th e  p o l i t i c a l  and r a c i a l  under-tones in vo lved . 
The D .A .P .'s  co n ten tio n  th a t  th e  problem of th e  a l lo c a t io n  o f lo c a l  u n iv e r­
s i t y  p la ce s  be re so lv ed  to  th e  s a t i s f a c t io n  o f a l l  communities appeared r a ­
th e r  f a r - f e tc h e d . Given th e  in h e re n t antagonism  between th e  Malays and non- 
M alays, one g ro u p 's  s a t i s f a c t io n  was l i a b l e  to  be a t th e  o th e r 's  expense, 
e i th e r  in  ab so lu te  term s o r pe rcen tag e  w i3e. Thus i f  the  D .A .P .'s  sugges­
t io n  th a t  th e  non-LIalay in ta k e  fo r  1977/78 se ss io n  be t r i p l e d  w ithou t redu ­
cing  th e  e x is t in g  in ta k e , th e  Malays were bound to  f e e l  th e  sense of lo s s  
by th e i r  reduced percen tage  from 7 j/° to  50$ in  th e  o v e ra ll  s tu d en t enrolm ent. 
Given t h e i r  b e l ie f  th a t  d is c r im in a tio n  in  t h e i r  favour was in tended  to  co r­
r e c t  p rev io u s  im balances in  th e  ed u ca tio n a l f i e ld  a g a in s t them, they  were 
l i a b le  to  r e a c t  em otionally  and i r r a t i o n a l l y  should th e  D .A .P .'s  su ggestion  
be c a r r ie d  o u t. Under th e se  c ircum stances, the  government would reg a rd  th e  
D .A .P .'s  su g gestions as a ttem p ts  to  ra b b le -ro u se  th e  Chinese, ig n o rin g  th e
fa c t  th a t  i t , ( i . e .  th e  governm ent)?had caused th e  f r u s t r a t io n  of th e  Chinese 
in  th e  f i r s t  p lace , e i th e r  d i r e c t ly  o r in d i r e c t ly .  The D.A.P. knew th a t
w hatever sug g estio n s  i t  gave would never be accepted  by th e  government, y e t 
Lim K it S iang  seemed undaunted in  a r t i c u l a t i n g  f r e e ly  non-Malay g rievances 
a t every a v a ila b le  o p p o rtu n ity . I t  would thus appear th a t  th e  D.A.P. in te n ­
ded to  c o n s ta n tly  remind th e  government th a t  Chinese problems were a lso  u r ­
g en t, and as such, should be t r e a te d  as n a t io n a l ,  no t s e c t io n a l ,  problem s.
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By s t r e s s in g  on th e  im portance of E ng lish  and accusing  th e  govern­
ment of d e l ib e r a te ly  cau sin g  th e  s tan d a rd s  of E n g lish  in  schools to  drop, 
th e  D.A.P. was in  fa c t  showing i t s  o p p o sitio n  to  Malay as th e  so le  medium 
o f in s t r u c t io n .  I t  however couched t h i s  o b je c tio n  by d w elling  on th e  adverse  
e f f e c ts  of doing away w ith  E n g lish , such as th e  f a l l  in  th e  o v e ra ll  s tan d ard s  
o f ed u ca tio n . However th e  D .A .P .’ s arguments a g a in s t th e  New Education Po­
l i c y  were n o t w ithout t h e i r  w eaknesses. The p a rty  had suggested  th a t  owing 
to  a sw itch  from E n g lish  to  Malay, th e re  was a lik e lih o o d  th a t  p ro sp e c tiv e  
s tu d e n ts  would f a i l  th e  E ng lish  language p ro f ic ie n c y  t e s t  fo r  en try  in to  
w hite  Commonwealth u n iv e r s i t ie s  and c o lle g e s . T his was because t h e i r  com­
mand o f th e  language was poor. The D .A .P .'s  co n ten tio n  in  th i s  a sp ec t lacked  
su b stan ce , s in c e  th e re  had been no re p o rte d  cases o f mass f a i lu r e s  o f p ro s­
p e c tiv e  can d id a tes  in  th e se  language t e s t s .  On th i s  b a s is ,  one can conclude 
th a t  th e  m a jo rity  o f th e  can d id a tes  who s a t  fo r  th e se  t e s t s  passed and were 
adm itted  in to  th e  w hite  Commonwealth in s t i t u t i o n s  o f h ig h e r le a rn in g . N
In  r e f e r r in g  to  th e  lo s s  of confidence in  th e  ed u ca tio n a l system , 
n o t a l l  th e  reasons given by th e  D.A.P. were c o r re c t .  Lim K it S iang po in ted  
out th a t  M in is te rs  and S u ltan s  had p re fe rre d  to  send t h e i r  c h ild re n  overseas, 
th u s  im plying  th a t  they  had no confidence in  th e  Malay-medium in s t ru c t io n  
ed u ca tio n a l system . I t  should be noted  th a t  even b e fo re  th e  sw itch  from 
E ng lish  to  Malay, M in is te rs  and S u ltan s  had a lread y  sen t t h e i r  c h ild re n  
abroad; p re fe ren ce  fo r  an overseas education  need not n e c e s s a r i ly  mean th a t  
one has lo s t  confidence in  o n e 's  own ed u ca tio n a l system . Also th e  overseas 
re c o g n itio n  of the S.P.M. as eq u iv a len t to  th e  G.C.E. 'o '  le v e ls  passes and 
th e  S i j i l  T inggi Perseko lahan  (S .T .P .)  as eq u iv a len t to  th e  H.S.C. fo r  en­
tra n c e  to  th e  U n iv e rs ity  o f S in g ap o re (su b jec t to  an E nglish  language p r o f i ­
c iency  t e s t  be ing  taken  by p ro sp e c tiv e  c an d id a te s) were ample testim ony  th a t
the standard of 
such low levels
education, as alleged by the D.A.P.,
70that confidence was lost in it.
did not deteriorate to
70. For recognition of the S.T.P. as entrance qualification by the Univer­
sity of Singapore subjected to an linglish language proficiency test, 
see New Straits Times, 4th March, 1980.
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(d) The Merdeka University Controversy
The proposal to establish the Chinese-medium Merdeka University- 
in 1978 marked a climax to the implications arising from the government's 
policies over the alteration of the character of Chinese and Tamil primary- 
schools, the 1972 mass M.C.E. Bahasa Malaysia failures and the lack of local 
higher educational opportunities for the non-Malays. It was a Chinese re­
action out of fear and anxiety which interpreted the above issues as the 
government's intention to do away with Chinese language, culture and educa­
tion in the country. The build-up to this fear and anxiety followed a logi­
cal sequence. Given the background of the long-standing Sino-Malay distrust 
and suspicion, which had been aggravated by the 1969 racial riot, the Chinese 
understandably perceived a new wave of Malay fanaticism, directly or indirect­
ly condoned by the government. This was manifested by a series of events
beginning with the acts of vandalism by the extremist M.L.S. in the Univer-
\
sity of Malaya in late 1970» followed by the government's adamant and repea­
ted non-recognition of Taiwan and Nanyang university degrees, the call to 
change the admission policy and medium of instruction of the T.A.R.C. and 
the demand that Chinese transport vehicles prominently display bold Malay 
lettering. (See section (b) of this chapter). It was within this racially- 
charged background that the government's reaction to the above issues was 
meted. Chinese dissatisfaction to it was to revive the call to set up the 
Merdeka University which had been mooted as early as 1968 by Chinese educa­
tionists and the Chinese Guilds and Associations. It would appear that in 
agitating for Merdeka University, the Chinese were mainly concerned with the 
lack of local higher educational opportunities for their children, but this 
issue had become entangled by the fear of the loss of their culture and lan­
guage as a result of the above-mentioned series of events which seemed to 
suggest government-condoned Malay fanaticism. Thus the Chinese perceived
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the Merdeka University concept as a panacea to their educational, cultural 
and linguistic ills. The strong supporters of the proposed university were 
the Chinese Guilds and Associations and the various Chinese school teachers’ 
unions. The D.A.P. decided to seek allies among them by fully supporting 
the proposed university. On the other hand, it was opposed by U.M.N.O. and 
the Malays outside the government. The Chinese partners of the N.F., the 
Ll.C.A. and the G.R.M., found themselves in a dilemma, t o m  between the need 
to satisfy the aspirations of their constituents and their commitment to 
the government stand. They sought to isolate the issue of the lack of local 
university places for non-Malays from the cultural and linguistic fears of 
the Chinese(which were regarded as inseparable by the D.A.P.) and then cal­
led for more places for non-Malays while at the same time rejecting the 
Merdeka University proposal. While the controversy over the proposed uni­
versity escalated, it was Complicated by another series of events considered
by the Chinese as a further manifestation of Malay extremism. This took pla-
\
ce in the latter half of 1978 and continued into 1979» beginning with the 
desecrations of Hindu temples, the convocation attire of the University of 
Technology Malaysia (U.T.M.), the alleged neglect of the Chinese and Tamil 
languages over Radio /television Malaysia(R.T.M.), the speech by a M.P. cal­
ling for the abolition of Chinese and Tamil schools, the Vietnamese refugees 
and the controversial speech on the lion dance by the Home Affairs Minister, 
Ghazali Shafie. However the govemment'3 announcement that there would be 
more local university places for non-Malays temporarily defused the Merdeka 
University controversy.
The proposal to set up the Merdeka University using Mandarin as 
the medium of instruction to cater for the needs of Chinese-stream seconda­
ry school students was mooted as early as 1968 when the difficulty of these 
students to obtain places in local universities in Malaysia and Singapore
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was felt. Chinese-strearn students had found that their qualifications were 
not compatible for entry into the English-medium Universities of Malaya and 
Singapore. Also the doors to their traditional avenues of higher education, 
Nanyang University and the universities in Taiwan, seemed to be gradually 
closing. In the first place, these degrees were not recognized by the govern­
ment. Secondly, in the case of Nanyang University, the admission requirements
71were gradually made more restrictive for Malaysian students. Hence it was 
felt that a Malaysian-based Chinese-stream university along the lines of Nan- 
tah, would cater to the needs of the many Chinese-stream students. As language 
was closely associated with culture, it was also felt that the proposed univer­
sity would serve as a cultural symbol to the large Chinese population in Malay­
sia. By the time of the 1969 general elections, the Merdeka University had be­
come heavily politicised. The D.A.P. included it in its "Malaysian Malaysia" 
platform in a bid to win massive support from the Chinese community while the 
M.C.A. attempted to steer a middle course over the issue. The M.C.A. rationa­
lized that if it supported the proposal to set up the university, it would com­
promise the government's official stand of opposing it. On the other hand, if 
it opposed the proposal, it was liable to lose the overwhelming support from 
the Chinese community who had become agitated over the government's pro-Malay 
I>olicies. The importance of having continual access to the government and
the fear of an extreme Malay backlash made the M.C.A. reject the proposal 
72initiallyl To mitigate this, the party called for alternative suggestions 
such as the upgrading of the Department of Chinese Studies at the University
7
of Malaya into a full faculty, and the setting up of a feeder college, the T.A.R.
71. In the absence of any official reasons given, one can only speculate 
that this was to increase the number of places at the university for 
Singapore students. By 1972 the full effects of this measure were felt 
when the Malaysian student enrolment at Nantah dropped significantly.
72. See Karl Von Vorys, qp.cit., p.29.1. For the M.C.A.'s rejection of Merdeka 
University, see Straits Times. 9th February, 1968.
73. Foot-note 32 of this chapter.
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These m easures, w ith  t h e i r  vario u s  short-com ings, d id  no t s a t i s f y  th e  r e s t ­
le s s  mood o f th e  C hinese, who, in s t ig a te d  by th e  Chinese Guilds and A ssocia­
t io n s  and th e  D .A .P ., were in s i s t e n t  on th e  estab lish m en t o f th e  Merdeka Uni­
v e r s i ty .  On th e  c o n tra ry , they  provoked ex trem is t Malays in  U.M.N.O. to  de­
mand s u c c e s s fu lly  f o r  th e  s e t t i n g  up o f a M alay-language N a tio n a l U n iv e rs ity !^  
As th e  1969 g en e ra l e le c tio n s  campaign in te n s i f i e d ,  th e  M.C.A., f e a r f u l  o f
a b ig  d e fe a t a t th e  p o l ls ,  fo rced  i t s e l f  to  f u l ly  support th e  estab lish m en t
75o f th e  proposed u n iv e r s i ty  s h o r t ly  b e fo re  th e  e le c t io n s .  A company c a l le d  
th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  Sdn. Berhad was r e g is te r e d  on 8 th  May 1969 to  pave 
th e  way fo r  th e  e stab lish m en t of th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity ! However th e  r a c i a l  
r i o t s  broke out 5 days l a t e r  w ith  t h e i r  a fte rm a th  of N.O.C. r u le ,  and w hat­
ever plan3 to  s e t  up th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  had to  be suspended owing to  th e  
extreme s e n s i t i v i t y  generated  by th e  co n troversy  in  th e  b u ild -u p  towards th e  
g en e ra l e le c t io n s .  The suspension  was a lso  p a r t  o f th e  N .O .C .’s measures to  
dampen m utual communal antagonism  to  co n ta in  th e  r i o t s .  D esp ite  i t s  apparen t 
permanency, th e  sponsors of th e  proposed u n iv e r s i ty  d id  no t g ive up hope as 
th ey  b e lie v e d  th a t  i t  was only tem porary , perhaps fo r  th e  d u ra tio n  o f th e  
emergency. F ollow ing th e  r e s to r a t io n  o f P a rliam en ta ry  r u le  in  February 1971, 
th ey  began to  re v iv e  t h e i r  p lans to  e s ta b l i s h  th e  u n iv e r s i ty .  They f e l t  th a t  
th e  T.A.R.C. d id  n o t re so lv e  th e  se r io u s  problem o f C hinese-stream  s tu d e n ts  who 
could no t f in d  p la ce s  in  lo c a l  u n iv e r s i t i e s .  I t  was only a fe e d e r c o lleg e
74« For f u l l  d e t a i l s  of t h i s ,  see  Jerome Bass, M alaysian P o l i t i c s ,  1968-70? 
Cri s i s  and Response, Ph.D. T h es is , U n iv e rs ity  o f C a l ifo rn ia , B erkeley , 
1973, pp. 47-52.
75* Tun Tan Siew S in , th e  then  M.C.A. P re s id e n t, in v ite d  th e  sponsors of
th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  to  jo in  th e  government and th o se  re sp o n s ib le  f o r  
th e  T.A.R.C. to  s e t  up a n a t i o n a l ( i . e .  M erd eka)un iversity  "devoid o f 
any p o l i t i c a l  und erto n es" . S t r a i t s  Times, 30th A p ril , 1969» op. c i t . 
D esp ite  t h i s  la s t-m in u te  change of s t r a te g y ,  th e  M.C.A. s t i l l  lo s t  a 
l o t  o f support to  th e  non-Malay o p p o s itio n . I t  a lso  in c u rre d  th e  d i s ­
p le a su re  o f U.M.N.O.
The Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  sponsors needed th e  M .C.A.’s support fo r  s e t t i n g  
up th e  proposed u n iv e r s i ty  because o f i t s  access to  th e  government.
76.
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catering for pre-university classes and some professional courses. In fact 
by educating more students for pre-university classes, the T.A.R.C. was 
swelling the numbers of Chinese students with the H.S.C. qualifications. 
Moreover it was felt that since the government had agreed to the establish­
ment of the Malay language National University, the request to set up Merde-
77ka University v/as not unreasonable; Shortly before the 1974 general elec­
tions, the Merdeka University sponsors claimed that Tun Razok had promised 
them that the government would take another look at the university plan on
7 o
the condition that it did not become politicized. According to them, offi­
cials close to Tun Razak held several private discussions with them. It 
could be surmised that the government's action, in this aspect, intended to 
pacify the Chinese community so as to win their votes for its Chinese part­
ners, especially the M.C.A., in view of the latter's dismal performance in 
the 1969 general elections. The impression conveyed to the sponsors was 
that there was still hope for the proposed university to be set up. How­
ever, whatever hopes they entertained did not materialise. They claimed 
that they had been betrayed after the N.F. had won a landslide victory in
the 1974 general elections and then refused to consider the matter despite
79Tun Razak's promise. Meanwhile qualified non-Malay students were finding 
it increasingly difficult to enter local universities as a result of the 
highly discriminatory practice adopted by the Central Processing Unit in its 
selection procedure.(See preceding section). If the situation v/as bad for
77. See A.M.Healy,"Education and Politics in a Plural Society: The Case 
of Malaysia", World Review, Vol. XIV No.3, October 1975» PP» 26-34»
The National University began its first session with a few hundred 
students in temporary premises in the former Malayan Teachers' College 
in Kuala Lumpur next to the University of Malaya, in 1970»
78. For full details of Tun Razak's unconfirmed promise, see article, 
"Storm over Merdeka", Asiav/eek, 13th October, 1978, pp» 33“7 •
79» Ibid.
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the English-medium non-Malay students, it appeared even worse for the Chine- 
se-stream students, given the biased attitude of the Central Processing Unit. 
By the time the Merdeka University sponsors renewed their campaign in early 
1978» the racial composition in the local universities had been some 75$
Malay to 2¥/o non-Malay. In fact Musa Hitam admitted that it was closer to 
85/0 Malay and 15$ non-Malay. The problem of the lack of local university 
places for non-Malay students was aggravated when the governments of Britain, 
Australia and New Zealand, for a variety of reasons, imposed restrictive
Qquotas and higher fees on foreign students in their universities and colleges; 
Added to the concern for lack of local educational opportunities in the uni­
versities for non-Malay students were the gradual weakening and erosion of 
the effective use of the Chinese language in schools(section (a)) and the 
apparently hostile government attitude towards Chinese cultural traditions 
like the lion dance. The emphasis to make Malay culture prominent after 
the 1969 racial riot had its predictable consequences on Chinese cultural 
traditions. While much publicity was given in the mass media to stress the 
importance of Malay culture as the national culture, restrictions such as 
the need to apply for permits(with restrictive conditions) were imposed on
the performance of the lion dance, the pride of the Chinese, on public fes- 
02tive occasions. Thus it may be argued that while the demand of the Merdeka
80. Tharn Seong Chee,op.cit. ,p. 348 and Rodney Tasker, °p. cit., pp. 14-6.
01. The New Zealand government, for instance, raised the fees of private
overseas students from NZ$220 to NZ$1,500 per annum with effect from 
1980* New Straits Times, 15th June, 1979» For details of the British 
government's imposition of higher fees for private overseas students 
also with effect from 1980, see New Straits Times, 3rd July, 1979*
82. Some of the conditions stipulated before a permit could be issued for 
a public performance of the lion dance were as follows: There should
not be more than 20 people in a group. Fire-crackers and loud-speakers 
were not to be used. Martial arts exhibitions would also be prohibited 
and traffic should not be obstructed. New Straits Times, 6th February, 
1980. Ghazali Shafie, the Home Affairs Minister, however clarified 
that any ban imposed on the lion dance would only be in processions.
New Straits Times, 6th December, 1979»
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University sponsors to set up a Chinese-medium private university could hard­
ly be compatible with the real issue at stake, i.e. the lack of local higher 
educational opportunities, they were also motivated by the desire to defend 
what they perceived to be the steady(government-backed)erosion of Chinese 
language and culture. They thus saw in the Merdeka University project a sym­
bol of their struggle against educational, linguistic and cultural oppression.
The Merdeka University sponsors decided to carry on their struggle 
by peaceful means and in accordance to the law. The establishment of univer­
sities and colleges in the country came under the provisions of the 1971 Uni­
versities and University Colleges Act(U.U.C.A.). Although the U.U.C.A. did 
not prohibit the establishment of private universities, it must first of all 
be approved by the King, who had to be satisfied that it was in the national
o ^
interest. The sponsors therefore sent a thick petition to the King, listing 
several detailed grounds as to why the proposed university should be establi­
shed?^ Their purpose was to stress the urgency of lack of higher educational 
opportunities locally for Chinese-stream students and to express Chinese fears 
that their language and culture were slowly being annihilated in the country.
The sponsors claimed that the establishment of Merdeka University would resolve 
the problem and fears stated above. As regards the former, it would accommodate 
qualified Chinese-stream students who could not get places in the local univer­
sities owing to the interference of non-academic factors in university admission,
85a reference to the Majid Ismail Committee recommendations. In the latter case,
83. See Asian Almanac, Vol. XVII, No. 11, 17th March, 1979»
84. For full details of the Merdeka University sponsors’ petition to the 
King, see Asiaweek, 6th October, 1978.
85. Asiaweek, 10th November, 1978. The petition emphasised that the deterio­
rating situation(concerning the Chinese)of their language, culture and
education must be redressed in the interests of national unity and ra­
cial concord.
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by using Mandarin as the main medium of instruction, the proposed university 
would allay Chinese fears that their language and culture would not he sti­
fled. The sponsors nevertheless stressed that although Mandarin would be 
the main medium of instruction, Bahasa Malaysia and English would be taught 
a3 compulsory subjects. The proposed university would complement the govern­
ment's educational objectives of promoting science and technology by setting 
up faculties of science, engineering, arts and commerced Although it would
cater primarily for Chinese-stream students, students from other language
07media would also be admitted. The basis of selection would be on merit.
As expected, the King on the advice of the government, rejected 
the proposal on the grounds that it was against the national interest. The 
rejection was summed up by 3 reasons, namely(a) the private sector would set 
up the university; (b) it would use Chinese as the medium of instruction and 
(c) it would cater to students from Chinese-medium schools. The government 
believed that although Bahasa Malaysia and English would be taught as com­
pulsory subjects, the use of Mandarin as the medium of instruction would 
perpetuate the incompetence in Bahasa Malaysia which tend to isolate Chinese- 
stream students from the mainstream of the New Education Policy, thereby 
making it3 development as far as the Chinese were concerned, difficult. 
Although the proposed university intended to open its doors to all qualified 
students irrespective of media, the fact that it would be an essentially 
Chinese institution in practice was not lost on the government as the T.A.R.C.
86. Ibid. 87. Ibid.
88. For full details of the government's rejection of the Merdeka Univer­
sity proposal, see Malaysia, November 1978 and New Straits Times,
16th October, 1978. See also article,"Another No to Merdeka U", 
Asiaweek, 6th October, 1978.
134
89had shown. If merit was to form the sole basis of admission, the Chinese
would, a3 the pre-1970 University of Malaya enrolment had indicated, tend to
90form the majority of the students admitted to the detriment of the Malays. 
The manner in which Musa Hitam chose to make his rejection of the proposal 
produced a highly charged racial situation. So too was its timing at the 
U.M.N.O. General Assembly in September shortly after Musa had been elected 
one of the party’s Vice-Presidents. He stressed that the New Education Po­
licy was clearly stated and easily understood by anyone interested in educa-
91tion and would therefore not be reviewed-. This was to allay the fears and 
anxieties of certain quarters in U.M.N.O. that the government might review 
the U.U.C.A. to make the establishment of Merdeka University possible owing 
to the restless mood of the Chinese. Musa added that those Chinese who va­
lued their citizenship in Malaysia should appreciate the government's deci-
92sion to reject the Merdeka University proposal. This was a reference to 
the 1957 Merdeka Agreement between U.M.N.O. and M.C.A. in which in exchange 
for liberal citizenship concessions for the Chinese, the Malays were to be 
entitled to special privileges guaranteed by their political supremacy.
Since the racial riot of 1969» the scope of special privileges had been 
greatly extended to include education and criteria for university selection. 
Musa thus gave an implied threat that if the Chinese continued to agitate 
for the establishment of the Merdeka University, the government might be
89. Out of the T.A.R.C.'s total enrolment of 2,932 students in 1975» there 
were only 32 Malays, 157 Indians and 4 Others, compared to 2,739 Chi­
nese. The Third Malaysia Plan,Government Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1976, 
pp. 402-3.
90. See foot-note 55 of this chapter.
91. See Malaysia, November 1978.
92. Ibid.
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fo rced  to  review  i t s  1957 s tan d  on l i b e r a l  c i t iz e n s h ip  concessions f o r  th e
C hinese. He was s o l id ly  backed by U.M.N.O. Youth and th e  v a rio u s  Malay
91School T eachers ' Unions. M usa's announcement m anifested  th e  b e l i e f  of th e  
Malays th a t  education  in  th e  Malay-medium, as sanc tioned  by th e  New Educa­
t io n  P o lic y , was c lo se ly  t i e d  up w ith  c u l tu r a l ,  p o l i t i c a l  and economic s t r i ­
v in g s , a l l  th re e  be ing  in t r i c a t e l y  in te r tw in e d . T heir claim  to  leg itim acy  
th rough  "Duminutraism" w ith  i t s  s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s  was th e re fo re  to  guaran­
te e  th e  e x is te n c e  o f a s a l i e n t  Malay p o l i t i c a l ,  c u l tu r a l ,  l i n g u i s t i c  and 
even r e l ig io u s  id e n ti ty (b a s e d  on Islam ) in  M alay s ia 's  p lu ra l  so c ie ty  a t a l l  
c o s ts .  This appeared to  be th e  very co re  of th e  p o l i t i c a l  philosophy o f th e  
Malays and th e re fo re  no t n e g o tia b le  under any c ircu m stan ces . The Merdeka 
U n iv e rs ity  p roposa l was th e re fo re  regarded  by th e  Malays as measures to  p ro ­
mote Chinese chauvinism  v ia  education .
The governm ent's arguments d id  n o t appear convincing  to  th e  Chinese
>
who were growing in c re a s in g ly  r e s e n tf u l  towards th e  in c re a s in g ly  o v e rt p ro- 
Malay p o l ic ie s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  ed u ca tio n . From prev ious experience , th e  ave­
rag e  Chinese had come to  b e lie v e  th a t  each tim e th e  government preached m u lti
94r a c ia l is m , i t  was in  f a c t  p r a c t i s in g  Malay communal ism". Chinese resentm ent 
wa3 s tro n g e s t a g a in s t th e  p ro v o ca tiv e  u tte ra n c e s  of U.M.N.O. Youth. Absence 
o f government r e s t r a i n t s  p u b lic ly  on U.M.N.O. Youth tend to  be in te rp re te d  
as i t s  t a c i t  support fo r  th e  s l id e  towards Malay extremism. Although th e re  
was a g en era l f e e l in g  o f anger and f r u s t r a t io n  over th e  governm ent's r e je c -
93. U.M.N.O. Youth P re s id e n t, Suhaimi Kamaruddin, c a l le d  on th e  government 
to  ta k e  a firm  s tan d  ag a in s t th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  fo r  no o th e r r e a ­
son than  " th a t th e  aims of th e  u n iv e r s i ty  a re  co n tra ry  to  th e  n a tio n a l 
educa tion  p o lic y " . New S t r a i t s  Times, 21st September, 1978, op. c i t .
94. This f e e l in g  was ty p ic a l ly  expressed  in  a comment by a prominent M.C.A. 
f i g u r e : " I t 's  no use th e  l e a d e r s ( i .e .  U.M.N.O.) t e l l i n g  us M alaysia i s
a m u l t i - r a c ia l  country  i f  a s ig n i f ic a n t  p ro p o r t io n ( i . e. th e  M alays) of 
th e  p o p u la tio n  tak e  i t  to  mean th e  country  must accept Malay hegemony". 
Asiaweek, 13th O ctober, 1978, op. c i t .
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tion of the Merdeka University proposal, the Chinese were divided and confu­
sed as regards what measures they should take. The more militant wanted a 
strong united stand to agitate for the proposal in the belief that if the 
Chinese continued to be indecisive, Malay extremism would be encouraged fur­
ther. On the other hand, the moderate elements felt that behind-the-scenes 
bargaining with the U.LI.N.O. leadership would achieve a compromise and cer­
tain concessions for the Chinese such as more places for non-Malays in the 
local universities. However with the prevailing mood of anxiety among the 
Chinese due to the long-standing neglect of what they regarded as their le­
gitimate grievances, the appeal of the more militant - the Chinese Guilds 
and Associations, the various Chinese School Teachers' Unions and M.C.A.
Youth - appeared more attractive. Musa's reference to the 1957 Merdeka bar­
gaining between U.M.N.O. and M.C.A. made the hard-liners direct their anger 
at the M.C.A., whose leaders they blamed for negotiating an agreement that
was never really accepted by the majority of the Chinese where the future
>
of their language, culture and education were concerned. Granted that the 
majority of the hard-liners were not the rich businessmen (who were in many 
cases foreign-bom and appeared more committed to their big businesses than 
the future of the Chinese community) but were local-bom, Chinese-educated 
and in many cases, having been the victims of discrimination in favour of 
the Malays, they could hardly be blamed for venting their wrath on the M.C.A. 
To them, the M.C.A. had been a useless, ineffective organisation which could 
not represent their interests effectively in the government. Thus the spon­
sors of the Merdeka University announced that they would organise a mass mee­
ting of 10,000 Chinese on 22nd October 1978 to make a united stand after dis-
95cussing the implications of the government's rejection of the proposal.
95» For full details, see K.Das,"Anger over Ban on Merdeka U", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 3rd November, 1978.
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The D.A.P. which had been m o n ito ring  th e  s i tu a t io n  c lo se ly , d e c i­
ded to  a s s o c ia te  i t s e l f  w ith  th e  sponsors o f the  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  and bac­
ked th e  p roposa l f u l l y .  D uring th e  1969 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  i t  had campaigned 
v ig o ro u s ly  fo r  th e  u n iv e rs i ty  as an is s u e .  I t  was fo rced  to  keep s i l e n t  over 
th e  same is s u e  in  th e  1974 g en era l e le c t io n s  p a r t ly  to  avoid being  p e n a lise d  
by th e  S e d itio n s  Act, and p a r t ly  because th e  problem of non-Malays f in d in g  
p la c e s  in  lo c a l  u n iv e r s i t ie s  had no t y e t been s e r io u s . However as th e  adver­
se  e f f e c t s  o f th e  New Education P o licy  became in c re a s in g ly  f e l t  by th e  Chi­
n e se , th e  D.A.P. rev iv ed  i t s  campaign fo r  th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  in  th e  1978 
g e n e ra l e le c t io n s ,  though on a lower key compared to  th e  I 969 g en era l e le c ­
t io n s .  The p a rty  f e l t  th a t  th e  government had n e g lec te d  and v/as co n tin u in g  
to  be in d i f f e r e n t  to  th e  lo n g -s ta n d in g  le g it im a te  g rievances o f th e  Chinese 
over h ig h e r  education  o p p o rtu n itie s  lo c a l ly ,  language and c u ltu re , to  th e  
e x te n t th a t  th e  Chinese were now becoming d e sp e ra te . In s te a d  of t r e a t in g  
Chinese g riev an ces  as n a t io n a l  problems and re so lv in g  them in  a manner th a t  
would a l la y  Chinese f r u s t r a t io n ,  th e  D.A.P. accused th e  government o f be in g  
more concerned about th e  Malay re a c t io n  to  i t s  trea tm en t o f Chinese problem s. 
The d i f f i c u l t y  o f th e  whole s i tu a t io n  was th a t  Malay in t e r e s t s  and Chinese 
i n t e r e s t s  tend  to  be d ia m e tr ic a l ly  opposed to  one ano ther where language, 
c u l tu re  and education  were concerned. The pandering  to  one must n e c e s s a r i ly  
in v o lv e  th e  d e p riv a tio n  o f th e  o th e r . S ince th e  government depended on th e  
Malays fo r  i t s  su p p o rt, i t  had to  p e rp e tu a lly  see to  i t  th a t  they  were r e ­
assu red  over i t s  p o l ic ie s ,  o therw ise  they  would t r a n s f e r  t h e i r  support to  
th e  e x tre m is t P .A .S . th e reb y  erod ing  U .M .N.O.'s power b ase . Hence a l l  th e
pro-M alay fe a tu re s  of government p o l ic ie s  had to  be w idely  p u b lic is e d  even
9oto  th e  e x te n t of causing  f r u s t r a t io n  to  th e  non-M alays, The government,
96. See ex c lu s iv e  in te rv iew  w ith  th e  Prime M in is te r , Datuk H ussein Onn,
P ar E astern  Economic Review, 26th January , 1979> pp« 18-23. H ussein 
Onn s ta te d  th a t  th e  Malays from tim e to  tim e wanted to  be re a ssu re d :
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despite Hussein Onn's explanations, could not pacify the restless Chinese.
♦j
On the contrary, over-zealous Malay bureaucrats often implemented its poli­
cies harshly against the Chinese, as in the selection of students to the 
local universities. When the Chinese protested, U.M.N.O. Youth was quick 
to take offence, often accusing them of bad faith and failing to understand 
the implications of the New Education Policy. The Seditions Act blunted the 
effect of Chinese protests. The D.A.P. warned that unless the bottled-up 
frustrations of the Chinese were given a legitimate outlet, they would be 
vulnerable targets for the M.C.P. The party justified its arguments that 
the government had persistently ignored its earlier warnings on Chinese 
frustration over the subtle alteration of the character of their primary 
schools, the 1972 mass M.C.E. Bahasa Malaysia failures and the denial of 
places in local universities for qualified Chinese students.(See sections 
(a) (b) and (c) of this chapter). It accused the government of either blan­
keting the frustration or grudgingly make negligible concessions which would 
later be more than balanced up by greater pro-Malay measures. A case in poi­
nt was the decision to allow the M.C.A. to set up the T.A.R.C. to blunt Chi­
nese demands for the Merdeka University. This angered the Malays and had
to be more than balanced up by the establishment of the Malay language
q?National University. In the event the Chinese felt more dissatisfied than 
ever because their position vis-a-vis the Malays had deteriorated. The D.A.P.
"We are not speaking of an urban, educated, sophisticated population.
The majority of the Malays are in the rural areas. If there is si­
lence for a time, they become suspicious, nervous that nothing is 
being done. This is where the impression is created that it is all 
for the "Bumiputra". It is mis-understood by the others. It is a 
pity, ye3. But we have to do it'.’ Op. cit.
97- See A.M.Healy, op. cit., pp. 26-34«
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sensed that the focus of Chinese frustrations would be the Merdeka Univer­
sity since it represented a symbol of their educational, linguistic and 
cultural struggle against the government. Earlier in March 1978» Dr. Chen 
Man Hin, the D.A.P. Chairman, unsuccessfully called on the government in 
Parliament to approve the establishment of the university?^ The D.A.P. 
followed this up in the 1978 general elections pampaign when it allegedly
promised voters that it would seek to amend the U.U.C.A. to provide for the
99establishment of the Merdeka University. The impression allegedly conveyed 
to the Chinese voters was that the amended U.U.C.A. would allow for the set­
ting up of the proposed university, whereas the M.C.A. was to argue later 
that this was not possible"!-^  Following the government's rejection of the 
Merdeka University sponsors' petition in early October 1978, the D.A.P. de­
cided to table a motion in Parliament to amend the U.U.C.A. to provide for 
the establishment of private universities and private university colleges}^ 
In making this move, the party felt that the Chinese had given it a mandate,
as indicated by its increased support in the 1978 general elections, to press 
for their legitimate demands(to set up the Merdeka University) in Parliament. 
The D.A.P.'s strategy was to link the Merdeka University proposal with the 
lack of local university places for non-Malay students. Lim Kit Siang stre­
ssed that the problem of the diminution of higher education opportunities 
for non-Malays was the single most divisive issue in the country with more
98. See Mirror of Opinion, highlights of Malay, Chinese and Tamil Press, 
Ministry of Culture, Singapore, No. 67/1978, 23rd March, 1978.
99. See Rahman Adnan,"Losers All? Special Report on Merdeka University", 
Malaysian Business, December 1978, pp. 7~D0. See also New Straits 
Times, 11th October, 1978.
100. Ibid.
101. For full report, see ibid.
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than 20,000 qualified. non-Malay students failing to gain entry into the 
5 local universities in 1977/78. This problem would be aggravated by the 
switch to Bahasa Malaysia from English in 1980 when students would no longer 
be entitled to automatic access to overseas universities as in the past^-0^
As such even the limited access to higher education opportunities overseas 
for non-Malays would be closed. It was therefore justifiable for the pri­
vate sector to set up private universities to cope with this problem. Kit 
Siang stressed that the establishment of private universities would comple­
ment and supplement the government's efforts to promote higher education}0^ 
He did not make any direct reference to the Merdeka University, but conveyed 
the impression that the Chinese had loot all hope of depending upon the gov­
ernment to resolve their problems concerning the diminution of higher edu­
cation opportunities, and were now depending upon their own private resources 
to do so. He stressed that all the Chinese wanted was permission from the 
government to start the ball rolling'!'05 If the U.U.C.A. was rigid, the 
D.A.P. felt that it should be amended. The D.A.P. knew that its motion 
would be defeated in view of its small representation in Parliament. It 
sought rather to force its rivals, the M.C.A. and the G.R.M., to make a 
clear stand on the issue.
The government's reaction to the D.A.P.'s motion was a film rejec-
102. The government's rebuttal was that in 1978, out of a total of 30,625 
applicants to the 5 local universities, 23,828 comprising of all 
races, were rejected. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. The Merdeka University sponsors had collected some $5 million for 
the "Chinese Culture Fund" and $600,000 for the Merdeka University 
project itself in the belief that more donations would be forthcoming 
from Chinese businesses organizations and individuals when required. 
See Asian Almanac, 17th March, 1979*
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tion by a vote of 117:15 in Parliament. The Prime Minister, Datuk Huss­
ein Onn had realized the importance of the implications of the D.A.P.'s 
motion and thereby allowed it to be debated for some 4 hours before a vote 
was taken. This was a departure from the previous strategy of killing 
D.A.P. motions by calling for a vote immediately after they were tabled. 
Hussein’s strategy was to encourage the non-Malay members of the N.F. to 
speak on the government' s behalf so as to x^revent what it saw as a one-sided 
version of the problem conveyed by the D.A.P. Malay back-benchers were 
deliberately restrained from malting statements in the debate as he felt that
they would tend to be emotional and thus exacerbate racial tension. This
107was one of the ways to get the Chinese to view the problem rationally.
However the government's chief spokesman had to be Ivlu3a Hi tarn, the Education
Minister. Mu3a argued along the lines of the impracticality for the private
sector to set up the proposed university in terms of cost and poor employ-
108ment prospects for its graduates. He cited the case of Hanyang Universi­
ty in Singapore which started off as a x^ivate university but had to be ta­
ken over by the government because its sponsors could not generate the mil­
lions of dollars annually to maintain the university. He added that despite 
the degree of the university being recognized by the Singapore government, 
the bigotry, especially of the private sector, to accord it a lower status 
comx^ared to the University of Singapore degree, could not be done away with. 
Owing to the importance of English as a result of increasing contacts with
106. See Hew Straits Times, 11th October, 1978.
107. For details, see K.Das,'’Hussein stops the rot", Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 20th October, 1978*
108. It was estimated that the initial cost of establishing a university 
to accommodate 2,000 students would be $30 million. $10 million 
would be needed to run it annually. Asian Almanac, 17th March, 1979*
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the outside world in terms of commerce and industry, science and technology 
and access to higher education - thi3 implied the downgrading of Mandarin 
for practical purposes - Nanyang University had to become a bi-lingual 
university, and eventually English was officially made a medium of instruc­
tion in 1975« The status of the university was downgraded further when a 
joint-campus programme merging it with the University of Singapore was ini- 
tinted in 1978* The government’s reference to Nantah was that the pro­
posed Merdeka University would suffer a similar fate, forcing the govern­
ment to take control of it eventually. Musa stressed that even the T.A.R.C., 
which was meant to be privately sponsored, had to depend on the government 
for half its bills, a further reminder to the Merdeka University sponsors 
of tne impracticality of private universities and colleges11^ His arguments 
were rational and markedly toned down from the implied threat of violence 
in his earlier announcement to reject the proposal at the U.M.N.O. General 
Assembly in September. The M.C.A. accused the D.A.P. of trying to make 
political capital by confusing the issue of the diminution of higher educa­
tion opportunities for the Chinese with the need to set up the Merdeka Uni- 
111versity. Lee San Choon, the M.C.A. President, charged that the D.A.P. 
was misleading the Chinese by promising them something which was not attain­
able within the stresses and strains of a multi-racial society1.12He maintai­
ned that the M.C.A. shared the concern of Chinese parents over a lack of
109. For full details, see Susurnu Awanohara,"The Great Debate rumbles on",
Far Eastern Economic Review, 4th April, I960, pp. 14-5. See also
article,"Nanyang U at the cross-roads"in New Straits Times, 3rd April,1980.
110. See interview with Musa Hitamj Asiaweek, 23rd June, 1978.
111. For full details of the M.C.A.’s arguments, see New Straits Times,
11th October, 1978 and Rahman Adnan, op. cit., pp. 7-IO.
112. New Straits Times, 11th October, 1978. TheM.I.C., G.R.M.,S.N.A.P. 
and S.U.P.P. gave broadly similar views.
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higher educational opportunities but that Merdeka University was not the 
solution on impractical grounds of cost and employment opportunities for 
graduates as stated earlier by Musa. Sensing the anxiety and fears of the 
Chinese, Lee appealed to them to think over the problem objectively and 
unemotionally (as the M.C.A. leadership had done so to great lengths and in 
great depth) while he would make a plea for more places in local universities 
for the Chimese!^ The M.C.A. was afraid that any emotional outburst by the 
Chinese would provoke an extreme Malay backlash and weaken the position of 
the moderate U.M.N.O. leadership. Already Malay extremists were talking 
about the need to set up an Islamic University if the Merdeka University 
proposal was approved}1^ Even the M.C.A.'s acknowledgement of the lack of 
higher educational opportunities for the Chinese was sufficient to provoke 
concern among certain quarters in U.M.N.O., particularly U.M.N.O. Youth'1'1^
The tendency of U.M.N.O. Youth was to regard the government's discrimination 
in admitting more Malays to the universities as a corrective measure to rec­
tify the pre-1970 imbalances against the Malays. They were angry in the sen­
se that corrective measures such as these were continually being thwarted 
by the admission of more non-Malays in overseas universities, disregarding 
the fact that lack of opportunities at home had forced the non-Malay students 
overseas in the first place. U.M.N.O. Youth wanted to settle for no less 
than the M.C.A. and the G.R.M. showing complete and unqualified rejection 
of Merdeka University and an acknowledgement that discrimination in favour
113« For details of the M.C.A.'s rejection of the Merdeka University, see 
New Straits Times, 27th November, 1978, Malaysia, February 1979» and 
Asian Almanac, 17th March, 1979»
114. For details, see Thaung Myine,"Merdeka University:T.7hy that debate?", 
Straits Times, 16th October, 1978. See also Mirror of Opinion, 
highlights of Malay, Chinese and Tamil Press, Ministry of Culture, 
Singapore, No. 25/1970» 31st January, 1978.
115. Rahman Adnan, op. cit., pp. 7-10*
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of Malays as regards university enrolment was imperative. Thus when Dr.
Goh Cheng Teik, a deputy minister representing the G.R.M., appealed to Musa 
to reconsider his earlier U.M.N.O. General Assembly announcement to reject 
the Merdeka University on the grounds that the principle to set up private 
universities was being compromised, Malay extremists from U.M.N.O., P.A.S.
117and the Kedah Malay Teachers’ Union attacked him and even asked him to resign. 
Under these circumstances, the Home Affairs Minister, Ghazali Shafie, could 
not allow the proposed meeting of 10,000 Chinese on 22nd October 1978 "to dis­
cuss the implications of the government’s rejection of the proposed univer­
sity. His fear was that Malay extremists would organize a bigger counter- 
demonstration, thus exacerbating racial tension. Ghazali therefore banned 
the scheduled meeting under the I.S.A., whereby the Merdeka University spon­
sors took steps to challenge the government's rejection of the proposed uni-
118versity on legal grounds.
The D.A.P. was angry with the government for banning the proposed
22nd October meeting, as it had counted on this meeting to drum up Chinese 
119support. It however denied that it was politicizing the issue, insisting
116. A typical comment from U.M.N.O. Youth was that the M.C.A. leadership 
must come out, more often, more boldly and forcefully on some of the 
issues that require the Chinese being given a lecture. Rahman Adnan,
op. cit., pp. 7-10.
117. New Straits Times, 23rd September, 1978 end K.Das,"Caught on the re­
bound", Far Eastem Economic Review, 24th November, 1978• Dr. Goh, 
the G.R.M.'s Political Bhreau chairman, had earlier stated that the 
reasons given by Musa for the government's rejection of the Merdeka 
University meant that the government was closing its door3 not only 
to the university an proposed by its sponsors, but also to any pro­
posed privately funded institution of higher learning regardless of 
whether it conformed to the education policy or not. Goh had regar­
ded the decision an too wide and rigid. For further details, see K. 
Das,"A Test of Strength on Education", Far Eastern Economic Review, 
6th October, 1978. Musa clarified that the government's rejection 
of private universities was only within the context of the applica­
tion to set up the Merdeka University. New Straits Times, 11th Octo­
ber, 197Ö.
118. See K.Das,"The Shadow of '69 passes again", Far Eastern Economic
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that the problems of the Chinese in relation to culture, language and edu­
cation, which were all tied up with the Merdeka University, were also natio­
nal problems and therefore merited national solutions. It felt that if it 
did not raise them, they would never be resolved. This was to hit at the 
M.C.A. and the G.R.I.l. for not daring to speak forcefully on behalf of the 
Chinese in the government. In fact the D.A.P. alleged that the IvI.C.A. had 
encouraged Malay extremists to be vociferous by giving the impression that 
the Chinese had the habit of demeaning themselves. A D.A.P. M.P. stated 
that the M.C.A. Deputy Minister of Education, Chan Siang Sun, showed igno­
rance of the dignity of his position as No. 2 man in the Education Ministry 
hierarchy when he led a M.C.A. delegation to see a Malay bureaucrat who was 
perhaps 12 or 25 in the same hierarchy to clear up an administrative matter.' 
Whatever the Deputy Minister’s reasons for leading the delegation, they cer­
tainly could not negate the fact that the M.C.A. had brought this indigni­
ty upon itself. The D.A.P.believed that this was the very reason that 
Malay extremists in U.M.N.O. never hesitated to attack the M.C.A. each time 
a controversial issue like Merdeka University cropped up. The D.A.P. conti­
nued that if there was any politicization of the proposed university issue, 
the government had been responsible in the first place, since the Education
Review, 3rd November, 1978 and New Straits Times, 20th October, 1978«
In banning the proposed meeting, Ghazali said:"Of course I can control 
the meeting. But how do you control the overflow from the meeting?
I mean how do you control the ideas, the words that flow out of the 
meeting and into society at large, and how do you say no to,a counter­
meeting after the damage i3 done?" F.E.E.R., 3rd November, 1978, op. 
cit. For details of the sponsors'intention to sue the government,see 
Asian Almanac,17th March,1979. B.Levin and Holger Jensen,"Malaysian 
Apartheid'", Newsweek, 20th November, 1978.
119. K. Das,"The Shadow of '69 passes again", F.E.E.R., 3rd November, 1978.
120. • New Straits Times, 22nd November, 1970. The same M.P., Chan Teck Chan,
also accused the M.C.A. for adopting double standards as regards the 
Merdeka University proposal. The M.C.A., according to him, protested 
against the government’s decision outside Parliament, but voted with 
it in Parliament. New Straits Times, 18th October, 1978.
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Minister chose to make the government’s rejection at a political meeting - 
the U.M.N.O. General Assembly, The party maintained that Merdeka Univer­
sity was in accordance with the letter and spirit of clause 152(l) of the
Constitution which called for the protection and sustenance of ethnic langua- 
122ges. It interpreted protection and sustenance as the right to have the 
ethnic languages used as media of instruction in schools and universities.
By using the Constitution as a yardstick and by showing that Merdeka Univer­
sity conformed to the Constitution, the D.A.P. attacked U.M.N.O.'s insistence 
that Merdeka University had contradicted the New Education Policy and there­
fore should be banned. The D.A.P. contended that by opposing Merdeka Univer­
sity, the New Education Policy had in fact conflicted with the Constitution. 
Since the Constitution was sacred, the D.A.P. suggested that the New Educa­
tion policy should be amended accordingly to conform to it. Lim Kit Siang 
held that the main problem contributing to the build-up of racial tension 
was the tendency of the Malays to perceive the Merdeka University issue as 
a threat to their existence. As such, the government should explain to 
them that this was not. Instead the government chose to appease them by 
banning the proposed legitimate meeting of the Merdeka University sponsors 
on 22nd October. The government should have allowed the meeting to carry on 
as scheduled; if the government intended to ban any so-called disruptive 
meetings, then it should contain the Malay extremists who had no legitimate 
grounds to organize counter-demonstrations}^ Sensing that the polemics
121. Haliman Adnan, op. cit., pp. 7-10.
122. Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 273.
123. See interview with Lim Kit Siang, , Asiaweek, 30th June, 1978.
124. The D.A.P. and the Merdeka University sponsors viewed the ban as a 
blatant interference with the freedom of assembly. Kit Siang stated:
"The Minister said that though the conference could be smoothly held, 
it might trigger off counter-meetings, leading to a threat to public 
order and national security. If this is the case, it is these counter­
meetings which must oe banned..." Far Eastern Economic Review, 3rd 
November, 1978, op. cit.
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between the D.A.P. and the government over the Merdeka University issue was 
generating an explosive situation if they continued unabated, the Prime Mi­
nister, Datuk Hussein Onn, decided to postpone the full-scale debate on the 
Merdeka University to December. This was to allow tempers to cool off and 
enable the parties concerned to reassess their strategy. In this way Hussein 
Onn hoped that a final sane and rational solution to the controversy would 
be brought about. The move to have the full-scale debate in December was 
at the D.A.P.’s request following the defeat of its October motion to amend 
the U.U.C.a }25
Meanwhile the heat on the Merdeka University controversy shifted 
to the unresolved problems of Chinese culture and language. This was brou­
ght about by a series of incidents in the last quarter of 1978»
(i) The Desecrations of Hindu Temples
Moslem vandals from a breakaway * dalewah * or missionary group destroyed qdols
126in some Hindu temples in remote areas of the countryside. Although the
desecrations took place in August, the full implications were only revealed
when 8 Hindu guards of the Sri Subramaniam Temple at Kerling in Selangor
were charged with manslaughter resulting in the deaths of 4 of the 5 intru- 
127ders. The guards had been asked by the police to protect their temple 
from desecrations in view of inadequate police patrols, but in the event, the
125» The motion read:"That this House expresses support for the Merdeka 
University project proposed by the Merdeka University Sdn. Bhd".
New Straits Times, 11th October, 1978, op. cit.
126. For details of the 'dakwah1 groups and their origins, see Ismail Kas- 
sim,"Dakwah Dilemma", New Nation, 24th October, 1978 and M.L.Lyon,
"The Dakwah Movement in Malaysia", Review of Indonesian and Malaysian 
Affair3, Vol. XIII No. 2, 1979, PP- 34-45*
127. For details of the temple desecrations, see K.Das,"Extremism rears its 
Head", Far Eastern Economic Review, 1st September, 1978 and "Spectre 
at Kerling", Asiaweek, Oth June, 1979* The 8 Hindu guards were sub- 
quently found guilty of the charge and given reduced jail sentences.
Asiaweek, 18th January, 1980.
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f a t a l  f ig h t  ensued. The dakwah movement which was aimed a t  gu id ing  Moslems 
to  th e  c o rre c t Is lam ic  l i f e - s t y l e ,  brought about e x trem is t s p l in te r  groups 
f a n a t ic a l  about r e je c t in g  m a te r ia l  a ff lu e n c e  and in te r p r e t in g  th e  d e s tru c t io n  
o f id o ls  as a p assp o rt to  Heaven. A pparently  th ey  sought out Hindu tem ples 
as t a r g e t s ,  p o ss ib ly  because Hindu tem ple id o ls  were very  conspicuous and 
a lso  th a t  Hindus were a m in o rity  in  M a la y s ia 's  m u l t i - r a c ia l  and m u l t i - r e l i ­
gious p o p u la tio n . The d e se c ra tio n s  were r e l ig io n - in s p i r e d ,  but as r e l ig io n  
was t i e d  up w ith  ra c e , they  assumed r a c i a l  o v e rto n es . Although th e re  had 
been no re p o rte d  in c id e n ts  on th e  d e se c ra tio n  of Chinese and Buddhist tem ples, 
f e a r s  o f such a p o s s ib i l i ty  were e n te r ta in e d  by th e  C hinese. These fe a rs  
were j u s t i f i e d  on th e  grounds th a t  th e re  had been inadequate  p o lic e  p a t r o ls ,  
fo rc in g  th e  tem ples concerned to  p ro te c t them selves.
( i i )  The Convocation A t t i r e  o f th e  U n iv e rs ity  of Technology M alaysiafU.T.M . 
The U.T.M. a u th o r i t ie s  decided th a t  a l l  graduands, i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f ra c e , sh ­
ould wear th e  Malay costume, sym bolised by th e  ' songkok '( cap) fo r  males to
128ensure  homogeneity in  i t s  g rad u a tio n  ceremony fo r  1978. As d re ss  was a sso ­
c ia te d  w ith  c u ltu re , th e  non-Malay graduands of th e  U.T.M. saw t h i s  as a 
move to  impose Malay c u ltu re  on them, and they  decided  to  boyco tt th e  convo­
c a tio n  ceremony. An e a r l i e r  p a r a l l e l  to  th i s  in c id e n t was th e  p re fe ren ce
o f some Malay judges to  d is c a rd  th e  t r a d i t io n a l  wig and courtroom decorum
129and put on th e  son/dcok.
128. For f u r th e r  d e t a i l s ,  3ee a r t i c le ," O f  A t t i r e  and Merdeka", Asiaweek ,
20th O ctober, 1978 and Lim Say Boon,"Merdeka U: Chinese Hopes fad e" , 
The A sian , Vol. I I  No. 6, February 1979* ' .  . ’■,
129. See Utusan Melayu  e d ito r ia l ," W ig  o r Songkok", M irror  o f Opin io n , 
h ig h lig h ts  o f Malay, Chinese and Tamil P re s s , M in is try  o f C u ltu re , 
S ingapore, No. 119/1978» 26th May, 1978. M a la y s ia 's  Lord P re s id e n t, 
Tun Mohamed S u ffia n , obv iously  d isp le a se d , stated :"Som e o f th e  mem­
b ers  o f th e  p u b lic  concern them selves w ith  what judges put on t h e i r  
heads. I  should have thought they  should worry more about w h a t's  in ' 
s id e  our ju d g es ' heads - w hether our judges a re  q u a l i f ie d ,  w hether 
they  are  h o n est, men of i n t e g r i t y ,  im p a r tia l  and capab le  o f doing 
ju s t i c e " .  Asiaweek, 3rd August, 1979» op. c i t .
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(iii) Speech to abolish Chinese and Tamil schools
In the Parliamentary session in October 1978» the newly-elected. M.P. for 
Kinabalu, Sabah, Mark Koding, allegely made a seditious speech, calling for 
the abolition of Chinese and Tamil schools and the prohibition of Chinese 
and Tamil characters on sign-boards}3^ In the aftermath of the heated debate 
to amend the U.U.C.A. in early October, Koding's outburst against Chinese 
and Tamil schools was apparently his desire to court the favour of Malay 
extremists in U.M.N.O., since it had been public knowledge that he, an inde- 
pendent(but Bersatu Rakyat Jelata Sabah(BERJAYA) backed) M.P. would soon 
join the N.f }31
(iv) Use of Chinese and Tamil over R.T.LI.
Non-Malay viewers had complained that the time allocated for Chinese and 
Tamil television programmes over R.T.M. was insufficient, while that for 
Malay programmes wa3 excessive. The same complaint applied to radio pro­
grammes.
The above series of incidents tend to give the Chinese the impression that
a wave of Malay racial, religious and linguistic fanaticism was underway and
132tacitly sanctioned by the government. This could be interpreted as a move 
to wipe out Chinese and Indian culture and to impose Malay culture. In th­
eir anxiety, fears and suspicions, the Chinese regarded this possibility as 
more real than apparent.
The D.A.P.'s move was to make use of the above-mentioned incidents
to strengthen its case for Merdeka University. It tried to show that they
justified the struggle for Merdeka University. In linking the issue of lack
130. Gee article,"Hot Potatoes in Parliament", Asiaweek, 3rd November,
1978 for further details.
131. Ibid. Koding defeated former Federal Minister, Ghani Gilong, in the 
Parliamentary constituency of Kinabalu in the 197Ö general elections.
132. Gee Lim Say Boon, op. cit.
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o f h ig h e r  ed u ca tio n a l o p p o rtu n itie s  w ith  th e  l in g u i s t i c  and c u l tu r a l  fe a rs
o f th e  C hinese, th e  D.A.P. h e ld  th e  government s o le ly  re sp o n s ib le . At th e
same tim e i t  sought to  show th e  Chinese what i t  could  have done fo r  them.
On th e  Hindu tem ple d e s e c ra t io n s , th e  D.A.P. he ld  th a t  they  were " ju s t  mere
t i p s  o f th e  iceb e rg "  and th a t  th e re  must have been prolonged fa n a t ic  indoc-
133t r i n a t io n  b e fo re  th e  a c ts  of d e se c ra tio n  were c a r r ie d  o u t. The p a rty  
im plied  th a t  th e  government had been in d i r e c t ly  re sp o n s ib le  fo r  t h i s  by no t 
d isco u rag in g  th i s  f a n a t ic  in d o c tr in a t io n  in  th e  f i r s t  p la c e , and was noft 
t r y in g  to  cover up a se r io u s  s i tu a t io n .  I t  he ld  th a t  i f  th e  8 Hindu guards 
had no t taken  th e  law in to  t h e i r  own hands, th e  d e se c ra tio n s  might s t i l l  
have co n tinued . To be f a i r  to  th e  government, i t  wa3 t r y in g  i t s  b e s t to  
p lay  down a h ig h ly  v o la t i l e  s i tu a t io n  as f a r  as p o ss ib le  to  p reven t r e l ig io u s  
v io le n c e  and fe a r  among th e  p e o p le d ^  The government f e l t  th a t  i f  i t  p u b li­
c ise d  th e  d e se c ra t io n s , th i s  might t r i g g e r  o f f  r e p r i s a l s  and c o u n te r - re p r i­
s a l s ,  th u s  en g u lfin g  the  whole n a tio n  in  r e l ig io u s  c o n f l i c t .  However once 
th e  d e se c ra tio n s  became p u b lic is e d , th e  government took a s tro n g  s tan d  in  
condemning them and pledged th a t  r e l ig io u s  extremism had no p lace  in  th e  
co u n try . Dr. M ahathir warned Moslem e x tre m is ts  n o t to  cause re l ig io u s  s t r i f e
in  th e  co u n try , w h ile  Ghazali S h afie  s t r e s s e d  th a t  s te m  a c tio n  would be
135tak en  a g a in s t th o se  caught d e se c ra tin g  tem ples. In  in te n d in g  to  calm th e  
fe a rs  o f th e  Hindus and to  re a ssu re  th e  Chinese, H ussein Onn even went to  
th e  ex ten t of a tte n d in g  Hindu and C h r is tia n  r e l ig io u s  f e s t i v a l s  in  public in
133. See Lim K it S ian g ’s p ress  s ta tem en t; New S t r a i t s  Times, 4 th  August, 
1979 , op. c i t .
134* I f  the government was g u ilty  o f the D.A.P. charge of not discouraging  
the fa n a tic  in d octrin ation , then i t s  main reason appeared to be to 
prevent P.A .S . and other extreme Malays from accusing i t  o f not being  
"true Moslems".
135« For d e t a i l s ,  see a r t ic le ," S p e c t r e  a t K erlin g " , Asiaweek, 8 th  June,
1979.
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Kuala Lumpur. The D.A.P. tried, to associate itself with the government's 
actions on the temple desecrations by declaring publicly the need to have 
a firm, clear and unequivocal stand against all forms of religious extremism 
and fanaticism. It went a step further to suggest the establishment of an 
inter-religious council, comprising of representatives from the various 
religions in the country to promote tolerance and goodwill}^ If the govern­
ment had taken a firm stand against temple desecrations, it appeared to at­
tempt to strike a balance regarding the convocation dress of the U.T.M. 
Initially Musa ordered the U.T.M. administration to dispense with the song- 
kok ruling, but when the Malay graduands of the U.T.M. protested, the govern­
ment decided to come to a compromise. It could not afford to antagonise the 
Chinese if it intended to pacify them that it had no intention of doing away 
with their culture. Yet at the same time if it made the songkok ruling not 
mandatory, it might be accused by Malay extremists of pandering to the Chi­
nese, thereby losing its support 'among the Malays. The government finally 
decided to let everyone wear the songkok which would be embroidered with 
motifs and tassels. In this way it hoped that the Malays would interpret 
the headgear as a songkok while the non-Malays would interpret it as other­
wise, so that no one would be displeased. In the event, both Malays and non- 
Malays appeared offended with only 4 out of the 23 non-Malay graduands atten­
ding the ceremony. The government's handling of this issue thus made it ve­
ry vulnerable to D.A.P. insinuations that it wa3 discriminating against
Chinese culture. On the allegedly seditious speech by the M.P. for Kinabalu,
1 ^8Mark Koding, the D.A.P. began to press for seditious charges against him.
136. New Straits Times, 12th June, 1979«
137« New Straits Times, 4th August, 1979*
138. See article"Hot Potatoes in Parliament",Asiaweek, 3rd November, 1978.
A year later, when the Attorney-General'3 chambers was still studying 
Koding's case, the D.A.P. continued to press for action against him. 
New Straits Times, 1st December, 1979.
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Having as background its resentment over the alleged alteration of the 
character of Chinese and Tamil primaiy schools by the government, the D.A.P. 
showed that it was committed to defending Chinese schools and Chinese charac­
ters on sign-boards, and thereby Chinese culture. It was also to show U.M.N.O. 
that just a3 it had been quick to press seditious charges against the Chinese, 
the D.A.P. would do likewise against Malays or North Bornean natives when 
such cases arose. Regarding the allegedly inadequate use of Chinese and Ta­
mil over R.T.M., the D.A.P. drew the Information Minister's attention that
Chinese and Tamil viewers wanted more time to be allocated to Chinese and
139Tamil programmes, and that their quality should be improved. The party's 
complaint was that R.T.M. was giving excessive prominence to Malay program­
mes at the expense of Chinese and Tamil programmes. R.T.M., an the govern­
ment's propagating machinery, had Contended that its task was to implement 
the government'3 objective of a Malay-based national culture. As such, the 
heavily-biased Malay programmes were imperative. To appease U.M.N.O. back­
benchers, the Information Minister, Mohamed Rahmat, had indicated that the 
use of Chinese and Tamil over R.T.M. was only a temporary measure to facili­
tate communication^^ The implication was that once the national objectives 
were attained, Chinese and Tamil would be dispensed altogether. The D.A.P.'s 
response was to query whether such a motive contravened the Constitution, 
especially clause 152(l) which guaranteed the protection and sustenance of 
ethnic languages'!^ It then suggested that the government should consider 
screening more Chinese and Tamil programmes so that R.T.M. would reflect
139. See queries by P.Patto, M.P. for Menglembu(Perak), New Straits Times, 
25th November, 1978»
140. Asiaweek, 3rd November, 1970«
141. Ibid.
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th e  m u l t i - r a c ia l  and m u l t i - c u l tu ra l  p o p u la tio n  of th e  coun try . Thus by 
making a firm  and c o n s is te n t pro-C hinese s tan d  on th e  above in c id e n ts ,  th e  
D.A.P. was drumming up Chinese support fo r  th e  proposed f u l l - s c a l e  debate  
on th e  I.Ierdeka U n iv e rs ity  in  e a r ly  December. I t  engaged in  a d r iv e  to  c o l­
l e c t  a m ill io n  s ig n a tu re s  from th e  Chinese in  a move th a t  would be in te r p r e ­
te d  to  save Chinese c u l tu re .  By ap p ea lin g  to  the  Chinese to  donate gene­
ro u s ly  to  th e  I.Ierdeka U n iv e rs ity  fund s e t  up by th e  sponsors , th e  D.A.P. 
gave th e  im pression  th a t i t  was determ ined to  put heavy p re ssu re  on th e  
government to  get the  proposed u n iv e r s i ty  s ta r te d .
However w hatever p lans the  p a r ty  m i^ it have in  making th e  Merdeka 
U n iv e rs ity  co n troversy  an is su e  to  boost i t s  p r e s t ig e ,  they  rece iv ed  a s e t ­
back. The Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  sponsors f e l t  th a t  th e  D.A.P. was pushing  th e  
is su e  too  hard  and too f a r  by i t s  measures in  working up Chinese passions 
and th u s  c a l l in g  fo r  th e  f u l l - s c a l e  d eb a te"!^  As th e  scheduled debate  would 
r e s u l t  in  c e r ta in  d e fe a t in  view of th e  m assive N .F. P arliam en ta ry  m a jo rity , 
th e  sp o n so rs , who were w a itin g  fo r  th e  outcome of th e  debate  to  decide  t h e i r  
nex t move, f e l t  th a t  i t  would je o p a rd ize  w hatever m easures they  in tended  to  
ta k e  to  sue the  government. In  f a c t  government sources had s tro n g ly  h in te d  
th a t  a f t e r  th e  deb a te , no more would be heard  on th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  i s ­
sue as th e re  was an in te n t io n  to  amend th e  C o n s ti tu tio n  to  th a t  e f f e c t . ^  
Under th e se  circum stances th e  sponsors were r e lu c ta n t  to  l e t  th e  debate  c a r ­
ry  on as scheduled . A fte r  a 7- hour m eeting w ith  th e  sponso rs , th e  D.A.P.
142. New S t r a i t s  Times, 25th  November, 1978*
143. For d e t a i l s ,  see Ism a il Kassim,"Merdeka U debate  w o rries  b ack e rs" ,
New N a tio n , 27th November, 1978*
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144. Ib id .
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145was persuaded to  withdraw i t s  m otion. This was to  enable th e  sponsors to
ta k e  le g a l  a c tio n  a g a in s t th e  government w ithou t unnecessary  o b s ta c le s .  In
w ithdraw ing h is  m otion, K it S iang  s ta te d  th a t  i t  was only a  tem porary measure
to  enab le  th e  sp o n so rs ' law yers to  co n su lt le g a l  ex p erts  in  England re g a rd in g
th e  in te n t io n  to  sue th e  governm en ts^  He s ta te d  th a t  th e  motion would be
re - in tro d ü c e d  a t a more a p p ro p ria te  tim e in  th e  fu tu reM ^  The government
f e l t  th a t  i t  had beaten  th e  D.A.P. a t i t s  own game by a llow ing  th e  f u l l - s c a l e
d eb a te . N ev erth e le ss  Musa Hitam d e liv e re d  the  s tatem ent he was to  have made
had th e  d ebate  c a r r ie d  on as schedu led , am idst p ro te s ts  from th e  D.A.P.
Musa announced th a t  th e re  would be more p la ce s  fo r  non-Malay s tu d en ts  a t th e
lo c a l  u n iv e r s i t i e s  w ithout sp e c ify in g  d e t a i l s  as to  how t h i s  was going to  be 
1
e f fe c te d . He s tre s s e d  th a t  th e  government sym pathised w ith  non-Malay pa­
r e n ts  fo r  b e in g  unable to  f in d  u n iv e r s i ty  p laces  fo r  t h e i r  c h ild re n  owing 
to  c ircum stances beyond t h e i r  c o n tro l ,  such as th e  p r o te c t io n is t  tre n d  o f 
overseas u n iv e r s i t i e s .  In  announcing th e  in c re a s e , th e  government hoped th a t  
i t  would reduce th e  sense o f f r u s t r a t io n  in  th e  non-Malays and be accep ted  
in  good f a i t h  by th e  M alays. The governm ent's announcement h in te d  to  th e  
non-M alays th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f a Malay b ack la sh .
In  response  to  the  announcement, th e  D.A.P. r e t r e a te d  from i t s  
a g i ta t io n  fo r  th e  estab lish m en t o f th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  to  co n cen tra te
145« See a r t i c le ," R e t r e a t  a t th e  e lev en th  hour", Asiaweek, 22nd December, 
1978. See a lso  New S t r a i t s  Times, 12th  December, 1978.
146. Lim K it S iang s ta te d  th a t  th e  D.A.P. d id  no t want to  com plicate  th e  
le g a l  a c tio n  being  planned by th e  sponso rs . Asian Almanac, 17th 
March, 1979*
147. New S tr a i t s  Times, 12th  December, 1978.
I 4 0 • I b i d . See a lso  M alaysia , February 1979> and Asiaweek, 22nd December,
1978.
149• New S t r a i t s  Times, 12th  December, 1978«
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on a c a l l  to  th e  Education M in is te r  ask in g  how t h i s  was to  be implemented 
to  th e  s a t i s f a c t io n  of th e  non-M alays. I t  f e l t  th a t  th i s  move was more ex­
p ed ien t pending c o n su lta tio n s  between th e  sp o n so rs ’ law yers and ex p erts  in  
England on th e  a c tio n  to  be taken  a g a in s t th e  government. The D.A.P. th e re ­
fo re  c a l le d  fo r  a w hite  paper s e t t in g  out th e  government’s in te n t io n  on u n i-
150v e r s i ty  s tu d en t enrolm ent to  admit more non-M alays. Lim K it S iang wanted
th e  w h ite  paper to  co n sid er how th e  government could f u l f i l  th e  a s p ir a t io n s
of th e  non-Malays fo r  h ig h e r education  o p p o r tu n itie s  lo c a l ly  w ithou t d e p r i-
151v in g  th e  Malays o f th e i r  e x is t in g  o p p o r tu n i t ie s .  The w hite  paper should 
a lso  c o n sid e r how th e  government proposed to  ensure  th a t  th e  5 lo c a l  u n iv e r­
s i t i e s  l i v e  up to  th e  N .E .P . 's  o b je c tiv e  o f r e f l e c t in g  th e  c o u n try '3  m u lti-
152r a c i a l  com position . The D .A .P .'s  su g g es tio n  o f a w hite  paper was in tended  
to  p re s su re  th e  government to  c le a r ly  d e t a i l  th e  m easures i t  would adopt in  
th e  same way th a t  Malay a s p ir a t io n s  were s a t i s f i e d  in  th e  T.M.P. From th e  • 
experience  of th e  governm ent's a lle g ed  n o n -fu lf ilm e n t o f land  a l lo c a t io n  to  
th e  non-Malays acco rd ing  to  th e  T.M.P*'s  recom m endations(th is i s  to  be d i s ­
cussed  in  th e  next c h a p te r) , th e  D.A.P. r a t io n a l i s e d  th a t  u n le ss  p re ssu re  
was tu rn ed  on the  government, th e  Education M in is te r 's  p ledge was l i a b le  to  
be empty. The re fe re n c e  to  th e  n e c e s s ity  o f th e  5 lo c a l  u n iv e r s i t i e s  l iv in g  
up to  th e  N .E .P . 's  o b je c tiv e  of r e f l e c t in g  th e  c o u n try 's  m u l t i - r a c ia l  compo­
s i t i o n  was to  challenge  M usa's e a r l i e r  c o n ten tio n  th a t  d u rin g  th e  implemen­
t a t i o n  o f th e  N .E .P ., th e  enrolm ent in  th e  3 predom inantly  Malay u n iv e r s it ie s ,
150. New S t r a i t s  Times, 13th  December,1978, 22nd A p r i l ,1979. I t  a lso  urged 
Musa to  ask fo r  Cabinet approval fo r  increased expenditure to f u l f i l  
the government's pledge to  in crease the non-Malay in tak e . New S t r a i t s  
Times, 9 th  A p ril , 1979*
151» New S t r a i t s  T im es, 22nd A p ril, 1979«
152. Ib id .
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the National University, the Agricultural University and the University of 
Technology, need not have to reflect the racial composition of the country}53 
The D.A.P. stressed that its call for a white paper was urgent in the sens, 
that more than 25,000 H.S.C./S.T.P. students were anxiously awaiting the 
result of their application to enter the local universities}54 It called 
on the government to release the white paper without delay to allay the 
anxieties of the affected students. If the government had any intention of 
delaying the implementation of its pledge, it found that it was under con­
siderable pressure not only from the D.A.P., but also from its non-Malay 
partners, the M.C.A. and the C.E.M. not to do so. In its General Assembly 
m  November, one of the resolutions adopted by the M.C.A. was to urge the 
government to expand facilities in the country's universities so that a more 
balanced distribution of opportunities for non-Malay students would be en- 
sured. Following Musa's announcement of increased non-Malay university 
enrolment, the M.C.A. Brickfields/bungsar ward had asked what the actudl 
increase in the intake would be}56 The G.E.M.'s Political Bureau chairman,
Dr. Goh Cheng Teik, said Musa's announcement had given fresh hope to the 
non-Malays and implied that the government should implement his pledge in a 
lair manner. Having made this pledge, the government found that it was 
concerned about the Malay reaction. As it needed the solid Malay support to 
maintain its power base, the government always had to ensure that the Malays
153‘ New Straits Times, 23rd March, 1979.The G.E.M. M.P., Dr. Tan Ti
Hong, had earlier expressed concern over Musa's statement which was 
endorsed by the pro-Choncellor of the U.T.M., Eahman Yaakub at its 
convocation ceremony, Malaysia, February, 1979.
154* Nov/ Straits Times, 22nd April, 1979»
155* New Straits Times, 20th November, 1978»
156. New Straits Times, 13th December, 1978.
157. Ibid.
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must no t in te r p r e t  i t s  measures as p ro -C hinese. Once th i s  happened, th e  
p o s i t io n  of th e  e x tre m is ts , e i th e r  w ith in  U.M.N.O. o r in  P .A .S ., would be 
s tre n g th en e d . In  th e  even t, th e  m oderate U.M.N.O. le a d e rsh ip , th e  only hope 
o f th e  non-Malays to  d e l iv e r  th e  goods,could  be endangered. Although th e  
M.C.A. and th e  G.R.M. were aware of th i s  danger, th e  an x ie ty  of th e  Chinese 
and th e  f e a r  o f lo s in g  out to  th e  D.A.P. fo rced  them to  make th e se  demands 
once they  found th a t  th e  government proved amenable. A fte r  some h e s i t a t io n ,  
Musa r e lu c ta n t ly  announced th a t  the  non-Malay in ta k e  would be in c re ase d  by
I  C Q
2 /  fo r  th e  1979/00 se ss io n  from th e  p rev ious se s s io n . The government s t a ­
te d  th a t  i t  had used th e  combined o v e ra l l  enrolm ent of Malay and non-Malay
159s tu d e n ts  in  both  lo c a l  and overseas u n iv e r s i t i e s  a3 the  main c r i t e r io n .
The in c re a s e  was a t  b e s t m arginal and th e re  was h a rd ly  any change in  term s 
of a b so lu te  numbers to  show th a t  th e re  was a marked non-Malay in c re a se  f o l ­
lowed by a correspond ing  Malay d ecrease , which was what th e  non-Malay3 ex­
p ec ted . They p re d ic ta b ly  a tta ck e d  i t  as in ad eq u a te . The D.A.P. found th a t  
i t  was overshadowed by the  c r i t ic is m s  le v e l le d  by c e r ta in  G.R.M. and M.C.A. 
wards in  Penang and P erak . The Datuk Keramat(Penang) branch o f th e  G.R.M. 
s ta te d  th a t  i t  wa3 wrong and u n fa i r  o f the  government to  co n sid e r th e  number
158« New S t r a i t s  Times,1 0 th  J u n e ,1979« enrolm ent fo r  a l l  5 lo c a l  u n i­
v e r s i t i e s  would be ra is e d  from 34/* in  1978 to  36/* in  1979» Musa l a ­
t e r  c l a r i f i e d  th a t  th e  2/  in c re a se  was a r e s u l t  of comparisons between 
th e  pe rcen tag e  o f non-Malay s tu d en ts  who en tered  th e  u n iv e r s i ty  in  
th e  1978/79 se ss io n (3 3 * 6 /) and th a t  , o f th e  1979/80 s e s s io n (3 5 * 7 /) •
I f  however an e v a lu a tio n  was made on th e  b a s is  o f numbers, i t  would 
be ev iden t th a t  th e re  was a c tu a lly  an in c re a se  o f 21 . 3>* or 330 non- 
Malay s tu d en ts  e n te r in g  u n iv e r s i ty ,  from 1,551 in  th e  1978/79 se s s io n  
to  1,801 in  the  p re sen t s e s s io n . The same could be ap p lied  to  th e  
in ta k e  o f Malay s tu d en ts  in to  th e  2 s e s s io n s . Prom th e  /  p o in t o f 
view, th e re  was a decrease  in  th e  in ta k e  o f Malays from th e  p rev ious 
se ss io n  to  th e  p re sen t one. But th e re  was an in c re a se  o f 315 Malay 
s tu d e n ts  or 10 . 3/  from th e  3>069 s tu d en ts  in  th e  1978/79 s e ss io n  to  
th e  3>384 s tu d en ts  in  th e  p re sen t s e s s io n . New S t r a i t s  Times, 24th  
O ctober, 1979»
159. New S t r a i t s  Times, 10th  June, 1979* By mid-1980, Malay s tu d en ts  in  
l o c a l  u n iv e r s i t ie s  numbered 11 , 425( 64'/ )  compared to  6 , 373( 36/ )  non- 
Malay s tu d e n ts . For overseas u n iv e r s i t i e s ,  th e re  were 8 , 407( 21/ )  
Malay s tu d en ts  and 3 2 ,1 7 1 (7 9 /)non-Maiay s tu d en ts  r e s p e c t iv e ly  fo r  
th e  sane p e rio d . New S t r a i t s  Times, 24th  June, 1980.
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of non-Malay students in foreign universities when allocating places in 
local universities. 0 Terming the increase as ’’grossly insufficient and 
negligible", the branch held that since local universities were supported 
by tax-payers, the majority of whom were non-Malays, it was only fair that 
the government allocate places to commensurate with the taxpayers' contri­
bution and not depend too much on foreign universities}61 There was a 
dearth for university expansion and the government should apportion the lar­
ger increase to non-Malays. The branch further stated that as the correct 
move towards national unity, the government should stop using terms like
and ''non-bumiputra" which had caused so much division among the 
people. It should instead use the term "Malaysian" for all}6^ The Padu 
(ipoh) ward of the M.C.A. described the increase as "misleading" and accused 
Musa of using a wrong strategy which negated the government's pledge}61 
The ward's complaint was that despite the so-called increase, some 4,079 
non-Malay students with high entrance qualifications had been rejected}6^ 
Obviously the expectation was that those non-Malays with good results who 
had been turned down previously could get admission if the increase in the 
non-Malay intake was to be meaningful. If the non-Malays considered the 
increase negligible, the Malays regarded it as excessive. At the U.M.N.O. 
General Assembly for 1979 in July, U.M.N.O. Youth was vociferous in demanding 
that the government stop making further concessions to the non-Malays}65
160. New Straits Times, 16th June, 1979* 161. Ibid.
162. Ibid. 163. Ibid. I64. Ibid.
I65. For the reaction of the Malays, New Straits Times,7th/8th July, 1979« See 
^also Mfidnysia, August 1979» articles,ÜBusiness amid laughter" and 
"The Ethnic Entry Dilemma", Asiaweek, 20th July, 1979, and K.Das,"A 
Tiger refuses to be ridden", Far Eastern Economic Review. 20th Juiv.1 Q-7Q . . 7 «7 7
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While its president, Suhaimi Kamaruddin, accused the non-Malays of not 
accepting the 2'fo increase in good faith, there were extreme calls to curb 
the non-Malay enrolment overseas and to strip the citizenship of the Merdeka 
University sponsors'!^ Veiled attacks of disloyalty were also made on the
M. C.A. and G.R.M. Musa had to pacify the angry mood of U.M.H.O. Youth by
pledging that the government would not compromise on the 2c/o intake and the 
167N. E.P. However following the dissatisfaction of both Malays and non- 
Malays over the 2'/o increase intake, U.M.H.O. and M.C.A. leaders met to deli­
berate on a formula that would be acceptable to both sides. It was obvious 
that this issue wa3 urgent, and after some 4 hours of discussion, an agree­
ment appeared to have been reached between the leaders of both parties.
The government intended to keep the contents of the formula a secret and to
implement it quietly so as not to allow it to be turned into a controversy
l68like the Z/o increase intake, either by its members or the opposition.
The D.A.P. unsuccessfully pressed the government to disclose the details of
I69the formula agreed upon by U.M.H.O. and M.C.A. Based on its suspicions 
of U.M.H.O.'s consistent one up-manship and the M.C.A.'3 weak bargaining 
position, the D.A.P. was skeptical over the formula. As there were many 
ways to arrive at a solution such as the formula, the D.A.P. felt that U.M.H.O. 
might, in conceding to the M.C.A., one aspect of the problem, make encroach-
166. New Straits Times, 7th July, 1979*
167. Ibid. U.M.H.O. Youth viewed education, and thereby university enrol­
ment, as within the scope of the H.E.P.
168 See Hew Straits Times, 29th June, 1979 and Malaysia, August 1979> 
and article,"University Balancing Act", Asiaweek, 13th July, 1979*
While the formula is still officially a secret, it is generally beli­
eved that the agreement was that by 1982, the proportion of Malay 
to non-Malay entrants would decrease gradually from the present 64- 
36 to a more satisfactory 55"45 3plit. The agreement is expected to 
help the M.C.A. in the 1983 general elections. Far Eastern Economic 
Review Asia Yearbook 1980» p? 228,
I69. Hew Straits Times, 4th August, 1979.
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merits on another aspect, so that the net effect would be no effect at all.
Lim Kit Siang was worried that the next proposal by the government might be
that racial entry not be based on the the total intake, but on the numbers
170who actually graduated. Then U.M.N.O. would add up all the figures of the
different races since the first Malaysian graduate and use that as its yard- 
171stick. On these grounds, the D.A.P. speculated that the formula would be
172"most unsatisfactory" where the non-Malays were concerned. In the absence 
of the formula’s details being publicised, it is difficult to affirm or 
disprove the D.A.P.'s contention.
In retrospect, the Merdeka University controversy arose when a 
technical and administrative problem, i.e. the lack of higher educational 
opportunities for non-Malays, which had racial implications, became entangled 
with the fear of what was perceived as the erosion of Chinese culture and 
language. The D.A.P.'s strategy was to pressure the government to resolve 
both the issues of the shortage of university places and Chinese fear of 
cultural and linguistic loss. It believed that these problems which had been 
suppressed but never resolved in the past, had become very serious and com­
plex, and unless they were tackled immediately and at the roots, it was like­
ly that they would become even worse in the future. The D.A.P. justified 
its contention by pointing to the increasing apprehensions of the Chinese 
over the series of events ranging from the desecration of Hindu temples to
the allegedly seditious speech by the M.P. for Kinabalu, Mark Koding. The 
government'3 response to these events appeared to the D.A.P. an tactical
170. See Hugh Lunn, op. cit. It's rationale was that since more non-Malays 
had graduated, more Malays should be admitted.
171. Ibid.
172. See article,"University Balancing Act", Asiaweek, 13th July, 1979» 
op. cit.
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balancing and never resolving the issues at all. Thus while the government
)[iC 0& t6V \ i t
condemned temple desecrations
by iVwblVtf
, Xt 1 mpl i edly gave in to Malay extremists over
the U.T.M. convocation attire and the use of ethnic languages over R.T.M.
In the case of the allegedly seditious speech by the M.P. for Kinabalu, 
the government appeared passive and the D.A.P. had to press the seditious 
charges. In all fairness to the D.A.P., had there been a similar outcry 
against Malay schools and Malay sign-boards, the government would not have 
hesitated to take immediate action to prosecute the offender. The govern­
ment’s actions over these issues served to confuse the Chinese as they inter-» 
preted them as double standards. The D.A.P. believed that the government 
was only paying lip service to the Chinese by its actions. Far from re-as­
suring the Chinese, the D.A.P. charged that the government's actions over 
2 subsequent incidents in fact aggravated Chinese apprehensions.
The first concerned the influx of Vietnamese refugees in the last 
quarter of 1978» continuing throughout 1979* The predominantly ethnic Chi­
nese Vietnamese refugees landed in the Malay east coast states of
Peninsular Malaysia. The Malays there regarded them as essentially Chinese 
rather than Vietnamese, and given the background of Sino-Malay hostility,
engaged in hostile acts, such as stoning them and pushing their boats back
173to sea. Government official policy was also hostile, applying the term
t  n  I
"illegal immigrants" on them. ^ As the refugee waves thickened, the govern­
ment threatened to chase all refugees in existing camps out and even to shoot
175those, who out of desperation, persisted to reach Malaysian shores. While
173.
174.
175.
For details, see Hugh Lunn, op. cit., and Bruce Grant,The Boat Peo­
ple? An Age Investigation, Penguin, Melbourne, 1979» Chapter VI.
The term "illegal immigrants" was used on the boat people because the 
government felt that they were escaping not from the ravages of war, 
but harsh living conditions under the communists, and were seeking 
greener pastures in developed countries by illegally entering Malaysia
first.
This threat was made by the Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir, out
162
these allegations were difficult to substantiate, they nevertheless created
■ t*the feeling in the Chinese that government assurances of goodwill were empty.’ 
They could point to the comparatively favourable treatment that the govern­
ment accorded to the Moslem refugees from Cambodia and the Southern Philip-
1V6pines as implications of Chinese antagonism. The D.A.P. called on the
177government to adopt a more humanitarian approach towards the refugees.
In case the government showed any signs of branding Chinese showing sympathy 
to the Vietnamese refugees as fifth columnists, Kit Siang maintained that 
the fact that there was no public Chinese outcry against the pushing back
178of Vietnamese boats out to sea, showed that they were committed to Malaysia. 
Kit Siang's statement reflected the wariness of the Malays, particularly 
U.M.N.O. Youth, to watch for any possible Chinese reaction over the govern­
ment's moves towards the refugees, and then to brand them as fifth columnists. 
It is difficult to gauge the impact of the Vietnamese refugees on the Chinese 
against the government in the sense that they increased Chinese fears and 
apprehensions. But one source has indicated the government's treatment of 
the refugees reinforced its opposition to the Merdeka University and gave 
the D.A.P. its first by-election victory in the predominantly Chinese cons­
tituency of Kampong Kolam for the Penang state assembly since Dr. Chen Man
of exasperation rather than intent. Asiaweek, 27th July, 1979*
176. See for instance Pertubohan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia fPHRKIM) plan
to take in pOO Cambodian Moslem refugees for resettlement in Malaysia, 
New Straits Times, 13th June, 1979» and the government's reference to 
to the Moslem victims of the Christian-Moslem conflict in the Southern 
Philippines who fled to Sabah as "refugees". A letter to Asiaweek,
17th August, 1979» candidly asked if the 70,000 Vietnamese refugees 
in Malaysia converted to Islam, would Tuhku Abdul Rahman, the Presi­
dent of PMRKIM, accept them for resettlement in Malaysia as in the 
case of the Cambodian Moslem refugees. For further details on alle­
ged hostile attitude towards the Vietnamese refugees on grounds of 
religion, see Hugh Lunn, op. cit.
177» On Dr. Mahathir's harsh attitude towards the refugees, Lim Kit Siang 
called on the government not to follow Vietnam's barbaric and irres­
ponsible attitude, but to take all steps to bring international pres-
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179H in '3  v ic to ry  in  th e  Rahang s t a t e  co n stitu en cy  of N egri Sembilan in  1965. 7
The second in c id e n t invo lved  th e  a lle g e d ly  p ro v o ca tiv e  speech by
th e  Horae A ffa irs  M in is te r , G hazali S h a fie , on the  l io n  dance. Opening a
sem inar on M alaysian c u ltu re  a t th e  N a tio n a l U n iv e rs ity  in  May 1979» G hazali
was re p o rte d  as say ing  th a t  th e  Chinese l io n  dance could n o t be accepted  as
180p a r t  of M alaysian c u ltu re . The m in is te r  h e ld  th a t  as i t  was a lread y  ex­
t i n c t  in  China, i t s  country  o f o r ig in , i t  could  no t be developed f u r th e r  and 
be accep ted  by a l l .  G hazali added th a t  th e  l io n  dance was not only incon­
gruous in  th e  M alaysian environm ent, but th a t  i t  h indered  th e  emergence o f 
a M alay-based n a tio n a l  c u l tu re .  I t  might perhaps be accep tab le  i f  i t  was 
m odified  to  a t i g e r  dance, accompanied by Malay and In d ian  m usic. G hazali
l a t e r  claim ed th a t  he was m isquoted and th e  Prime M in is te r , Plussein Onn, had
181to  c l a r i f y  h is  speech to  show th a t  no o ffen ce  was meant to  th e  Chinese'.
su re  on Vietnam to  be more humane. New S t r a i t s  Times, 17th  June, 1979* 
The D.A.P. a lso  u n su c c e ss fu lly  ta b le d  a m otion in  P arliam en t to  e f f ­
ec t a more hum anitarian  a t t i tu d e  to  th e  re fu g ee  problem. New S t r a i t s  
Times, 19th  June, 1979«
178. Hugh Lunn, op. c i t .
179* See K.Das, '‘V icto ry  fo r  the  wrong re a so n s" , Far E astern  Economi c  Re­
view, 29th  December, 197Ö and Lim Say Boon, op. c i t . Kampong Kolam had 
an e le c to ra te  o f 17,638  made up of 14»522(82.3$) Chinese, 2 ,032(11 .5$) 
Malays and 1 , 064(6$) In d ia n s . The D .A .P. had won th i s  co n stitu en cy  
in  th e  1978 g en era l e le c t io n s  but an a p p lic a tio n  a g a in s t th e  d is q u a l i ­
f i c a t io n  of th e  N .F.(G .R .M .) can d id a te  was s u c c e ss fu l. In  th e  by- 
e le c t io n ,  th e  D .A .P. p o lle d  8,063 to  b ea t th e  G.R.M. by a m a jo rity  o f 
3,665 v o te s . Appendix C. The D.A.P. however denied th a t  i t  made an 
is su e  of th e  Vietnamese re fu g ees  in  th e  b y -e le c tio n . See Karpal 
S ingh ' 0 l e t t e r  to  th e  Far E aste rn  Economic Review, 26th January , 1979»
180. For d e t a i l s ,  see  a r t i c l e , " S p e c t r e  o f  K erlin g " , A siaw eek, 8th  June, 1979 
and Thaung Myine, "M alays w o rried  by C hinese Lion Dance", The A sia n ,
V ol. I l l  No. 2, J u n e /J u ly ,  1979 .
181. Datulc H ussein  Onn d en ied  th a t  th e  governm ent had open ly  su g g es ted  t h a t  
th e  l io n  dance be changed to  a t i g e r  dance and c la im ed  th a t  G h a z a l i 's  
speech  had n o t a ro u sed  i l l - f e e l i n g s  betw een th e  r a c e s .  G h aza li, a c ­
c o rd in g  to  Datuk H ussein  Onn, on ly  r e f e r r e d  to  th e  dance as an exam­
p le  in  e x p la in in g  th e  p ro c e s s  by w hich c u l tu r a l  e lem en ts  from o th e r
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Whatever Ghazali’s intention in making that speech, it stirred up Chinese 
dissatisfactions from the numerous Chinese cultural organizations in the 
country. The Home Affairs Minister was regarded as unnecessarily provoca­
tive in his previous utterances on government policy towards the Chinese.
In the past he had been alleged to have suggested a multi-racial "kompan/r" 
(Malay drum) group, wearing Malay dress taking part in a National Day parade. 
The significance of this to many Chinese appeared to be assimilation towards 
Malay culture, which they resented. The fact that Ghazali had a strong in­
fluence in determining the N.E.P. and his hostile attitude towards the Viet­
namese refugees helped to create the "ultra" image in him as far as the Chi­
nese were concerned. It was pointed out that if he had shown any inclina­
tion towards fair play, it was never recalled that he had made a similar 
suggestion as regards any Malay dance being accompanied by Chinese and Indian 
music to be considered as part of national culture. Predictably the D.A.P.
attacked Ghazali’s speech as being blind to the realities of a multi-racial,
18?multi-cultural society. "At the same time the party justified the need for 
the lion dance to be part of Malaysian culture.
countries could be absorbed and fully accepted in its new environment. 
Excerpts of the speech were as follows:"As an example, the presenta­
tion and accompanying music of the lion dance would hot possibly be 
accepted as a dance movement and melody in Malaysia. The dance had 
originated in Mainland China and its environment; nevertheless the 
lion dance was no longer in existence there. As such how then could 
it be developed and be accepted widely by all? In the future, through 
the process of reorientation and restructuring, an interaction of all 
the various cultures would take place. Maybe then we will have ele­
ments of a national culture, one of which would adopt the movements 
of a "tiger" dance accompanied by various types of drums of the game- 
lan or the barong dance as in Bali". New Straits Times, 9th Novem­
ber, 1979) op. cit.
182. Lira Kit Slang described Ghazali’s speech as "shocking" and showing 
"surprisingly little perception of the basis of a plural society".
He added that the fact that the dance was extinct in China was all 
the more reason it should be accepted as part of Malaysian culture. 
This would, in his opinion, show that Malaysian Chinese cultural 
expressions were distinctly Malaysian, and not subject to the con­
temporary influences of China. Asiaweek, 8th June, 1979) op. cit.
165
Thus as far as the D.A.P. was concerned, so long as the Chinese 
feel insecure about their culture and language, they would strive for the 
establishment of Merdeka University, trying to link it to any related problem 
that became available, such as the lack of higher educational opportunities. 
As their major representative in Parliament and the state assemblies, the 
D.A.P. felt it had every right to speak on their behalf. U.LI.N.O, on the 
other hand regarded the proposed university as agitation for Chinese chauvi­
nism which was unrelated to the predictable consequences of the N.E.P, and 
the New Education Policy on the Chinese. It felt that since the I969 racial 
riot and the promulgation of the N.E.P., the majority of the Chinese were 
reorientating themselves to a new order in which the superiority of the Ma­
lays as the country's indigenous people was acknowledged in all fields - 
social, cultural, economic, political and educational. Given time, national 
unity was 3lowly but steadily being achieved. It therefore accused the Chi­
nese Guilds and Associations and the D.A.P. of trying to disrupt the slow 
and painful efforts that it had built up in what was perceived as harmony 
between the races , by agitating for Merdeka University. U.M.N.O. was also 
displeased with the M.C.A. and the G.R.M. over their initial undecided stand 
on the issue. It had felt that its non-Malay allies were not firm enough 
to reject outright the proposed university on the grounds that it compromised 
the New Education Policy. U.M.N.O. tend to judge the M.C.A. and the G.R.M. 
by its own standards without realizing that while it had some 90$ of the 
Malay support in terms of Parliamentary seats in the 1970 general elections, 
the M.C.A. and the G.R.M. could not claim to be supported by the majority of 
the Chinese. Cn their part the non-Malay partners of the N.F. found that 
they were under pressure from both their Chinese constituents and U.M.N.O.
The agitation of the D.A.P. tend to weaken their support among the Chinese.
If they had any intention of supporting the Merdeka University, they felt 
that the time was not yet appropriate, and the D.A.P. by pushing the issue
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i r r e s p o n s ib ly  and p rem atu re ly , had l e f t  th e  U.M.N.O. le a d e rsh ip  no a l t e m a -
T O }
t i v e  but to  r e j e c t  i t  a l to g e th e r .  At th e  same tim e they  h e ld  th e  govern­
ment re sp o n s ib le  fo r  c re a t in g  e d u ca tio n a l, c u l tu ra l  and l in g u i s t i c  in s e c u r i ty  
among th e  C hinese. This was m an ifested  by th e i r  p re ssu re  on th e  government 
to  e f f e c t  i t s  p ledge of more p lace s  in  lo c a l  u n iv e r s i t ie s  fo r  non-Malays 
fo llo w in g  Musa’s announcement and th e  r e s o lu t io n s  u rg in g  n a tio n a l le a d e rs  
n o t to  make deroga to ry  comments on th e  customs and p ra c t ic e s  o f any ra c e  in  
th e  co u n try , an obvious re fe re n c e  to  G h aza li’s remarks on th e  l io n  dance. ^ 
However to  m ain ta in  s t a b i l i t y  in  th e  government which they  f e l t  to  be in  th e  
lo ng -term  in t e r e s t s  o f th e  C hinese, they  e v en tu a lly  had to  r e j e c t  th e  Merde- 
ka  U n iv e rs ity . Hence th e  Merdeka U n iv e rs ity  p roposal which s ta r te d  in  1968 
and was rev iv ed  some 10 y e a rs  l a t e r ,  i s  f a r  from be in g  re so lv e d .
183» This view was expressed  by Ur. Lim Chong Eu w hile  campaigning fo r  
th e  N.F. (G.R.IvI .)  can d id a te  in  th e  Karapong Kolam b y -e le c tio n  in  
December 197Ö. See fo o t-n o te  179.
184« New S t r a i t s  Times, 30th J u ly , 1979.
CHAPTER V
The New Economic P o lic y .
(a )______ Poverty erad ication , Unemployment and Landlessness
The New Economic P o licy  (N .E .P .) was launched in  1971 and b a s ic a l ly  
i t s  im plem entation invo lved  a s e r ie s  o f 5 -y ea r development p lans u n t i l  1990.
I t  bore  th e  im p rin t o f th e  l a t e  Prime M in is te r , Tun Razak, but r e f le c te d  th e  
thought o f G hazali S h a fie , th e  b r i l l i a n t  s e n io r  c i v i l  se rv an t who had tu rn ed  
p o l i t i c i a n  and become a fu l l - f le d g e d  m in is te r  a f t e r  th e  1969 r a c i a l  r io t s }
The N .E.P . was b a s ic a l ly  guided by 2 major o b je c t iv e s , i . e .  th e  e ra d ic a tio n  
o f poverty  among a l l  M alaysians i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f ra c e , and th e  r e s t r u c tu r in g
p
o f s o c ie ty  to  e lim in a te  economic fu n c tio n  w ith  r a c i a l  id e n t i f i c a t io n .  The 
ra tio n a le b e h in d  the  N .E .P ., acco rd ing  to  one so u rce , was th a t  th e  prim ary 
so u rces o f c o n f l ic t  in  M alaysia, as m an ifested  by th e  1969 r i o t s ,  were r a c ia l^  
I t  f e l t  th a t  th e  Malays re se n te d  t h e i r  economic backwardness which they  a t t r i ­
bu ted  to  in c re a s in g  Chinese a ff lu e n c e  as a r e s u l t  o f th e  1957 "quid  pro quo1* 
arrangem ent o f th e  A llian ce  under the  le a d e rsh ip  o f  Tunku Abdul Rahman^ The 
Malay resen tm ent which had been simmering, s p i l l e d  over in to  r io t in g  as a 
r e s u l t  o f what they  perceiv ed  as th r e a ts  to  t h e i r  p o s it io n  as th e  c o u n try 's  
d e f in i t iv e  p eo p les , by th e  p o s t-p o l l  exuberance of th e  non-Malay o p p o sitio n
1. R .S.M ilne and D.K.Mauzy, P o l i t i c s  and Government in  M alaysia , F edera l 
P u b lic a t io n s , S ingapore, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, 1978» p .326. G hazali 
S h afie  had been th e  Permanent S e c re ta ry  to  th e  M in istry  o f Foreign A ffa­
i r s .  He was a member o f th e  N.O.C. when th e  country  was p laced  under 
emergency r u le  a f t e r  th e  I 969 r i o t s .  He was appoin ted  a se n a to r  and 
made th e  In fo rm ation  M in is te r . He n e v e r th e le s s  re s ig n ed  from h is  p o s i­
t io n  as s e n a to r  to  c o n te s t in  th e  Kuala L ip is(Pahang) P arliam en ta ry  
b y -e le c tio n  to  t e s t  h is  appea l. On w inning th e  b y -e le c tio n , he c o n t i ­
nued to  r e t a in  h is  In fo rm ation  M in is te rsh ip .
2. I b id .
3. M ichael S ten so n ,"C lass  and Race in  West M alaysia", B u lle t in  o f Concerned 
Asian S c h o la rs , P a r t I I ,  Yol. V III No. 2, A pril-Ju n e  1976» PP» 45“54*
4. See C hapter I ,  fo o t-n o te  5«
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partie». To prevent a recurrence of racial rioting in the future, the N.E.P. 
decided to establish broad racial parity for the Malaya with the non-Malays 
in the economic field. It stated that the Malaya must stake at least 30rfo 
ownership of the commercial and industrial activities in the country by 1990
5in all categories and at all levels of operation. Ghazali Shafie, the N.E.P.'s 
main architect, stated that the Malays and other indigenous peoples must be­
come full partners in all aspects of the economio life of the nation^ He 
envisaged the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community which 
would be conspicuous and indentifiable with the Chinese-predominated urban 
environment of the country, not "alien" to it as many Malays were inclined
7to feel. To re-assure the non-Malays against the threat of nationalisation 
and ex-propriation, the government stated that the N.E.P. would be premised 
on a rapidly expanding economy through increasing investment opportunities.
In its implementation, the N.E.P. pledged that no particular racial group 
need experience any loss or feel any sense of deprivation.
As the N.E.P.'s primary concern was poverty eradication irrespec­
tive of race, the D.A.P.'s first criticisms were directed at the manner in 
which the incidence of poverty among the various racial groups and between 
the rural and urban sectors was determined. The importance of this was its 
inter-relation with the subsequent poverty eradication measures which the 
government would implement accordingly. It held that if the incidence of 
poverty was inaccurately determined, either by the use of wrong criteria or 
the omission of certain important criteria, or both, the measures meted out
5. For full details, see Ghazali Shafie,"The Key to Unity", Malaysian 
Digest, 15th March, 1971*
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
169
would nob b rin g  about t h e i r  d e s ire d  e f f e c t s .  The D.A.P. drew an analogy w ith  
th e  wrong d ia g n o sis  o f a problem nob respond ing  to  what may be regarded  as 
th e  c o rre c t rem edies ad m in is tered  o r v ic e  v e rs a . Under th e se  c ircum stances, 
i t  concerned i t s e l f  w ith  th e  breakdown and a n a ly s is  o f th e  in c id en ce  of po-
g
v e r ty  among th e  v a rio u s  r a c i a l  groups and between th e  r u r a l  and urban s e c to r s .  
I t  f e l t  th a t  th i s  was no t a f a i r  in te r p r e ta t io n  o f th e  in c id en ce  o f poverty  
where th e  non-Malays were concerned, fo r  th e  in c id en ce  o f poverty  among th e  
Malays was u n u su a lly  h igh  (64 . 8$) w hile  th a t  o f th e  Chinese (26rfo) was unus­
u a l ly  low? These f ig u re s  were th e  T hird  M alaysia P la n 's  (T .M .P .'s )  s t a t i s ­
t i c s  f o r  th e  in c id en ce  of poverty  in  P e n in su la r  M alaysia fo r  th e  y e a r 1970» 
which was used as th e  s t a r t i n g  p o in t fo r  th e  N .E.P. The D.A.P. had rea so n ­
ab le  grounds to  b e lie v e  th a t  th e  government had d e l ib e ra te ly  exaggerated  th e  
in c id en ce  o f Malay poverty  w hile  a t  th e  same tim e p lay in g  down th a t  o f th e  
C hinese. The p a r ty  accused th e  government o f d e l ib e ra te ly  conveying th e  
m istaken  im pression  th a t  a l l  th e  Chinese were th e  "haves" as ag a in s t th e  
Malays who were th e  "h av e -n o ts" . The D.A.P. a lle g ed  th a t  th e  government 
had used th e  r ic h  in  th e  M.C.A. to  ty p ify  th e  average Chinese to  th e  Malay 
m asses. Lim K it S iang a ttem pted  to  d isp rove  t h i s  co n ten tio n  by quo ting
8. The Households in  P overty  by Race f o r  1970 fo r  P e n in su la r  M alaysia 
were as fo llo w s:
A ll Poor P overty P ercen tage  of
Households Households Incidence T o ta l Poor
(000»s ) ( 0 0 0 ' s ) (*> Households
Malay 901.5 584.2 6 4 .8 73.8
Chinese 525 .2 13 6 .3 2 6 .0 1 7 .2
In d ian 160 .5 6 2 .6 39.2 7 .9
O thers 18 .8 8 . 4 44.8 1 . 1
1 , 6 0 6 . 0 791.8 49.3 10 0 .0
A ll r u r a l 1 , 1 6 6 .7 683.7 58.6 86.3
A ll urban 439.3 10 8 .1 24 .6 13.7
Source* T hird  M alaysia P lan , 1976-1980, Government P re s s , Kuala
Lumpur, 197&, p.  180 .
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the less publicised government official statistics.. In this way, the D.A.P. 
hoped to show that the country’s wealth was actually controlled by foreigners 
- the British, American, West German and Japanese companies - and not the 
local Chinese, the majority of whom were petty traders, artisans, hawkers, 
labourers, etc. This was to negate the N.E.P.'s rationale that the Malays 
being the nations’s largest poverty group, were entitled to the major portion 
of developmental aid to the exclusion of the other communities. The D.A.P. 
justified its contention by the fact that targets for the Malays were speci­
fied, such as the increase in their workforce in the manufacturing and indus­
trial sectors by a certain date, they were to own certain percentages of the 
share market solely by certain datelines and efforts to train them for tech­
nical and managerial roles in the universities and colleges by certain date­
lines, not to mention new land to be allocated to them at specified periods}^ 
In contrast, whatever measures to aid the non-Malays appeared by comparison, 
vague and devoid of targets. The D.A.P.'s objective here was to stress to 
the government that these excessively pro-Malay measures would increase the 
resentment of the Chinese and Indians.
In criticising the government's unfair interpretation of the inci­
dence of poverty among the non-Malays and the urban areas, (the urban areas 
are usually predominantly Chinese whereas the rural areas are mainly Malay)
9* Ibid. See comparison of figures in foot-note 8.
10. The statistics were taken from The Second Malaysia Plan (S.M.P.) 1970" 
1975« Lim Kit Siang stated that in 1969» out of a total share capital 
of C4»678 million, 62.1^ o was hel£ by foreigners compared to 22.8$ for 
the Chinese, 1.5ft for the Malays and 0.9p for the Indians. Foreign 
interests accounted for J to 4- of the share capital of limited companies 
in agriculture, mining, manufacturing, wholesale trade and finance, one- 
third in construction, retail trade and other industries and i of oil 
palm and coconut acreages on estates in Peninsular Malaysia. See Par­
liamentary speech,"The Second Malaysia Plan, 1970-1975” on 14th July, 
1971 in Lim Kit Siting, Time Bombs in Malaysia. 2nd ed., D.A.P., Kuala 
Lumpur, 1978» P« 55*
11. Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, p. 49.
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the D.A.P. accused the government of omitting certain important criteria in 
arriving at the incidence of poverty. The omission of such criteria had 
"brought about the understatement of the incidence of Chinese poverty; conse­
quently the incidence of Malay poverty became overstated. In determining
the incidence of poverty in the country, the D.A.P. claimed that the govem-
12ment had made use of a poverty income line as a yardstick. According to the 
T.M.P., this was the minimum income required to sustain a decent standard of 
living. It considered the minimum nutritional and other non-food requirements 
of each household. Households whose income fell below the poverty income 
line were considered poor and their total number determined the incidence of 
poverty in the country. For 1970* out of 1,606,000 households, 791>800 had 
incomes beloY/ the poverty income line, constituting a poverty incidence of 
49*3$'!’^  A breakdov/n of the 791,800 poor households revealed that Malay house­
holds comprised 584>200, Chinese households 136,300 and Indian households 
62,900^ On this baais, the percentage of Malay households to total house­
holds was 73.8$ compared to 17.2$ for the Chinese and 7*9$ for the Indians}^ 
Lim Kit Sisng listed 2 important criteria that the government had deliberately 
left out in arriving at the incidence of poverty for the various racial groups. 
They were the variation in sizes of households and the difference in the cost 
of living between the rural and urban areas^ Dealing with the first, he
12. Ibid, p.160.
13. Foot-note 8.
14. Foot-note 8.
15. Foot-note 8.
16. See Parliamentary speech,MThe Third Malaysia and the Time-Bombs in 
Malaysia”, on 20th July, 1978 in Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 146, 
for further details.
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maintained that the government had falsely conveyed the impression that all 
households were of a standard size in arriving at the total number of house­
holds in Peninsular Malaysia for 1970» him Kit Siang pointed out that in 
actual fact, they were not. In referring to the T.M.P., he held that the
average size of Malay families was 5*070 members per household compared to
175.819 for Chinese and 5*420 for Indian households. The government’s logi­
cal implication was that there was no difference between the needs of large­
sized and small-sized households with the same total income. The lower ave­
rage household size of Malay families against the comparatively higher ave­
rage household size for Chinese and Indian families had inflated the total 
number of Malay rural households to 901,500. By extension, the incidence of 
Malay poverty also became unrealistically exaggerated. Thus the D.A.P. char­
ged the government with deliberately ignoring the variations in the sizes of 
households by giving greater weighting to Malay households in the same way 
that electoral constituencies were gerrymandered to favour the Malay vote. 
This was a prelude to Kit Siang's allegation of the distortion of living 
standards between Malay and non-Malay households. Since living standards 
were reliable indicators of the incidence of poverty, he held that Malay 
households, owing to their comparatively smaller size, were not as poor as 
the government made them out to be. Kit Siang based his argument on a per 
capita basis. With the same total household income, he argued that larger 
families tend to have comparatively lower living standards per individual 
than smaller ones}^ Therefore if there was to be a common poverty income
17* Ibid.
18. Ibid. Kit Siang pointed out that even if large families had comparative­
ly higher incomes, it did not mean that there would be a corresponding 
increase in living standards. For instance, if a 10-member household 
had a monthly income of $4 0 0» its standard of living would be lower 
than, say, a 2-member household with a monthly income of $200. This 
was because the per capita income per month would be $40 in the first 
case compared to £100 in the second.
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line to accurately and meaningfully determine the incidence of poverty,
Kit Siang held that the size of households(to arrive at a figure on a per 
capita basis)must he considered^ Concerning the difference in the costs 
of living between the rural and urban areas, the D.A.P. held that, as in the 
case of the variation in the sizes of households, the government had also 
deliberately ignored this. The cost of living in the urban areas would al­
ways be higher than that in the rural areas. Thus on the basis of the same 
amount of monthly income, allowing for higher costs, the D.A.P. maintained 
that the incidence of poverty would always be higher in the urban areas.
Kit Siang pointed out that the urban poor were at a disadvantage compared 
to their rural counterparts, because unlike the latter, they had no land 
base to fall back and work on if their skills were not in demand. Inflation 
would always hit the urban areas harder than the rural areaß according to the 
D.A.P. The party's reference to the government's disregard for the differe­
nce in the cost of living between the rural and urban areas was to strengthen 
its earlier argument that large-sized families should hot be unfavourably 
compared to smaller-sized ones to determine the incidence of poverty. Thus 
the D.A.P. argued that the true disparity ratios in levels of living between
the Malays and the non-Malays were in fact lower than they had been made out
20to be in official government publications and pronouncements.
19. Kit Siang held that the Malayan Trade Union Conggress(M.T.U.C.) had 
devised its own method of determining a poverty income line for its 
members. A minimum family budget for a worker with a wife and 3 chil­
dren was worked out. It provided figures of the everyday expenses of 
the family to procure its basic needs. Two of the children were atten­
ding school; food and rent made up the bulk of the expenditure but only 
the barest needs(the diet based on hospital standards)were provided for. 
No provision was made for festivals, emergencies and medical expenses. 
The budget for 1970 was worked out as follows:
Food $ 94.11
Rent(including water,elec­
tricity, etc.) 86.13
Education 25*20
Other 24.13
$2.29-31Total
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Having thus charged the government with giving a biased incidence 
of poverty figure in so far as the non-Malays were concerned, the D.A.P. 
proceeded to point out that the government’s poverty eradication and restruc­
turing of society measures would also be, logically, to the disadvantage of 
the non-Malays. The D.A.P. criticised the objectives of the N.E.P. in that 
although poverty eradication, irrespective of race, was given the main em­
phasis, in practice it only became incidental to the second objective, i.e. 
the restructuring of society to eliminate race identification with economic 
function. This meant that the government had been more concerned with pla­
cing as many Malays as possible in the commercial and manufacturing sectors 
than doing away with poverty among Malaysians of all races. Despite the 
T.M.P.'s reiteration that poverty was a Malaysian rather than a Malay pheno­
menon, that poor Chinese and Indians were also to be included in the poverty
21eradication programmes, the D.A.P. remained skeptical. The D.A.P.’s skepti­
cism was that even if the government had honourable intentions to be fair 
to the non-Malays, there was nothing to stop Malay bureaucrats from imple­
menting them in a manner biased against the non-Malsys.
A case in point concerned the problem of unemployment. Unemploy­
ment was one of the causes of poverty in that unemployed people found it ve-
Kit Sisng thus showed that the M.T.U.C. method was more comprehensive 
and reliable than the T.M.P.'s, as it had bearing to actual facts in 
the prevailing situation. If the Post Enumeration Survey of the 1970 
Population Census figure of 50*5/0 of households having incomes below 
$200 per month indicated roughly the incidence of poverty in Peninsu­
lar Malaysia, then the M.T.U.C.'s minimum budget of $229*57 bad refl­
ected it fairly. Kit Siang held that the M.T.U.C.'s own method was 
tantamount to showing that it had no confidence in the T.M.P.'s de­
termination of the incidenoo of poverty.. Ibid, p*147*
20. Ibid, p. 146
21. For the T.M.P.'s reiteration that poverty was a Malaysian phenomenon, 
see its foreword, pp. v -vii, by the Prime Minister, Datuk Hussein 
Onn.
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ry difficult to procure the basic necessities of living. Although unemploy­
ment was a national problem, the D.A.P. held that its incidence was particu­
larly high among the Chinese and Indians in the urban areas. This was due 
to the average-sized urban household(5»0 members per family)being larger 
compared to its rural counterpart(5*4 members per family). The T.M.P. 
appeared to recognize the gravity of the unemployment problem in the urban 
areas. To deal with this effectively so as to reduce the incidence of po­
verty, the T.M.P. advocated the expansion of employment opportunities in the
23urban areas, including the promotion of small-scale industries. Emphasis 
was to be placed on manufacturing and construction since their labour- 
intensive characteristics would help to make available employment opportuni­
ties. In addition, the T.M.P. advocated adequate access to basic public
services, including low-cost housing, water supply, sewerage and transporta- 
24tion to the poor. On the surface, it appeared that the T.M.P. had pledged 
to alleviate the incidence of poverty among the non-Malays, as they consti­
tuted the majority in the urban areas. The D.A.P. pointed out that on clo­
ser analysis, however, the prime beneficiaries of the T.M.P.’s poverty re- 
dressal programmes appeared to be the Malays, and if the non-Malays received 
any benefits in this process, they appeared to be incidental rather than 
intentional. The S.M.P. had spearheaded the large influx of rural Malays 
to the urban areas in search of employment in the commercial and industrial
sectors. This was in response to the N.E.P.’s aims of creating a viable and
25visible Malay commercial and business community in the urban areas. With
22. The Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, p. I67. The T.M.P. had stated that 
that unemployment was the major reason of poverty in the urban areas.
23. Ibid, p. 49-
24. Ibid, p. 167.
25. See Ghazali Shafie, op. cit
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the T.M.P.'s emphasis to ensure that the S.M.P.'s objectives in relation  
to Malay economic advancement be invigorated, the migration of Malays to the 
urban areas in search of employment continued unabated. This appeared to 
be the government’s measures to restructure society by a greater urbanisa­
tion rate among the Malays. It was premised on a predicted high annual 
rate of economic growth(lO^) for 1977 because the government anticipated 
much private investment from both foreign and local investors. When the 
high growth rate did not for a variety of reasons, the large
numbers of Malays who had migrated to the urban areas, found that they were 
faced with unemployment. Given the government's p artia lity  towards the 
Malays, i t  was easy for the D.A.P. to point out that the T.M.P.'s measures
4
to provide employment opportunities to reduce the incidence of poverty, were
meant for the Malays rather than the Chinese and Indians. The typical non-
Malay complaint was that they were being displaced in the competition for
jobs in the urban areas by the Malays due to the government's restructuring
26of society  measures. At the risk  of repetition , i t  may be held that th is  
practice, sanctioned by the S.M.P. and invigorated by the T.M.P., continued 
to be implemented harshly against the non-Malays by over-zealous Malay bu­
reaucrats, much to their resentment. A case in point was the Industrial 
Co-ordination Act (i.C .A .) in which firms with at least $250,000 capital 
were required to have at least 5O/0 of Malay representation in their workforce. 
This new regulation, instigated by the younger Malays in U.M.N.O., manifes­
ted the government's urgency to see that i t s  restructuring measures at grea­
ter Malay urbanization attain the required ta r g e t ,i .e . 3Of> by 1990.(This is  
to be discussed fu lly  in the next section ). It may also be to re-assure any
26. For d eta ils , see R.S.Milne,"The P o lit ic s  of Malaysia's New Economic
Policy", Pacific A ffa irs, Vol. XXXXIX No. 2, Summer 1976, pp. 235-62.
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p o s s ib le  a n x ie ty  among th e  Malays who had expected to  f in d  ample emplpyment 
o p p o r tu n itie s  in  th e  urban a reas  and th en  r e a l iz e d  th a t  t h e i r  e x p ec ta tio n s  
d id  no t m a te r ia l iz e .  The non-Malays viewed th i s  as a fu r th e r  m a n ife s ta tio n  
o f r a c i a l  d is c r im in a tio n . In  th e  f i r s t  p la c e , they  had f e l t  a l ie n a te d  and 
d isc r im in a te d  by Malay s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s ,  which, when implemented, b a rre d  
them from employment in  th e  p u b lic  s e c to r  even though th ey  were q u a l i f ie d .  
T h e ir only  means o f employment w ith  th e i r  own k ind  appeared th re a te n e d  by 
t h i s  5&!° Malay w orkforce in s is te n c e .  Thus th e  g en era l im pression  th a t  th e  
non-M alays had and which th e  government was unable to  r e f u te  was t h a t ,  n o t 
only  would they  be p ro h ib i te d  from f in d in g  employment in  th e  p u b lic  s e c to r ,  
th e  enclave o f th e  M alays, but th a t  t h e i r  own enclave , th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r ,  
was being  in c re a s in g ly  invaded to  prov ide f o r  th e  Malays a t  t h e i r  expense.
The D.A.P. f e l t  th a t  t h i s  would aggravate  th e  a lread y  bad fe e l in g s  between 
th e  Malays and non-Malays i f  i t  continued  unabated . I t  th e re fo re  jo in ed  
th e  A ssoc ia ted  Chinese Chambers o f Commerce and In d u s try (A .C .C .C .I .)  in  c a l ­
l in g  th e  government to  re p e a l t h i s  re g u la t io n . The D .A .P .'s  s tan d  dem onstra­
te d  i t s  b e l i e f  th a t  th e  T.M.P. had reneged on i t s  pledge th a t  no group need 
f e e l  any sense o f d e p riv a tio n  as a r e s u l t  o f  th e  governm ent's poverty  e ra d i-  
c a tio n  and r e s t r u c tu r in g  o f s o c ie ty  m easures.' In  th i s  case , i t  p o in ted  out 
th a t  th e  non-Malays f e l t  d ep rived  o f t h e i r  r ig h t f u l  share  o f employment
27. In  a rgu ing  th e  case o f th e  non-M alays, Lee Lam Thye, th e  M.P. fo r  Kua­
l a  Lumpur Bandar, s ta te d  th a t  many non-Maiay s q u a tte rs  in  Kuala Lumpur 
depended on th e i r  s q u a t t in g  accommodation fo r  self-em ploym ent such as 
ca rp en try , h a n d ic ra f t o r producing greens and re a r in g  p o u ltry  fo r  l o ­
c a l consumption. The d em olition  o f th e se  s q u a t te r  h u ts  as a r e s u l t  o f 
re s e ttle m e n t in  low -cost f l a t s ,  d ep rived  th e se  s q u a tte rs  o f t h e i r  means 
of l iv e lih o o d . The government d id  n o t su c c e ss fu lly  f in d  them a l te r n a ­
t iv e  employment. I t  was a lso  unsym pathetic towards is s u in g  lic e n c e s  
fo r  hawkers and p e tty  t r a d e r s  to  do b u s in ess  in  c e r ta in  a reas  o f  Kua­
l a  Lumpur because o f t r a f f i c  o b s tru c t io n . Lam Thye th u s  argued th a t  
t h i s  aggravated  th e  unemployment problems o f th e  non-M alays. Speech 
by Lee Lan Thye d u rin g  th e  Debate on th e  1975 a l lo c a t io n s  f o r  the  
M in is try  o f General P lan n in g  and Socio-Bconomic R esearch d u ring  Com­
m itte e  S tag e .(Copy w ith  th e  w r i te r ) .
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o p p o r tu n i t ie s .  Lim K it S iang fu r th e r  s ta t e d  th a t  co n tra ry  to  red u c in g  th e  
in c id en ce  o f p o v e rty , th e  T.M.P. had a c tu a l ly  planned an in c re a se  ( in  abso-
o n
l u t e  term s) o f poor urban  households from 85*900 in  1970 to  125*000 by 1990.
T his in c re a s e  was a t t r ib u te d  to  the  in f lu x  o f r u r a l  Malays to  th e  towns.
What K it S iang  aimed to  show was th a t ,  co n tra ry  to  having  t h e i r  in c id en ce
o f poverty  reduced , th e  urban poor were h u m ilia te d  f u r th e r  by th e  sw e llin g
o f  t h e i r  ran k s  o f some 40,000 r u r a l  m ig ran ts . The o th e r  consequence was th a t
w hile  th e  r a t e  o f unemployment among th e  Malays d e c lin ed , th a t  o f th e  non-
29Malays had in c re a s e d . This had been caused by th e  re d u c tio n  o f th e  non- 
Malay sh are  in  employment in  th e  secondary and t e r t i a r y  in d u s tr ie s  to  make 
way fo r  th e  M alays, w h ile  a t th e  same tim e they  were not compensated by an 
in c re a s e  in  a g r i c u l tu r a l  (prim  ary ) employment as th e  T.M.P. had p ledged.
Having h ig h lig h te d  th e  d is illu s io n m e n t o f th e  non-Malays in  th e  
urban a re a s , th e  L .A .P . n ex t d ire c te d  i t s  appeal to  th e  poor non-Malays in  
th e  r u r a l  a reas  -  th e  Chinese new v i l la g e  re s id e n ts  and th e  In d ian  e s ta te  
w orkers. Taking advantage o f th e  T.M .P.*s s t r e s s  on e ra d ic a t in g  poverty  in  
th e  r u r a l  a re a s , th e  D.A.P. in s i s t e d  th a t  th e  new v i l la g e  re s id e n ts  and th e  
e s ta te  w orkers, b e in g  r u r a l  poverty  groups as acknowledged by th e  T .M .P., 
should  re c e iv e  th e  same b e n e f i ts  as the  r u r a l  Malays?^ The T.M.P. had s t a ­
te d  th a t  sh o rtag e  o f  lan d  was th e  m ajor cause o f th e  poverty  o f new v i l la g e  
r e s id e n ts .  T his was aggravated  by th e  la ck  o f s e c u r i ty  o f te n u re . Thus
28. Lim K it S iang, o p . c i t . ,p .!4 8 . This showed a  drop from 21^ in  1970 to  
9j> in  1990. In  c o n tr a s t ,  th e  in c id en ce  o f r u r a l  poverty  was expected 
to  f a l l  from 59/^(706,000) to  23^(390,000) fo r  th e  same p e rio d .
29 . Lim K it S iang , o p . c i t . ,p .!5 2 . K it S iang po in ted  to  th e  changes in  th e  
unemployment r a t e  o f a l l  ra c e s  from 1971 to  1975* Malays - d e c lin e  
from 8 .1 ^  to  6 .9 /j; Chinese - in c re a se  from 7$ to  7 »2$, Ind ian s  - 
in c re a s e  from ll°/o to  12 .2$ .
30. According to  th e  T .M .P ., on th e  b a s is  o f th e  1970 P opu la tion  Census, 
85,000 o f th e  146,000  househo lds( 58$) o f j u s t  over 1 m illio n  people 
wholly C hinese, were considered  poor accord ing  to  th e  poverty  income 
l i n e .  About h a l f  o f th e  new v i l la g e  re s id e n ts  in  u rb an ized  v i l la g e s
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most new v i l la g e  r e s id e n ts  who were farm ers had been trap p ed  in  poverty  owing 
to  t h e i r  uneconom ically  sm all p iece s  of lan d . Most o p era ted  on th e  b a s is  of 
tem porary o ccu p a tio n a l lic e n c e s  because they  were much cheaper than  payments 
fo r  permanent land  l ic e n c e s .  This arrangem ent o fte n  d iscouraged  new v i l la g e  
farm ers from expanding t h e i r  p ro d u c tio n , even in  th e  case  o f econom ic-sized 
la n d , because o f th e  p o s s ib i l i t y  o f e v ic tio n  a t  any tim e . The T.M.P. thus 
recommended th a t  land  be a llo c a te d  to  new v i l la g e  r e s id e n ts  to  f a c i l i t a t e  
t h e i r  involvem ent in  a g r ic u l tu r a l  employment. Apart from s t r e s s in g  th a t  non- 
Malays should  a lso  p a r t i c ip a te  in  F edera l Land Development A u th o rity  (FELDA) 
schemes, th e  T.M.P. d id  no t sp ec ify  any f ig u re s  and t a r g e t s  as to  how land  
should  be given to  th e  la n d le s s  non-Malay new v i l la g e  r e s id e n ts .  The D.A.P. 
co n sidered  th e  absence o f  ta r g e ts  and f ig u re s  as th e  governm ent's i n s in c e r i ­
ty  and la ck  o f commitment towards th e  non-Malay poor. I t  su sp ec ted  th a t  in  
view o f th e  vague pronouncements by the  T.M.P. on th i s  h ig h ly  im portan t mat­
t e r  in  which the  non-Malay farm ers were concerned, th e  government was p repa­
re d  to  pay l i p  s e rv ic e  o n ly . I f  th e  government had been s in c e re  in  a l l e v ia ­
t i n g  th e  p l ig h t  of th e  non-Malay poor, i t  would s u re ly  have s p e c if ie d  what, 
when and how land  should  be a llo c a te d  as in  th e  cane o f a l l  forms of deve­
lopm ental a id  to  th e  M alays. In s te a d  th e  government had re s o r te d  to  th e  
t a c t i c  o f sh e lv in g  r e s p o n s ib i l i ty .  To th e  D .A .P .'s  appeals fo r  d e f in i te  
and co n cre te  measures to  a l lo c a te  land  to  new v i l la g e  fa rm ers , th e  C en tral
o r a c c e ss ib le  v i l la g e s  lo c a te d  n ear urban a reas  were employed as con­
t r a c t  la b o u re rs  in  nearby e s ta te s  o r self-em ployed  in  market gardening, 
p a d i, rubber and l iv e s to c k . The o th e r  h a l f  had b u s in esses  of t h e i r  
own o r found wage employment in  nearby towns. About 50$ -  60$ o f th e  
households in  u rban ized  new v i l la g e s  had a monthly cash income of $200 
o r le s s  w hile  more than  80$ o f th o se  r e s id e n ts  in  sm all remote v i l la g e s  
earned incomes below $200 p er month. In d ian s  com prised some 45$ o f 
th e  250,000 e s ta te  w orkers in  150,000 households. About 60$ o f th e se  
workers earned monthly cash incomes between $100 -$120 w ith  20$ earn ­
in g  below th e se  f ig u re s  and 20$ above. w
The Third  M alaysia  P lan , 1976-1980, pp. 165-7«
180
Government had always replied that these were state matters to he meted out 
by the respective state governments concerned. The party was aware that the 
Malay-controlled state governments in Perak and Selangor where the majority 
of the new villages were located, had always been reluctant to allocate land 
to the new villagers for a variety of reasons, but mainly because the new 
villagers were Chinese. This had been the case in the 1950s during the 
communist emergency with regard, to the resettlement of Chinese squatters?^ 
Only the gravity of the communist threat and the severe pressure exerted by 
the Colonial Administration had succeeded in persuading the Malay Sultans 
to grudgingly allocate state land for the new villages. From this example 
the D.A.P. was convinced that state governments would always see to it that 
as far as possible, non-Malays would not be entitled to land. It attributed 
this inertia on the part of state governments to the lack of pressure from 
the Central Government. If the latter was sincere, it could always direct 
the former to allocate land to Chinese farmers in accordance to the T.M.P.’s 
pledge(as the Colonial Administration had done during the emergency) instead 
of shelving responsibility and passing the buck. Being aware that the only 
manner in which land could possibly be allocated to non-Malay farmers was 
through FilLDA, the D.A.P. repeatedly called on the government to admit more 
non-Malays to this scheme. It pointed out the glaring disparity in land 
ownership via FKLDA among the racial groups for 1973» Of the 526,900 acres 
allocated, 96.2^ were Malay as compared to 2.1/o Chinese and 1.6/£ Indian. 
Calling for a redressal of this gross imbalance, the D.A.P. stated that the 
government should review the FilLDA programme in such a way as to reflect
31. See John W. Humphrey,"Emergency Resettlement and the Chinese in Mala­
ya", Journal of Asian Affairs, Vol. I No. 2, 1977» PP« 33“7 •
32. See article,"A Persistent Pressure Point", Asiaweek, 28th April,
1978, pp. 12-4.
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the racial composition of the country^ In this way the D.A.P. argued that 
the poverty eradication and restructuring of society measures undertaken 
would be in line with the T.M.P.'s objectives.
In retrospect, the D.A.P.'s criticisms of the manner in Y/hich the 
government handled the issues of poverty eradication, unemployment among 
the non-Malays and land allocation, seemed to suggest to the government that 
despite the Prime Minister's pledge of fair treatment,(to the underprivileged 
of all communities by the T.M.P.)in practice, this was hardly the case where 
the non-Malays were concerned. The D.A.P. had shown that the Malays were 
still getting more than their fair share of the T.M.P.'s benefits and the 
position of the non-Malays had not improved significantly. Their unemploy­
ment rate was still high and they were still eagerly awaiting the land pled­
ged by the T.M.P. to them^ The D.A.P.'s arguments on behalf of the non- 
Malays stressed that rectifying imbalances should be drawn across the board 
and not merely confined to Malay disadvantages. This was evident in the 
call for more state land for non-Malays. Just as in the case of the govern­
ment's recommendations in certain areas, the D.A.P.'s arguments also tend 
to overlook certain impracticalities concerning certain problems. For exam­
ple, in suggesting that more Chinese should be admitted into the FELDA pro­
gramme, it failed to consider that just as the rural Malays would face diffi­
culties in adjusting to a Chinese-predominated commercial and industrial 
environment, the Chinese new village farmer, long accustomed to a Chinese- 
predominated environment, would also encounter difficulties in settling into
33. For details, see Parliamentary speech,"Twenty-year Neglect of the 
750,000 Nev/ Villagers", in Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., pp. 66-70.
34. The main reason that land allocation targets were not specified for 
non-Malays appeared to be the government's wariness in monitoring 
the reaction of the Malays. Targets in this aspect v/ere conditional 
on the Malays not having the feeling that too much was being done 
for the non-Malays.
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a new, completely Malay-predominated agricultural environment. The lack of
freedom to grow and market whatever crops he may want to cultivate was also
35another possible deterrent to the Chinese new villager to join FELDA.
The government was inclined to regard the D.A.P.’s criticisms as manifesta­
tions of its opposition to the N.E.P. In the event, it felt that they con­
fused the Chinese by distorting the N.E.P.'s rationale, and thus antagonise 
the Malays. However the government failed to realise that it had made the 
situation conducive for the D.A.P. to exploit Chinese dissatisfactions.
The government's other weakness also appeared to be either its inability or 
reluctance to restrain over-zealous Malay bureaucrats from implementing the 
T.M.P.'s objectives to the detriment to the non-Malays.
35» These difficulties were stated by the Land and Regional Development 
Minister, Tan Sri Kadir Yusof, when he commented on the low intake 
of non-Malay FELDA settlers. New Sunday Times, 2nd September, 1979 
and New Straits Times, 23rd November, 1979*
183
( b)_____ The I n d u s t r ia l  C o -o rd in a tio n  Act
The I n d u s t r ia l  C o-o rd in a tio n  Act ( i .C .A .)  wan a p iece  o f l e g i s l a ­
t io n  in s t ig a te d  by th e  younger Malays w ith in  U.M.N.O. in  1975 1° re g u la te  
economic development in  th e  country  to  th e  b e n e f i t  o f th e  Malays in  l in e  
w ith  th e  o b je c tiv e s  o f th e  N .E.P. However th e  I.C .A . made Chinese b u sin ess  
e n te r p r i s e s ,  v/hich formed th e  m a jo rity  o f dom estic in v e s to r s ,  r e lu c ta n t  to  
in v e s t  because th ey  f e l t  th a t  th e  re tu rn s  were no t commensurate w ith  t h e i r  
in v estm en ts . This was because o f th e  I .C .A . 's  in s is te n c e  th a t  a la rg e  p ro ­
p o r tio n  o f th e  r e tu rn s  be given to  th e  M alays. The re lu c ta n c e  o f dom estic 
businessm en to  in v e s t  had a n eg a tiv e  e f f e c t  on fo re ig n  in v e s to rs .  As a r e ­
s u l t ,  th e  T .M .P .’s o b je c t iv e s  o f encouraging p r iv a te  investm en t, bo th  domes­
t i c  and fo re ig n , appeared to  s u f f e r  a s e t-b a c k . The A .C .C .C .I., which r e ­
p re sen te d  a c ro s s - s e c t io n  o f th e  Chinese b u s in ess  community, s tro n g ly  c r i ­
t i c i s e d  th e  I.C .A . The D.A.P. was quick to  a s s o c ia te  i t s e l f  w ith  c r i t ic is m s  
o f th e  I.C .A . and added i t s  ovm. This marked i t s  a ttem pts to  s t r i k e  ra p p o rt 
w ith  th e  Chinese b u s in ess  community to  widen i t s  base and su p p o rt. The 
D .A .P .’ s s t r a te g y  was to  agree  w ith  th e  A .C .C .C .I. in  p o in tin g  out th a t  th e  
I.C .A . was a d e te r re n t  to  th e  T .M .P .'s  o b je c t iv e s  of encouraging p r iv a te  
in v estm en t, b esid es  d is ru p t in g  th e  e x is t in g  a c t i v i t i e s  in  b u s in e ss , in d u s­
t r i a l  and m anufacturing  c i r c l e s .  As such, i t  c a lle d  fo r  th e  re p e a l o f th e  
I.C .A . in  i t s  e n t i r e ty .
The I .C .A . 's  m ajor p ro v is io n s  were th a t  firm s w ith  a c a p i ta l  o f a t  
l e a s t  $250,000 must have a w orkforce r e f l e c t in g  th e  r a c ia l  com position of 
th e  co u n try , in d ic a t in g  th a t  a t l e a s t  50r/o must be M alays; land  acq u ired  fo r  
in d u s try  was to  be g ran ted  only  i f  th e  p a y ro ll  o f th e  fa c to ry  to  be s i t e d  
in c lu d ed  a v a ry in g  bu t h ig h  percen tag e  of M alays; b u s in esses  w ith  a  paid -up  
c a p i t a l  o f $500,000 must re s e rv e  a t  l e a s t  30^ o f t h e i r  sh a res  f o r  Malays;
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Malay p ro fessio n a l serv ices  must be used wherever possible?^ U.M.N.O. r e ­
garded the I.C .A . as the d riv in g  force o f the N.E.P. to  play a c o n tro llin g  
r o le  in  the country's commercial l i f e .  I t  ra tio n a lized  th at the T .M .P.'s 
vast investm ent drives to  encourage domestic and foreign  investment to  the  
country would enable non-Malay business ventures, both Chinese and fo re ign , 
to  reap huge p r o f its  i f  economic growth were to be exp lo ited  fu l ly  as in  the  
s itu a t io n  during the c o lo n ia l days and pre-1969 M alaysia. Under th ese c i r ­
cumstances, i t  f e l t  that attempts to  restru ctu re  so c ie ty  to enable the Malays 
to  control at le a s t  30/£ o f the corporate sec to r  would be negated. There was 
a lso  a strong b e l ie f  among the younger Malays in  U.M.N.O. that Chinese firm s 
were merely paying l ip  serv ice  to the N .E .P ., th e ir  e ffo r ts  to  support the  
N.E.P. being merely window dressin g . I t  was a lso  f e l t  that Chinese b u si­
nessmen in  one way or another, managed to  fin d  loop -h oles in  the N.E.P. whe­
th er  in  the "Ali-Baba." p ra ctice  or buying shares meant for  Malays through 
39M alays. Thus the I.C .A . appeared a p erfect p iece  o f  le g is la t io n  in  plug-
36. For d e ta i l s ,  see a r t ic le ," C a llin g  for  a f a ir  share", Asiaweek, 17th  
March, 1978» pp.39”40«
37« The T.M .P.’s encouragement o f private  investment was m anifested by the  
Prime M in ister 's  assurance to  the p r iva te  sec to r  in  o u tlin in g  the high­
l ig h ts  o f the T.M.P. in  July 1976. Datuk Hussein Onn sa id :" I g ive the  
ca tegoric  assurance th at every e ffo r t  w i l l  be made to  ensure the main­
tenance of a favourable investment clim ate which i s  so necessary for  
the private  sector  to make f u l l  use o f the many opportunities for pro­
ductive investment in  the country". See M alaysian D ig est, 15th Ju ly , 
1976, p .2 ,
38. The Finance M in ister, Tengku R azaleigh Hamzah, c r it ic iz e d  the private  
sec to r  for  tokenism in  help ing Malays in  b u sin ess. He c ited  the case  
o f large sca le  Malay recruitm ent only in  the outer periphery of the 
management c ir c le ,  such as public r e la t io n s . Tengku R azaleigh 's c r i ­
tic ism s were that non-Malay business firms were not in tere sted  in  t r a i ­
ning Malays fo r  managerial r o le s .  See Yong Mun Cheong e d . , Trends in  
in  Mala y 8 ia (2 ) , I n s t itu te  of Southeast Asian S tudies, Singapore, 1974» 
p. 2£>V
39* The "Ali-Baba" system o f business in d ica tes  a partnership between the 
Malay(A li) and the Chinese(Baba) in  which the Malay becomes a s leep in g  
partner, using hi3 name for the b u sin ess . The business i s  then opera­
ted  by the Chinese under e f f ic ie n t  business p r in c ip le s . The Malay gets  
a cut o f  th e p r o f its  when the y ie ld s  come in . The top U.M.N.O. lead er-
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ging  a l l  e x is t in g  lo o p -h o les  in  th e  N .E.P . to  ensure th a t  growth was con­
t r o l l e d  so th a t  r e s t r u c tu r in g  of s o c ie ty  would be achieved w ithou t h in d ra n c e ^  
The 50^ Malay w orkforce re g u la tio n  would ensure  th a t  la rg e  firm s promote mass 
employment o p p o r tu n itie s  fo r  Malays. As many o f th e se  firm s were in  th e  con­
s t r u c t io n  and m anufacturing  f i e ld s ,  the  government f e l t  th a t  th e  I.C .A . would 
se rv e  an a d d it io n a l  purpose in  g e t t in g  la rg e  numbers o f Malays to  work in  th e  
t e r t i a r y  in d u s t r ie s  in  l in e  w ith  th e  T .M .P .'s  o b je c t iv e s ^  The in c re a s in g  
use o f Malay p ro fe s s io n a l se rv ic e s  would a lso  ensure th a t  Malays were ade­
q u a te ly  re p re se n te d  in  a l l  le v e ls  o f employment, p a r t i c u la r ly  th e  m anagerial 
and te c h n ic a l  l e v e l s .  The 30$ share  re s e rv a tio n s  fo r  Malays in  companies 
w ith  $500,000 sh are  c a p i ta l  would ensure th a t  by 1990» they  owned a t  l e a s t  
3O70 o f th e  co rp o ra te  s e c to r .  This was to  supplement th e  o b je c t iv e s  o f th e  
S e c u r i t ie s  Investm ent Act o f 1973 which sought to  t r a n s f e r  sh are  ownership 
from non-Mai ay (C hinese and fo re ig n ) to  Malay hands v ia  th e  Kuala Lumpur Stock 
E x ch an g ed
The unfavourab le  re a c tio n  from th e  Chinese b u s in ess  community was 
p re d ic ta b le ,  and through the  A .C .C .C .I., i t  made an open p ro te s t  to  the  
governm ent. The common com plaints o f  Chinese b u s in ess  firm s were th a t  th e  
I .C .A . 's  m easures to  b r in g  Malays in to  th e  m ainstream  of development had l e f t
ship has tr ie d  u n su ccessfu lly  to  stem th is  arrangement because the re ­
turns to both Malays and Chinese have been lu c r a tiv e . The Parliamen­
tary  Secretary to the Trade and Industry M inistry has sta ted  that about 
tw o-thirds o f the 1,255 Malay r ic e  w holesalers were doing the ”A ll-Baba” 
system of business in  1979* New Sunday Times, 27th  January, 1980.
For d e ta i l s  o f th e  "A li-B aba” system , see Gordon P. M eans,''S pecial R igh ts 
as a S tra teg y  f o r  Development: The Case of M alaysia” , Compar a t iv e  P o l i ­
t i c s , Vol. V N o .l, 1972-73, pp. 29-61.
40. See a r t i c l e , ”The New Malay Dilemma” , Asiaweek, 15th  September, 1978, 
pp. 31-6.
41. In  1970, the  Malays comprised between 16 to  28^ o in  th e  m anufacturing , 
commerce and c o n s tru c tio n  s e c to r s .  In  th e  m einufacturing s e c to r  manage­
ment, t h e i r  re p re s e n ta t io n  was even lo w e r , i .e .  T"/° compared to  68c/o fo r  
C hinese, 4:/° Ind ian  and 18rfa fo re ig n . The government in tended  to  r a is e
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in v e s to rs  f r u s t r a te d  and u n w illin g  to  in v e s t .  To them, th e  I.C .A . h in d ered  
th e  expansion o f e x is t in g  b u s in e sse s , reduced  th e  p o s s ib i l i ty  o f l ic e n c e s  
in  a wide range o f a reas  where th e  Chinese were a lre ad y  o p e ra tin g , and i t  
r a is e d  th e  s p e c tre  o f mass unemployment among th e  C h in e se ^  The D.A.P. 
which had been m onito ring  th e  d i s s a t i s f a c t io n s  o f th e  Chinese b u s in ess  com­
m unity fo r  some tim e, decided to  c a p i t a l iz e  on th e  s i tu a t io n  to  f a c i l i t a t e  
i t s  expansion p la n s , p a r t i c u la r ly  in  term s o f f in a n c e d  The p a r ty 's  i n i t i a l
c r i t i c i s m  o f th e  I.C .A . was th a t  i t  was a c o n tro v e rs ia l  p iece  o f l e g i s l a t i o n
45th a t  would d is ru p t th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f b u s in ess  and m anufacturing  c i r c l e s ;
This seemed to  concur w ith  th e  A .C .C .C .I . 's  argument th a t  in v e s to rs  had b e­
come f r u s t r a t e d ,  d i s s a t i s f i e d  and r e lu c ta n t  to  in v e s t because too  much was 
b e in g  done fo r  th e  Malays a t  t h e i r  expense. Local in v e s to rs  had encountered 
a dilemma when th e  I.C .A . was th r u s t  upon them a f t e r  assu ran ces  by th e  gov­
ernment th a t  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  to  c re a te  economic growth would no t be unnecessa­
r i l y  h in d e red . On the  one hand, they  f e l t  th a t  they  were exhorted  by th e  
government to  c rd a te  growth. The ta r g e t  f o r  th e  non-Malay investm ent by 1990 
was to  be 40^. In  1970, th e  Chinese ov/nership o f share  c a p i ta l  in  l im ite d  
companies was 2 2 . 5 On th a t  b a s is ,  th e  non-Malay ov/nership o f sh are  c a p i-
Maloy re p re s e n ta t io n  in  m anufacturing , commerce and c o n s tru c tio n  from 
160,000 out o f 1 , 432,000 in  1970 to  1 ,088,000 out o f 2 , 765,000 by 
1990 in  l in e  w ith  th e  Q^p/o Malay w orkforce req u irem en t. For d e t a i l s ,  
see Fred R.von der Mehden,"Communalism, In d u s tr ia l. P o licy  and Income 
D is tr ib u tio n  in  M alaysia", Asian Survey, Vol. XV No. 3» March 1975»
pp. 247-61.
42. For th e  reasons behind the  S e c u r i t ie s  Investm ent Act o f 1973, see An­
drew D avenport, "T igh ten ing  up in  M alaysia", Far E astern  Economic Re­
view, 26th December, 1975» PP* 47**8.
43* See a r t i c l e ," C a l l in g  fo r  a f a i r  sh a re " , Asiaweek, 17th  March, 1978» 
pp. 39-40*
44* Finance has always been one o f th e  D .A .P .'s  m ajor weaknesses in  view 
o f i t s  sm all membership(compared to  th e  N .F .) and l im ite d  donations 
from th e  p u b lic . This has sev e re ly  co n stra in ed  envisaged  expansion 
p la n s . Thus i f  Chinese b u s in ess  firm s could be persuaded to  support 
th e  D.A.P. f in a n c ia l ly ,  i t s  expansion p lans would be f a c i l i t a t e d .
45• New S t r a i t s  Times, 13th  Decembe r , 1978.
46 . Sevinc C arlson , M alaysia: Search fo r  Nationa.! U nity and Economic
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t a l  was ta rg e te d  to  r i s e  9 tim es above th e  1970 mark or a 15 . 1$  annual growth 
r a t e  between 1971- 75» which would r a i s e  i t  to  37*3$  and u lt im a te ly  a 15 »5$  
annual growth r a te  between 1976-80 to  a r r iv e  a t th e  ta rg e te d  p ercen tage  of 
40'/oP On th e  o th e r ,  they  were n o t be ing  given  any in c e n tiv e s  to  r e a l i z e
t h i s .  As one source pu ts  i t ,  th e  major in c re a s e  in  Chinese and In d ian  owner­
sh ip  was expected to  ta k e  p la ce  as a n a tu ra l  development a r i s in g  out of th e
growth o f th e  economy and no s p e c ia l programmes had been p repared  to  a id
Aftt h e i r  a c t i v i t i e s .  Most Chinese m anufacturing  firm s were sm all concerns,
and were th u s  g re a t ly  handicapped in  th e  fa c e  of m assive com petition  from
g ia n t government-backed c o rp o ra tio n s  such as Perbadanan Nasional(PERKAS),
M a jlis  Amanah Rakyat(MARA), th e  Urban Development A uthority (U .D .A .) ,  e t c . ,
49a id in g  th e  M alays: In  a d d itio n  they  a lso  had to  face  com petition  from
la rg e ,  fo re ig n  l im ite d  l i a b i l i t y  companies. Chinese firm s th u s  laboured  un­
d e r th e  grave th r e a t  o f e x -p ro p r ia tio n  and c o n f is c a tio n  to  h e lp  c re a te  th e
Growth, Sage P u b lic a tio n s , B everly  H i l l s ,  London, 1975» P* 22.
47« See The Third  M alaysia P la n ,1976-1980» p. 86 . Even th e  fo re ig n  sec ­
t io n  which would be cu t in  h a l f  in  term s o f p e rcen tag e (63 . 3$  in  1970 
to  30. 0$  in  1990) w&s expected to  in c re a se  8$  annually  due to  th e  
growth in  th e  economy. Fred R.von d er Mehden, op. c i t . ,  p . 252.
48. Ib id . Fred R.von der Mehden a t t r ib u te d  th i s  to  th e  apparen t acceptance 
by M alaysian p lan n ers  o f th e  b e l i e f  in  th e  omnipotence o f Chinese 
economic power and th e i r  la c k  o f u n d ers tan d in g  o f th e  c h a ra c te r  of 
Chinese b u sin ess  p a t te rn s .
49* Small Chinese firm s in  S outheast A sia tend  to  d isp la y  th e  same charac­
t e r i s t i c s .  On t h i s  b a s is ,  i t  may be assumed th a t  a study of th e  cha­
r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f sm all Chinese firm s in  Indonesia  f a i r l y  r e f le c te d  
th o se  in  M alaysia. In  h is  study  on t h i s ,  Donald W illm ott observed th a t  
sm all Chinese firm s in  Semarang in  th e  e a r ly  1950s showed th e  fo llo w in g  
c h a r a c te r i s t i c s :  ( i )  th e  m a jo rity  were sm all enough fo r  th e  fam ily  to  
handle w ithou t employing o u ts id e rs  above c le rk s  and w o rk e rs ;( i i )  th e  
tendency to  d iv e r s ify  a c t i v i t i e s ;  ( i i i )  th e re  was h igh  i n s t a b i l i t y  w ith  
numerous b a n k ru p tc ie s , f a i l u r e s , e t c . ; ( iv )  they  had f a m i l i s t i c  p e r­
sonnel s t r u c tu r e ; ( v )  f a m i l i s t i c  ownership and (v i)  in fo rm al s t ru c tu re ,  
p re f e r r in g  p a r tn e rsh ip s  to  c o rp o ra tio n s . Donald W illm o tt, The Chinese 
o f Semarang , C ornell U n iv e rs ity  P re s s , I th a c a , I960, pp. 47-58. Also 
Fred R.von der Mehden, op. c i t . ,  p . 253* Though a co n sid e rab le  
p e rio d  o f tim e has lap sed  s in ce  Y /illm ott l a s t  made h is  s tu d y , nev er­
th e le s s  th e se  c h a r a c te r i s t i c s  a re  s t i l l  very  prom inent today .
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n ecessa ry  grov/th fo r  r e s t r u c tu r in g  to  b e n e f i t  th e  M alays; To make m a tte rs  
w orse, th e  I.C .A . appeared to  th e  Chinese as y e t ano ther instrum en t to  s t r e ­
ngthen th e  a lread y  fav o u rab le  p o s i t io n  o f th e  M alays. Although th e  I.C .A . 
was p r im a r i ly  geared to  a f f e c t  th e  la rg e  companies, bo th  la rg e  and sm all 
Chinese firm s could no t h e lp  f e e l in g  apprehensive about th e  e x -p ro p r ia tio n  
th r e a t  m a te r ia l is in g  in  th e  n ear f u tu r e .  This was due to  t h e i r  p re c a rio u s  
p o s i t io n  o f having  to  e x h ib it  d e fen siv e  ten d en c ie s  ag a in s t m assive com peti­
t io n  from government-backed c o rp o ra tio n s , w hile  a t  th e  same tim e th in k in g
51o f c o n s tru c tiv e  p ro p o sa ls  to  improve t h e i r  own p o s i t io n ;  To be f a i r  to  th e  
C hinese, t h i s  s t a t e  of a f f a i r s  was l i a b l e  to  make them unable  to  c re a te  th e  
e x tr a  p o r tio n  o f th e  p ie  meant f o r  someone e ls e .  The D.A.P. was th u s  ab le  
to  p o in t out th a t  the  government »contrary  to  re so lv in g  th e  dilemma o f th e  
Chinese businessm en by i t s  double s tan d a rd s  o f g iv in g  w ith  th e  r ig h t  hand 
and ta k in g  back w ith  th e  l e f t ,  had in s te a d  aggravated  i t  by in tro d u c in g  th e  
I.C .A . As such th e  D.A.P. j u s t i f i e d  i t s  co n ten tio n  th a t  lo c a l  in v e s to rs  
were r e lu c ta n t  to  in v e s t because they  f e l t  r e s t r i c t e d  and f r u s t r a te d .
The D.A.P. next added fu e l  to  th e  A .C .C .C .I .’ s com plaints th a t  th e  
I.C .A . had h indered  the  expansion of e x is t in g  b u s in esses  w hile  reduc ing  th e  
p o s s ib i l i t y  o f l ic e n c e s  in  wide a reas  where th e  Chinese were a lread y  o p era-
50
50. Alex Lee made th i s  w arning very c le a r ly  in  1971 du rin g  th e  Chinese
U nity Movement d r iv e . He s tr e s s e d  th a t  th e  Chinese must h e lp  to  c re a te  
a b ig g e r economic cake and th a t  e x tra  p o r tio n  would have to  go to  some­
one e l s e ( i . e .  th e  M alays). F a ilu re  to  do so would mean th a t  th e  e x is ­
t in g  cake would have to  be cu t in to  sm alle r p ie c e s . I t  was a lso  pos­
s ib le  th a t  should th e  w orst happened, th e  Chinese might have to  be 
fo rced  to  g ive up t h e i r  own p o rtio n  of th e  cake. See round ta b le  d i s ­
cussion  on Alex Lee,"T rends in  P o l i t i c s :  A M aisysian-C hinese View"in 
P a tr ic k  Low e d ., Trends in  Southeast A sia No. 2, I n s t i t u t e  o f South­
e a s t Asian S tu d ie s , S ingapore, 1971» p .8 6 .
51. For f u l l  d e t a i l s ,  see R .S .M ilne, op. c i t . ,  pp. 235-62.
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ting. In this it dealt with the mandatory 50$ Malay workforce regulation 
and the 30$ share reservations for Malays. It affirmed the complaint that 
the 50$ Malay workforce regulation placed severe difficulties on firms which 
had difficulty in recruiting Malays to their workforce. The demographical 
pattern of the country with the Malays predominating in the rural areas and 
the non-Malays in the towns, accentuated this difficulty. Since most of the 
industries were located in the urban areas, firms had no difficulty in get­
ting non-Malay labour prior to the I.C.A. With the I.C.A. legislated, it 
became extremely difficult to recruit Malay labour in the towns and also in
C O
states where Malays formed a minority(e.g.Penang); Even if firms should 
succeed in getting adequate Malay labour, increased expenditure of commuting 
between the tov/ns where the industries were located and the hpmes of the 
Malays in the rural areas would reduce the take-home pay of Malay workers 
and thus discourage them from working in such places to try to find jobs 
nearer their homes. Another factor which made the recruitment of Malay la­
bour to industries difficult was the predominantly Chinese cultural environ­
ment in the tov/ns. The operations of most Chinese firms and clientele were
53based on social and cultural values. Their smooth functioning would be 
dislocated by a large influx of Malays whose values and traditions were dif­
ferent. In any case the Malay workers would have felt alienated in a Chi­
nese-predominated cultural environment and thus encountered grave socio­
economic problems^ It was thus pointed out that owing to the above factors
52. For full details of the difficulties of recruiting Malay labour, see 
Fred R.von der Mehden, op. cit., pp. 254-6.
53» This was more 30 in the case of small Chinese firms, but to an increa­
sing extent in large ones.
54» Some of these could be difficulties in adjusting to an entirely dif- 
derent lifestyle altogether. For instance, some Malays,, long used 
to the serenity of rural living, may find the.hustle and bustle 
of urban living not to their liking.
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large industries had grave difficulties in recruiting such a large propor­
tion (50$) of Malay labour. According to the I.C.A., if large firms could 
not meet the 50$ Malay mandatory stipulation, business licences would not 
be issued to them. Also existing businesses might have to close down on the 
non-renewal of their licences. This possibility, though remote, was never­
theless real, being subjected to the discretions of the Malay bureaucrats. 
Although there were assurances from the government that the I.C.A. would be 
implemented flexibly and pragmatically, it appeared that investors could not 
help feeling apprehensive. This, the D.A.P. held, was due to the abuse and 
misuse of the wide arbitrary and discretionary powers vested in Malay bureau­
crats who were responsible for the I.C.A.'s implementation. The D.A.P. 
stated that these bureaucrats, many of them sympathetic to the younger Ma­
lays in U.M.N.6., used as their criteria for approving plans, licences and 
applications, the need to comply with existing economic and social objectives 
in the national interest. As this criteria was very vague, the D.A.P. sta­
ted that it was very easy for the bureaucrats concerned to interpret it ac­
cording to their whims and fancies. As such, the non-Malay firms felt inse­
cure, helpless and completely at the mercy of the more than often unsyijipathe-
55tic Malay bureaucrats.
Regarding the 30$ Malay share reservations, the D.A.P. agreed with
the A.C.C.C.I. that it was extremely unfair to Chinese business concerns.
The general feeling among the Chinese wa3 that it had taken them years of
hard work and struggle just to build up their business concerns from scratch
56to their present positions'; They felt that legislation to force them to 
share 30$ of what they had painfully acquired with others who did not have 
to experience any suffering at all was not only unfair but illogical. The 
55* New Straits Times, 13th December, 1978*
56. Article,"Calling for a fair share", Asiaweek, 17th March, 1978, p.40.
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principle of private enterprise, which the T.M.P. upheld, would be infringed
if industries were compelled to take in 2>Cf/o Malay equity partnership and
, 57therefore 3O/o of all board members. Added to this was the extreme difficul­
ty of the industries concerned to find suitable Malay business partners, es-
58pecially those who would be compatible, sincere and had the cash to invest; 
The D.A.P. stressed that even former U.M.N.O. leaders considered the legis­
lation unfair. It cited the former Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who 
commented that the implementation and thereby implication, of the I.C.A. was
wrong, with privileges being forced on the Malays and disregarding the intri-
59cacies and complexities of how businesses were run; As such, the Tunku held 
that the "incubation" of Malay businessmen through legislation would deprive 
them of the experience of years of entrepreneurship that Chinese businessmen 
had acquired. As a result, the Tunku concluded that incompetent and passive 
Malay business partners would be created who would be a liability rather 
than an asset to the business community.
Taking the theme of the 30$o Malay share reservations further, the 
D.A.P. alleged that it was a ploy to cover up the false hope and consequent 
despair created for the Malays in harping on too ambitious a target on share 
ownership in the first place. The T.M.P. had stated that Malay ownership 
of the share capital, being only 2.4$ in 1970» was targeted to rise at an
57 * Ibid.
58. Ibid.
59« Dr. Chen Man Hin, the D.A.P. Chairman, quoted the Tunku’s comments 
fully:"The way in which it(i.e. the I.C.A.) is being implemented is 
wrong. We have to help the bumicutra3 get a fair share in the economic 
life of the country which is the main aim of the policy. But it is 
wrong to force upon the buminutras a load they cannot shoulder. Not 
only does this interrupt orderly growth of industries but the system 
creates men of straw - people who participate without investing a 
single cent, or having the competence to contribute to the company's 
development". New Straits Times, 13th December, 1978, op. cit.
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average annual growth rate of 43*6$ from 1971-75 and from 25.870 from 1976-80^ 
This had assumed that corporate assets grew at a constant rate of 10$ per 
annum. The D.A.P. considered these targets to be too high, calculated to 
pacify Malay extremists at the commencement of the N.E.P. In a fervour of 
economic nationalism and realizing that much was needed to be done to raise 
the low Malay percentage of share capital within a comparatively short time, 
the U.M.N.O. leaders who initiated the I.C.A. were either blind, chose to 
ignore, or seriously underestimated the adverse consequences from certain 
unforeseen circumstances beyonft their control. The D.-A.P.'s contention could 
be justified by the uncertain economic growth rate, the fluctuations of the 
share market, the value systems of the Malays and the exploitation tendencies 
of some Chinese businessmen. To be fair to the D.A.P., it was unlikely that 
corporate assets would grow at a constant rate of 10$ per annum as this would 
have to depend on a constant economic grovzth. In reality, economic recessions 
and inflation, which were becoming more often, slowed down the economic growth 
rate. The technicalities of the stock exchange are complex and due to con­
stant fluctuations of the laws of supply and demand, the market value of 
shares are likely to change frequently. Thus to reap the full benefits of 
participation in the share market, a sound knowledge of the technicalities 
of the laws of supply and demand and the trend of how share prices move, is 
necessary. The traditional values of the Malays, based on Islam, were likely
to make them attach less importance to the workings of the share market, which
6lcould be interpreted as some form of gambling. Lastly, it had always been
60. The Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, p. 86.
61. For full details of the value systems of the Malays, see Brien K. Par­
kinson, ’ITon-Economic Factors in the Sconomic Retardation of the Rural 
Malays", Modem Asian Studies, Vol. I No.l, 1967» pp« 31-46.
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the tendency of some unscrupulous Chinese businessmen to make use of certain 
loop-holes in the I.C.A. by getting Malays to buy shares reserved for Malays 
at a nominal price on their behalf, and to s e l l  them later  at a higher price 
with a cut of the profits going to the Malays concerned. This practice was 
sim ilar to the t,Ali-Babal> system of business. All these circumstances, e i­
ther individually or in some form of combination, produced a situation in 
which the target of 3Ofo Malay ovmership of the corporate sector by 1990 was 
l ik e ly  to appear unattainable. The D.A.P. ju stified  th is contention by re­
ferring to the pessim istic comments of Othman Ahmad, the Malay Chairman of
62the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. It attempted to corroborate Othman Ahmad’s 
remarks by alleging that of the £704 m illion worth of shares reserved for 
the Malays between 1971 ancl 1975» only $268 m illion were taken up, mostly 
by the government on behalf of the Malays, leaving £436 m illion worth of 
stock id le ^  The party then pointed out that the government needed a fast 
and convenient remedy to cover up i t s  own shortcomings so as not to lose i t s  
cred ib ility  among the Malays. Hence i t  alleged that the government predict­
ably institu ted  a series of measures in a bid to arrest shares slipping out 
of Malay hands. Thus the 30$ share reservation for Malays ruling was a lo ­
g ica l follow-up to the Securities Investment Act and the Bumiputra Invest­
ment Foundation^ In in stitu tin g  these measures, the government, according
62. See Anthony Rowley,"The Economic R ealities of Pulling together", Far 
Eastern Economic Review, 10th June, 1977» pp. 29-30. Othman Ahmad had 
stated that i f  by 1990, the Malays were to own 30tfo of the share capi­
ta l of a ll joint-stock public limited companies, then the Malay share 
must r ise  from the £100 m illion in 1970 to £14,000 m illion in 1990, 
given an annual growth rate of 25»8$ . To attain th is , Kit Siang held 
that the Malay ownership must r ise  by £650 m illion each year. (65 times 
what i t  was in 1970). The £14,000 m illion figure was revised to £24, 
000/by Ghafar Baba, Secretary-General of the N.F., in a statement in 
January I960. See New Sunday^  Times, 27th January, I960.
63. See Parliamentary speech,"The Weakened Ringgit" on 10th November,
1975 in Lim Kit Sianga n .c i t . ,pJL39» See also Louis Kraar and Stephen 
Blank,"Malaysia: The High Cost of Affirmative Action", Asia, March/ 
April 1980, pp. 6- 9 . The authors stated that the government's measures
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to the D.A.P.'s implications, preferred to overlook the other unforeseen 
circumstances (discussed above) and tend to lay the entire blame on unscru­
pulous Chinese businessmen, making them a convenient scapegoat since they 
were the most easily identifiable and thus likely to make the Malays forget 
that the other circumstances existed. While the Securities Investment Act 
tightened up the controls of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange(with the film of 
transferring assets from foreign and Chinese investors into Malay hands), 
the Bumiputra Investment Foundation sought to buy up shares in the larger
65and more profitable manufacturing industries to keep in trust for the Malays. 
As the more profitable manufacturing industries were predominantly non-Malay 
owned and showed no inclination to sell their shares to the Malays for a 
variety of reasons, the I.C.A. thus compelled them(those with share
capital) to reserve 30$ of their equity for the Malays. The government’s 
reasons appeared to most Chinese(from previous experience) as a punitive 
measure on the whole Chinese business community for the sins of an unscrupu­
lous few. Thus it could be held that the government was indifferent to the 
legitimate grievances of large Chinese firms that they had taken years to 
build up big manufacturing concerns from scratch, only to see a large pro­
portion of the fruits of their labour being unfairly channelled to Malays,
67simply because they were bumiputras. The A.C.C.C.I. charged the government
in the I.C.A. advocated state capitalism and concluded that by 1990>
23$ of the corporate sector would be owned by the state, either direct­
ly or indirectly. Only 7$ of the corporate sector was likely to be 
owned by Malays individually.
64. For details of the Securities Investment Act, see Anthony Rowley, op. cit. 
For the establishment of the Bumiputra Investment Foundation and its 
reasons, see article,"Plugging the Bumi Loop-hole", Asiaweek, 28th 
April, 1978, p. 13.
65. See Susan Lim,"Propping up the Bumiputras", Insight, August 1978, 
pp. 45-6.
66. Though the reasons are not explicit, it may be surmised that the Chi­
nese preferred to deal with members of their own community, given 
their bigotry that the Malays were incompetent in business.
Article,"Calling for a fair share", Asiaweek, 17th March, 1978, p. 40.67.
195
w ith  r a c i a l  d is c r im in a tio n  in  th e  sense th a t  th e re  was no l e g i s l a t i o n  r e ­
q u ir in g  burai p n tra. companies to  p a r t  w ith  },Ofo o f t h e i r  sh are  c a p i ta l  to  th e  
60C hinese. Under th e se  c ircu m stan ces , i t  was easy fo r  th e  D.A.P. to  make 
p o l i t i c a l  c a p i ta l  out o f th e  A .C .C .C .I . 's  charges th a t  th e  I.C .A . 30$ share  
re s e rv a t io n s  f o r  Malays was a r a c i a l  d isc r im in a to ry  measure on th e  p a r t  of 
th e  government.
In  c r i t i c i s i n g  th e  government on th e  above-m entioned grounds, th e  
D.A.P. t r i e d  to  show th a t  i t s  e a r l i e r  w arnings o f th e  I.C .A . proving  a d e te r ­
r e n t  to  th e  investm ent d r iv e s  o f  th e  T.M.P. were j u s t i f i a b l e .  Thus Lim K it 
S iang  p o in ted  to  th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  r a t e  o f economic growth was a c tu a l ly  be­
low th e  10/o T.M.P. s t ip u la t io n  f o r  th e  y e a r  1 9 7 7 ^  His charge was corrobo­
r a te d  by th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  F edera l I n d u s t r ia l  Development A u th o rity  (F .I .D .A .)  
which m onitored a l l  investm ents in  th e  country  had conceded th a t  lo c a l  c ap i-  
t a l  investm ent fo r  1977 only 2 jfo  o f th e  proposed t a r g e t , The lo g ic a l  
ex p lan a tio n  fo r  th e  low r a te  o f lo c a l  in v estm en t, accord ing  to  th e  D .A .P ., 
was th e  I.C .A . This had a chain  e f fe c t  on fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  who suspected  
th a t  i f  lo c a l  in v e s to rs  h e s i ta te d  to  in v e s t  in  t h e i r  own co un try , som ething 
must be wrong w ith  th e  investm ent c lim a te . U nderstandably th ey  adopted a 
"w ait and see" a t t i tu d e  b e fo re  making any p e r t in e n t  moves. A pparently  im­
p a t ie n t  w ith  th e  lo c a l  in v e s to rs  whom th e  government claim ed had m isunder­
s to o d  th e  r a t io n a le  of th e  I .C .A ., Dr. M ahath ir, th e  Trade and Prim ary In ­
d u s t r ie s  M in is te r , had to  embark on overseas m issions in  a b id  to  convince 
fo re ig n  in v e s to rs  th a t  th e  investm ent c lim a te  in  M alaysia was sound, and 
th e  I.C .A . would n o t a f f e c t  them h a rsh ly . The D.A.P. was in c lin e d  to  lay
68. I b id .
69. See P arliam en ta ry  speech,"T he I n d u s t r ia l  C o -o rd in a tio n  Act" in  Lim K it 
S ia n g ,o p . c i t . , p .168. He s ta t e d  th a t  th e  Finance M in is te r 's  fo re c a s t  
fo r  p r iv a te  investm ent f o r  1977» which was o r ig in a l ly  9 T/as re v is e d  
to  8 .2 io .
70. A rtic le ,"T h e  New Malay Dilemma", Asiaweek, 15th September, 1978. 
p . 31»
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the blame on both the M.C.A. and U.M.N.O. for the dilemma the I.C.A. had 
brought upon the Chinese business community. As the D.A.P. was competing 
for the support of the Chinese business community with the M.C.A., its atta­
cks were directed more at the latter than U.M.N.O. It suggested that if the 
extremists in U.M.N.O. had been able to force the I.C.A. on the Chinese bu­
siness community, thus reneging on the 1957 "quid pro quo" implied contract 
in which there was a division between the Malays and Chinese of political 
and economic power, the M.C.A. was chiefly to blame for encouraging them to 
do so. The weakness of the M.C.A. in the N.F. coalition had made it possi­
ble for the Malays to want to dominate both political and economic power in 
the country. The D.A.P. tend to agree with Chinese business circles (appa­
rently angry at the invasion of their traditional enclave)that the M.C.A. 
could have blocked the I.C.A. during its early stages before it became law
but for reasons which were not clearly explained, the M.C.A. President, Lee
71San Choon, could not or would not do so; As usual when any controversy 
erupted which affected the Chinese, the M.C.A. itself was caught in a dilem­
ma. As a partner of U.M.N.O. in the N.F., it had to support the I.C.A., yet 
at the same time it had to be sensitive to the feelings of the Chinese busi­
ness community from which much of its support came. When these conflicted, 
the M.C.A. tried to steer a middle path. It conceded that the I.C.A. was a 
Mfait accompli11 as in the case of the other anti-Chinese government policies
71. Observers recalled that former Finance Minister and M.C.A. President,
Tun Tan Siew Sin(who resigned in 1974 before the general elections) 
had used his powers to block a legislation similar to the I.C.A. a 
decade earlier. Tun Tan was able to do this because he was the Finance 
Minister and also the then Alliance government under Tunku Abdul Rahman 
faithfully adhered to the "quid pro quo" principle. It may be argued 
that the M.C.A. which conceded the Finance Minister's portfolio to 
U.M.N.O., was no more in a position to block I.C.A.-type legislations 
after Tunku Abdul Rahman resigned as Prime Minister in 1970* The fact 
that the Finance Minister's portfolio was given to Tengku Razaleigh, 
a prominent member of the younger Malays within U.M.N.O., greatly 
strengthened the latter's position. They were thus able to legislate 
the I.C.A. in late 1975» Articles'»'"Calling for a fair share", Asiaweek,
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in the aftermath of the 1969 racial riot. It urged the Chinese to make the 
best of a deteriorating situation and on its part pledged that it would do 
its-test to ensure a fair implementation of the I.C.A. Chinese business 
firms facing difficulties as a result of the I.C.A.'s implementation were 
advised to consult M.C.A. ministers who would channel their problems for 
remedial action by the proper authorities. The M.C.A. tried to explain the 
necessity of supporting the moderate U.M.N.O. leadership by co-operating
72fully with the government to ensure the success of the N.E.P. and the I.C.A.
It echoed the government's contention that the I.C.A. which was the N.E.P.'o 
driving force to restructure to ensure an equitable distribution of the na­
tion’s wealth, was not meant to benefit any particular community(i.e. the
73
Malays)at the expense of others(i.e. the Chinese). The I.C.A.'s implemen­
tation, the M.C.A. repeated, would be flexible and pragmatic. The moderate 
U.M.N.O. leadership, in rallying to the M.C.A., explained that the rationale 
behind the N.E.P. and the I.C.A. had been distorted by communalists and chau­
vinists, in a reference to the A.C.C.C.I. and the D.A.P. Dr. Mahathir re­
iterated that the I.C.A. was legislated to ensure the success of the N.E.P. 
which was premised on bumiputraisml^ He contended that bumiputraism, being 
a necessity for political stability, was a pre-condition of economic growth, 
the alternative being national disunity and racial violence. According to 
him, every country had its N.E.P. and I.C.A., and Malaysia's N.E.P. and I.C.A.
17th March, 1978, pp. 39“40 and "Tough Times for the M.C.A.", Asiaweek, 
15th September, 1978, pp. 34“6.
72. See speeches by M.C.A. President Lee San Choon;. New Straits Times,
27th November, 1978 and M.C.A. Secretary-General Neo Yee Pan; New 
Straits Times, 19th June, 1979» Both warned that if the moderates 
fell from power, the extremists would take over, thus jeopardizing 
the position of the Chinese further.
73* See speech by M.C.A. Deputy Trade and Industry Minister, Lew Sip Hon,
New Straits Times, 13th December, 1978.
74. See interviews with Dr. Mahathir, Malaysian Business, March I979 and 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 13th April, 1979.
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were comparatively less harsh than those of many adjacent countries in South- 
75east Asia. To win the support of the Chinese business community, Dr. Maha­
thir stated that if businessmen sought to co-operate with the government to 
ensure the success of the N.E.P. and the I.C.A.(as some had already done so), 
not only would they keep their existing share of the nation.!s economic cake, 
but would actually be able to expand it. In fact government expenditure in
conjunction with the N.E.P. brought large spin-off advantages to Chinese
76contractors. The gist of Dr. Mahathir's message was that it was more pro­
fitable for the Chinese business community to co-operate with the government 
in supporting the N.E.P. and the I.C.A. so that they too would benefit per­
sonally. The M.C.A.'s position and Dr. Mahathir's message gave the D.A.P. 
added fuel to charge that the M.C.A. was colluding with U.M.N.O. to use the 
N.E.P. and the I.C.A. to produce Malay millionaires(this is to be discussed 
fully in the next section) since the majority of those Malays who benefitted 
were from U.M.N.O. In return for this favour, U.M.N.O. allowed the M.C.A. 
to help itself to the spin-off advantages that were incidentally created.
It was obvious to the D.A.P. that those Chinese contractors who benefitted 
were M.C.A. members who had access to the government. The D.A.P. pointed 
out that the M.C.A. had been very self-centred in this aspect instead of 
concerning itself with the interests of the Chinese business community in 
general, which wanted a repeal of the I.C.A. The I.C.A., the D.A.P. con­
cluded, was just one in a series of pro-Malay measures which seemed to hint 
that the extremists in U.M.N.O. would not stop once economic parity with the 
Chinese was reached by 1990. Judging from previous experience that Malay
75. New Straits Times, 21st November, 1978*
76. Dr. Mahathir was referring to Chinese contractors making millions of 
dollars in government projects sponsored by U.D.A. in both Kuala Lum­
pur and Alor Star, Kedah. See Malaysia, June 1978.
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special privileges which were originally intended to be transitory being 
made permanent (this is to be discussed fully in the next section), the Chi­
nese had reasonable grounds to believe that once the extremists achieved
77economic parity, they would demand economic superiority; The D.A.P. thus 
called for a complete repeal of the I.C.A. It refuted suggestions by the 
extremists that local(i.e. Chinese) investors were deliberately maintaining 
an economic squeeze on the country in order to sabotage the N.E.P. as a pro­
test against the I.C.A., insisting that the reluctance of the Chinese inves­
tors was due to apprehensions and fears of the I.C.A.’s implications. At 
the same time, it also called for a curb on the wide discretionary powers 
vested in Malay bureaucrats who implemented the N.E.P. and the I.C.A., stres­
sing that this would restore the confidence investors once had in the invest­
ment climate of the country.
Thus the D.A.P.'s strong and consistent stand against the I.C.A. 
was to highlight the difficulties and frustrations faced by the business 
community as a result of the I.C.A.'s implications. It was to instigate 
the Chinese business community to stand up to prevent the further erosion 
of their legitimate interests. The D.A.P. felt that the Chinese business
77* See New Straits Times, 2nd June, 1980. At a U.M.N.O. Economic Conven­
tion to review the N.E.P. at its mid-term stage, there were suggestions 
by U.M.N.O. extremists to increase the 30rfo Malay ownership of the cor­
porate sector by 1990 target to 51/* without specifying details as to 
how and when this was going to be achieved. This appeared to be a 
reaction out of fear that Chinese economic development in the country 
wa3 going at a faster rate than that of the Malays. Although no fi­
gures were available to substantiate this, there were indications that 
the Chinese were successfully striving towards their 4 ownership of 
the corporate sector by 1990 target, given their thrift and entrepre­
neurial skills and also the political stability facilitating economic 
development provided by the government. While cautioning against the 
impracticality of the high target (51/<0, U.M.N.O. moderates went all 
out to explain the reasons behind the demand. To the Chinese, this 
did not appear as a restraint on the extremists by the moderates.
Thus they concluded that if this target was to be achieved, it would 
have to be at their expense. Y/hether the fears of the Chinese are 
justified or not would have to depend on how successful the moderate 
U.M.N.O. leadership could restrain the extremists.
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community, up to the point of the I.C.A.'s promulgation in late 1975» still 
appeared unconcerned and indecisive over what action to take to arrest the 
slide towards Malay economic nationalism with all its adverse implications 
on the Chinese. In doing so, the D.A.P. associated itself with the A.C.C.C.I. 
to launch a scathing attack on the M.C.A. By implication, the D.A.P. attemp­
ted to show the Chinese business community that it was a viable alternative 
to the M.C.A. as far as it(i.e. the business community) was concerned. The 
D.A.P. was aware that the government's problem in relation to the N.S.P. and 
the I.C.A. appeared to be to attempt to balance the conflicting demands of 
Malay economic nationalism strongly urging for a restructuring of society 
and the conducive conditions(i.e. minimal legislation)necessary for private 
investment. By consistently calling for the I.C.A.'s entire repeal(which 
it knew the government would ignore), the D.A.P. was in fact prepared to
settle for something less, like its amendments in those sections of it where
78businessmen were adversely affected. The party's main reason for this cou­
rse of action appeared to be its inability to deliver the goods to the Chi­
nese business community, since unlike the M.C.A., it had no access to the 
government.
78. For the government's moves to amend the I.C.A., see New Straits Times, 
13th October, 1978 and 15th June, 1979» The amendments, for example, 
provided for a special Industrial Advisory Council to consider appeals 
from businessmen affected by the I.C.A.'s implementation.
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(c)______ Special Privileges, Exploitation and Corruption
The issues of exploitation and corruption have been a common phe­
nomenon in many third world countries practising the free enterprise system, 
but in Malaysia, their incidence is likely to appear as a by-product of the 
special rights syndrome. From a historical point of view, the Malaysian 
Constitution guaranteed special privileges to the Malays in view of their 
status as the country'3 indigenous peoples. It was also to compensate them 
for their economic backwardness vis-a-vis the non-Malays. Their manner of 
implementation had however generated a lot of controversy. Common allega­
tions by critics, both Malays and non-Malays, were that U.M.N.O., in whose 
care special privileges were placed, had abused and misused them. They, 
especially the D.A.P., argued that special privileges did not uplift the 
poor Malays as originally intended, but instead enriched a few already rich 
and influential Malays in U.M.N.O. or closely associated with it. Exploita­
tion and corruption were thus implied in these allegations. U.M.N.O. on its 
part denied that it had abused and misused special privileges, but could not 
hide the fact that many of its leaders were becoming rich by allegedly ac­
quiring wealth disproportionate to their known sources of income without gi­
ving satisfactory explanations. The N.E.P. re-affirmed and widened the scope 
of special privileges, thereby accentuating their controversy further.
Special Privileges
The special privileges of the Malays have always been a fundamen­
tal issue in Malaysian politics. This problem could be dated back to the
79period immediately following the end of the Japanese occupation in Malaya.
79* For a discussion of this problem, see K.J.Ratnam, Communalism and the 
Political Process in Malaya, University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 
1965, Ch. IV.
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The Malayan Union concept in 1946 made the Malaya realize hov7 weak they were
economically via-a-vis the Chinese and Indians. Thus the proposal under the
Malayan Union to give equal citizenship rights to the non-Malays threatened
80their status as the country’s indigenous peoples. They had taken for gran­
ted that this had been guaranteed by the Colonial Administration. The fear 
that the British had broken this pledge led to the formation of U.M.N.O.
With the solid support of the Malays, U.M.N.O. strongly agitated for the
abolition of the Malayan Union proposals. This was successful and the Fede-
81ration of Malaya Agreement was promulgated in 1948» This restored the po­
sition of the Malays as the country's indigenous peoples. With the citizen­
ship requirements for the non-Malays becoming more stringent and restrictive, 
special privileges came to symbolise the pre-eminent position of the Malays 
in the country. The British High Commissioner was thus made responsible for 
their care under the Federation of Malaya Agreement. When Malaya and later 
Malaysia came into being, the responsibility of special privileges was trans­
ferred to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong(King). Briefly the scope of special pri­
vileges under Articles 153 and 89 of the Constitution covered a system of
quotas applied to recruitment to the public service, scholarships, licences
82for any trade or business and land reservations for Malays. Special privi-
80. For details see James de V. Allen, The Malayan Union, Yale University 
Press, New Haven, 1967 and Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, From Malayan Union 
to Singapore Separation: Political Unification in the Malaysian Region 
1945-1965> University of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1974» Ch. II.
81. Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, (1974) op. cit., Ch. III.
82. Article 153 states:"It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di- 
Pertuan Agong to safeguard the special position of the Malays and the 
legitimate interests of other communities..." Article 89 sanctions 
the system of Malay(land)Reservations. Gordon P. Means, op. cit.,
jd. 40» Means argues that the purpose of Article 153 was to ensure 
that the operation of the democratic process would not erode or termi­
nate Malay special rights and that while the Constitution defines spe­
cific Malay special rights, it provides no guidance as to the legiti­
mate interests of other communities. He contends that the latter ph­
rase has acquired no meaning in practice, since the rulers have never 
recognized any specif illegitimate interests of other communities".
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le g e s  were o r ig in a l ly  in tended  to  be t r a n s i to r y .  They were supposed to  be 
a b o lish ed  e v en tu a lly  when th e  Malays reached  economic p a r i ty  w ith  th e  non- 
Malays a t some fu tu re  d a te .
The D .A .P .'s  p re -1969 a t t i tu d e  tow ards s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s  was 
id e n t i c a l  to  th a t  of i t s  p red ecesso r, th e  P .A .P . Ydien Singapore was in  Ma­
la y s i a ,  Lee Kuan Yew's r a t io n a le  o f s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s  stemmed from h is  ana­
ly s i s  o f th e  causes of Malay poverty?^ He h e ld  th a t  th e se  were a t t r ib u ta b le  
to  t r a d i t i o n a l  Is lam ic  conservatism  in  th e  va lue  system s o f th e  Malays and 
concluded th a t  s p e c ia l  p riv ileg e s (w h ich  could  only  be h e lp fu l  on a s h o r t ­
term  b a s is )  was no t th e  long-term  s o lu t io n  to  Malay p o v erty . In s te a d  r a ­
t io n a l  economic p o l ic ie s ,  d e lv in g  in to  th e  ro o t causes o f Malay p o v e rty , and 
a m ental re v o lu tio n  were advocated. These arguments were summed up in  th e  
P .A .P . 's  d o c tr in e , dem ocratic so c ia lism . Although th e  D.A.P. came to  ac­
cep t th e  p r in c ip le  o f s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s ,  i t  n e v e r th e le s s  doubted t h e i r  
re le v an c e  and v a l id i ty  w ith in  th e  co n tex t o f  M a la y s ia 's  m u l t i - r a c ia l  popu­
l a t i o n .  At b e s t ,  l ik e  th e  P .A .P ., th e  D.A.P. might have h e ld  th a t  th ey  were 
a  n ecessa ry  tem porary m easure. The D .A .P .'s  n e g a tiv e  a t t i tu d e  tow ards spe­
c i a l  p r iv i le g e s  r e f le c te d  i t s  deep commitment to  th e  d o c tr in e  o f dem ocratic  
so c ia lism  in h e r i te d  from th e  P .A .P . I t  claim ed th a t  dem ocratic  so c ia lism
83. They were o r ig in a l ly  meant to  be fo r  15 y e a rs  from M erdeka(l957) where 
by they  would be review ed. See R .K .V asil, P o l i t i c s  in  a P lu r a l  S o c ie ­
ty :  A Study o f Non-communal P o l i t i c a l  P a r t ie s  in  Wes t  Mala y s ia , East 
Asian H is to r ic a l  Monographs, Oxford U n iv e rs ity  P re s s , S ingapore and 
Kuala Lumpur, 1972, p . 18. The 15-y e a r p e rio d  was however g iven  up 
and l e f t  to  th e  d is c re t io n  o f th e  King. The M.C.A. and M .I.C . had 
agreed to  t h i s  in  th e  b e l i e f  th a t  th e  p e rio d  o f s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s  
would be le s s  than  15 y e a rs , gee a lso  K .J.Ratnam , op. c i t . ,  p . 111.
84 . See Alex Jo3ey, Lee Kuan Yew, Donald Moore, S ingapore, 1968, p . 59»
85 . See M ichael Ong, The D .A .P .: Case fo r  a M alaysian M alaysia R e - s ta te d , 
M.A. T h es is , La Trobe U n iv e rs ity , 1969 , Ch. IV. Lim K it S iang  defin ed  
dem ocratic  so c ia lism  as "an ideo logy  and movement committed to  th e  
enlargem ent of in d iv id u a l freedom by c o l le c t iv e  o r s o c ia l  a c tio n  to  
p rov ide  fo r  a l l  an equal r ig h t  to  h ap p in ess , d ig n ity  and th e  f u l f i l ­
ment o f l i f e " .  Op. c i t .
204
was the only "sane and rational" solution to the problem of the unequal 
distribution of wealth in Malaysia, manifested by Malay poverty. As an 
ideological party, the D.A.P. intended the practice of democratic socialism 
on a non-comraunal approach to cut across all racial barriers. Under these 
circumstances, it held that the racist approach of special privileges would 
not solve the problem of Malay poverty because its causes were economic and 
not racial, as allegedly claimed by U.M.N.O. The D.A.P. held that special 
privileges would only create resentment among the non-Malays, the majority 
of whom were also poor like the Malays. The party suggested that special 
privileges were on the contrary, likely to enrich only a few Malays who were 
already rich and influential; in all cases, these would be U.M.N.O. members 
or persons closely associated with U.M.N.O. The implication was that U.M.N.O. 
under the pretext of claiming special privileges for the Malays in general 
to uplift them economically, would tend to channel these privileges to en­
rich itself. This had been manifested by the alleged preferential treatment 
accorded to U.M.N.O. politicians and their relatives in the allocation of 
transport licences, timber and mining concessions, government aid in agri­
culture and scholarships, to mention a few. Under these circumstances, the 
D.A.P. held that U.M.N.O. had abused and misused special privileges which 
were meant to alleviate the incidence of poverty among the Malay peasants, 
farmers, rubber small-holders and fishermen.
Following the 1969 racial riot, the controversy over special pri­
vileges became more intense. The escalation of the controversy appeared to 
be the over-reaction of the Malays towards the perceived threat to abolish 
special privileges altogether on the part of the non-Malay opposition part­
ies, especially the D.A.P., during the long campaign of the 1969 general 
elections. The D.A.P. had harped on the abolition of special privileges 
because it wanted to win the mass support of the Chinese. Thus special
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privileges, which had not been officially permanent, -was- guaranteed in the
Constitution. First indications of this were revealed by the then Attorney-
General, Tan Sri Kadir Yusof in late 1970 when he stated that special privi-
86leges v/ould be for ’’hundreds of years”. The Constitutional Amendment Bill 
in February 1971 considered special privileges one of the ’’sensitive issues” 
and prohibited their discussion in public. The N.E.P. with its first phase, 
the S.M.P.(1971-75), extended the scope of special privileges to include 
education and encroachment into the traditional economic enclaves of the 
non-Malays in the private sector, thus doing away with the ’’quid pro quo” 
policy of Tuiiku Abdul Rahman. Thus special privileges were to include new 
employment opportunities for Malays in the urban areas in new and existing 
industries, shares in private companies, directorships for Malays, etc., to 
mention a few. The 3C$  Malay OY/nership of all sectors of the economy and at 
all levels by 1990 as stipulated by the N.E.P., made special privileges a 
more than ever important means to the Malays to achieve this objective, gi­
ven the short time available(20 years) and the extremely low Malay ownership 
(below 5i°) percentage at the starting point of the N.E.P. in 1970.
The D.A.P. regarded U.M.N.O.'s renewed vigour to perpetuate spe-
a
cial privileges by the N.E.P. as^blatant attempt to build up its financial 
base at all costs. It believed that U.M.N.O. intended to wrest control of 
economic power from the Chinese by using its new unchallenged political po­
wer to this effect. Under these circumstances, the party was skeptical that 
the government would actually realise the N.E.P.'s first aim, i.e. eradica-
86. See Asian Almanac, Vol. VIII No. 43, 24th October, 1970, op. cit.
Contrast this with foot-note 83. In R.K.Vasil,op.cit.,p.18» Tun Razak 
had allegedly told the M.C.A. and M.I.C. prior totKe Constitution 
being drafted in 1957 that special rights would not be necessary for 
more than 15 years. This was to persuade them to drop the 15-year 
limit insistence on special privileges.
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tion of poverty even though the majority poverty group,(according to the
wasT. M.P./were Malays. It felt that U.M.N.O. was more concerned in carrying 
out the N.E.P.'s second aim, i.e. the restructuring of society to eliminate 
identification of race with economic function. The D.A.P.'s rationalizations 
were premised on the "Revolusi Mental1*(Mental Revolution)concept of U.M.N.O. 
in 1971 and the "economic nationalism" call by U.M.N.O. Youth underlying
the N.E.P?^ A team of 14 U.M.N.O. intellectuals led by Senu Abdul Rahman,
the Secretary-General of U.M.N.O., studied in depth and analyzed the various
causes of Malay poverty and economic backwardness. They concluded that if
the Malays wanted to progress economically to be on par with the non-Malays,
they should follow the acquisitive 3pirit and thrift of J.P. Getty and other
88
successful entrepreneurs. The Malays were therefore exhorted to modify their 
attitude and philosophy an regards striving for material affluence through 
business activities in the private sector. They were persuaded that this 
would not conflict with traditional Islamic values. The younger Malays in
U. M.N.O. with high expectations of what the government should do to uplift 
the Malays economically, found the Mental Revolution exhortation very much 
in line with their call for economic nationalism. This cadi reflected their 
deep resentment towards Chinese economic domination of the country which they 
blamed on the previous "quid pro quo" policy of Tunku Abdul Rahman. In its 
most extreme form, economic nationalism made the idea of downright confisca­
tion of Chinese and foreign property(as in Indonesia during the Sukarno era 
as a short cut to wealth)very attractive. However in view of the wide mea­
sures of control exercised by Chinese and foreigners in the economy, such
87. For full details of U.M.N.O.'s "Revolusi Mental", see Syed Hussein
Alatas, The Myth of the Lazy Native, Frank Cass, London, 1977» Cb» X.
88. Ibid.
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confiscation would be tantamount to killing the goose which lay the golden 
eggs. In this case, private investment would leave the country, resulting 
in economic chaos(as in Indonesia prior to the 1965 abortive communist coup) 
and the group mo3t disadvantaged would be the Malays. Thu3 the most effec­
tive alternative to confiscation would be to seek out the co-operation of 
the successful non-Malay entrepreneurs(Chinese and foreign)to create a via­
ble Malay middle class. The D.A.P. believed that its pre-1969 contention 
that special privileges were likely to enrich the Malay elite rather than 
benefit the majority of the poor Malays was vindicated. As few Malays were 
then engaged in the commercial and industrial activities of the country, it 
was obvious that U.M.N.O. intended to place as many Malays as possible in 
these sectors by way of special privileges and the N.E.P, Given the deep- 
rooted traditional and Islam-based value systems of the rural Malays, the 
group to be re-structured, the D.A.P. rationalized that this was unlikely 
to be effected, considering the difficulties of adjustment to new attitudes 
(which may at times appear conflicting) and a new, urban, Chinese-predominated 
cultural environment to be faced by the Malays. Moreover the party felt that 
the target set(30^) was too high and the time factor (20 years) too short.
Thus the D.A.P. believed that any restructuring process would only involve 
the entrenchment of U.M.N.O. elites, members and close associates into com­
fortable positions, resulting in the creation of Malay "haves". Under these 
circumstances, it expected the poor Malays to feel deprived at the deviation 
of special privileges towards the U.M.N.O. elite and then resentful as the 
latter grew rich. The D.A.P. thus began to harp on Malay poverty, attributing 
its causes to the abuse and misuse of special privileges by U.M.N.O. The 
party felt that just as many non-Malays were drawn to it because they were 
fed up with the racial discriminatory policies of the government, the poor 
and deprived rural Malays would similarly find its appeal attractive in view
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o f t h e i r  d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  towards th e  c la s s -d is c r im in a to ry  p ra c t ic e s  of 
89U.M.N.O. A n a t io n a l  r u r a l  o rg a n is a tio n  sub-com m ittee to  m onitor th e  d i s ­
s a t i s f a c t io n s  o f th e  poor Malays in  th e  r u r a l  a reas  w ith  a view to  r e c r u i t
90them as members was formed in  mid-1971* Every e f f o r t  was made to  fa n  th e
f r u s t r a t io n s  o f th e  poor Mal&ys by c i t i n g  numerous in s ta n c e s  o f  th e  a lle g e d
abuse and m isuse of s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s  by U.M.N.O., sometimes to  th e  p o in t
o f  ex ag g e ra tio n . Lim K it S iang a lle g e d  th a t  th e  g ra n tin g  o f lan d , tim ber
and m ining concessions and ta x i  and o th e r  t r a n s p o r t  l ic e n c e s  were given to
in f l u e n t i a l  M alays(in  most cases d e fea ted  A llian ce  can d id a tes  in  th e  1969
g e n e ra l e le c t io n s ) in s te a d  o f  to  poor, bona f id e  Malays who in ten d ed  to  make
91use  o f  th e se  o p p o r tu n itie s  £o r b u s in e ss . He added th a t  th e  b e n e f ic ia ­
r i e s  d id  n o t make use o f th e  l ic e n c e s ,  con cessio n s , e t c . ,  d i r e c t ly  as what 
was expected o f them, but in s te a d  s u b - le t  them to  o th e rs , u su a lly  Chinese 
businessm en, and re c e iv e d  a p o r tio n  o f th e  p r o f i t s .  I t  was a lso  common f o r  
each b e n e f ic ia ry  to  p o ssess  s e v e ra l l ic e n c e s  as in  th e  case o f ta x is  and o t ­
h e r  t r a n s p o r t  means to  j u s t i f y  th e  p ra c t ic e  o f s u b - le t t in g .  In  th e  case o f 
s c h o la rsh ip s  and o th e r  aw ards, th e  D.A.P. a lle g e d  th a t  they  were in  many 
cases  given to  th e  c h ild re n  o f  w e ll- to -d o  Malays in  U.M.N.O. who d id  no t 
deserve  them, in s te a d  of to  th e  d e se rv in g  c h ild re n  o f poor M alays. To g ive
89. See in te rv ie w  w ith  Fadzlan Yahaya, Chairman o f the  D .A .P .’s R ural 
Development B u reau ,* Asiaweek, 18th January , 1980.
90. For d e t a i l s ,  see A sia R esearch Bul l e t i n , Vol. I  No. 1, June 1971« The 
p a r ty 's  th en  O rgan ising  S e c re ta ry , Lee Lam Thye, claim ed th a t  th e  D.A.P. 
had a membership of 3>000 o f which 45cf° were Chinese, 2QF/o Malays w ith  
In d ian s  and o th e rs  making up th e  r e s t .  In  view of th e  p a r ty 's  consp i­
cuous Chinese image, th e  Malay membership appeared in f l a t e d .  Lam Thye 
a lso  he ld  th a t  th e  D.A.P. had e s ta b lis h e d  some 87 branches in  Penang, 
P erak , S elangor, N egri Sembilan and Pahang. I t  p lanned to  expand to  
K elantan  and Trengganu. See a lso  K it S ia n g 's  p re ss  s ta tem en t on th e  
D .A .P .'s  r u r a l  re c ru itm e n t d r iv e d  Malay M ail, 9th. August, 1971*
91. See P arliam en ta ry  speech,"M id-Term Review: Second M alaysia P la n " , in  
Lim K it S iang , op. c i t . ,  p . 97«
92. Ib id .
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legitimacy to its charges of the abuse and misuse of special privileges, 
the D.A.P. ensured that they could be corroborated by the arguments of anti- 
U.M.N.O. Malay intellectuals. Syed Hussein Alatas, Professor of Malay Stu­
dies at the University of Singapore and f ormer Chairman of the G.R.M., had 
on several occasions, criticised the S.M.P. on the grounds that the govern­
ment through its corporations like MARA and PERNAS, had created and developed 
profitable business ventures and then passed them on to influential(but in- 
experienced)Malays to take charge of them?^ His contention was that this 
group of Malays(from U.M.N.O. or closely associated with it)wan unlikely to 
keep the business ventures functioning effectively and efficiently. They 
were rather likely to enrich themselves by the opportunities provided by the 
government. This, in Professor Alatas' view, was therefore irrelevant to 
eradicating poverty among the Malays through eliminating identification of 
race with economic function. Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, a political science lec­
turer at University Sains (Science University of Malaysia),Penang,
stated that the problem of Malay poverty would not be resolved in the 1990s 
since the rural development programmes such as land schemes and the introduc­
tion of technology in agriculture would benefit only a small elite of rural 
94dwellers; This argument was basically similar to that of Professor Alatas 
mentioned above. Anwar Ibrahim, the President of Angkat an Belia Islam Malay­
sia^.B.I.M. ), also made a similar allegation in addition to stressing that
scholarships at the University of Malaya were in most cases given to the chil-
95dren of government ministers instead of poor, deserving Malay students; As 
regards sub-letting transport and other business licences, the D.A.P. hoped
93. Syed Hussein Alatas, The Second Malaysia Plan 1971-75! A Critique, 
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1972. See also his 
criticisms in relation to this in Patrick Low ed., op. cit., pp. 41-8» 
and Yong Mun Cheong ed., op. cit., pp. 106-13.
94. New Straits Times, 29th October, 1979» No WaS speaking at a forum on 
Malaysia in the 1990s organized by the Selangor branch of the Austra­
lian and New Zealand Graduates Association of Malaysia.
95. Yong Mun Cheong ed., op. cit., p. 131»
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to show that U.M.N.O. was a hypocrite in approving of the MAli-Baba" system 
of business among its members in private in contrast to its (i.e. U.M.N.O.’s) 
public opposition to it. By implicating Chinese businessmen in the above- 
mentioned kind of business practice, the D.A.P. was trying to show that it 
was a non-communal party to the poor Malays. However it was careful to point 
out that the Chinese businessmen involved were not representative of the 
whole Chinese community. This was to dispel the belief of the poor Malays 
that the Chinese were a group of exploitative businessmen. This belief had 
gained acceptance in view of the visible role of Chinese middlemen in rural 
areas since the colonial days and had been re-inforced by mutual Sino-Malay 
antagonism. The D.A.P. went all out to stress that the majority of the Chi­
nese were poor petty traders, hawkers, labourers, peasants, etc., just like 
the poor Malays, and the middlemen who formed a minority of the Chinese po­
pulation were likely to be M.C.A. members. This was an attempt to unite the 
the two major races together along the lines of class like what the S.F. had 
done previously. By bringing in the M.C.A., the D.A.P. charged that U.M.N.O. 
was creating Malay capitalists who would collude with Chinese capitalists, 
and by implication, exploit the poor of all races. In arguing along the lines 
of class, the D.A.P. hoped to convince the poor Malays that its doctrine of 
democratic socialism was non-racial in that it was as much against Chinese 
capitalism as it was against Malay capitalism. Democratic socialism was 
thus portrayed as the anti-thesis of the capitalistic philosophy of U.M.N.O.'s 
"Revolusi MentalM to win over the poor rural Malays. U.M.N.O., on the other 
hand, denied that it had abused and misused special privileges as alleged by
its critics, including the D.A.P. The late Tun Razak had stressed that the
96N.E.P. aimed to create a Malay middle class, not a privileged elite. Simi-
96. See R.S.Milne, op. cit., p. 259
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larly, the Finance Minister, Tengku Razaleigh, denied that MARA, PERNAS and
other similar organizations served a small coterie or exist to foster "an
elitist group whose sole claim to the prospect of wealth rests on their ca-
97pacity to manipulate political power in their real interests’1. As regards
the allocation of scholarships, both Musa Hitam and Ghazali Shafie denied
98that they were solely for the sons of Ministers, Datuks, etc. U.M.N.O.
justified its contention that many poor Malays remained backward because they
had not heeded its exhortations in the Mental Revolution, that the Malays
’’should show more enterprise and initiative and be motivated more by achieve-
99ment criteria and less by ascriptive criteria". It could point to the 
success of those Malay businessmen who became rich by making full use of the 
opportunities provided by special privileges and attributed this to a posi­
tive response to the Mental Revolution by the Malays concerned}0^ Under 
these circumstances, U.M.N.O. accused the U.A.P. of going against the N.E.P. 
by opposing special privileges for the Malays. It regarded the D.A.P.’s 
democratic socialism doctrine as a device to split the Malays along the lines 
of clans, given its primary approach to politics that all Malays must be 
united and that it must dominate political power in the country.
Exploitation
The D.A.P. attempted to show that exploitation by Malay middlemen 
was one of the major causes of Malay poverty, which was basically tied to
97» Ibid, op. cit.
98. See Yong Mun Cheong, ed..op.cit.,p.134 and Ghazali Shafie? QP*_ cit*
99» R.S.Milne, op, cit., p. 258.
100. See interview with Tengku Razaleighj Malaysian Business, July 1976
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landlessness among Malay peasants and farmers. Land was the most important 
asset to the peasants and farmers, since it formed the base in which their 
farming activities - predominantly rice cultivation and rubber small-holdings 
- could be carried out. Y/ithout land, whatever skills or agricultural im­
plements the peasants and farmers possessed, would not be utilized. The 
problem of landlessness may be said to be a legaoy of feudalism, the social 
and cultural norm of pre-colonial Malay society'}’^  Land ownership was con­
centrated into the hands of the elite ruling class, a few landlords and some 
peasants, while the majority of the peasantry were likely to operate as te­
nant farmers. They hired the land from the landlords to farm and paid their 
rent in the form of a proportion of their agricultural produce. As regards 
the peasants who owned land, in the majority of cases, such land tend to be 
small and uneconomic in terms of crop yield. Over the years, it had been 
the tendency of the owner-farmers to have the already small size of their 
land diminished or fragmented further, and in some cases, foreclosed or sold 
altogether. Various factors, either individually or in some form of combi­
nation, helped to bring about such a situation, which reflected the economic
backwardness of the Malays. Scholars have attributed this backwardness to
102the deep-rooted Islamic-based social and cultural values of the Malays.
These values, based on conservatism, happened to be diametrically opposed 
to radical change and innovation to adjust to environmental pressures, the 
criteria generally regarded as the Western standards of success^^ In at-
101. For details, see Brien K. Parkinson, op. cit., pp. 31-46, and Michael 
Stenson, op. cit., pp. 45-54»
102. Ibid.
103. B. Parkinson, op.cit. ,p.43. In comparing the value systems of the Ma­
lays with those of the Chinese, he stated that because they possessed 
different cultures, attitudes, values and motivations, both Chinese 
and Malays maximised different things. Neither one was necessarily 
superior to the other, but the maximizing postulates of the Chinese 
were likely to lead to economic development in the Western sense than 
the maximizing postulates of the Malays.
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tem p ting  to  analyze th e se  v a lu e s , Park inson has m ain tained  th a t  th e  Malays 
were n o t only  no t in to le r a n t  of r a d ic a l  changes to  th e  s t a t u s quo o f th e  
s t r u c tu r e  of t h e i r  s o c ie ty , hu t a c tu a l ly  d iscouraged  such ch an g es} ^  He 
added th a t  th e  Malays would only accep t any new id eas  o r methods on th e  con­
d i t io n  th a t  o ld  e x is t in g  id eas  and methods, to  v/hich they  were f a m il ia r ,  wo-
105u ld  n o t he d isca rd ed  i r r e s p e c t iv e  o f w hether they  had become outmoded o r n o t. 
P a rk in so n 's  a n a ly s is  rev ea led  th e  b a s ic  Malay a t t i tu d e  o f a l ik in g  fo r  th e  
f a m i l ia r  and a f e a r  o f th e  u n fa m ilia r . His a n a ly s is  was co rro b o ra ted  by th e  
S.M.P. (Mid-Term Re view) con ten t ion th a t  th e  low incomes o f Malay p easan ts  had 
been a t t r ib u te d  to  uneconom ic-sized h o ld in g s , agronom ically  poor o r u n s u ita ­
b le  p lo ts  o f c u l t iv a t io n ,  t r a d i t i o n a l  methods o f farm ing and lack  of access 
to  modem a g r ic u l tu r a l  in p u ts ’! ^  To agg ravate  t h i s  po v erty , Malay c u l tu r a l  
and s o c ia l  customs f u r th e r  decreed th a t  they  had to  spend la v is h ly  on f e s t iv e  
o c ca s io n s . This meant spending beyond t h e i r  means, which le d  them to  borrow 
e x te n s iv e ly  and th u s  caused in d eb ted n ess . As a r e s u l t ,  they  e i th e r  had t h e i r  
lan d  d im inished  in  s iz e ,  fragm ented, fo rec lo sed  o r so ld  to  s tav e  o f f  f in a n ­
c ia l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  S ince th e se  p ra c t ic e s  in  most cases invo lved  th e  Malay 
landlords(w ho were U.M.N.O. members) as th e  o th e r p a rty  who appeared to  be­
n e f i t ,  th e  l a t t e r  were very v u ln e rab le  to  charges of e x p lo ita t io n  w hether 
th^y  were g u i l ty  o r n o t. Another cause o f peasan t p o v erty , a t t r ib u ta b le  to
th e  government and th e  la n d lo rd s , appeared to  be h igh  land  ta x e s , and in  th e
107case  o f te n a n t fa rm ers , heavy ex ac tio n s  in  th e  form o f t h e i r  produce.
104. I b id .
105. I b id .
106. Lim K it S iang , op. c i t . ,  p . 79.
107. See P.S.R.M . document, P lig h t  o f F ed era l Land Development A uthority  
S e t t l e r s  in  Malaya, Jo u rn a l o f Contemporary A sia , Vol. I l l ,  1973»
p. 3Ö9 .
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U.M.N.O. as th e  p a rty  in  power had attem pted  to  so lve  th e  problem
o f poverty  among th e  peasan ts  in  such a manner as to  ensure th a t  th e  s ta tu s
quo was no t r u f f le d  as f a r  as p o s s ib le , and a lso  th a t  i t s  power base among
108th e  lan d lo rd s  was no t th re a te n e d . Being t r a d i t io n a l  and co n se rv a tiv e
them selves, U.M.N.O. le a d e rs  to  adopt id eas  and methods th a t  were ex-
109pansionary  r a th e r  than  re fo rm atio n a ry  and re v o lu tio n a ry . They b e lie v ed  
th a t  th e  Malay peasan t was b a s ic a l ly  co n se rv a tiv e  and more concerned w ith
sh o r t- te rm  b e n e f i ts  and th e  sym bolic and p sy ch o lo g ica l assu rances from spe­
c i a l  p r iv i le g e s  w ith  reg a rd  to  p r e f e r e n t ia l  land  development p o l i c i e s ! ^
Hence U.M .N.O.'s s o lu tio n  appeared to  be doub le-cropp ing , a g r ic u l tu r a l  ex­
te n s io n  programmes, a g r ic u l tu re  c r e d i t s ,  su b sid ized  f e r t i l i s e r s ,  f r e e  seed ­
l in g s ,  farm im plem ents, improved m arket o u t le t s  f o r  produce, c o -o p e ra t iv e s , 
e t c . ,  in  th e  case o f ow ner-farm ers whose crop y ie ld s  were low. In  th e  case 
o f la n d le s s  p e a sa n ts , U.M.N.O. advocated t h e i r  re - s e t t le m e n t in  land  schemes 
such as FELDA, where th e  p easan ts  would engage in  th e  c u l t iv a t io n  o f more 
lu c r a t iv e  crops such as palm o i l ,  p ineapp le  and h igh  y ie ld  r i c e ^ ^  U.M.N.O.’s 
p o l ic ie s  tend  to  r e - in f o rc e  and s tre n g th en  th e  t r a d i t i o n a l  and co n se rv a tiv e  
Is lam ic -b ased  s o c ia l  and c u ltu re d  va lues o f th e  M alays. Even th e  u n d e rly in g  
ph ilosophy behind i t s  M ental R evolu tion  was not meant to  inv o lv e  r a d ic a l  
changes th a t  would up set th e  whole gamut of Is lam ic  t r a d i t i o n s .  R ather i t
108.
109.
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In  r e l a t io n  to  t h i s ,  P ro fe sso r  Esman s ta te d  th a t" . . .n o n e  o f th e  t r a ­
d i t io n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  of Malay s o c ie ty  a re  to  be im paired in  th i s  
p ro c e ss . The a u th o r i ty , p r iv i le g e s  and s ta tu s  of th e  t r a d i t io n a l  
r u le r s  who a re  f a r  from exemplars o f modern ach iev in g  man, a re  to  be 
f u l l y  re sp e c te d . The co n se rv a tiv e  and r i t u a l i s t i c  form of Islam  in  
M alaysia i s  to  be p ro te c te d  and encouraged. The Malay, p a r t i c u la r ly  
th e  p easan t, i s  to  be made more e f f i c i e n t  and more p ro d u c tiv e  w ith in  
th e  e x is t in g  s o c ia l  system . The r e v o lu t io n ( s i l e n t ) . . .w i l l  be o rd e rly  
and c o n tro lle d  from above. There w il l  be no s o c ia l  re v o lu tio n  and 
no change in  th e  power s t r u c tu r e " .  M ilton J .  Esman,A d m in is tra tio n  
and Development in  M alaysia? I n s t i t u t i o n  B u ild ing  and Reform in  a 
P lu r a l  S o c ie ty , C orne ll U n iv e rs ity  P re s s , I th a c a , New York, 1 9 7 2 ,o p .c i t
pp. 54-5-
Mi chael S tenson, op. c i t . ,  
Gordon P. Means, op. c i t . ,
p. 49« 
p. 51« 111. Ib id .
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was tailored to strengthen the status quo in which its power base was firm' 
ly entrenched.
Given its strong opposition to the government, the D.A.P. was 
understandably disinclined to accept the precarious position U.M.N.O. was 
in, having to deal with the poverty of peasants, partly caused by the tra­
ditional Islamic-based Malay social and cultural values, and the necessity 
of maintaining its power base, which if eroded, would lead, in its view, to 
instability in the country. The D.A.P. intended to show that landlessness, 
the major cause of peasant poverty, was caused by the exploitative tendencies 
of Malay landlords in U.M.N.O. This strategy was not a new one; as early as 
1966, Lim Kit Siang, in his capacity as the then Organising Secretary of the
party, had attacked U.M.N.O. landlords for allegedly exploiting tenant padi
112farmers of their labour. The D.A.P. now felt that its earlier criticisms 
regarding exploitation by landlords, had been vindicated by subsequent events, 
such as the defiance of the peasant leader, Hamid Tuah to seize state land 
without permission for cultivation, the eviction of Tasek Utara squatters 
in Johore Baru, the hunger march in Baling and the demonstrations of Malay 
students against the government}"^ 'Whatever the underlying assumptions be­
hind these incidents, the D.A.P. believed them to be associated with peasant 
poverty, and by implication, exploitation by U.M.N.O.-backed landlords.
112. See Lim Kit Siang,"Revolution Betrayed", Who Lives if Malaysia Dies? 
D.A.P.*s Case for a Multi-racial Society, D.A.P., Petaling Jaya,
19(39, pp. I7O-4. See also the Alliance's reply, "A Rocket for the 
(D.A.P.)Rocket", Suara Malaysia,Vol. II No. 53» 29th December, 1966.
113. Hamid Tuah was detained under the I.S.A. for illegally seizing govern­
ment land at Telok Gong in Selangor in September 1969. For details
of the eviction of squatters in Tasek Utara, see article,"Cutting sho­
rt the life of a village", Far Eastern Economic Review, 4th October, 
1974» For details of the Baling hunger march and the student demon­
strations, see Denzil Peiris,"The Qnerging Rural Revolution", F.S.E.R., 
10th January, 1975 and "Student Rumbles", F.E.E.R., 13th December,
1974.
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Regarding the measures meted out by the government to improve the 
crop yields of owner-farmers, such as double-cropping, agricultural exten­
sion programmes, agriculture credits, subsidized fertilisers, free seedlings, 
farm implements, improved market outlets for produce, co-operatives, etc., 
the D.A.P. doubted very much that these benefits would actually go to the 
poor owner-farmers concerned as originally intended. It alleged that the 
financially superior and influential landlords with connections to U.M.N.O. - 
would in one way or another, procure these benefits for themselves by way 
of unfair competition, thus denying them to the poor owner-farmersY/i- 
thout access to these facilities, it was hardly surprising to the D.A.P. 
that the already small and uneconomic pieces of land belonging to the owner- 
farmers showed any improvement with respect to better and higher crop yields. 
Under these circumstances, the D.A.P. rationalised that the forced fragmen­
tation, foreclosure and sale of their land was inevitable. As for the tenant- 
farmers, the D.A.P. maintained that they were forced to terminate their te­
nancies on their failure to pay the heavy rents exacted in the form of their 
produce. It added that double-cropping was likely to cost the tenant-farmers 
the loss of their tenancies and push them further into poverty and indebted- 
ness. Lim Kit Siang cited the case of the Muda Irrigation Scheme(Kedah) 
where with regard to double-cropping of the rice yields, landlords preferred 
to pool their resources, bought modem machinery, hired farm hands and thereby 
dispensed with the tenant-farmers'!'^^
Turning to the FKLDA schemes for the re-settlement of landless 
peasants in new agricultural land where they would cultivate cash crops such 
as palm oil, pineapple and high yield rice to raise their incomes, the par­
ty’s intention was to shov? that they were just other surreptitious means of
exploitation of the labour of the peasants}^ The government's main objec-
114. Dim Kit Siang, op.cit., p. 61. 115» Ibid.
116. Ibid. 117. Ibid, pp. 57-61.
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tive of the FELDA schemes was to provide land and the costs of resettling 
peasants in a new agricultural environment. The costs would be recouped by 
monthly deductions from the incomes of the settlers through the 3ale of the 
cash crops they had cultivated. The government would also provide facilities 
to market the produce of the peasants and also to meet their daily necessi­
ties. Its intention behind the FELDA schemes was to create a new breed of 
farmers who would not be so much subjected to poverty as the ordinary rice 
cultivator and rubber small-holder, both of whom were affected by seasonal 
changes amd price fluctuations of an international market. The D.A.P. alle­
ged that the government had deliberately suppressed the conditions of the 
FELDA schemes that prospective settlers must fulfil as their part of the 
bargain while at the same time publicising the benefits to be derived. It 
held that these conditions when properly examined, would reveal that the 
prospective settlers would not be having such a good deal as they were made 
to expect by the government. In trying to show that these conditions in 
fact worked to the disadvantage of the settlers, the D.A.P. alleged that 
the government had exploited the peasants after deceiving them by vague
promises. The D.A.P.'s allegations were corroborated to a large extent by
118the P.S.R.M., the former Malay wing of the defunct S.F. The P.S.R.M.'s
leaders, Syed Husin Ali and Kassim Ahmad, were well-known Malay intellectuals
with leftist tendencies, bitterly opposed to the capitalist policies of the
119government. The P.S.R.M. claimed to have significant support from Malay
118. See P.S.R.M. document, Plight of Federal Land Development Authority 
Settlers in Malaya, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. Ill, 1973» 
pp. 367-71» for full details.
119. Both Syed Husin Ali and Kassim Ahmad are at present detained under 
the I.S.A. The former was detained in 1974 following the eviction 
of Tasek Utara squatters and the hunger march by peasants in Baling. 
The latter was detained in 1976 with other politicians from both the 
government and the opposition follöwing the confession of Samad Is­
mail in relation to C.U.F. activities.
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university students who took an active part in opposing government actions 
over the detention of Hamid Tuah under the I.S.A., the eviction of squatters
in Tasek Utara and the hunger march of peasants in Baling.
The D.A.P.'s main allegation regarding the FELDA schemes was the
perpetual state of indebtedness that the government had brought upon the
settlers through not making to them clearly the conditions of their re- 
120settlement. In concurring with the P.S.R.M., the D.A.P. held that the
government had taken advantage of the eagerness of the peasants to partici­
pate in the schemes owing to their being landless for a long time. On ac­
cepting the conditions of participation, it was held that the settler fami-
121ly was given a loan of $15,000 to $25,000. This was to meet the costs of 
re-settlement and incidental expenses prior to the scheme becoming fully 
operational when the settlers could harvest their crops. The settler fami­
ly was given to understand that the loan would have to be repaid by deduc­
tions from their monthly income from the sale of the crops, estimated to
122be between $300 and $400, when the scheme became fully operational. In
the intervening period, the settler would be given a monthly allowance of
$70 to meet his daily needs in respect of food, etc., and also to pay the
123compulsory developmental tax and co-operative dues. Both the D.A.P. and 
the P.S.R.M. claimed that the settlers were deceived into believing that once 
the loan was repaid, they could keep the whole portion of their monthly 
income and also that they could own the land on which they farmed. The
120. Lim Kit Siang, op, cit., p. 58*
121. P.S.R.M., Plight of the Federal Land Development Settlers in Malaya, 
p. 367.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
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D.A.P. and P.S.R.M. further accused the government of not distinguishing 
between an allowance and an income to the simple peasants. Thus it was held 
that when the schemes became fully operational and the settlers were in fact 
earning between &300 and $400 per month as envisaged, their take-home income 
continued to be limited to $70 monthly, much to their frustration. The go­
vernment, it was alleged, could determine the actual income due to the set­
tlers because it was virtually in charge of marketing their produce and pro­
viding them with the basic necessities such as food, etc. The D.A.P. thus 
claimed that irrespective of how much the settler earned, the government co­
uld always manipulate the figures in such a way that his monthly income wo­
uld be limited to only $70. The government was also accused of not revealing
124the rate of interest charged on the loan. In the absence of this, the 
D.A.P. suggested that they were higher than the normal rates charged. The 
absence of an up-to-date statement of the debts of the settlers was inter­
preted by the D.A.P. as the government's intention to keep them permanently 
in debt. Thus the D.A.P. held that the major part of the income of the set­
tlers in fact went to the government who was making use of their cheap la­
bour to enrich itself. To aggravate the plight of the settlers, both the 
D.A.P. and the P.3.R.L1. claimed that purchases from the government in res­
pect of necessities like food, etc., were at higher costs than those normally
charged, and that the settlers were not entitled to any labour benefits like
125pensions, paid holidays, injury benefits, sick or hospital benefits. ' The 
real beneficiaries of the FHILDA schemes, according to the D.A.P., were the 
middlemen and contractors who supplied the facilities for the projects.
124. Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 58.
125. P.S.R.M., Plight of the Federal Land Development Settlers in Malaya, 
p. 368.
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Under these circumstances, the D.A.P. held that the government was actually 
aggravating the poverty of the peasants instead of eradicating it through 
the FELDA schemes. FELDA was not the solution to the problem of landless­
ness among the peasants, since too many restrictive conditions were imposed 
on them, which in the long run, worked to their disadvantage. Also the high 
incomes and the eventual ownership of the land which they had been made to 
expect often did not materialize.
Having criticised the government freely on the alleged exploita­
tion of the poor peasants, the D.A.P. attempted to make its own suggestions 
as towards a solution of the problem as attractive as possible to the pea­
sants concerned. The D.A.P. argued that if the government was sincere in
solving the problem of landlessness among the peasants, it should give land
126freely to the peasants with the only condition that they cultivated it.
In this way, the party held that only bona fide landless peasants (not ab- 
sentee landlords) should be allowed to till the land given to them. To 
remove the root causes of poverty among peasants, which the D.A.P. had bla­
med the government for deliberately avoiding, the party suggested that the
128government should institute radical and structural agrarian reforms.
This particular suggestion was not a new one, having been advocated by Ahmad
129Boestamam in the early days of Malay nationalism in 1946. 7 The P.S.R.M. 
and the P.A.P. had also called for similar land reforms. The D.A.P.'s ra-
126. Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 80.
127. This suggestion was made by Lee Lam Thye. See Ian Gill,"PERNAS Octo­
pus: Facing Digestive Problems", Insight, April, 1979» P* 24.
128. For details of this, see Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., pp. 61,71-2, 80.
129« See Mohamed Noordin Sopiee, (1974) op. cit., p. 224. See also similar 
calls by Anwar Ibrahim, Asiaweek, 24th August, 1979» Chandra
Muzaffar, New Straits Times, 29th October, 1979«
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tionale behind agrarian reforms was to break the hold that the landlords 
allegedly had on the peasants, which had been responsible for the fragmenta­
tion, foreclosure and sale of land belonging to the owner-farmers. The 
D.A.P. called on the government to allocate land whose sizes were at least 
economically feasible to the peasants}^ The government should also encou­
rage the diversification of crops through double-cropping and even multiple 
cropping!^ It should ensure that the peasant eventually owned the land he 
tilled and not be left to the mercy of vague regulations which served to 
perpetuate his indebtedness. The marketing of the produce of the peasants, 
credit facilities and co-operatives should also be prohibited from operating 
in such a way as to enable middlemen to exploit the peasants.
The D.A.P.'s suggestions to resolve the problem of landlessness 
among the peasants were designed to erode the power base of U.M.N.O. On 
the surface, the D.A.P.’s advocacy of agrarian reforms appeared reasonable 
in intending to increase the incomes of the peasants. Y/hat the D.A.P. care­
fully avoided and what U.M.N.O. certainly found precarious, were the diffi­
culties brought about by a complex situation involving the social, cultural 
and religious values of the Malays. Agrarian reforms along radical and struc­
tural lines pierced through the very core of Islamic traditional conservatism. 
They would necessitate the conservative Malay peasants to discard outmoded 
values and adopt new ones. According to Parkinson’s earlier analysis of how 
the Malays preferred the familiar and feared the unfamiliar, they were likely 
to reject these reforms if they felt that their religion and culture were 
compromised. Even the P.S.R.M. with its conspicuous Malay leadership had
130. Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 80.
131. Ibid, p. 72.
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found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  convince th e  Malay p easan ts  about th e  n e c e s s i ty  of 
a g ra r ia n  re fo rm s. In  th e  case of th e  D.A.P. w ith  i t s  predom inant Chinese 
le a d e rs h ip , th e  ta sk  would be even more d i f f i c u l t .  U.M.N.O. on i t s  p a r t  
fe a red  th a t  i f  any a g ra r ia n  reform s were c a r r ie d  o u t, i t  would up set the  
fe u d a l t r a d i t i o n a l  m onarchial system  of government, sym bolic o f Malay sove­
re ig n ty  in  th e  coun try , which i t  was t r y in g  so hard to  p re se rv e . A s i tu a t io n  
s im ila r  to  th e  r i s e  of th e  Communist P a rty  o f In d o n esia  b e fo re  1965 be
imminent i f  p easan ts  were o rgan ized  a long  th e  l in e s  of c la s s .  But what 
U.M.N.O. fe a re d  even more was th e  e ro s io n  o f i t s  power b ase , a s ig n i f ic a n t  
p a r t  o f i t  b e in g  made up o f th e  la n d lo rd s . Y/hatever th e  d e fe c ts  of th e  
s ta tu s  quo,su ch  as th e  a lle g e d  e x p lo ita t io n  in  which much economic a fflu e n c e  
was v e sted  in  th e  hands o f th e  few lan d lo rd s  as ag a in s t th e  a lle g e d  mass 
poverty  of th e  p e a sa n ts , they  c e r ta in ly  upheld Malay t r a d i t i o n ,  c u ltu re  and 
r e l ig io n .  Most im portan t of a l l ,  acco rd in g  to  U.M.N.O*, they  p rese rv ed  i t s  
power b a se . On th e se  grounds, U.M.N.O. considered  a g ra r ia n  reform s advoca­
te d  by th e  D.A.P. as d ia m e tr ic a lly  opposed to  i t s  v e s te d  i n t e r e s t s .  Knowing 
f u l l y  w ell th a t  i t s  sug g estio n s  would n ever be accepted  by U.M.N.O., th e  
D .A .P .'s  in te n t io n  was n e v e r th e le s s  to  d i s c r e d i t  th e  l a t t e r  in  th e  eyes o f 
th e  p e a sa n ts . The D.A.P. a s so c ia te d  e x p lo i ta t iy e  lan d lo rd s  w ith  U.M.N.O.'s  
power base and a ttem pted  to  make them unpopular to  th e  p e a sa n ts . In  th i s  
way th e  p easan ts  were in d i r e c t ly  drawn to  r e s e n t  U.M.N.O., t h e i r  resen tm ent 
be ing  d i r e c t l y  channelled  towards th e  la n d lo rd s . By c a l l in g  fo r  th e  removal 
o f th e  la n d lo rd s , th e  D.A.P. was im plying th a t  U.M.N.O. erode i t s  own power 
b a se . T his l e f t  U.M.N.O. in  a p reca rio u s  p o s i t io n , having  to  choose between 
p re se rv in g  i t s  power base and i t s  c r e d ib i l i t y  among th e  p e a sa n ts . In  th e  
event U.M.N.O. was u n lik e ly  to  adopt m easures which would je o p a rd iz e  i t s  
power base even i f  i t  meant th a t  i t s  c r e d ib i l i t y  was impugned.
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Corruption
The D.A.P.'s next move was to highlight the wealth acquired by
the Malay elite and allude it to corruption. In this, it aimed to show that
the wealth acquired by the Malay elite was disproportionate to their known
sources of income as Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries,
132Mentri-mentri Besar, M.P.'s, state assemblymen and senior civil servants.
The material affluence of the Malay elite was manifested by politicians, 
senior bureaucrats and royalty holding several directorships in private com­
panies, monopolising government contracts and new industries and acquiring 
shares'!''^  The D.A.P. held that the wealth of the Malay elite was acquired 
by their domination of politics and the bureaucracy since almost all rich 
Malays were once political leaders or senior civil servants}^ Lim Kit Siang
alleged that these Malay politicians in power and civil servants were likely
135to make money out of their office and thereby were corrupted. He cited 
several cases to show that the Malay elite had corruptly enriched itself it­
self through numerous opportunities in private and public investments crea-
132. See Parliamentary speeches,"Why N.B.I. must be an independent agency", 
pp. 30-42, and "Corruption in High Political Circles", pp. 43-9»
Lim Kit Siang,op.cit. See also article,"Is Nepotism government backed?", 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 2nd September, 1977» for Lim Kit Siang's 
allegations.
133* Although there were no statistics of Malay millionaires, there was
speculation that there were probably a few hundred Malay millionaires 
and about 50,000 Malays who constituted the rising Malay middle class 
in the bureaucracy, business, professions and the military. See Brew­
ster Grace,"The Politics of Income Distribution", American Universi­
ties Field Staff Inc. Southeast Asian Series, Vol. XXIV No.9» Septem­
ber 1976, p. 5.
134» Article,"Is Nepotism government backed?", F.S.E.R., 2nd September, 1977*
135. Ibid
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ted by the N.E.P., under the pretext of restructuring society . MARA had 
bu ilt shop-house3 in the towns for bona f id e Malay traders in lin e  with the 
N.E.P.’s objective of creating a Malay urban and industrial community.
The D.A.P. alleged that U.M.N.O. members had instead acquired these shop- 
houses, not to trade, but to rent them out(in some cases to Chinese busi­
nessmen) at exhorbitant charges to make huge profits}"^ In Malacca, some 
3,300  acres of state land which had orig inally  been allocated to peasants 
to grow food crop3 by way of FELDA, were allegedly retracted and given to
a Malay company, the Syarikat Sri Lingga Berhad, to develop into an o il  
137palm estate. According to Lim Kit Siang, the men behind the o i l  palm 
project were close associates of the Chief Minister of Malacca. Under these 
circumstances, the D.A.P. alleged that the Malacca Chief Minister was cor­
rupted in engaging in secret business deals with private companies at public 
expense. Other cases of corruption through the use of p o lit ic a l power a l­
leged by the D.A.P. were the alienation of 1,000 acres of o il  palm land in 
Hutan Melintang(Perak) worth some $100,000 to a P.P.P. state assemblyman in  
1973 when the P.P.P. joined the N .F .coalition(see C h.IIl), a newspaper edi­
tor who became a millionaire after becoming Chief Minister of a state and 
investing $1.5 million in a newspaper in Singapore, and another Chief Minis­
ter  who paid $200,000 annual premiums for an insurance policy worth $5 mil- 
lion . The D.A.P. alleged further that corruption was also through misma­
nagement and failure to follow the principle of public accountability with 
regard to public enterprises. Lim Kit Siang cited the case of the mismanage-
136. See Parliamentary speech,"Security and Development", Lim Kit Siang, 
op. c i t . ,  p. l 62 .
137* See Parliamentary speech, "The Weakened Ringgit", Lim Kit Siang, 
op. c i t . ,  p. 138.
138. Ibid, p. 4 5 . In the la tter  2 cases, Kit Siang was probably refer­
ring to Donald Stephens and Tun Mustapha, former Chief Ministers of 
Sabah.
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ment of Bank Rakyat in which privileged Malays had unscrupulously enriched
themselves through excessive loans to engage in land purchases or business 
139deals. ' The non-payment of these loans at the time the white paper on 
Bank Rakyat was tabled in Parliament would have liquidated the bank if not 
for government intervention at the last minuteM^
In citing the many cases of corruption, the D.A.P. attempted to
show that it had been indirectly encouraged(or at least not discouraged)by
the government's failure to check the abuse and misuse of special privileges
and also exploitation through va3t opportunities for the Malays provided by
the N.E.P. The D.A.P. depicted corruption as a social evil, with most of its
victims being the poor Malays since they were supposed to be the beneficia-
141ries of the N.E.P.'s vast opportunities. Lim Kit Siang claimed that corrup­
tion had deviated from the aims of the N.E.P. in this aspect. The D.A.P. 
believed that the government, despite the incorruptibility of the Prime Mi­
nister, Datuk Hussein Onn, did not appear serious in checking the incidence 
of corruption in high political circles. This was manifested in either the 
reluctance or inability of the National Bureau of Investigations(N.B.I. )to
crack down on corruption among government politicians in spite of wide publi-
142city to the contrary. As a result, the D.A.P. claimed that the public had
alluded corruption to being a norm of the government with bureaucrats in the
143lower rungs of the hierarchy following the example of their superiors.
139. For full details, see K. Das, "Calling Debtors to account", Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 13th July, 1979» Bank Rakyat's sources of funds were 
built up from the income of poor fishermen and farmers. About 6,520 
people had borrowed amounts ranging from $1,000 to $1 million. More 
than 2,000 loan defaulters had been served with notices to recover 
nearly $25 million. Op. cit.
140. For details of the white paper on Bank Rakyat, see Malaysia, August
1979.
141.
142.
See "Kit Siang on the N.E.P. saboteurs", ibid.
Lim Kit Siang, op. cit., p. 45» 143* Ibid, p. 46
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The D.A.P. appeared more in te r e s te d  to  h ig h lig h t th e  f a c t  th a t  th e  government 
was l i k e ly  to  tak e  ac tio n  ag a in s t co rru p tio n  only to  th e  e x ten t th a t  i t s  po­
wer base  was th re a te n e d . T h i3 was ev iden t in  th e  case a g a in s t Dato Harun, 
th e  form er M entri Besar of Selangor, who had s e v e ra l charges of co rru p tio n  
in v o lv in g  m illio n s  of d o lla rs  in  s e v e ra l d ea ls  le v e l le d  a g a in s t him in  1976^ ^  
The D.A.P. he ld  th a t  i t  was common knowledge to  th e  p u b lic  th a t  Dato Harun 
th re a te n e d  th e  power base of th e  l a t e  Prime M in is te r , Tun Razak, and was 
q u ie t ly  persuaded to  accept th e  post o f M a la y s ia 's  permanent r e p re s e n ta t iv e  
a t  th e  U nited N ations. Had Dato Harun accepted  Tun R azsk 's  o f f e r ,  th e  D.A.P. 
m ain ta ined  th a t  th e  co rru p tio n  charges might not have been made o r q u ie t ly  
dropped. The p a rty  added th a t  th i s  had exp lained  why p o l i t i c i a n s  who toed
th e  governm ent's l in e  ob ed ien tly  and a ss id u o u sly  had no f e a r  of be ing  charged 
145w ith  c o rru p tio n . In  fa c t  th e  D.A.P. h e ld  th a t  th e  government would even 
go to  th e  ex ten t o f sh ie ld in g  i t s  staunch  su p p o rte rs  and members from corrup­
t io n  ch arg es . Lim K it Siang c ite d  th e  case of s e v e ra l  open l e t t e r s  in  c i r ­
c u la t io n  in  1975» accusing  Abdullah Ahmad, th e  form er P o l i t i c a l  S ec re ta ry  
to  Tun Razak, o f be ing  a m il l io n a ir e  in  a cq u ir in g  w ealth  n o t p ro p o r tio n a te  
to  h is  known sources of income and demanding an in v e s t ig a t io n  by th e  N .B .lM ^ 
K it S iang a lle g ed  th a t  th e  Home A ffa irs  M in is try , f a r  from i n s t i t u t i n g  
an in v e s t ig a t io n  by th e  N. B. I . ,  had in  f a c t  banned th e  c i r c u la t io n  o f th e
1 A 'l
open l e t t e r s  under the I .S.A.  on the grounds that they were subversive.
144» The case ag a in s t Dato Harun began in  e a r ly  1974 when th e  l a t e  Prime 
M in is te r , Tun Razak, ordered the  N .B .I. to  look in to  a l le g a t io n s  of 
co rru p tio n  in  th e  Banggi Timber concession  d ea l in v o lv in g  th e  form er 
M entri B esar, by s tu d en ts  of th e  N a tio n al U n iv e rs ity . Datuk Hussein 
con tinued  th e  case a f t e r  Tun Razak d ied  in  e a r ly  1976. See R .S.M ilne 
and D.K.Mauzy. o p .c i t . , pp.205-7 * Dato Harun was e v en tu a lly  found g u i l ­
ty  and j a i l e d  fo r  a t o t a l  of 6 y e a r s .
145 . For d e t a i l s ,  see Fan Yew Teng,"M alaysia: Growing Insurgency and In ­
c re a s in g  R epression", Jou rn a l of Contemporary A sia , Vol. VI, 1976»
PP. 371-5.
146 . Lim Kit Siang, op. c i t . ,  p . 40« 147» Ib id .
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The D.A.P. added that the government also did not take action against Tun 
Mustapha, although it was evident that the ex-Chief Minister of Sabah was 
corrupted, a fact he did not deny. This was because Tun Mustapha had coun­
tered a BERJAYA suggestion that the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the al­
leged corrupt practices of his government with the demand that such an inqui-
149ry should have its scope broadened to cover the whole of Malaysia. In 
calling for the N.B.I. to be made accountable to Parliament rather than mere­
ly to the Prime Minister's department, the D.A.P. charged that it was being 
used as a political weapon to strike down the Prime Minister's opponents 
or protect its own disciples, instead of it being used to conduct impartial 
investigations on all alleged corruption cases.
The D.A.P.'s charges that the government had indirectly condoned
corruption where its own power base was not threatened could be corroborated
by previous incidents, the allegations by Malay intellectuals and even the
implementation of some of its legislations, especially with regard to share
ov/nership. In the early 1960s, government funds were used to pay the legal
costs of a minister after he had unsuccessfully sued an opposition M.P. for 
150libel and slander. In that suit, the P.P.P. leader, D.R.Seenivasagam, had
151accused the then Minister of Education, Rahman Talib, of corruption. Syed 
Hussein Alatas had at various stages alleged that certain U.M.N.O. leaders 
were corrupted, a fact that Musa Hitam did not directly deny, but attempted
148. Ibid, p. 46. 149. Ibid.
150. See Mahathir b. Mohamad,The Malay Dilemma, Asia Pacific Press, Singa­
pore, 1970> Ch. I.
151. For details, see Karl Von Vorys, Democracy without Consensus, Commu­
nal ism and Political Stability in Malaysia, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1975» PP* 183-8.
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to explain away that it was the privilege of the party in power, as in the
cane of many countries, to procure facilities to enable the party to dischar-
152ge its mandate effectively to the people. Similarly, Anwar Ibrahim had
stated that Datuk Huessein Onn's reputation as an incorruptible politician
would only be meaningful if he started to weed out the corrupted members of
153his own cabinet first before dealing with other allegedly corrupted cases.
The D.A.P. concluded that corruption was becoming increasingly rampant and
more open, inspired by greed. For instance, it was alleged that U.M.N.O.
members had taken advantage of the new ruling in the Securities Investment
Act and the I.C.A. in respect of share quotas for Malays to enrich themselves
154excessively. Two big private companies, the East Asiatic Company and the 
Kuala Lumpur Kepong, had "as a gesture of goodwill towards the bumiputra 
people" issued to U.M.N.O. members and other influential Malays, shares at
155prices far below those currently quoted on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange.
As these two companies were established, the prices of their shares naturally 
rose, thereby creating substantial profits(more than $70 million) for the 
holders. The government, on its part, tried to rationalise in its reaction 
to the allegations of corruption. The typical U.M.N.O. justification was 
that the Malays(as represented by its members)were showing signs of success 
at striving for the N.E.P.’s 30^ Malay ownership target by 1990« Among the
152. See Yong Mun Cheong ed., op, cit., p. 153*
153» See interview with Anwar Ibrahim, Asiaweek, 24th August, 1979» PP» 
30-1.
154» For full details, see Guy Sacerdoti and Paul Yfilson, "Stockmarket 
1 Spoils for Sons of the Soil", Far Eastern Economic Review, 6th Octo­
ber, 1978» PP» 72-4» and article,"Alleged Discrimination in Malay­
sian Share Issues", Asia Research Bulletin, Vol. VTII No. 6, Novem­
ber 1978.
155. Guy Sacerdoti and Paul Wilson, op. cit. A broker in Kuala Lum­
pur, however, denied that the low-priced shares issued were a gesture 
of goodwill. He claimed that both the companies concerned were in­
directly ordered by the government to do so.
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moderates, there were attempts to explain away a situation in which corrup­
tion was alleged to the detriment of the poor Malays. While there was a 
willingness to concede that a difference existed between what was intended 
and what had actually been implemented, U.M.N.O. denied that the N.E.P.’s 
aims were being deviated, as alleged by the D.A.P. Dr. Mahathir stated that
economic privilege was not being translated into political advantage for
156U.M.N.O. He justified the allocation of N.E.P.-created opportunities to 
U.M.N.O. members since they too were Malays. Dr. Mahathir did not make a 
point-by-point reply to the D.A.P. regarding the numerous charges of corrup­
tion, but stressed that the backwardness of the Malay peasants, the alleged 
victims of corruption, was their incapability to absorb government aid and 
to utilize it properly. As for the issue of shares, he contended that the 
best way to keep them within the hands of the Malays was to give them to 
those Malays capable of retaining them, i.e. the already successful Malay 
businessmen, who were likely to be U.M.N.O. members. If, as he suggested, 
shares were given to the poor Malay peasant unfamiliar with the mechanics 
of how their prices moved, he might be used by others(presumably Chinese 
bu3inessmen)by financing him and using his name, so that although the poor 
Malay peasant might make a small fortune, he would not ultimately hold the 
shares. What the government did not explain, and what appeared to be the
rationale behind its indirect condonation of corruption, was to pacify the
157extremists who had massive support at grass-roots level. Granted that
156. See interviews with Dr. Mahathir, Malaysian Business, March 1979 and 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 13th April, 1979*
157. See article,"Is Nepotism government backed?", Far Eastern Economic 
Review,2nd September, 1977. A U.M.N.O. backbencher from Ulu Trengga- 
iiu, in referring to the fears expressed by the D.A.P. that the N.E.P. 
had created Malay millionaires rather than helping the poor Malays, 
was reported to have said in Parliament that the creation of Malay 
millionaires was justifiable on the grounds that there were non-Malay 
millionaires. He held that the more Malay millionaires the N.E.P. 
created, the greater its success would be.
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th ey  were re sp o n s ib le  fo r  th e  1969 r a c i a l  r i o t  and th e  economic n a tio n a lism  
behind  th e  N .E .P ., the in c l in a t io n  of th e  top  U.M.N.O. le a d e rsh ip  to  overlook 
th e se  a l le g a t io n s  of co rru p tio n  among them was regarded  as th e  n ecessa ry  
p r ic e  to  pay to  m ain ta in  s t a b i l i t y  w ith in  th e  p a r ty .
In  r e t ro s p e c t ,  th e  D.A.P. a ttem pted  to  show th a t  e x p lo i ta t io n  and 
c o rru p tio n  were lin k e d  to  s p e c ia l  p r iv i le g e s .  In  f a c t  i t  suggested  th a t  
they  were th e  m a n ife s ta tio n s  of th e  ex cessiv e  abuse and m isuse o f sp e c ia l  
p r iv i le g e s .  The D.A.P. went out o f i t s  way to  d e p ic t th e  poor Malays as 
th e  v ic tim s  and the  U.M.N.O. e l i t e  as th e  o p p resso rs  by c i t in g  numerous 
in c id e n ts  of a lle g e d  e x p lo ita t io n  and c o rru p tio n  by U.M.N.O., some of which 
were c o rro b o ra ted  by the  anti-U .M .N .O. Malay i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  By su g g es tin g  
th a t  th e  a lle g e d ly  U .M .N .O .-perpetrated  e x p lo i ta t iv e  and co rru p ted  p ra c t ic e s  
were c o n tra ry  to  th e  aims o f the  N .E .P ., th e  D.A.P. hoped to  convince th e  
poor Malays th a t  p overty , t h e i r  main problem, was due to  c la s s  e x p o li ta t io n  
r a th e r  th an  r a c i a l  antagonism s, as U.M.N.O. was l ik e ly  to  advocate . The 
D .A .P .'s  purpose in  th i s  a spec t was to  s e l l  i t s  d o c tr in e  of dem ocratic  so ­
c ia lism  to  th e  poor Malays to  p lay  down i t s  conspicuous Chinese image.
CHAPTER VI
Conclusion.
The D.A.P.'s post-1969 strategy of highlighting issues consequen­
tial on the government's policies did not depart significantly from its pre- 
1969 strategy, except that the overt "Malaysian Malaysia"call was played 
down, and its criticisms with regard to sensitive issues were couched in 
insinuations} The usual style of the D.A.P. was to regard a particular 
standard or yardstick as an acceptable norm, and to point to the fact that 
government policies, either in principle or implementation, deviated from 
this norm. For instance, the party suggested that the Constitution was sa­
cred and that the New Education Policy, stressing on Malay as the sole me­
dium of instruction, thereby leading to the neglect of the other languages, 
had conflicted with Article 152(l) of the Constitution which guaranteed the 
use and sustenance of other languages. Having made this suggestion, the 
D.A.P. would then give its own proposals, which ignoring all the possible 
constraints and problems of a multi-racial society faced by the government, 
appeared to comply with the required standard. This implied a call to the 
government to modify its policies accordingly to comply with the D.A.P.- 
proposed acceptable norms. For instance, if the New Education Policy con­
flicted with the Constitution, then it should be amended to follow the lat­
ter. The D.A.P. then ensured that its criticisms of the government could 
be corroborated by well-known persons or bodies. It either echoed the argu­
ments of the government's critics or placed its arguments in such a way that 
they could be identical with those of other critics. Thus criticisms of 
government exploitation of poor Malays and corruption were vindicated by
1. The D.A.P. also assumed for itself the role of a watchdog by highligh­
ting other issues in relation to government inefficiency, which it 
criticised freely and openly. See for instance, Lim Kit Siang's cri­
ticisms of the inefficiency of the immigration department in issuing 
passports, Far Eastern Economic Review, 7th September, 1979»
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Professor Syed Hussein Alatas' criticisms of the S.M.P. Similarly it echoed 
the A.C.C.C.I.'s and the Bar Council’s condemnation of the I.C.A. and the 
E.S.R. respectively. It also justified its criticisms of the I.C.A.’s im­
plementation by referring to Tunku Abdul Rahman's displeasure towards it.
The D.A.P. followed the government with regard to claims for national solu­
tions to communal problems, but from the opposite end of the spectrum. Just 
as the government stressed that Malay problems were national problems, the 
D.A.P. similarly argued that non-Malay problems also qualified as national 
problems, thereby meriting national rather than sectional solutions. By 
adopting the above-mentioned measures, the D.A.P. was boosting its image as 
a fearless, principled party while at the same time denigrating that of the 
government.
The D.A.P.'s strategy must be viewed within the context of its 
perception of national unity in Malaysia as interpreted by the government.
The government's approach to national unity was based on historical grounds, 
that Malaysia was first and foremost, a Malay country. The Malays were the 
indigenous or definitive peoples. The National Language, special privileges, 
the sovereignty of the rulers and Islam as the official religion were impe­
rative. After the 1971 Constitutional Amendment Bill, they were firmly en­
trenched in the Constitution and could not be questioned any more. U.M.N.O. 
believed that racial discrimination in favour of the Malays was necessary 
to correct the adverse legacies of British colonial rule: while the country 
as a whole prospered through economic development, the Malsys as a race be­
came economically backward compared to the Chinese and Indians who had worked 
hard to acquire their wealth. The D.A.P. rejected the government's approach 
to national unity based on history as impracticable, on the grounds that 
Malaysia, unlike the other adjacent countries of Southeast Asia(where the 
Chinese were a minority) was a multi-racial country with the Malsys forming
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b a re ly  h a l f  o f  th e  t o t a l  p o p u la tio n . I t s  main c o n te n tio n  was th a t  th e  e q u a l­
ly  numerous non-M alays, who had as much r i g h t  to  re g a rd  M alay s ia  as t h e i r  
homeland by v i r t u e  o f t h e i r  b i r t h  in  th e  c o u n try , shou ld  n o t be t r e a te d  as 
s e c o n d -c la s s  c i t i z e n s ^  The D .A.P. h e ld  t h a t  th e  p o s t -1969 p o l i c ie s  o f  th e  
governm ent, f a r  from r e s o lv in g  th e  lo n g s ta n d in g  p o l i t i c a l ,  econom ic, s o c i a l ,  
c u l t u r a l  and e d u c a tio n a l p rob lem s, had in  f a c t  made them more a cu te  and com­
p le x . As a  r e s u l t ,  s e v e ra l  " tim e bombs" w ith  th e  p o te n t i a l  f o r  b ig g e r  May 
13 r a c i a l  r i o t s  had been c re a te d .  To s im p lify  a  complex s i t u a t i o n ,  th e  D.A.P. 
r e - c l a s s i f i e d  th e  above-m entioned  problem s in to  tim e bombs o f  ra c e  and c l a s s .  
As re g a rd s  th e  f i r s t ,  i t  m a in ta in e d  th a t  th e  governm en t's  d iv i s io n  o f  th e  
p eo p le  in to  "b u m ip u tra s" and "n o n -b u m ip u tras" and th e n  openly  d i s c r im in a t in g  
in  fav o u r o f th e  form er a t  th e  l a t t e r ' s  expense , made them more co n sc io u s  o f  
t h e i r  race (M a lay s , C h inese , In d ia n s ,  e t c . , )  r a t h e r  th a n  t h e i r  n a t i o n a l i t y  
(M a lay s ia n ). An even b ig g e r  and more s e r io u s  problem  was th e  m utual a n ta g o ­
nism  w hich appeared  to  be g a in in g  momentum betw een th e  ra c e s , w ith  th e  non- 
M alays in c r e a s in g ly  grow ing r e s e n t f u l  tow ards th e  g o v ern m en t-c rea ted  p r i v i ­
leg ed  bum ipu tras  and th e  M alays b e in g  q u ick  to  f e e l  o ffen d ed  by th e  u n ju s -  
f i a b l e  re sen tm en t o f th e  "im m igrant r a c e s " .  In  th e  second c a se , th e  p a r ty  
cla im ed  th a t  s p e c ia l  p r iv i l e g e s  and th e  N .E .P . had. c re a te d  a  r i s i n g  Malay
2. The p o p u la tio n  o f M a la y s ia ( l9 7 0 )  was as fo llo w s :
M alays 4 ,8 5 9 ,7 1 6 47.1
C hinese 3 ,495 ,977 33.9
In d ia n s 933,250 9 .0
Ibans 357,202 3 .5
Kadazans 183,574 1 .8
O ther Borneo N a tiv e s 337,758 3.3
O thers 151,847 .... 1 ..4 ,
T o ta l 10, 319,324 100 .0$
S ource : Goh Cheng T e ik , I n te g r a t io n  in  a P lu r a l  S o c ie ty :  The C hinese
in  M a lay s ia , The S t r a i t s  Echo P re s s ,  Penang, 1978» p* 19*
3 . The p e rc e n ta g e  o f  lo c a l - b o m  C hinese in  M alay s ia  had been s t e a d i ly  i n ­
c r e a s in g  from 31.256 in  1931» 6 2 .5/4 in  1947» 74*51° in  1957» 86.9/6 in  1970 
to  v i r t u a l l y  lOOP/o in  1977 in  th e  case  o f  th o s e  aged 35 y e a rs  and below . 
Goh Cheng T e ik , op. c i t . ,  p . 21. The s i t u a t i o n  o f  th e  In d ia n s  and o th e r  
ra c e s  cou ld  be assumed to  be b ro a d ly  s im i la r .
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m idd le  c l a s s  co m p ris in g  o f th e  a lre a d y  r i c h  and p r iv i le g e d  in  U.M.N.O. 
grow ing r i c h e r  w h ile  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f th e  r u r a l  M alays rem ained  as poor and 
backw ard as ever5  Thus th e  D .A .P. concluded  th a t  a lth o u g h  th e  co u n try  had 
been in d ep en d en t s in c e  1957» th e  governm ent was s t i l l  n o t w ork ing  tow ards 
n a t io n a l  u n i ty .  In s te a d  i t  had a g g rav a ted  r a c i a l  and c re a te d  c la s s  p o l a r i ­
z a t io n  to  c o n s o l id a te  i t s  power b ase  on a  communal b a s is  and to  p re se rv e  i t s  
c a p i t a l i s t  c la s s  i n t e r e s t s .  N a tio n a l u n i ty ,  a c c o rd in g  to  th e  D .A .P ., sh o u ld  
be th e  in t e g r a t i o n  o f  a l l  r a c e s  - M alays, C h inese , In d ia n s  and o th e rs  -  in to  
a s in g le  M alaysian  n a t io n ,  p la c in g  n a t i o n a l i t y  ahead of e t h n i c i t y  as in  th e  
ca se  o f S w itz e rla n d  o r S in g ap o re . P o l i t i c a l  e q u a l i ty  sh o u ld  be acco rded  to  
th e  non-M alays w h ile  s p e c ia l  p r iv i l e g e s  sh o u ld  be p ro p e r ly  u t i l i z e d  to  u p l i f t  
th e  M alays econom ica lly  in  g e n e ra l to  b r in g  them a t  p a r  w ith  th e  non-M alays. 
Non-Malay c u l tu r e  sho u ld  a ls o  be a cc ep ted  as p a r t  o f  n a t io n a l  c u l tu r e .  W hile 
a c c e p tin g  Malay as th e  n a t io n a l  lan g u ag e , th e  D .A .P. c a l le d  f o r  i r o n - c la d
g u a ra n te e s  t h a t  th e  use  and su s te n a n c e  o f  th e  C hinese , Tam il and E n g lish
5
la n g u ag es sho u ld  n o t be re n d e re d  s t e r i l e ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  e d u c a tio n . A lthough 
th e  D .A .P . conceded th a t  th e r e  w ere g re a t  d i f f i c u l t i e s  in  th e  ta s k  o f  c r e a t in g  
n a t io n a l  u n i ty  in  view o f th e  a p p a re n tly  i r r e c o n c i l i a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e s  betw een 
th e  r a c e s ,  i t  n e v e r th e le s s  charged  th a t  th e  g o vernm en t's  p o l i c i e s  w ere in  th e  
wrong d i r e c t i o n  a l to g e th e r^  I t  th e r e f o r e  saw i t s  ta s k  as to  a r r e s t  th e  s l i d e  
tow ards r a c i a l  and c la s s  d iv i s iv e n e s s ,  f o r  w hich i t  h e ld  th e  governm ent r e s ­
p o n s ib le .
4 . For d e t a i l s  o f th e  r i s i n g  M alay m idd le c l a s s ,  see  a r t i c l e ," S o n s  o f th e  
S o i l :  O utgrow ing t h e i r  p ro v e rb s  -  th e  Bumis can do i t " ,  F a r E a s te rn  
Economic Review , 2nd Septem ber, 1977« F adzlan  Yahaya, Chairman o f th e  
D .A .P . ' s  R u ra l Development B ureau, c la im ed  th a t  a  b u m ip u tra  economic 
co n v en tio n  a t  th e  N a tio n a l U n iv e rs i ty  in  1977 p u t th e  p o v e rty  r a t e  among 
th e  r u r a l  M alays as h ig h  as 83°/o» A siaw eek, 1 8 th  Ja n u a ry , 1980.
5 . F or d e t a i l s ,  see  Lim K it S ian g , op. c i t . ,  pp. x v i i i - x i x .
6. See interview  with Lee Lam Thye, Mai ay 3ian  B usiness, September 1978 and 
P erson a lity  P r o f ile  on Lim Kit Siang, Malaysian B u sin ess, December 1979* 
See a lso  Lam Thye's  press statem ent, New S tr a its  Times, 26th  March, 1979»
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The D.AoP. was n o t so n a iv e  as to  b e l ie v e  t h a t  i t s  c o n s is te n t  a r ­
t i c u l a t i o n  o f th e  d e f e c ts  o f th e  governm ent’s p o l i c i e s  would le a d  to  t h e i r  
a b ro g a t io n .  W ith on ly  16 M .P . 's  ou t o f  a  t o t a l  o f  154> i t  wa-3 aware t h a t  
w h a tev e r m otions i t  sough t to  in tro d u c e  to  c h a lle n g e  th e  governm ent would be 
d e f e a te d .  T h e re fo re  th e  D .A .P .’ s s t r a t e g y ,  m a n ife s te d  by im a g e -d e s tru c t io n  
o f th e  government and im a g e -b u ild in g  o f  i t s e l f ,  aimed more a t  d raw ing  th e  
g o v ern m e n t's  a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  unsavoury  a s p e c ts  o f  i t s  p o l i c i e s .  By h a rp in g  
c o n s i s t e n t ly  on c e r t a in  is s u e s  and s t r e s s i n g  t h e i r  g r a v i ty ,  som etim es to  th e  
p o in t  o f  e x a g g e ra tio n , th e  D.A.P. hoped th a t  th e  government would be made to  
rev iew  i t s  p o l i c i e s ;  i t  would e i t h e r  have to  r e t r a c t  th o s e  w hich w ere u n ju s ­
t i f i a b l e ,  make t h e i r  im p lem en ta tio n  l e s s  h a rs h , o r come up w ith  a c c e p ta b le
7
a l t e r n a t i v e  s o lu t io n s ;  M a n ife s ta t io n s  o f  t h i s  w ere th e  D . A . P . 's  se v e re  c r i ­
t i c i s m s  on th e  S .M .P ., th e  I .C .A .  and th e  govern m en t's  r e j e c t i o n  o f  th e  Mer- 
deka U n iv e r s i ty  p ro p o s a l .  The S .M .P ., r e f l e c t i n g  th e  z e a l  o f U.M.N.O. Y o u th 's  
econom ic n a t io n a l is m , had in  th e  D.AoP. 's  v iew , co m p le te ly  ig n o re d  th e  a s p i ­
r a t i o n s  and w e lfa re  o f  th e  non-M alays, d e s p i te  i t s  n o n - r a c ia l  app roach  in  
p r i n c i p l e .  The D .A .P . ' s  c r i t i c i s m s ,  re g a rd e d  as c h a u v in is t i c  by U.M.N.O.
Y outh, w ere n e v e r th e le s s  q u ie t ly  c o n s id e re d  in  th e  T.M .P. w hich acknow ledged 
th e  p o v e rty  o f  some non-M alays and th e  n e c e s s i ty  f o r  rem e d ia l a c t io n  among 
them . In  r e l a t i o n  to  th e  I .C 0A ., th e  D .A o P .'s  c o n s is te n t  c a l l s  f o r  i t s  com plete  
r e p e a l ,  r e f l e c t i n g  th e  f r u s t r a t i o n  o f th e  C hinese b u s in e s s  community, le d  to  
s e v e r a l  amendments w hich le s s e n e d  th e  h a rsh n e s s  o f  i t s  im p lem en ta tio n . W ith 
re g a rd  to  th e  M erdeka U n iv e rs i ty  p ro p o sa l r e j e c t i o n ,  th e  D .A .P .' s  c r i t i c i s m s  
h ig h l ig h te d  n o t on ly  th e  g rav e  s h o r ta g e  o f  lo c a l  u n iv e r s i ty  p la c e s  f o r  q u a l i ­
f i e d  non-M alays, b u t a ls o  th e  ap p reh e n sio n s  co n ce rn in g  C hinese lan g u ag e  and 
c u l tu r e .  T h is  le d  th e  governm ent to  a l lo c a t e  more p la c e s  f o r  non-M alay s tu -
7 . See P e r s o n a l i ty  P r o f i l e  on Lim K it S ian g , M alaysian  B u s in e s s , December 
1979. He claim ed t h a t  th e  D .A .P. had a good re c o rd  in  t h i s  a r e a .  K it 
S ian g  a lso  re g a rd e d  power as th e  a b i l i t y  to  p re v e n t u n a c c e p ta b le  govern ­
ment p o l i c i e s  by c o n s i s t e n t ly  c r i t i c i s i n g  th e  governm ent.
236
dents in local university enrolment although non-Malay apprehensions over 
their language and culture have yet to be allayed. Provocative as they might 
appear to be, it would be fair to suggest that in the absence of the D.A.P.'s 
consistent criticisms and agitation, the government would be less inclined 
to take the appropriate remedial action to the problems of the non-Malays. 
This could be due to its belief that Malay problems were more urgent and its 
inclination to take for granted the fact that, as in the pa3t, non-Malays 
appeared to resign themselves to their problems rather than to seek solutions 
which might antagonise the Malays. It could also be surmised that if the 
non-Malay partners in the N.F., the M.C.A. and the G.R.M., either remained 
unconcerned or helpless over the urgency of non-Malay problems, the D.A.P.'a 
criticisms certainly jolted them into action, if not for anything, at least 
to prevent their support from being eroded by the D.A.P.
The extent of democracy practised by the government seemed to de­
termine the course of the D.A.P.'s post-1969 strategy. It could be suggested 
that had the country not reverted to Parliamentary rule in February 1971» 
restricted as it might seem to the D.A.P., the party's strategy would not 
have been allowed to exist after 1969» as in the period during N.O.C. rule. 
Despite the loud public protests of the D.A.P. that the government had made 
a mockery of democracy especially during the period of general elections, it 
could be surmised that privately, the party was inclined to accept the fact 
that the government under Datuk Hussein Onn, had done its best to uphold
Q
democracy within acceptable constraints. This appeared to be a departure
8. In this, the D.A.P. charged the government with being intolerant of dis­
sent and opposition, and working towards a one-party state. New Straits 
Times, 1st July, 1978* Kit Siang argued that it wanted to keep the 
facade of democracy but emptied of all its contents. Lim Kit Siang,op. 
cit.,p. xii. Perhaps the D.A.P.'s most effective allegation of the 
government trying to undermine democracy was through political cartoons 
showing the party personified by Lim Kit Siang with his hands tied be­
hind his back and mouth sealed being attacked by the government and
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from its previous belief which was based on the adverse effects experienced 
by it, due to a series of government measures such as the ban on local coun­
cil elections, the gerrymandering of constituencies to favour the Malay vote,
the promulgation of the E.S.R. to strengthen the I.S.A. and the tight control
9
of the mass media, to mention a few. The D.A.P.'s apparent belief in the 
viability of democracy (within the constraints of Malaysia's multi-racial 
society) reflected its trust in the leadership of Datuk Hussein Onn. The 
party's confidence in the Prime Minister manifested its belief that Datuk 
Hussein, like his father, Dato Onn, the founder of the I.M.P., was sincerely 
dedicated to the achievement of a multi-racial Malaysia^ This confidence 
had been strengthened by the manner in which Datuk Hussein had been able to 
topple Malay extremist strongmen like Dato Harun(ex-Mentri Besar of Selangor) 
and Tun Mustapha(ex-Chief Minister of Sabah) without losing his support.
Under these circumstances, the D.A.P. was encouraged to attempt to bring about 
change to effect its aims through peaceful and constitutional means’^  These 
attempts, which at times tend to be too optimistic, envisaged long-term ex-
the mass media. Ibid, p. xxxxxii. This was during the campaign for 
the 1978 general elections.
9. For details on the ban on local council elections and the gerrymander­
ing of constituencies, see Ch. Ill, sections (b) and (c). The news­
papers, especially the English language New Straits Times and the Malay 
language Utusan MelaYP., were extremely biased against the D.A.P. These 
government-controlled papers deliberately published news harmful to the 
D.A.P.'s morale, together with government attacks against the D.A.P. 
in their headlines and in the front pages. Often D.A.P. replies were 
blacked out, scantily treated in a few sentences and relegated to some 
obscure comers of the newspapers where they were likely to be missed. 
See John A. Lent,"Mass Media in Malaysia", Asian Profile, Vol. VI No.
2, April 1973, pp. 153-81.
10. Lim Kit Siang expressed the hope that just as Dato Onn had tried to 
bring non-Malays into U.M.N.O. prior to hi3 formation of the I.M.P. in 
1951> Datuk Hussein would ensure that the N.F. would become a genuinely 
multi-racial party.
11. Lim Kit Siang stated:"There may be those who say that the democratic 
process is a charade. They aren't exactly wrong given the experience 
of D.A.P. leaders. But at the end of it all you feel that so long as 
there is a chance to try the democratic peaceful process to bring about
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pansion plans of the party to states where its influence and support were 
minimal or non-existent, e.g. Kelantan and Trengganu, and states where its 
support could be substantial if conditions were favourable to it, e.g. Sara­
wak and Sabah, with their large Chinese and non-Moslem indigenous peoples.
As regards states where its influence was significant, the party even embar­
ked on over-ambitious plans to take control of a state government, e.g.
Penang. The D.A.P. also never hesitated to repeat its call, especially at 
general or by-elections, of the need for a strong and articulate opposition 
to keep the government on its toes^
To be fair to the D.A.P., the government’s commitment to democracy 
was conditional on the strength of its power base. The aftermath of the 1969 
general elections, which saw a marked reduction of U.M.N.O.'s strength in 
Parliament and the various state assemblies, resulted in the suspension of 
Parliamentary rule following the racial riots. Tun Razak had pledged that 
there would be no return to Parliamentary democracy unless the government 
could muster a two-thirds majority in Parliament. Since the Constitutional
change, one shouldn't miss the opportunity". See Barry Wain, "Deter­
mined Dissent: Opposition battles near-impossible odds in Malaysia 
Elections", The Asian Y/all Street Journal, 7th July, 1978, op. cit.
12. For the D.A.P.'s expansion plans in Kelantan and Trengganu, see New 
Straits Times, 21st/22nd October, 1979 and 3rd March, 1980. The party 
had already opened up a branch in Kota Bahru, while plans were made to 
open up branches in Pasir Mas, Pasir Puteh, Tumpat(all in Kelantan) 
and Kuala Trengganu (Trengganu). The party w as also encouraged to open 
up branches in Sarawak and Sabah following its sole electoral victory 
in the Parliamentary constituency of Sandakan. New Straits Times,
17th July, 1978» It however failed to win a single seat in the Sara­
wak state elections in September 1979* New Straits Times, various is­
sues, September 1979» For the D.A.P.'s plans to control a state govern­
ment, see New Straits Times, 4th June, 1979» to capture the Penang 
State government, see New Straits Times, 13th November, 1979»
13. This was especially evident at the campaign for the Port Klang Parlia­
mentary by-election in late 1979) the call being made by Lee Lam Thye. 
See New Straits Times, 19th November, 1979.
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Amendment Bill of 1971» U.M.N.O.'s representation in Parliament and the state 
assemblies had increased to the point that it did not feel threatened any 
longer. The N.E.P. and other pro-Malay policies, especially in relation to 
language, education and culture, had succeeded in winning the overwhelming 
support of the Malays as indicated by the 1974 and 197& general elections 
which resulted in the decimation of U.M.N.O.’s traditional rival, P.A.S. 
U.M.N.O. al30 felt that the N.E.P.'s aim3 of creating a viable Malay commer­
cial community and capitalist class were slowly being achieved^ With that 
the sense of political and economic security among the Malays seemed assured. 
U.M.N.O. could thus afford to give some semblance of political power to the 
non-Malays in the M.C.A., G.R.M. and M.I.C. As in the past, the status quo 
is enforced with the stratification of the country's political structure in­
to a strong Malay core, enclosed by an outer layer of Malay, Chinese and
15Indian partnership which was extended to the Ibans and Kadazans. This would 
pave the way for the government's approach to national unity based on condi­
tional integration. In this process, the diverse cultural and social traits 
of all communities - the Malays, Chinese and Indians - would have free inter­
play, so that by mutually adjusting to one another, an end-product represen­
ting the best of the contributions from all communities and acceptable to all 
of them, would eventually emerge. This end-product would be the new Malay­
sian identity. However the principal condition in this process would be that 
integration assumed a Mnative"or Malay base with Islam, Malay language and 
Malay culture being dominant^ Thus what the moderate U.M.N.O. leadership
14. See interviews with Dr. Mahathir, Malaysian Business, March 1979» and 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 13th April, 1979»
15. See Wang Gungwu,"Malayan Nationalism", Royal Central Asian Journal, 
Parts 3 & 4» July-October 1962, pp. 317"28.
16. See Tun Razak's press statement, Straits Times, 16th May, 1972.
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probably had in mind was the emergence of a new generation of Malaysians of 
all races, all speaking Malay as the first language and practising Malay 
customs in the same way that Europeans of all nationalities adopted the Anglo- 
Saxon cultural base and spoke the English language to become Americans, Aus­
tralians or New Zealanders. An even ideal situation in this aspect to the 
U.M.N.O. leadership would be the adoption of the Islamic religion by the non- 
Malays. They could still retain their cultures and languages in the same 
way that non-Anglo-Saxon Europeans(e.g. the Greeks and Italians) retained 
theirs in the United States, Australia or New Zealand. Indeed they could 
even be allowed to develop and flourish to complement Malay culture provided 
they did not threaten its dominance in Malaysia. The advocacy of conditional 
integration reflected the compromising spirit of the moderate U.M.N.O leader­
ship to concede the fact that although Malaysia is basically a Malay country, 
the other races also have their rightful place there so long as thqy do not 
challenge the supremacy of the Malays. The previous policy of assimilation 
(advocated when the Malays felt threatened as such) with its complete and 
unquestioning submergence to Malay culture(e.g. like the Negroes in America),
is considered unfeasible in view of the large Chinese and Indian minorities
17and their deep-rooted cultures. The U.M.N.O. moderates have come to realize 
that even in adjacent countries of Southeast Asia(where the Chinese minorities 
are smaller, and in the case of Thailand, certain similarities between the 
Thais and the Chinese, e.g. the Buddhist religion), assimilation has only
17. See Tun Razak's rejection of assimilation, ibid. The most common means 
to assimilation was a formal political link with Indonesia advocated .'by 
the Malay extremists in the 1960s, such as the Maphilindo concept.
In this instance, the Chinese would be reduced to an insignificant 
minority. For the advocacy of assimilation, see Mahathir b. Mohamad, 
The Malay Dilemma, Asia Pacific Press, Singapore, 1970, pp. 98-102,
K.J.Ratnam, Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, University 
of Malaya Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1965» P* 29, and Gordon P. Means, 
Malaysian Politics, 2nd Ed., Holder and Stoughton, London, 1976, P» 13»
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been p a r t i a l l y  s u c c e s s fu l. The p rocess o f c o n d itio n a l in te g r a t io n  i s  perhaps 
synonymous w ith  th e  m oderate U.M.N.O. le a d e r s h ip 's  b e l ie f  th a t  th e  develop­
ment o f a n a t io n a l  id e n t i ty ,  in  th e  case o f M alaysia w ith  i t s  numerous and 
deep c leavages between th e  race3 , can only come about th rough accommodation 
and a p o lic y  o f g ive and tak e  w ith  more advantages to  the  Malays and more 
s a c r i f i c e s  on th e  p a r t of th e  o th e r  ra c e s . Once th e  foundation  o f th i s  s t r a ­
t i f i c a t i o n  i s  l a id ,  i t s  consequent e v o lu tio n  through tim e would b r in g  about 
what U.M.N.O. would co n sid er a t r u l y  M alaysian id e n t i ty .  The obvious d i f f i ­
c u lty  to  t h i s  approach would be th e  draw ing o f th e  l in e  between a s s im ila tio n  
and c o n d itio n a l in te g ra t io n  on th e  p a r t  of th e  non-M alays. At p re s e n t, t h i s  
l in e  appears to  be b lu r re d . They tend  to  reg a rd  c o n d itio n a l in te g r a t io n  as
a s s im ila t io n  in  view of the  governm ent's in s is te n c e  on th e  supremacy of Ma-
18la y  c u l tu re ,  Malay language and th e  Is lam ic  r e l ig io n .  Government p o lic ie s  
in  r e l a t io n  to  th e se  suggested  t h e i r  n o n -n e g o tia b il i ty  under w hatever c i r ­
cum stances. Also 7/hat could be considered  th e  b e s t product from th e  syn the­
s i s  of th e  v a rio u s  c u ltu re s  from th e  non-Malay p o in t o f view might no t be 
accep tab le  to  th e  M alays, and v ic e -v e rs a . T his has le d  th e  D.A.P. to  suggest 
th a t  as in  th e  p a s t ,  th e  government appeared to  be working tow ards a Malay 
r a th e r  than  a M alaysian M alaysia. U.M.N.O. n e v e r th e le s s  appeared o p tim is tic
about th e  success of c o n d itio n a l in te g ra t io n  in  n a tio n  b u ild in g  in  th e  long 
19ru n . To co u n ter th e  demands o f th e  C hinese, i t  had. to  c o n s ta n tly  remind
18. See fo r  in s ta n c e  th e  U.T.M. convocation ceremony(Ch.IV, s e c t io n (d ) )  
in  which th e  songkok was th e  m andatory a t t i r e  fo r  male s tu d e n ts . The 
governm ent's compromise in  having th e  songkok m odified w ith  m o tifs  and 
t a s s e l s  could be regarded  as a c o n d itio n a l in te g ra t io n  m easure, though 
in  what way the  m o tifs  and ta s s e l s  re p re se n te d  any semblance of non- 
Malay c u ltu re  rem ained u n c le a r .
19. Musa Hitam contended th a t  em otional and p sy ch o lo g ica l f a c to r s  were th e  
main o b s ta c le s  to  th e  non-Malays accep tin g  Malay c u l tu re .  He was con­
vinced  th a t  through p e rsu as io n  and ed u ca tio n , non-M alays, e sp e c ia lly  
th e  younger g e n e ra tio n , could be won over. See Yong Mun Cheong e d ., 
Trends in  M alay sia (2 ) , I n s t i t u t e  of Southeast Asian S tu d ie s , S ingapore, 
1974» P» 142. See a lso  in te rv iew  w ith  Musa Hitam, M alaysian B usiness, 
May 1980.
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them th a t  elsew here in  Southeast A sia(excep t S ingapore), t h e i r  lo t  would n e ­
v e r  be as good as i t  i s  in  M alaysia. For in s ta n c e , in  In d o n es ia , they  would 
have t h e i r  p ro p e rty  c o n f is c a te d , fo rced  to  change th e i r  names and r i o t s  would 
be conducted a g a in s t them. Thus i f  they  a re  p r a c t ic a l ,  th ey  should accep t 
c o n d itio n a l in te g ra t io n  w il l in g ly  and u n q u estio n in g ly . Any changes to  th e  
s ta tu s  quo to  e f f e c t  a b e t te r  d ea l fo r  them would have to  be in crem en ta l and 
c o n d itio n a l only  on th e  Malays no t having  th e  f e e l in g  o f b e in g  th re a te n e d .
The governm ent's a t t i tu d e  towards th e  D.A.P i s  a lso  determ ined by 
th e  e x ten t o f i t s  s tr e n g th . In  th e  p a s t ,  th e  government h a rra sse d  and p ro ­
secu ted  D.A.P. le a d e r s .  They were e i th e r  charged w ith  s e d i t io n  as in  th e  
case o f Fan Yew Teng and Oh Keng Seng, d e ta in ed  under th e  I .S .A . as in  th e
case o f Lim K it S iang, Chan Kok K it and Chian Heng Kai or charged w ith  th e
20leakage  of o f f i c i a l  s e c re ts  as in  th e  case of Lim K it S iang and P. P a tto . 
These harrasam ents and p ro secu tio n s  were a t a tim e when th e  government was 
s t i l l  c o n so lid a tin g  i t s  power base and needed to  ta k e  no chances a g a in s t a l l  
forms o f p o te n t ia l  th r e a t  or i r r i t a n t s .  As th e  government appeared s tro n g e r , 
i t s  harrassm ent and p ro secu tio n s  o f D.A.P. le ad e rs  were toned  down as mani­
f e s te d  by th e  re d u c tio n  o f K it S ia n g 's  f in e s  to  enable him to  con tinue  to
21d isch a rg e  h is  d u tie s  as a M.P. and s t a t e  assemblyman. The governm ent's
20. B arry Wain, op. c i t .
21. Lim K it S iang was a r r e s te d  in  A p ril 1978 and charged w ith  5 counts un­
der th e  O f f ic ia l  S e c re ts  Act which c a r r ie d  a maximum o f 31 y e a rs  im p ri­
sonment f o r  h ig h lig h tin g  th e  purchase o f 4 Swedish-made c r a f t  by th e  
Royal M alaysian Navy and q u e s tio n in g  t h e i r  p r ic e  and s u i t a b i l i t y ,  bo th  
in s id e  and o u ts id e  P a rliam en t. Charged to g e th e r  w ith  him was P .P a tto , 
who, as e d i to r ,  p r in te d  K it S ia n g 's  accu sa tio n s  in  th e  p a r ty 's  jo u rn a l ,  
"The R ocket". A fte r a long  t r i a l ,  K it S iang was found g u i l ty  and f in e d  
a t o t a l  o f $15,000 on a l l  th e  ch arg es . The D.A.P. viewed t h i s  as th e  
governm ent's a ttem pt to  c r ip p le  i t s  le a d e rsh ip  s in ce  K it S iang was th e  
p a r ty 's  main s t r a t e g i s t  in  th e  1978 g en era l e le c t io n s .  K it S iang sub­
seq u en tly  appealed a g a in s t th e  d e c is io n  o f th e  lower cou rt to  th e  Fede­
r a l  C ourt. His appeal ag a in s t th e  sen tence  was d ism issed , bu t h is  f in e s  
were reduced s u b s ta n t ia l ly  from $15,000 to  $6,500 on a l l  charges. A 
c ross appeal by th e  P u b lic  P ro secu to r on th e  inadequacy o f th e  sen tence  
was d ism issed . P. P a tto  was given a d isch arg e  no t amounting to  an acqui-
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attitude towards the D.A.P. demonstrated its grudging recognition of the 
party*s dedication to national unity on the one hand and deep resentment 
of its penchant for arousing Chinese emotions on the other. Firstly,
the government was convinced that the D.A.P. was unlikely, perhaps unable, 
to pursue its struggle unconstitutionally, like the M.C.P or even the L.P.M. 
The D.A.P.'s leadership and rank and file were made up of the English and 
Chinese educated lower middle class who had no previous record of communist 
militancy. The government, especially Datuk Hussein Onn, probably felt that 
the D.A.P., despite its abrasive Chinese image, was performing a useful func­
tion as an opposition, constructive or otherwise, to keep it on its toes?2 
The plethora of problems on almost about every kind of issue affecting the 
public, highlighted by the D.A.P., especially Lim Kit Siang, indicated to 
the government that the party was concerned about the welfare of the people. 
D.A.P. elected representatives were in most cases, full-time politicians who 
were dedicated to their work. Some,like Lim Kit Siang, had even given up 
well-paid, secure jobs to enter full-time politics. Further manifestations 
of the D.A.P.'s dedication were the willingness of its leaders to make per­
sonal sacrifices and endure harrassments and prosecutions. In contrast to
tal when the prosecution tended an amended charge against him following 
the reduction of Kit Siang's fines. He was however re-arrested a few 
days later to face the earlier charges. For details of Kit Siang's 
alleged leakage of official secrets, see his letter to the Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 24th September, 1976. His arrest, M.G.G.Pillai,"The 
Nabbing of Lim Kit Siang11,Asiaweek, 5th May, 1976 and Mirror of Opinion,
Hi gill i gilts of Malay, Chinese and Tamil Press, Publicity Division, Minis­
try of Culture, Singapore, issues 93 & 96/1978» The 5 Official Secrets 
Act charges against him are published in Lim Kit Siang,op.cit.,p.xxxxxv. 
For a full account of his trial, see New Straits Times,various issues, 
October and November, 1978. For details of the reduction of his fines, 
see New Straits Times, 15th September, 1979. For details of P. Patto's 
discharge and re-arrest, see New Straits Times. 18th and 30th March, 1980.
22. For details, see Far Eastern Economic Review, 8th December, 1978.
23. Lim Kit Siang has been a full-time politician since 1966 when the D.A.P. 
was first registered. Lee Lam Thye stated that he joined politics not 
for £iersonal gain but to make a firm political commitment towards the 
political process in the country and "help bring about a more just and 
equal society for all". New Straits Times, 12th July, 1978, op. cit.
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the pre-1969 situation, D.A.P. leaders in many cases, had grown with exper­
ience, were less likely to rabble-rouse and likely to offer constructive cri­
ticisms in pointing out government inefficiencies in implementing policies, 
though the inclination to insinuate was not lost. In this aspect, the role 
of Lee Lam Thye, recently elevated to the Deputy Secretary-Generalship of
r\ a
the party, was very prominent. As an elected representative, either at
Parliamentary or state level, Lam Thye had discharged his duties very well
and had maintained close rapport with the government, especially in relation
to the hawkers, squatters and other dispossessed elements in the Federal
25Territory. The government would more than anything else, however, regard 
the D.A.P. as a useful outlet where the frustrations of the Chinese communi­
ty over its pro-Malay policies could be voiced constitutionally. As regards 
the second, the government considered the D.A.P. irresponsible in whipping 
up Chinese fears and dissatisfactions for political gain. Though Datuk Hus­
sein Onn admitted that the D.A.P.’s arguments on behalf of the Chinese were 
sometimes justifiable, they were nevertheless not rational within the con­
text of Malaysia's political environment in which the Malays perceived ra­
cial discrimination in their favour as corrective measures to the defects 
of British colonial rule where they had been placed at a disadvantage, eco­
nomically, compared to the other races. In this aspect, Datuk Hussein chided 
the D.A.P. with being interested in scoring points among the Chinese rather 
than working towards national unity, which according to the government's 
implications, necessitated the Chinese-based political parties to discipline
24. Lam Thye was elected as one of the 2 Deputy Secretary-Generals of the 
D.A.P. at the party's 5th Triennial Conggress. New Straits Times,
17th December, 1979*
25. For details, see interview with Lam Thye, Malaysian Business, Septem­
ber 1978* He was even included in a Parliamentary delegation to Lon­
don and Moscow(the only opposition M.P.) led by the Speaker in late 
September 1978* Ibid.
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th e  Chinese on th e i r  need to  make s a c r i f i c e s  in  th e  o v e ra ll  i n t e r e s t s  o f th e
26n a tio n , a f t e r  ex p la in in g  to  them th e  r a t io n a le  behind i t .  The D .A .P .'s  
p e rs is te n c e  to  a r t i c u la te  non-Malay g riev an ces  consequent on th e  implementa­
t io n  of th e  governm ent's p o l ic ie s  was in te rp re te d  by Datuk H ussein as a ttem p ts 
to  s t i r  up Chinese d i s s a t i s f a c t io n  and th u s  undermine th e  M .C .A .'s and G .R.M .'s
approach o f continuous d ia logue  w ith  UoM.N.O. in  th e  s p i r i t  o f g ive and tak e
27
to  e f fe c t  accep tab le  s o lu tio n s  to  a l l  com m unities. While th e  M.C.A. accused
th e  D.A.P. o f s p l i t t i n g  Chinese u n ity , th e  G.R.M. warned th a t  th e  D .A .P .'s
28p ro v o ca tiv e  brand o f p o l i t i c s  would lead  to  i n t e r - r a c i a l  s t r i f e .  A pparent­
ly  ex aspera ted  a t th e  D .A .P .'s  p e rs is te n c e  to  s t i r  up Chinese d i s s a t i s f a c t io n s ,  
Dr. M ahathir charged K it S iang w ith  being  th e  "b ig g est o b s ta c le "  to  n a tio n a l 
u n ity . The l a t t e r ' s  in d ig n an t re p ly  was to  ch a llen g e  th e  government to  ban
th e  p a rty  and put i t s  le a d e rs  behind b a rs , and see i f  a l l  th e  unreso lved  i s -
2Qsues p e r ta in in g  to  race  and c la s s  d is c r im in a tio n  would sim ply d isa p p e a r .
The government r a t io n a l iz e d  th a t  i t  could a ffo rd  to  ig n o re  th e  D .A .P .'s  ta u ­
n t ,  as i t  was in  a s tro n g  p o s it io n  to  c o n tro l th e  p a rty  in  view o f i t s  mas­
s iv e  m a jo rity  in  P arliam en t and th e  S ta te  Assem blies and i t s  t ig h t  c o n tro l 
of th e  media. Whatever motions th e  D.A.P. proposed to  ch a llen g e  th e  govern­
ment would be r e je c te d .  The governm ent-con tro lled  media would a lso  ensure 
th a t  th e  D .A .P .'s  a c t i v i t i e s  would no t be f u l ly  p u b lic is e d  to  deny i t  access
26. See in te rv ie w  w ith  Datuk Hussein Onn, Fa r E astern  Economic Review,
26th January , 1979*
27» I b id . Musa Hitam s ta te d  th a t  th e  D.A.P. in te rp re te d  is su e s  in  i s o la t io n
(and thus out of c o n te x t) in s te a d  o f from th e  whole g en e ra l p e rsp e c tiv e . 
Malay s ia n  B u sin ess , May, I 98O. For th e  G .R.M .'s approach to  n a t io n a l  
u n ity , see  Goh Cheng T eik , op. c i t . ,  Ch. IV.
28. Goh Cheng Teik , op. c i t . ,  p. 34* See a lso  p re ss  s ta tem en t of Paul 
Leong, th e  S ecre ta ry -G en era l of th e  G.R.M,, New S t r a i t s  Times, 41h 
December, 1978 fo r  th e  G.R.M .'s w arning to  th i s  e f f e c t .
29. For d e t a i l s ,  see a r tic le ,"A n g ry  Words in  P a rliam en t" , Asiaweek, 20th 
A p ril , 1979 and P e rs o n a lity  P r o f i le  on Lim K it S iang, M alaysian B usi­
ness , December 1979*
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to putting its message across to the people. To U.M.N.O., the D.A.P. would 
always he a Chinese chauvinist party, just like its mentor, the P.A.P. The 
D.A.P. could sever its emotional links with the P.A.P., but U.M.N.O. f&lt 
that their policies would always be identical^ Being a party which had 
existed to fight solely for the rights of the Malays(beginning with the over­
throw of the Malayan Union)since 1946» U.M.N.O. was convinced that the D.A.P.'s 
major policies, which opposed the very core of bumiputraism. would never be 
acceptable to the majority of the Malays. In the first place, the D.A.P.'s 
insistence that Malaysia is a multi-racial country in principle conflicted 
with the basic cardinal principle of the Malays that Malaysia is a Malay 
country. The intricacies of this basic conflict were manifested by the D.A.P.1* 
advocacy of multi-lingualism and an end to special privileges, which are con­
sidered anathema, even to moderate Malays. Thus no matter how hard the D.A.P. 
tried to preach multi-racialism, the Malays at large would always interpret 
it as another way of expressing Chinese chauvinism. At the present moment, 
they appeared politically and economically secure, and could thus afford to 
regard the D.A.P.'s challenge as mere pin-pricks at best. Unlike the P.A.P., 
the D.A.P. was likely to be a nuisance at its best rather than a threat. 
Compared to Lee Kuan Yew who could offer an alternative attractive government 
as in the case of Singapore, Lim Kit Siang could not hope to deliver the 
goods, although he had been highly critical of the M.C.A. and the G.R.M. of 
merely obtaining for the Chinese half a loaf. He could at best make const­
ructive criticisms about the bad implementation of government policies or at 
worst, snipe harmlessly from the sidelines. Therefore U.M.N.O. could afford
30. At its 5th Triennial Conggress in December 1979» the D.A.P. adopted the 
unprecedented step of amending its constitutional objective of the 
re-unification of Singapore with Malaysia on equal terms to one of pro­
moting goodwill among ASEAN countries. New Straits Times, 17th December, 
1979» This marked the official severance of the D.A.P.'s emotional 
links with the P.A.P. which began with the return of Devan Nair to 
Singapore shortly before the 1969 general elections.
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to  allow  th e  D.A.P. to  c a rry  on w ith  i t s  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t i e s  under th e  
p re sen t c ircu m stan ces . However once the  D.A.P. ch a llen g e  appears to  he a 
th r e a t  l ik e  th e  P .A .P . ch a llen g e  in  l a t e  1964 and e a r ly  1965» o r th e  s ig n i ­
f ic a n t  non-Malay o p p o s itio n  e le c to r a l  ga ins in  th e  1969 g en e ra l e le c t io n s ,  
th e  chances a re  th a t  th e  Malays would r e a c t  em otionally  and i r r a t i o n a l l y ,  
to  f i g h t  to  th e  l a s t  i f  n e c e ssa iy , to  ensure th a t  M alaysia rem ains a Malay 
co u n tiy  a t a l l  tim es .
The D.A.P. was aware of i t s  f a i l u r e  to  win s ig n i f ic a n t  Malay sup­
p o r t under th e  p re sen t c ircu m stan ces , owing to  i t s  conspicuous ab ra s iv e  Chi­
nese  image and th e  m u l t i - r a c ia l ( to  th e  M alays, p ro -C h in e se )p o lic ie s  i t  advo­
c a te d . B e liev in g  th a t  i t s  success as a genu inely  m u l t i - r a c ia l  movement lay  
in  hav ing  s ig n i f ic a n t  Malay su p p o rt, th e  D.A.P. embarked on a long-term  p lan  
o f mass re c ru itm e n t of Malays to  i t s  ra n k s . Like th e  P .A .P ., i t  gave up hope 
o f w inning over th e  Malays on a sh o rt- te rm  b a s is  to  c o n ce n tra te  on making 
them respond to  i t s  ideo logy  based on c la s s  and economics in  th e  long  ru n , 
though i t  would n o t know how long i t  would tak e  them to  respond p o s i t iv e ly  
and in  s ig n i f ic a n t  numbers. N ev erth e less  i t  was determ ined to  p e r s i s t  in  
t h i s  d i f f i c u l t  ta s k .  The obvious answer appeared to  be to  convince th e  Ma­
la y s  th a t  U.M.N.O,'s  approach to  re s o lv in g  p o v e r ty ( th e ir  main problem)was 
wrong and was bound to  f a i l  to  th e  d e trim en t of th e  poor Malays in  th e  long 
r u n ^  The p a r ty ’s ta sk  in  th i s  a spec t was to  a ssu re  th e  Malays th a t  i t  had 
a sane and r a t io n a l  a p p ro a c h ( i .e . dem ocratic so c ia lism )o f  ta c k l in g  poverty  
e f f e c t iv e ly .  In  th i s  i t  aimed fo r  the  r i s i n g  Malay m iddle c la s s  and Malay 
i n t e l l e c t u a l s  in  th e  sense th a t  th e se  2 groups were educated and could d is -
31. See in te rv ie w  w ith  Fadzlan Yahaya, Asiaweek, 18th Jan u ary , 1980, 
f o r  more d e t a i l s .
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32c e m  the real causes of the economic backwardness of the Malays. Moreover
these 2 groups were highly respected by the masses and thus held much poli-
33tical influence over them. The party had. realized the futility of appealing 
directly to the Malay masses because of a communication gap. Firstly, it 
rationalized that rural Malays might not fully understand its advocacy of 
democratic socialism, and secondly, much time was lost and very little achie­
ved in commuting within the vast rural areas. To ensure that its message 
would be receptive to the Malays, the D.A.P. had to play down the role of its 
conspicuous Chinese leadership and make its few Malay leaders the torch- 
bearers. It thus elevated them to prominent positions in the party so as to 
give them as much publicity as possible to facilitate their task of recruiting 
significant numbers of Malays on the party's behalf, especially the middle 
class and the intellectuals3^ The D.A.P.'s previous approach of merely is­
suing pamphlets and "The Rocket" on its ideology would be supplemented by 
the speeches of its Malay leaders, especially on the government's alleged 
failure to eradicate poverty among the Malays. By this it hoped to attract 
Malay intellectuals as a first step, who could in turn conduct "ceramahs"
(or dialogue sessions) with the masses on the party's behalf, and thus en­
lighten them on its aims and objectives, which it felt, had been distorted 
by U.M.N.O.35
U.M.N.O. did not appear perturbed by the steps taken by the D.A.P. 
to challenge its power base. The sense of Malay communal solidarity, rein­
forced by religious exclusiveness and facilitated by the government's pro-
32. Ibid. 33- Ibid.
34» Mohd. Zalleh Nakhoda Itam, the Perak state assemblyman for Guntong
for 1974 and 1978, was elected one of the 2 Deputy Secretary-Generals 
of the party, giving him the same status as Lee Lam Thye. Fadzlan 
Yahaya, the unsuccessful D.A.P. candidate for the Perak state assembly 
in both the 1974 and 1978 general elections, was made the Chairman of
the party's Rural Development Bureau. Asiaweek. 18th January, 1980.3 5• Ibid•
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Malay p o l ic ie s ,  was u n lik e ly  to  be even den ted . Given i t s  b ig o try  th a t  th e  
D.A.P. would always be a Chinese ch au v in is t p a r ty , U.M.N.O. was s k e p t ic a l  o f 
th e  l a t t e r ' s  in te n t io n  to  r e c r u i t  Malays in  s ig n if ic a n t  numbers to  p lay  down 
i t s  conspicuous Chinese image and put up a m u l t i - r a c ia l  facad e . J u s t  as i t  
had nom inal non-Malay re p re se n ta tio n (b y  th e  D .A .P .'s  s ta n d a rd s ) in  th e  N .F ., 
U.M.N.O. was in c lin e d  to  charge th a t  th e  few(by i t s  own standards)M alays th a t  
th e  D.A.P. r e c ru i te d  to  i t s  le a d e rsh ip  ranks would n o t be given im portan t 
p o s i t io n s  th a t  would in f lu e n c e  th e  p a r ty 's  policy-m aking  s ig n i f ic a n t ly .
Thu3 U.M.N.O. was n o t im pressed by th e  e le v a tio n  o f th e  few Malay le a d e rs  
in to  th e  D .A .P .'s  C.E.C. on th e  grounds th a t  th e  m a jo rity  of th e  C.E.C.mem­
b ers  were s t i l l  C h inese .(S ee  Appendix B). At b e s t ,  U.M.N.O. r a t io n a l iz e d  
th a t  th e  D .A .P .'s  e f f o r t s  to  r e c r u i t  Malays in to  i t s  ranks had n e g l ig ib le  
im pact. In  mo3t c ase s , th e  Malays who jo in e d  th e  D.A.P. were d isg ru n tle d  
form er U.M.N.O., P .A .S . o r PEKiMAS members. According to  one sou rce , they  
d id  so f o r  a v a r ie ty  o f re a so n s , some personal?^  I t  was q u ite  common fo r  
form er U.M .N.O./P.A.S. incumbents who were n o t s e le c te d  fo r  r e - e le c t io n  to  
jo in  th e  D.A.P. as a s ig n  o f p ro te s t  to  t h e i r  own form er p a r t i e s ,  so th a t  
th ey  could  co n tes t in  t h e i r  form er c o n s ti tu e n c ie s  under th e  D.A.P. banner. 
Once th e y  lo s t  in  th e  e le c t io n s ,  they  u s u a lly  l e f t  th e  p a r ty . O thers might 
have jo in e d  th e  D.A.P. a f t e r  be in g  taken  in  by th e  p a r ty 's  propaganda th a t  
i t  was co n fid en t o f ta k in g  c o n tro l over c e r ta in  s ta te 3 ( e .g .P e r a k ) . They 
hoped th a t  th ey  would be appo in ted  to  to p  p o s i t io n s (e .g .  M entri B esar) should  
th e  p a r ty  win c o n tro l o f a  s t a t e  government. Thun p o l i t i c a l  opportunism  
appeared to  be th e  main reaso n  fo r  th e  Malays to  jo in  th e  D.A.P. Owing to
36. See Ism a il K assim ,"D .A .P .' s E lusive  Goal in  P erak", New N ation , 9 th  
September, 1977. The w r i te r  he ld  th a t  th e  Malays concerned were "no 
hopers who ran  over to  th e  D.A.P. because they  f e l t  th ey  were no t 
making any headway up th e  U.M.N.O. o r P .A .S . h ie ra rc h y " . Op. ci t .
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the dearth of Malay members,(which was contrary to its claim) the D.A.P.
could not afford to be discriminatory(as in the case of non-Malay members)
in recruiting Malays. In one case, it even admitted an ex-U.M.N.O. member
37who allegedly absconded with Bank Rakyat loans. This is not to suggest that 
all the Malays who joined the D.A.P. were political opportunists, lacking 
conviction in the party’s principles. In fact some of its Malay leaders, 
either present or past, had shown themselves to be more loyal than some of 
its non-Malay leaders. Their number is however small compared to the many 
who lacked conviction. Under these circumstances, U.M.N.O. dismissed the 
D.A.P.’s claims that it had penetrated certain U.M.N.O. strongholds as wist­
ful thinking. U.M.N.O.’s assessment is vindicated by the fact that since 
the D.A.P.’s inception in 1966, it has yet to have a Malay M.P. or state 
assemblyman representing the Malay areas. The D.A.P.'s one or two Malay
state assemblymen had been returned from Chinese rather than Malay-predomi-
39nated constituencies. If on the other hand they were elected from Malay 
predominated constituencies like in the case of the P.A.P.'s victories in 
the 1963 Singapore elections, then U.M.N.O. might have grounds to worry^ 
U.M.N.O. also felt that it could induce /threaten D.A.P. Malay members to 
resign/defect faster than the D.A.P. could recruit them, especially during
37« See K.Das,"Calling Debtors to account11,Far Eastern Economic Review,
13th July, 1979* The person concerned, took up loans totalling 
332,000 in I97S and 1971 when he was a member of U.M.N.O. He joined 
the D.A.P. just before the 1978 general elections, but resigned after 
he l03t his contest. He was then liable to repay 3197?133«
38. Examples of present D.A.P. Malay leaders who appeared loyal to the par­
ty are Ibrahim Singgeh, Deputy Chairman, and Fadzlan Yahaya. Despite 
losing in the 1974 and. 1978 general elections, both have not resigned 
from the party.
39« Mohd. Zalleh Nakhoda Itam,for instance, was elected from the Chinese- 
predominated state constituency of Guntong in Perak.
40. In the 1983 Singapore elections, the P.A.P. wrested the 3 former
U.M.N.O. strongholds of Geylang Serai, Kampong Kembangan and Southern 
Islands.
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g en e ra l e l e c t i o n s ^  U.M.N.O.’s advantage in  t h i s  was th a t  i t  had th e  f u l l  
support of th e  mass media to  e f f e c t  t h i s ,  s in ce  i t  c o n tro lle d  i t .  Also p ro ­
m inent Malay D.A.P. le a d e rs  had been known to  succumb to  th rea ts /in d u ce m e n ts
A O
to  re s ig n  from th e  p a rty ?  To agg ravate  th i s  m a tte r , th e  D .A .P .'s  h an d lin g  
o f c e r ta in  is su e s  in  r e la t io n  to  th e  s e n s i t i v i t i e s  of th e  M alays, have made 
i t  very  v u ln e rab le  to  Malay d e se r tio n s  from i t s  a lread y  d e p le t in g  Malay 
membership. Follow ing th e  1978 genera l e le c t io n s ,  6 D.A.P. non-Malay s t a t e  
assemblymen in a d v e r te n tly  m issed th e  o a th - ta k in g  ceremony in  th e  Perak S ta te  
Assembly, th u s  in c u rr in g  th e  w rath  of th e  Perak S u ltan , who accused them o f 
d is lo y a l ty  under Malay custom*? ^  The governm ent-con tro lled  p re ss  gave a 
b ia sed  coverage o f th e  in c id e n t to  d i s c r e d i t  th e  D .A .P., e s p e c ia l ly  among 
th e  M alays. D.A.P. le a d e rs ,  p a r t i c u la r ly  Lim K it S iang, d id  t h e i r  very  b e s t 
to  sa lv ag e  the  s i tu a t io n  by p u b lic ly  ap o lo g iz in g  to  th e  su lta n ?^  The in c i -
41. For a sami/Le o f th e  numerous re p o r ts  o f D.A.P. r e s ig n a t io n s /d e fe c t io n s ,  
p a r t i c u la r ly  among Malay members, see S t r a i t s  Times, 3rd & 5 th  J u ly ,
1978, and M irro r of O pinion, H ig h lig h ts  of Malay, Chinese and Tamil 
P re s s , P u b lic i ty  D iv is io n , M in is try  of C u ltu re , S ingapore, is su e s  127» 
128, 135> & 138/1978 re s p e c t iv e ly .  In  th e  l a t t e r  p u b lic a t io n , most
o f th e  d e fe c tio n s  were re p o rte d  by Utusan Melayu.
42. A good example of t h i s  was Daing Ibrahim  Othman. He had been one o f 
th e  top  D.A.P. Malay leaders(V ice-C hairm an) and was w ith  th e  p a rty  
when i t  was s t i l l  known as P .A .P .(M alaya). D aing 's lo y a l ty  to  th e  p a r-  
ty  appeared s tro n g  a f t e r  he had u n su c c e ss fu lly  co n te s ted  in  a s e r ie s
o f b y -e le c tio n s  and g en era l e le c tio n s  in  Malay a re a s , p a r t i c u la r ly  in  
Joho re , h is  home s t a t e .  A pparently  in  acknowledgement o f h is  lo y a l ty ,  
th e  p a rty  put him up as a  can d id a te  in  th e  C hinese-predom inated c o n s t i ­
tuency of P a s ir  Puteh in  Perak a g a in s t P .P .P . incumbent Foo Kuan Tze 
in  th e  1974 g en era l e le c t io n s .  In  a swing ag a in s t th e  P .P .P . , Daing 
won by a huge m a jo r ity . In  th e  1978 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  Daing was how­
ever piqued a t be ing  t r a n s fe r r e d  to  c o n te s t in  th e  r e l a t i v e ly  "unsafe" 
s t a t e  s e a t of Chemor in  Perak . This was to  make way fo r  Chian Heng 
Kai who was under d e te n tio n , s in ce  P a s ir  Puteh was considered  a "sa fe "  
c o n stitu en c y . New S t r a i t s  Times, 23rd June, 1978. U.M.N.O. e x p lo ite d  
t h i s  and induced him to  re s ig n  so as to  encourage more Malay d e fe c t io n s /  
re s ig n a tio n s  from th e  D.A.P. Daing subsequen tly  jo in e d  U.M.N.O. in  
March I 98O. New S t r a i t s  Times, 5 th  March, 19.80.
43. See New S tra its„ T im e s , v a rio u s  is s u e s ,  6 th  to  11th August, 1978.
and a r tic le ,"B o o b in g  in  P erak", Asiaweek, 18th  August, 1978*
44* In  ap o lo g iz in g  to  th e  Perak S u ltan , K it S iang made i t  very  c le a r  th a t  
th e  6 assemblymen had made a se r io u s  m istake and th a t  th e  D.A.P. meant
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dent could always be U3ed by the D.A.P.'s oppononents, in particular U.M.N.O., 
to accuse the D.A.P. of being anti-Malay rulers as an additional weapon to 
make its Malay recruitment drive difficult. U.M.N.O. also appeared to have no 
fears over the Malays responding in significant numbers to the D.A.P.'s 
call for agrarian reforms and democratic socialism. U.M.N.O.'s contention 
was justified to the extent that the average Malay peasant was so deep-rooted 
to Islamic conservatism and tradition that the form of redress he expected 
against any injustice perpetrated had to be Islam-based.^ Under these cir­
cumstances, the D.A.P.'s agrarian reforms and democratic socialism appeared 
irrelevant. This is vindicated by the fact that even the P.S.R.M., with its 
conspicuous Malay leadership, and which advocated similar policies, had al­
so failed in the past. On the contrary, the resurgence of traditional Is­
lam, manifested by the proliferation of dakwah movements and inspired by 
the recent upheavals in Iran, would tend to make the D.A.P.'s task in this 
aspect, virtually impossible. As regards the party's intentions to recruit 
Malay intellectuals and the Malay middle class, the situation also appeared 
bleak for the D.A.P. Although anti-U.M.N.O. Malay intellectuals like Anwar* 
Ibrahim and Dr. Chandra Muzaffar shared practically the same views as the
D.A.P. in relation to agrarian reform and the abuse and misuse of special 
privileges, they still distrusted it as a Chinese chauvinist party, despite
no disrespect to him in particular and the Malay royalty in general.
His request for an audience with the sultan over this matter was not 
granted. Ibid. The Chairman of the Perak D.A.P., Lim Cho Hock, one 
of the 6, in accepting full responsibility over the incident, claimed 
that it was a misunderstanding and offered to resign both his position 
as Perak D.A.P. Chairman and his state assembly seat. Lam Thye stres­
sed that the party had taken a serious view of the incident and would 
ensure that such mistakes, even if made inadvertently, would not hap­
pen again. Interview with Lam Thye, Malaysian Business, September,
1978.
45* For full details, see Michael Stenson,"Class and Race in West Malaysia", 
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Part II, Yol. VIII No. 2, 
April-June 1978, pp. 45”54•
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+i«Sthe elevation of its few Malay leaders and the severance of emotional -links 
with the P.A.P. To make matters harder for the D.A.P. in this aspect, some of 
them decided to oppose U.M.N.O. by joining P.A.S., either directly or indi­
rectly^ The D.A.P.'s attempts to woo the Malay middle class would also ap­
pear to be unsuccessful in the majority of circumstances. Any possible suc­
cess in this direction would have to involve the Malay middle class to come 
out strongly in favour of non-communalism, multi-lingualism, multi-culturalism,
A1an end to Malay special privileges, and to place nationality ahead of race! 
This is premised on the belief that the Malays have regarded Malaysia as a 
Malaysian rather than a Malay country, a remote possibility to say the least. 
Granted that the Malay middle class would be able to discern the root-causes 
of Malay poverty as economic and not racial, it may be surmised that middle 
class Malays would not associate themselves with the D.A.P. for the simple 
reason that they, like the Malay intellectuals, regarded it as a Chinese 
chauvinist party. If the Malay middle class had any political inclinations, 
it was likely that it would associate itself with U.M.N.O., since the latter, 
through the N.E.P., had been responsible for its creation and rise.
If U.M.N.O. appeared unperturbed by the D.A.P. challenge to its 
Malay base for the reasons discussed above, the non-Malay partners of the 
N.F., particularly theM.C.A., felt otherwise. The D.A.P.'s articulation
46. A.B.I.M. was the ally of P.A.S. in the 1978 general elections when many 
of its leaders campaigned for P.A.S. Subky Latiff, a Malay intellec­
tual who was once close to the U.M.N.O. leadership, particularly Tun 
Razak, contested unsuccessfully in the Port Klang by-election in Decem­
ber 1979 on a P.A.S. ticket. New Straits Times, 3rd December, 1979*
47. This contention was the conclusion R.K.Vasil derived for the possible 
success of non-communal parties on a long term basis in Malaysia. See 
R.K.Vasil, Politics in a Plural Society: A Study of Non-communal Poli­
tical Parties in West Malaysia, East Asian Historical Monographs, Ox­
ford University Press, Kuala Lumpur, 1971» Conclusion.
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of th e  is su e s  co n seq u en tia l on th e  pro-M alay p o lic ie s  o f th e  government drew 
th e  Chinese to  t h e i r  d isadvantageous p o s it io n  in  th e  country  v is - a - v i s  th e  
M alays. The c o n s is te n t arguments o f th e  D.A.P. he igh tened  th e  awareness of 
th e  Chinese th a t  t h e i r  r ig h t s  -  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c ia l ,  c u l tu r a l ,  economic and 
e d u ca tio n a l - were s te a d i ly  be ing  eroded by th e  M alay-led government. The 
D .A .P .'s  arguments went along p re d ic ta b le  l in e s :  In  th e  p re -1969 s i tu a t io n ,
t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  power was n e g l ig ib le ,  but they  s t i l l  c o n tro lle d  th e  economy 
and t h e i r  c h ild re n  could s t i l l  go to  th e  u n iv e r s i ty  i f  they  were q u a l i f ie d .  
A fte r  1969» no t only  d id  t h e i r  semblance o f p o l i t i c a l  power d e c lin e , but 
t h e i r  pre-em inence in  th e  economy was be ing  eroded by th e  N .E .P . and th e  
I.C .A . In  a d d itio n , th e  c h a ra c te r  of Chinese schools was b e in g  in s id io u s ly  
a l te r e d ,  q u a l i f ie d  Chinese s tu d en ts  w ith  good H.S.C. r e s u l t s  could no t f in d  
p lace s  in  th e  lo c a l  u n iv e r s i t i e s ,  Chinese c u l tu r a l  t r a d i t io n s  were d isco u ­
raged  and on some in s ta n c e s , r id ic u le d ,  and f i n a l ly ,  th e  p le a s  to  s e t  up a 
C hinese(M erdeka)U niversity  had been r e je c te d .  The sum of th e  D .A .P .1 8 argu­
ments p o in ted  to  a b leak  fu tu re  f o r  th e  Chinese community in  th e  coun try . 
Although they  were framed in  such a way to  avoid be ing  p e n a lise d  by the  Se­
d i t io n s  Act and to  appear c o n s tru c tiv e  in  many cases , th e  in s in u a tio n s  could 
n o t h id e  th e  D .A .P .'s  an ti-M alay  b ia s ,  e s p e c ia l ly  in  r e l a t io n  to  language, 
c u ltu re  and ed u ca tio n . The D.A.P. a lso  appeared to  the  Chinese as a p a rty  
which was not a f ra id  to  con fron t th e  M alay-led government when n ecessa ry  to  
speak f o r c e fu l ly  on th e i r  b e h a lf , even a t th e  r i s k  of p e rsec u tio n ?  Under 
th e se  c ircu m stan ces , i t  was ab le  to  s u b s ta n t ia l ly  in c re a se  i t s  support in  
th e  urban a re a s . In  th e  1978 g en era l e le c t io n s ,  th e  D.A.P. p o lle d  some 
652,000 v o te s , m ostly from th e  C h in e se ^  This was alm ost double th a t  of th e
48. The ro le  o f Lim K it Siang has been very  prom inent in  t h i s  case .
49. For f u r th e r  d e t a i l s ,  see D.K.Mauzy,MA Vote fo r  C o n tin u ity : The 1978 
G eneral E lec tio n s  in  M alaysia", Asian Survey, Vol. XIX No. 3> March 
1979, PP- 281-96.
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M.C.A.'s poll of slightly over 300,000 votes. If there had been no gerry­
mandering of the electoral constituencies, it might have been possible that 
the D.A.P. would have won more than the 16 Parliamentary seats and the 25 
state assembly seats compared to the M.C.A.'s 17 and 43 respectively. On 
this basis, the D.A.P. felt that it had as much claim to represent the Chi­
nese as the M.C.A. The M.C.A.’s main worry was that the pro-Malay policies 
of the government had in fact strengthened the D.A.P. with Chinese protest 
votes. Unlike the D.A.P., the M.C.A. was constrained by its commitment 
to the government's pro-Malay policies as a partner in the N.F., even if 
these policies were unpopular to its constituents. The M.C.A. was expected 
by U.M.N.O. to fully endorse the government's pro-Malay policies and at the 
same time retain the support of the Chinese. Caught between these 2 oppo­
sing forces, the M.C.A.'s lack of a firm commitment either way caused it to 
lose Chinese support to the D.A.P. on the one hand and to incur the displea­
sure of U.M.N.O. on the other. To the restless and frustrated Chinese, the 
M.C.A.'s strategy of attempting to effect a less harsh implementation of the 
government's pro-Malay policies through behind-the-scenes bargaining appeared 
less attractive than the D.A.P.'s publicly calling for their repeal altoge­
ther, either directly or indirectly. To refer to an earlier section of this 
conclusion, it was held tha/t in terms of effecting a less harsh implementa­
tion of the government's policies or to seek other more palatable alternatives, 
the D.A.P.'s consistent highlighting of the unsavoury aspects of the policies 
appeared successful, an in the case of the recognition of the poverty of some 
non-Malays in the T.M.P. and the allocation of more local university places 
for qualified non-Malay students. This would make the M.C.A.'s approach 
seem less effective to the Chinese.
Thus the D.A.P.'s post-1969 strategy was b o m  out of necessity ra­
ther than choice, firstly to ensure its survival, and secondly to effect
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possible expansion plans in an atmosphere of U.M.N.O.-dictated communal 
politics. To be fair to the D.A.P., the party did attempt to seek alterna­
tive strategies, albeit unsuccessfully. Before the consolidation of Lim Kit 
Siang's leadership, the D.A.P. attempted to merge with the M.C.A. and thus 
join the government to ensure its survival in the early 1970s. If the par­
ty's attempted merger could be considered the infusion of new blood into the 
M.C.A., the failure of the attempted merger was interpreted as a blessing 
in disguise for it, for the demise of the "Young Turks", either in the Chi­
nese Unity Movement or the Perak Task Force, indicated that a similar fate 
could befall the D.A.P. In the unlikely event of the government seeking to 
co-operate with the D.A.P. along the same lines of the P.P.P. and G.R.M. 
coalitions, the D.A.P. would also be disinclined to accept^ The apparent 
loss of electoral support for the P.P.P. in Perak and the declining support 
for the G.R.M. in Penang among the Chinese owing to the overtly pro-Malay 
policies of the N 0F., is a lesson the D.A.P. cannot forget^ By remaining 
outside the government, the D.A.P. felt itself free to articulate Chinese 
grievances each time they cropped up. Thus ironical as it may seem, the pro- 
Malay policies of the N.F, have been largely responsible for the increasing 
Chinese support for the D.A.P. and a corresponding decline for the N.F. non-
50. This possibility was suggested in interviews with Lee Lam Thye, Malay­
sian Business, September 1978, and Datuk Hussein Onn, Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 26th January, 1979* Both have categorically rejected 
proposals of the D.A.P. merging 'with the N.F. on the grounds of con­
flicting and irreconciliable core policies.
51. For the P.P.P.'s demise, see A.Sri Nayagam,"Decline of the P.P.P. after 
the death of the Seeni Brothers", New Sunday Times, 30th July, 1978*
As for the G.R.M., its representation in the Penang State Assembly, its 
stronghold, declined from 11 in 1974 to 8 in 1978» At Parliamentary 
level, 4 G.R.M. M.P.'s were returned in 1978 compared to 5 in 1974»
Of even greater significance was the loss of the G.R.M.'s predominantly 
Chinese constituencies at both State and Parliamentary levels, including 
Tanjong(Parliament) previously held by Dr. Lim Chong Eu from 1 9 6 4 to 
1974*(Dr. Lim did not contest any Parliamentary seat in 1978). It 
would appear that the G.R.M. was not voted out of Penang at state level 
in 1978 partly out of fear of U.M.N.O. becoming the dominant party 
there.
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Malay parties. The only effective way for the N.F. to contain and ultimately 
defeat the D.A.P. is to play down the pro-Malay emphasis of its policies, 
get the Chinese to view their problems rationally in an attempt to defuse 
and ultimately resolve the issues(that have maxie the D.A.P. popular) to the 
satisfaction of the Chinese. The argument in favour of this strategy is 
that it is synonymous with delivering the goods to the Chinese, the main 
weakness of the D.A.P. Datuk Hussein Onn might have adopted it partially 
in accepting the D.A.P.'s call for a full-scale debate on the Merdeka Uni­
versity controversy, and then defusing it by announcing more places for non- 
Malay students in local universities. The N.F. has lately come to realize 
that prosecuting and harrassing D.A.P. leaders would not contain the party; 
on the contrary, these measures would give the party a sympathy boost and 
actually increase its support among the Chinese as the results of the 1978 
general elections had shown. However U.M.N.O. is unlikely to adopt this 
strategy fully and on a permanent basis as it considers the costs too high. 
U.M.N.O.'s major fear in this aspect is P.A.S.' accusations that it had sold 
out fundamental Malay rights to the Chinese. Under these circumstances, it 
would lose its support to its traditional rival. Neither are the M.C.A. and 
the G.R.M. likely to press this strategy too fax for fear of jeopardizing 
the position of the moderates and strengthening that of the extremists in 
U.M.NoO. In fact the restraint of both the M.C.A. and the G.R.M. could be 
due to their belief that the moderates had, in making important concessions 
to the non-Malays, done more than what was expected of them and risking their 
political future. Thu3 the D.A.P.'s consistency in articulating Chinese grie­
vances, if carried too far, would accelerate the existing racial polarization 
in the country. With its support increasing among the Chinese and its evident 
failure to make any significant headway among the Malays, it is likely that 
the party will eventually degenerate into a bigger replica of either the P.P.P., 
the U.D.P. or the L.P.M. if present trends remain unchanged.
APPENDIX A
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THE SETAPAK DECLARATION
Introduction
We, the Chairman and Members of the Central Executive Committee of 
the Democratic Action Party, together with Members of Branch Committees of 
the Party, here assembled at Setapak, Kuala Lumpur, on 29th July 1967» hereby 
re-state and re-affirm the basic guiding policy and principles of the Demo­
cratic Action Party, as given hereunder.
We firmly resolve to continue to be governed in all our activities 
and in all our approaches to the social, political, economic and cultural 
problems in Malaysia, by the same basic guiding policy and principles,
2. Objectives
The D.A.P. is irrevocably committed to the ideal of a free, democra­
tic and socialist Malaysia, based on the principles of racial equality, and 
social and economic justice, and founded on the institutions of parliamenta­
ry democracy.
We believe that it is possible to mobilise the support of the big 
majority of the multi-racial people of Malaysia in the pursuit of this aim, 
and we shall regard it as our primary objective to mobilise such support.
We are aware that in the pursuit of our aims, we shall meet with 
serious resistance, not only from the Alliance Party and Government, but also 
from political forces hostile to the Malaysian nation and inspired by foreign 
powers and ideologies.
We re-affirm that the D.A.P. intends to be guided by purely Malaysian 
perspectives and aspirations. We shall not allow ourselves to be deflected 
from our chosen path by either the reactionary and communal right wing, or 
by the foreign-inspired anti-Malaysia left. Neither shall we lend ourselves 
to manipulation by either of these two groups.
In order to achieve our primary objective, the most vital condition 
must be success in the process of nation-building in a multi-racial society. 
But it i3 precisely in the vital process of nation-building that the Alliance 
Government has been guilty of a gross and shameful betrayal of national 
trust.
3• The Correct Principles of Nation-building in a Multi-Racial Society
We uphold as incontestable the fact that success in the nation­
building process must depend on the adoption and implementation of the 
principle of racial equality at all levels of national life and in all 
fields of national endeavour - political, social, economic, cultural and 
educational.
The first thing to do if we are to get our principles of nation­
building in a multi-racial society correct is to completely eschew any idea 
of racial hegemony by one community. Such an endeavour mu3t be doomed to 
failure, and must be discarded, on the grounds of both desirability and 
practicability.
Racial hegemony in a multi-racial society is certainly an undesirable
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p r in c ip le  to  be adopted anywhere in  th e  w orld , bu t in  M alaysia, th e  very  
com position o f our p o p u la tio n  a lso  makes i t  im p rac tic ab le  o r r e a l i s a t io n ,  
f o r  th e  good reason  th a t  in  t h i s  co u n try , no s in g le  r a c i a l  group can claim  
to  enjoy an o v e ra ll  m a jo r ity .
The Malays do not c o n s t i tu te  a n a t io n a l  m a jo r ity . N e ith e r do th e  
C hinese, n o r th e  In d ia n s , no r anybody e ls e .  In  o th e r  words, any s in g le  
community in  M alaysia, by i t s e l f  i s  outnumbered by th e  r e s t .  And th e reb y  
hangs th e  obvious le sso n  th a t  any attem pt to  v io la te  th e  p r in c ip le  o f r a c i a l  
e q u a li ty  in  M alaysian s o c ie ty  must le ad  to  in e v i ta b le  and c a ta s tro p h ic  
f a i l u r e .
A ll movements aimed a t th e  r e a l i s a t i o n  o f r a c i a l  hegemony by one 
communal group o r an o th e r , have f a i l e d  in  th e  p a s t ,  and w i l l  con tinue  to  
f a i l  in  th e  fu tu r e .
For example, one o f th e  m ajor reasons fo r  th e  f a i l u r e  o f th e  armed 
in s u r re c t io n  i n i t i a t e d  by th e  Malayan Communist P a rty  in  194Q was th e  f a c t  
th e  communists committed th e  g re a t m istake  o f th in k in g  th a t  success was 
p o s s ib le  on th e  b a s is  of ap p ea lin g  to  th e  s u s c e p t ib i l i t i e s  o f only  one sec ­
t io n  o f th e  community -  th e  C hinese, w hile  ig n o rin g  th e  s u s c e p t ib i l i t i e s  o r 
th e  a s p ir a t io n s  of th e  o th e r  communities.
The communists d iscovered  to  t h e i r  co st th a t  in  th e  absence of a 
m u l t i - r a c ia l  n a t io n a l  b ase , they  were in e v i ta b ly  den ied  n a tio n a l su ccess .
We see th e  A llian ce  Government a lso  f a i l i n g ,  e v e n tu a lly , f o r  th e  same 
reason  -  th a t  th ey  show a re a d in e ss  to  pander to  th e  r a c i a l i s t  g a l le ry  o f a 
p a r t i c u la r  community, w hile  ig n o rin g , i f  no t a c t iv e ly  o ffen d in g  ag a in s t th e  
r if^ a ts , s u s c e p t ib i l i t i e s  and a s p ir a t io n s  o f o th e r  communities.
C la s s ify in g  th e  c i t iz e n s  in to  "bum iputras" and "non-bum iputras", d is ­
c rim in a tin g  a g a in s t c i t iz e n s  in  m a tte rs  o f appointm ents and prom otions, p a r t i ­
c u la r ly  in  th e  p u b lic  s e c to r  and now in c re a s in g ly  in  th e  p r iv a te  s e c to r ,  on 
grounds o f ra c e , a re  h a rd ly  c a lc u la te d , in  our view, to  s tre n g th en  th e  sense 
o f n a t io n a l  consciousness and s o l id a r i ty  in  our m u l t i - r a c ia l  n a tio n .
Mere l ip - s e r v ic e  to  th e  p r in c ip le s  o f r a c i a l  e q u a li ty , m u tu a lity , 
to le ra n c e  and accommodation, w i l l  no t r e a l i s e  th e  id e a l  of n a tio n a l s o l id a r i ­
ty .  The p r in c ip le  must be seen to  be c le a r ly  r e f le c te d  in  a l l  n a tio n a l p o l i ­
c ie s ,  and to  be f a i t h f u l l y  implemented in  p ra c t ic e  in  a l l  f i e ld s  of n a t io n a l  
l i f e .
Such implementation o f th e  b a s ic  p r in c ip le s  o f r a c i a l  e q u a li ty , 
m u tu a lity , to le ra n c e  and accommodation a re  c le a r ly  abesent fo r  example, in  
th e  A llia n c e  Government’s p o l ic ie s  on th e  s e n s i t iv e  bu t n o n e th e less  v i t a l  
q u estiö n s  o f language, education  and c u l tu re .
4» On Language, Education and C u ltu re
While th e  D.A.P. w i l l  uncompromisingly champion th e  accep tance , p ro ­
pag a tio n  and development o f th e  n a t io n a l  language, we cannot accept a langua­
ge and educa tion  p o lic y  based  on th e  erroneous prem ise th a t  th e  p ropaga tion  
and th e  permanence o f th e  n a t io n a l  language can on ly  be f i n a l ly  secured  on 
th e  b a s is  o f th e  ev en tu a l d e c u ltu ra t io n  o f  two m ajor communities in  M alaysia 
-  th e  Chinese and th e  In d ia n s .
T his i s  p r e c is e ly  what s ig n i f ic a n t  sec tio n s  o f th e  M alaysian people
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read into the National Language Act and the education policy of the Govern­
ment, and in our view, with ample justification.
If linguistic and cultural homogeneity were the vital pre-condition 
of national existence and consolidation, then several multi-lingual and 
multi-cultural nations in the world, like Switzerland, Canada or India could 
never have come into being or succeeded, let alone survived.
The Malaysian Constitution does indeed recognise the multi-lingual 
and multi-cultural character of the nation, and guarantees the free use of 
the languages of the other major communities in the nation.
This constitutional guarantee is, however, rendered sterile by an 
educational policy which does not permit the free use of the Chinese and 
Tamil languages as media of instruction and of examination in national-type 
secondary schools. This restriction must lead to the steady deterioration 
of levels of attainment and of proficiency in these two languages, as well 
as to the inevitable decline in their usage and to their eventual elimina­
tion.
We re-affirm our contention that the Alliance Government's education 
policy has the effect of rendering null and void the constitutional guarantee 
with regard to the free use of the other languages in the country, and we 
shall deem it as one of our objectives to secure a correspondence between 
educational policy and constitutional guarantee.
We also reiterate our belief that while the national language should, 
by virtue of its status, become ultimately the chief language of administra­
tion in the country, this should not preclude the use for necessary official 
purposes, of the Chinese and Tamil languages, in addition to the English 
language. This would contribute to the fitness of things, as well as to the 
purposes of rational and intelligent administration.
5« The Removal of Economic and Educational Imbalance as the Correct
Means to Achieve National Integration in a Multi-racial Society
Communal divisions and dissensions are, at bottom, engendered and 
aggravated by economic causes. The intelligent and effective way of dissol­
ving communal barriers, and transcending communal sentiments in our multi­
racial society, and to expedite the process of national integration, would 
be to implement a policy aimed at the eradication of the existing economic 
imbalance between the communities.
This imbalance reflects the slower pace of socio-economic processes 
in the rural areas, and the disparity as between rural incomes and producti­
vity on the one hand, and urban incomes and productivity on the other.
These are phenomena which are not peculiar to Malaysia among the 
developing countries. Similar social, economic and cultural disparities as 
between rural and urban areas also confront other developing countries.
What renders the problem more acute and dangerous for Malaysia, 
however, is the fact that class divisions in our country appear very often 
to coincide with communal divisions.
The rural peasantry are largely Malays while the bourgeoisie in the 
towns and the professional classes are largely non-Malays. This fact has 
been effectively exploited in the past, and continues to be so exploited,
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by communal-minded politicians who play on Malay sentiments of insecurity 
and backwardness in order to justify the political dominance which they 
exercise in the name of the Malays, but which in fact they really exercise 
for the minority social class which they represent - that sordid, selfish 
and curious amalgam of a social class, for whom the best description so far 
coined is - the ’’feudal-compradoreM class, and their hangers-on, which 
constitute the Alliance leadership.
In point of fact, the coincidence of class divisions with communal 
divisions is not as straightforward and as general as it would appear at 
first sight. No doubt, certain communal politicians find it convenient to 
give the impression to the Malays that the "haves" are all non-Malays. This 
is simply not true, for the vast majority of Malaysians of Chinese and Indian 
origin are workers and wage-earners of various categories.
The truth is that the fraternity of Malaysian "have-nots" are to be 
found in the urban as well as rural areas, and embraces Malaysians of all 
communities and religions. This is the truth which the communal politicians 
deliberately ignore, for it upsets the neat and plausible theories which 
they habitually hawk as their stock-in-trade in order to justify themselves 
to their followers. But it is truth which national-minded democratic 
socialists must incessantly drive home, in order to help expedite the pro­
cess of national integration on the basis of the common economic interests 
of the have-nots of all races.
However the economic and educational imbalance as between the urban 
and rural areas does lend itself rather easily to being clothed, in a commu­
nal garb, and it must be part of any enlightened socio-economic policy to 
remove this imbalance.
The D.A.P. charges the Alliance Government with not doing anything 
significant towards this end. Indeed, one of the most striking commentaries 
on Alliance failure in this respect is the fact that the great majority of 
Malay students in our university do Malay language and religious studies, 
whereas the crying need is surely for more and more Malays to become quali­
fied in the modern disciplines of science, medicine, technology, economics, 
etc., so that Malays may be able to compete on equal terms with their fellow 
Malaysians of Chinese and Indian origin, who are not in the habit of sending 
their offspring to centres of higher learning in order to become experts in 
Buddhism or the Bible or the Bhagavad Gita.
But apart from occasional lip-service, the Alliance leadership has 
been gravely delinquent in regard to the positive encouragement of Malay 
students to qualify themselves in the more productive and sophisticated 
disciplines of modem knowledge.
Again, with regard to the improvement of the rural economy, one 
would have thought that the primary end in view would be the raising of the 
per capita income of the Malay peasantry, while the means employed would 
have been radical land reform measures to eradicate crude exploitation of 
the peasantry by landowners and middlemen and the introduction of modem 
techniques of agricultural production.
Instead of this, the emphasis has been on the provision of an expen­
sive and outwardly imposing infrastructure in the rural areas, which has 
largely succeeded thus far only in enriching a few entrepreneurs, middlemen 
and a favoured elite among the Malays.
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The c o n s t i tu t io n a l  p ro v is io n  a ffo rd in g  c e r ta in  s p e c ia l  r ig h t s  to  th e  
Malays has been used , no t w ith  a view to  r a i s in g  th e  g en e ra l s tan d ard s  o f 
l iv in g  in  th e  r u r a l  a re a s , bu t fo r  th e  c re a tio n  o f an e l i t e  Malay c a p i t a l i s t  
c la s s  who have proved ju s t  as rap ac io u s  than  th e  20th  cen tu ry  expects of i t s  
e n tre p re n e u rs .
The c ru c ia l  c r i t ic i s m ,  however, i s  th a t  i t  i s  im possib le  to  see how 
th e  per c a p i ta  income and th e  s tan d a rd s  o f l i f e  o f th e  Malay p easan try  can 
be s ig n i f ic a n t ly  r a is e d  by th e  c re a tio n  o f  an e l i t e  group of Malay c a p i ta ­
l i s t s ,  who o p e ra te  in  co n ju n c tio n  w ith  an e l i t e  group o f Chinese compradores 
and ty co o n s.
L est i t  be charged th a t  we oppose Malay p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  b u s in ess  
and commercial f i e l d s ,  we might d e c la re  c a te g o r ic a l ly  th a t  we welcome th e  
e q u a lis a t io n  o f o p p o r tu n itie s  f o r  Malays to  p a r t i c ip a te  in  a l l  f i e ld s  o f 
n a t io n a l  l i f e .
Our co n ten tio n  i s  sim ply th a t  no m ajor onslaught can be made a g a in s t 
peasan t poverty  in  th e  r u r a l  a reas  by c re a t in g  a few r ic h  M alays, any more 
th an  th e  s o c ia l  and economic problems of th e  Chinese and In d ian  w orkers in  
th e  urban a reas  can be so lved  by e n ro ll in g  a few more members in  th e  MCom- 
p radores Club1’ o r th e  even more r e s t r i c t e d  club o f th e  b ig  b u sin ess  tycoons, 
bo th  p re s id e d  over by th e  M.C.A.
Problems o f g e n e ra l, s o c ia l  and economic development in  urban as w ell 
as r u r a l  a reas  can only  be ta c k le d  on th e  b a s is  of th e  a p p lic a tio n  of more 
m eaningful economic p o l ic ie s ,  aimed a t im proving th e  l o t  of the  many, and no t 
o f enhancing of th e  g a in s o f th e  few.
6 . I n te r n a t io n a l  P e rsp e c tiv e  of M alaysia
The f i r s t  th in g  f o r  M alaysians to  understand  and a p p re c ia te , as we 
look a t  th e  re 3 t  o f th e  w orld , and p a r t i c u la r ly  a t th e  r e 3 t  o f A sia, i s  th a t  
we a re  a very  sm all n a tio n , by any s ta n d a rd s , w ith  a p o p u la tio n  o f about 9 
m illio n  p eop le .
Indeed , th e  only  n a tio n  sm a lle r than  us in  th i s  p a r t  of th e  w orld i s  
S ingapore . For th e  r e 3 t ,  we a re  surrounded by la r g e r  co u n trie s  w ith  f a r  
b ig g e r p o p u la tio n s  and re so u rc e s .
One o f our c losest neighbours in  South East A sia i s  In d o n esia , w ith  
more th an  a hundred m ill io n  peop le , whose re c e n t p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta r y  
c o n fro n ta tio n  we managed to  meet and su rv iv e , no t on our own, bu t because of 
th e  p ro te c t iv e  B r i t i s h  defence um brella  sp read  over us and S ingapore.
A second s ta r k  and naked fa c t  th a t  we have to  face  i s  th a t  th i s  
B r i t i s h  defence um bre lla , which we have tak en  a l l  a long  fo r  g ran ted , and 
behind which we had c o n fid e n tly  s h e l te re d ,  i s  now in  th e  p rocess o f ra p id  
c o n tra c tio n , le a d in g  to  ev en tu a l t o t a l  w ithdraw al. The grim fa c t  i s  th a t  
by th e  m id -se v en tie s , p re sen t B r i t i s h  p lan s  envisage the  complete w ithdraw al 
o f th e  B r i t i s h  m il i ta r y  p resence  in  M alaysia  and S ingapore.
This means th a t  as a sm all n a t io n , l iv in g  in  an extrem ely  tro u b le d  
and u n s e t t le d  p a r t of th e  w orld, surrounded by huge neighbours w ith  f a r  
la rg e r  s tan d in g  arm ies, M alaysia must in c re a s in g ly  depend on h e r own more 
s le n d e r  re so u rc e s , fo r  bo th  in te r n a l  and e x te rn a l defence . We must swim 
alone in  a h o s t i l e  sea  f u l l  o f p red a to ry  sharks and m an-eating  p ira n h a s .
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The fa c t  th a t  bo th  M alaysia and S ingapore a re  r e l a t iv e ly  b e t t e r  o f f  
econom ically  than  any o th e r  country  in  A sia (a p a r t  from Jap an ), and prov ide 
a b e t t e r  l iv in g  fo r  t h e i r  peop le , does n o t make our problems o f su rv iv a l 
sm all, bu t s e p a ra te  and d i s t i n c t  p o l i t i c a l  e n t i t i e s  in  th e  y ears  ahead, any 
e a s ie r .
I t  i s  dangerous to  bo sm all, d e fe n c e le ss , bu t r e l a t i v e ly  a f f lu e n t  i f  
you a re  surrounded by la r g e r  co u n trie s  w ith  b ig g e r and h u n g rie r p o p u la tio n s . 
H is to r ic a l ly ,  such a s i tu a t io n  has always p rov ided  th e  c la s s ic  re c ip e  f o r  
ag g re ss io n .
One o f th e  s tro n g est in d ic tm en ts  of th e  la ck  o f fo re s ig h t  o f th e  
A llia n c e  le a d e rsh ip  has been i t s  proved i n a b i l i t y  to  envisage and p rep are  
fo r  th e  dangerous defence vacuum th a t  would be c re a te d  i f  and when th e  B ri­
t i s h  do decide  to  e f f e c t  a t o t a l  m il i ta r y  w ithdraw al, as th ey  have a lread y  
decided  to  do.
There was no a p p re c ia tio n  over th e  l a s t  decade th a t  th e  p rocess of 
d e c o lo n isa tio n  in  A sia and A frica  had f i n a l l y  and ir re v o c a b ly  d ep rived  B ri­
t a i n  o f h e r s ta tu s  and r o le  as a w orld power, and l e f t  h e r  as y e t an o th er 
sm all European n a tio n , f a r  more in te r e s te d  in  h e r s u rv iv a l in  Europe as a 
member of en European economic f r a t e r n i t y ,  th an  in  any k ind  of p resence  in  
d is ta n t  South East A sia .
In  s p i te  o f t h i s ,  B r i t i s h  p u b lic  op in ion  might have been persuaded 
in to  co n tin u in g  B r i t i s h  defence commitments in  t h i s  p a r t  o f th e  w orld over 
a lo nger p e rio d , a t l e a s t  u n t i l  such tim e as M alaysia could have s a fe ly  
secured  a l t e r n a t iv e  defence arrangem ents, i f  th e  A llia n c e  government had 
not gone about t r y in g  to  tw is t  th e  t a i l  o f  th e  aged B r i t i s h  l io n  in  a  f i t  
o f ju v e n ile  h e ro ic s .
A llian ce  backbenchers indu lged  in  a n t i - B r i t i s h  t i r a d e s  in  P a rliam en t, 
w hile  th e  A llian ce  government i t s e l f ,  obv iously  p lay in g  up to  a th o u g h tle s s  
g a l le ry ,  s lapped  down on a whole range of Commonwealth p re fe re n c e s .
The s tu p id i t i e s  o f th e  A llian ce  Government have f i n a l ly  come home to  
r o o s t ,  in  th e  shape of th e  re c e n t ly  p u b lish ed  B r i t i s h  defence V/hite Paper, 
and we had to  w itn ess  th e  h u m ilia tin g  sp e c ta c le  o f th e  two A llian ce  Govern­
ment le a d e rs  v i s i t i n g  London, and app ea lin g  to  th e  very  same people th ey  had 
only l a t e l y  in s u l te d  and r e v i le d ,  to  r e t a in  t h e i r  m i l i ta r y  presence  in  th e  
coun try .
Be th a t  as i t  may, M alaysia must now seek to  su rv iv e  in  a  r a p id ly  
changing w orld , and p a r t i c u la r ly  in  a South East A sia  in  which th e  p o te n t ia l  
dangers and th r e a ts  to  our n a t io n a l  su rv iv a l and t e r r i t o r i a l  in t e g r i t y  a re  
l ik e ly  to  be agg ravated , r a th e r  than  d im in ished , in  th e  y ea rs  ahead.
S ince we a re  n e i th e r  a  super-pow er nor even a medium-sized one, i t  i s  
c le a r  th a t  we a re  too  sm all to  defend o u rse lv e s , and th a t  we must seek a l t e r ­
n a tiv e  defence arrangem ents fo r  o u rse lv es  in  co n ju n c tio n  w ith  f r ie n d ly  powers, 
and look fo r  w hatever in te r n a t io n a l  gu aran tees  and co -o p e ra tio n  we can o b ta in  
to  safeg u ard  our n a t io n a l  so v e re ig n ty  and t e r r i t o r i a l  in t e g r i t y .
I f  p u b lic  con fidence , which has a lread y  been ru d e ly  shaken, i s  to  be 
m ain ta ined , i t  i s  im p era tiv e  th a t  th e  government be seen to  be working 
in t e l l i g e n t l y  and d i l ig e n t ly  towards c re d ib le  and dependable arrangem ents 
to  ensure n a t io n a l  defence and s e c u r i ty .
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I t  i s  in  t h i s  new con tex t th a t  th e  D.A.P. hopes th a t  th e  governments 
o f S ingapore and M alaysia w i l l  f i n a l l y  see i t  as th e  b e t t e r  p a r t  of wisdom, 
to  cease t h e i r  p e rp e tu a l feuds and in te rm in a b le  sq uabb les, and to  e s ta b l i s h  
new r e la t io n s  o f t r u s t ,  confidence and co -o p e ra tio n  to  ensure  t h e i r  common 
economic dem ocratic  development and p ro s p e r i ty , defence and su rv iv a l..
7* C e rta in  V ita l  C onditions fo r  M alaysian N a tio n a l S u rv iv a l in  an
U nstable  South East A sia
I t  i s  no t always t r u e  th a t  sm all n a tio n s  cannot h o ld  t h e i r  own, 
e i th e r  m i l i t a r i l y  o r p o l i t i c a l l y ,  in  th e  in te r n a t io n a l  power game. S evera l 
sm all n a tio n s  have d is tin g u is h e d  them selves in  h is to ry  by showing a c ap a c ity  
f o r  n a t io n a l  s u rv iv a l and p ro g ress  out o f a l l  p ro p o rtio n  to  t h e i r  geograph i­
c a l s iz e  o r to  th e  s iz e  o f t h e i r  p o p u la tio n .
They have done so , in v a r ia b ly , because they  enjoyed th re e  v i t a l  p re ­
r e q u is i t e s  o f s u rv iv a l:  One, a firm  sense  of n a t io n a l  u n i ty ,  id e n t i ty  and
s o l id a r i t y ;  two: a h ig h ly  s k i l l e d  and d ed ica ted  p o p u la tio n ; and th re e :
s o c ia l  and economic d i s c ip l in e .
We do no t see any reason  why, g iven  th e  r ig h t  p o l i t i c a l  le a d e rs h ip , 
M alaysia cannot acq u ire  a l l  th o se  a t t r ib u te s  so c le a r ly  n ecessa ry  to  ensure 
our con tinuance and su rv iv a l as a n a t io n . I t  i s  our co n ten tio n  th a t  th e  
p re sen t p o l ic ie s  o f th e  A llian ce  government a re  g rav e ly  in im ic a l to  th e  
n a t io n a l  a tta in m en t o f th e  v i t a l  a t t r i b u t e s .
The f i r s t  p r e - r e q u is i te  o f a firm  sense of n a t io n a l  u n ity , id e n t i ty  
and s o l id a r i ty  can only  be e s ta b lis h e d  i f  th e  p r in c ip le  of r a c i a l  e q u a li ty  
i s  f a i t h f u l l y  observed and implemented in  a l l  f i e ld s  o f n a t io n a l  l i f e .  We 
s h a l l  s tru g g le  f o r  t h i s .
The second p r e - r e q u is i te  o f a h ig h ly  s k i l l e d  and educated p o p u la tio n  
can be o b ta in ed  th rough  th e  im plem entation o f a modem and dynamic p o lic y  o f 
ed u ca tio n . The D.A.P. s h a l l  s t r i v e  to  achieve such an educa tion  p o lic y .
The th i r d  p r e - r e q u is i te  of s o c ia l  and economic d is c ip l in e  in  th e  
n a t io n a l  l i f e  can be secured  by th e  fo llo w in g  m easures. One, th e  fo rm u la tio n  
and im plem entation o f s o c ia l  and f i s c a l  p o l ic ie s  to  ensure a  f a i r e r  d i s t r i ­
b u tio n  o f th e  n a t io n a l  w ea lth . Two, a more scrupulous adherence to  th e  p r in ­
c ip le s  and p ra c t ic e  o f s o c ia l  j u s t i c e .  Three,m ore r e a l i s t i c  p lan n in g  fo r  
economic d iv e r s i f i c a t io n ,  and a g r ic u l tu r a l  and in d u s t r i a l  expansion , in v o l­
v in g  th e  e n th u s ia s t ic  involvem ent and p a r t ic ip a t io n  of a l l  s e c tio n s  of th e  
p o p u la tio n , and fo u r , th e  c re a tio n  o f an in c o r ru p t ib le  and e f f i c i e n t  govern­
ment a d m in is tra tiv e  m achinery. A ll th e se  measures th e  D.A.P. s h a l l  p e r s i s ­
t e n t ly  s t r i v e  f o r .
8 . On th e  Use and Abuse o f th e  In te rn a l  S e c u rity  Act
One o f th e  un p leasan t f a c t s  of l i f e  th a t  we have to  l iv e  w ith  i s  th a t  
-the g en e ra l s i tu a t io n  in  South East A sia be in g  what i t  i s ,  M alaysia w i l l  
con tinue to  face  grave th r e a ts  to  h e r s e c u r i ty  from th e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f th e  
agents and in s tru m en ts  o f fo re ig n  powers, h o s t i l e  to  our n a t io n a l  e x is te n c e .
The th r e a t  o f subversion  i s  very  r e a l ,  as th e  p e rio d  of Indonesian  
c o n fro n ta tio n  so c le a r ly  showed, and as th e  e x is ten c e  of fo re ig n - in s p ire d  
communist a c t i v i t i e s  in  th e  country  con tinues to  show.
265
In the circumstances, the D.A.P. as a sober and realistic party, 
cannot share the enthusiasm of well-meaning but nevertheless starry-eyed 
and unrealistic persons, who call for the total repeal of the Internal 
Security Act.
We must recognise that it must be one of the paramount concerns of 
any Malaysian Government, even of a D.A.P. Government, to protect the secu­
rity and integrity of the nation against the forces of foreign-inspired 
subversion.
We therefore support, in principle, the need for internal security 
legislation. We must nevertheless urge the utmost public vigilance in 
regard to the existence of the powers vested in the government by the Inter­
nal Security Act.
We cannot afford to be blind to the fact that it is not beyond the 
capacity of the Alliance Government to abuse the provisions of the Internal 
Security Act for partisan and other purposes, which have nothing to do with 
the legitimate concern for the maintenance of internal security.
Some examples which come to mind are, 1. The retention by the 
government of emergency labour laws promulgated in the name of meeting the 
dangers of Indonesian confrontatiön, long after that confrontation had ended, 
and 2. The continuance of the requirement for suitability certificates for 
admission to higher centres of learning, despite the fact that experience 
has shown that no real security need exists for such a requirement.
The D.A.P. therefore calls for the abolition of the requirements for 
suitability certificates as being both unnecessary and humiliating, and for 
the prevention of other abuses committed in the name of the maintenance of 
internal security.
9* Conclusion - A Choice of National Destiny
Regarded against a broad historical background and perspective, 
Malaysia must be seen as undergoing an evolutionary crisis in which is 
concealed a choice of its destiny.
For a stage has been reached in which intelligent Malaysians can 
discern, on the one hand, the possibility of integration of a multi-racial, 
multi-lingual and multi-religious people in a wider, all-embracing Malaysia- 
centred identity and consciousness, and,on the other hand, the equal possi­
bility of the failure to effect such an integral transformation with the 
inevitable consequences of national discord, dissension and disintegration.
The choice is there, and it is imperative. In the final analysis, 
it must be the people as a whole who have to make this choice of destiny - 
either to take the road which leads to an integral national transformation, 
or the alternative road leading to eventual national decay and disintegra­
tion.
We have faith that if this choice of destiny is placed before them 
in frankness and honesty, Malaysians of all races and creeds will inake the 
right choice.
All that the Alliance leaders have contributed in this direction so
slogans and panaceas.
The politics of the Alliance have been the politics of communal 
segmentation and division, we see it as the primary duty of all Malaysians, 
who desire the survival of their country, to counter the segmenting and 
dividing politics of the Alliance with the politics of creative and dynamic 
multi-racial integration at all levels - political, social, economic and 
cultural.
Those who are communalists in mind and spirit can never hope to 
contribute to the nation-building process. Only those Malaysians can take 
up this process, who have effected the integral transformation in their own 
minds and spirits, and who therefore possess a creative and harmonising 
spirit of national construction. Otherwise, everything must welter in a 
general confusion and discord out of which it will be impossible to build 
a greater harmonic life of the nation.
It is to this sacred task of creative and constructive nation­
building that we in the D.A.P. dedicate ourselves.
Source: who Lives if Malaysia Dies? D.A.P.'s Case for a Multi­
racial Society, D.A.P., Petaling Jaya, 1 969, pp. 17“30.
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COMPOSITION OF THE D.A.P.'S CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (AS AT DECEMBER 1979)
SECRETARY-GENERAL: Lim Kit Siang
CHAIRMAN: Dr. Chen Man Hin
DEPUTY SECRETARY- 
GENERALS: Lee Lam Thye
Mohamad. Zalleh b. Nakhoda It am
DEPUTY CHAIRMAN: Ibrahim b . Singgeh
VICE-CHAIRMEN: Karpal Singh 
Lim Cho Hock
ORGANISING SECRETARY: P.Patto
ASSISTANT ORGANISING 
SECRETARIES: Hu Se Peng 
Osman b. Tahor
TREASURER: Lee Kaw
ASSISTANT TREASURER: Chan Kok Kit (presently under detention)
DIRECTOR OF POLITICAL 
BUREAU: Chan Teck Chan
PUBLICITY SECRETARY: Chian Heng Kai (presently under detention)
Dr. Tan Seng Giaw 
Peter Paul Dason 
Chong Siew Chiang 
Lau Dak Kee
(N.B. Dr. Tan Seng Giaw is at present ACTING PUBLICITY SECRETARY for 
Chian Heng Kai.)
Source: New Straits Times, 17th December, 1979»
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AN ANALYSIS OF TUE D .A .P . 'S PERFORMANCE IN THE 1978 GENERAL ELECTIONS.
The D .A .P. f i e ld e d  51 c a n d id a te s  f o r  P a r lia m e n t and 126 f o r  th e  v a r io u s  
S ta t e  A ssem blies f o r  P e n in s u la r  M a lay s ia .
D is t r ib u t io n  o f D .A .P. c a n d id a te s  by ra c e  and r a c i a l  m a jo r i ty  o f c o n s ti tu e n '
c ie s  f o r  P a r lia m e n t and S ta te  
A ssem blies
Types o f 
C o n s titu en cy L evel
Race Malay C hinese
In d ia n s  
& O thers
M alay P a r i . 21 8 ( 0 ) n ( o ) 2 (0)
m a jo r i ty S "fc £L"fc 0 • 59 41(0) 15(0) 3 (0 )
C hinese P a r i . 20 _ 17(11) 3 ( 3 )
m a jo r i ty S ta t e . 46 2 (1 ) 3 7 ( 1 8 ) 7 (5 )
Mixed P a r i . 10 ! ( ° ) 5 (° ) 4 ( 1 )
S ta t e . 21 4 ( 0 ) 1 3 ( 1 ) * 4(0 )
T o ta l P a r i . 51 9 ( ° ) 3 3 ( H ) 9 (4 )
S1/ 3,1/ G • 126 4 7 ( 1 ) 65(19) 14(5)
N o te s : F ig u re s  in  b ra c k e ts  i n d i c a te  number o f s e a t s  won.
* The N .F . c a n d id a te  f o r  th e  c o n s ti tu e n c y  was d i s q u a l i f i e d .
D .A .P .V ic to r ies(P a r lia m en t)
PENANG
B u k it Merta.jam (41 ,243  )
Seow Hun Kim ( dap) 13,051
Lee Jong  Ki 1NF) 9,910
S haik  Adam 1(PAS) 4,757
M.Huss e in  ( (k ita ) 350
Tan Cheng Beel; d 4,082
T anjong (5 1 ,9 3 0 )
Wong Hoong Keat(DAP) 19,260
Dr. Ronnie Ooi (NF) 13,412
Hoo Kee P in g  
PERAK
( i ) 7,496
Ipoh  (6 3 ,4 0 8 )
Lim Cho Hock (DAP) 30,680
Kuan Peng Soon(NF) 17,771
Bu k it Bendera (55 ,860 )
P e te r  P au l Dason (DAP) 21,864 
H 'ng Hung Yong (NF) 17,954 
Oh Keng Seng (SDP) 3 ,022
J elu ton g  (6 0 ,2 4 8 )
K arpal Singh (DAP) 23,606
Lee Him (NF) 19,985
Yeap Ghim Guan (SDP) 2,401
Menglembu (6 1 ,4 3 9 )
P .P a t to  (DAP) 29,573
Lee Chan F a i (NF) 16,803
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Beruas (27,109) Batu Ga.iah (41,835)
Ting Chek Ming (DAP) 
Su Liang Yu (NF) 
Zulkiflee b. Alias 
(PAS)
9,611
9,204
1,683
Chian Heng Kai (DAP) 
Chan Kit Chee (NF)
18,752
12,471
SELANGOR
Petaling (90,6ll)
Lim Kit Siang (DAP) 
Yeoh Poh San (NF)
41,017
24,243
FEDERAL TERRITORY
Kuala Lumpur Bandar (51»726) Damansara (67,278)
Lee Lam Thye (DAP) 
Thian Oon Kin (NF) 29,5677,853
V.David (DAP) 
S.Subraraaniam (NF) 
Syed Ibrahim (PAS) 
Thinakaran (KITA)
21,461
18,2395,386
161
Sungei Be3i (79»°96)
Chan Kok Kit (DAP) 
Osman Alias Seman 40,307
Baba (PAS) 6,620
Ganga Nayar (WP) 1,731
Lim Heng Kiap (i) 3,098
Woo Hong Kong (I) 1,584
NEGRI SEMBILAN
Seremban (52,924)
Dr. Chen Man Hin (DAP) 23»057 
Dr. Gan Kong Seng (NF) 14,984
MALACCA
Kota Melaka (60,086)
Chan Teck Chan (DAP) 28,044
Chevr Hock Thye (NF) 17,844
JOHORE
Kluang (44,331)
Lee Kaw (DAP)Datuk Loh Fook Yen (NF) Abu Bakar Kathom (PAS;
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SABAH
Sandakan
Fung Ket Wing (DAP) 8,933
Vincent Wong Foo Bin (NF) 6,294
D.A.P»Victories(State Assemblies)
PENANG
Pekan Bukit Merta.jajn (18,212)
Seow Hun Kim (DAP) 8,512
Oh Teik Aun (NF) 5>451
V.Apparoo(KITA) 181
Ayer Itam (18,903)
Peter Paul Dason (DAP) 7,643 
Ghoong Ewe Leong (NF) 6,421 
Oh Keng Seng (SDP) 517
Pay a Terubong (17,803)
Chin Nyok Soo (DAP) 5>525
Lau Kok Chew (NF) 5>255
Lim Cheng Teik (SDP) 2,320
Khoo Huat Hin (i) 660
Kampong Kolam (17,638)
Bukit Gelugor (21,942)
Karpal Singh (DAP) 7>776 
Tan Gim Hwa (NF) 7>202 
Yeap Ghim Guan (SDP) 946 
A.R.Karim (i) 848
Ooi Ean Kwong (DAP) 10,239 
Mah Cheok Tatt (i) 2,225 
Lee Peik Hooi(l) 581
* This electoral victory was subsequently declared null and void on a 
successful application against disqualification by NF incumbent, Datuk
Khoo Kay Por. A bye-election was held in December 1978* The D.A.P. 
retained the seat with the following result:
Ooi Ean Kwong (DAP) 8,063 
Datuk Khoo Kay Por
(NF) 4,398
PERAK
Kelian Pauh (30,799) Gopeng (25,190)
Lim Eng Chuan (DAP) 
Dr. Ng Ah Thong (NF) 
Mai b. Mat (PAS)
13,398
9,257
770
P.Patto (DAP)
Chung Koy Fah (NF) 
Raja Idris b. Raja 
Hassan (PAS)
9,544
8,641
1,053
Kepayang (32,951) Guntong (30,457)
Lim Cho Hock (DAP) 
R.Jegathesan (NF) 
Ng Thor Fung (i)
17,848
7,414
228
Mohd. Zalleh Nakhoda 
"Itam (DAP) 
M.Singgaram (NF)
12,197
10,231
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Pasir Put eh ( 34 > 542)
Chian Heng Kai (DAP) 16,086 
Wu Lian Hwa (NF) 9 »917
Pantai Remis (16,104)
Young Heow Choo (DAP) 7>338 
Peramjik Singh (NF) 4» 338
Mohamed b. Dams (PAS) 492
Pasir Bedamar (21,503)
Thee Ah Kow (DAP) 10,164
Chin Lik Sun(NF) 5,683
SELANGOR
Serdang (16,049)
Lee Lara Thye (DAP) 6,554
Yap Pian Hon (NF) 5,813
Kuala Kubu Bahru (11,928)
Pan Su Peng (DAP) 3,202
Yap Hon Chu (1- ) 647
NEGRI SSMBILAN
Rahang (17,293)
Dr. Chen Man Hin (DAP) 8,641 
Cheah Yee Kooi (NF) 3,9°6
Sungei U.jong (16,206)
Hu Se Peng (DAP) 6,572
Chin Chan Sung (NF) 4,771
MALACCA
Tranquerah (12,056)
Chan Teck Chan (DAP) 5,188
Yoong Yong Pow (NF) 4,049
Kubu (12,739)
Lim Kit Siang (DAP) 7,239
S .K.R .M. Dorairaj (NF) 2,680
Kuala Pari (26,897)
Lim Nyit Sin (DAP) 12,787
Tan Tiew Bock (NF) 7,352
Karapar (22,299)
Lee Kak Hoi (DAP) 9,331
Lim Tong Kwai (NF) 4,320
Kaiang (15,708)
Liew Ah Kim (DAP) 6,841 
Kan Tong Fong (NF) 4,313 
Datuk Kampo Radjo(PSRM) 550 
Aman Khan (KITA) 308
Raaah (12,415)
M. Kuppusamy (DAP) 5,981
Lew Thin Poh (NF) 2,900
Durian Daun (11,304)
Yong Wee Yook (DAP) 6,122
Hee Ah Pow (NF) 2,424
Bandar Hilir (11,134)
Bernard St a Maria (DAP) 4,522 
Gan Boon Leong (NF) 3,902
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JOHORE
B andar K lu an g  (29»014)
Lee Kaw (DAP) 1 2 ,2 5 5  
Yau Kim Suan(N P) 8 ,5 1 8  
Mohd. A bdol b .
T u lo s  (PAS) 409
The D .A .P . p o l le d  664>433 v o te s  (1 8 .5 $ )  n a t i o n  w id e .
I n  P e n in s u l a r  M a la y s ia , i t s  s h a re  o f  th e  v o te s  wa3 how ever 6 5 2 ,7 3 0  (2 1 .5 6 $ )  
f o r  P a r l ia m e n t  and  502 ,286  (2 0 .2 $ )  f o r  th e  S t a t e  A sse m b lie s .
In  th e  F e d e ra l  T e r r i t o r y  o f  K u a la  Lumpur, th e  D .A .P . p o l le d  101 ,306  v o te s  
(54 .41$) f o r  th e  4 P a r l ia m e n ta r y  s e a t s  c o n te s te d .  The o th e r  s e a t  (S e ta p a k )  
was won u n c o n te s te d  by th e  N .F . (U .M .N .O .) when th e  o p p o s i t io n  c a n d id a te s  
w ere  d i s q u a l i f i e d  on n o m in a tio n  d ay .
7 D .A .P . P a r l ia m e n ta r y  and 15 S t a t e  A ssem bly c a n d id a te s  l o s t  t h e i r  
d e p o s i t s .
S o u rc e s :  I s m a i l  b . K assim , R ace , P o l i t i c s  and M o d e ra tio n : A S tudy
o f th e  M a la y s ia n  E l e c t o r a l  P ro c e s s ,  Times Books I n t e r n a ­
t i o n a l ,  S in g a p o re , 1979-
D.K .M auzy, "A V ote f o r  C o n t in u i ty :  The 1978 G e n e ra l E le c ­
t i o n s  i n  M a la y s ia " ,  A sian  S u rv e y , V o l. XIX N o .3» M arch 
1979, p p . 2 8 1 -9 6 .
M a la y s ia  -  A M onth ly  Review  o f  M a la y s ia n  A f f a i r s ,  A ugust 
1978.
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